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

The MAIN ELEVATION

(Facing South).

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On Waring's Problem

By

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Let $g(n)$ denote the least value of s required to represent every positive integer as the sum of s non-negative nth powers. Further, let $l = [(3/2)^n]$ and $j = [(4/3)^n]$ where $[x]$ denotes the integral part of x. The object of this paper is to prove the following results:—

Theorem I: $g(n) = 2^n + (3/2)^n + O(4/3)^n$.

Theorem II: When $n > n_o$ and $\{(3/2)^n\} \leqslant 1 - \dfrac{l+3}{2^n}$,

$$g(n) = 2^n + l - 2, \tag{1}$$

where $\{x\}$ denotes the fractional part of x.

Theorem III: When $n > n_0$ and $\{(3/2)^n\} \geqslant 1 - \dfrac{l}{2^n}$,

$$g(n) \geqslant 2^n + l + j - 3.$$

It is not unlikely that $\{(3/2)^n\}$ is uniformly distributed in the interval $(0, 1)$. If it is true, then (1) is true for almost all n. Further, it may be possible that when $n \geqslant n_0$, $\{(3/2)^n\} \leqslant 1 - (l+3)/2^n$. If this is proved, $g(n)$ is completely determined.

Vinogradow proved recently that

$$G(n) = O(n \log n).$$

{On Waring's problem—The Annals of Mathematics, Vol. 36, No. 2, (395—405). The proof is based on his method. (x) denotes the distance of x to the nearest integer.

1. NOTATION AND LEMMAS.

n is a positive integer. $\nu = 1/n$.

$k = [n \log (12n^2) + 5]$; $t = n^9$; $\mathfrak{f} = 4/t$.

$\sigma = n(1-\nu)^k$.

θ is a number whose modulus is less than unity. The constants in O are always independent of n.

N_o is a positive integer.

$P = [3^{-1} N_o^{\nu} + 1]$; $P_1 = [n^{\nu} P^{1-\nu}]$; $R = [P^{1-\nu/2}]$;

$R_1 = [n^{\nu} R^{1-\nu}]$; $Y = [P^{(\nu-\nu^2)/2}]$; $\tau = 2n\, 3^{n-1} P^{n-1/2}$

N is an integer lying in the interval $N_o - N_o P^{-1/4} < N \leqslant N_o$.

$$N_o \geqslant \beta \text{ where } \beta = n^{5n^{11}}. \tag{A}$$

Then we can easily verify that

$2^n P^n - N_o P^{-1/4} > P^n$; $N_o > 8\sigma \,.\, 3^{n-4} P^n$;

$$Y^n \leqslant 2^{-1}\sqrt{P}\,;\ \tau \leqslant P^n. \tag{1}$$

p is a prime.

$E\{x\}$ denotes e^x; $\eta = E\{2\pi i/q\}$.

If $q > 0$, $(a, q) = 1$, we put

$$S_{a,q} = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} E\{2\pi i a r^n/q\}\,;\ B_{a,q} = (1/q) S_{a,q}\,.$$

$$S'_{a,q} = \sum_{h} E\{2\pi i a h^n/q\}\,,\ \text{where } (h, q) = 1,\ 0 < h \leqslant q.$$

$$A_q(N) = \sum_{a}^{t} B_{a,q} \,.\, E\{-2\pi i a N/q\},$$

where a runs through all integers less than and prime to q.

$\chi = \chi_x = \chi_x(m)$ denotes the $h\{=\varphi(q)\}$ Dirichlet's characters modulus q. χ_1 is the principal character; $\bar{\chi}$ is the character conjugate to χ. $\chi' = \chi_{x'}$ denotes a special character, that is, a character such that

$$\chi_x{}^n = \chi_1 .$$

$\delta = (h, n) = (\varphi(q), n)$.

P.N. 4 refers to the paper by Hardy and Littlewood in *Mathematische Zeitschrift*. Band 12. (1920). (101—188).

P.N. 6 refers to the paper by the same authors in the same journal. Band 23. (1925). (1—38).

Lemma (1): If $\tau_x = \sum_{l=1}^{q} \eta^{al} \bar{\chi}_x(l)$, then for all q,

$$| \tau_x | \leqslant \sqrt{q}.$$

Let $$f(m) = \sum_{r=1}^{q} \chi(r) . \eta^{mr},$$

and $$g(m) = | f(m) |^2.$$

Then from page 493, Landau's Primzahlen, we have

$g(m) = | \bar{\chi}(m) f(1) |^2 = g(1)$, when $(m, q) = 1$; and $g(m) \geqslant 0$, when $(m, q) > 1$.

So $\varphi(q) g(1) \leqslant \sum_{m=0}^{q-1} g(m) = q \sum_{n} \chi(nn')$ (page 494)

$$= q\varphi(q).$$

Hence $g(1) \leqslant q$.

Therefore, when $(m, q) = 1$, we have

$$g(m) \leqslant q.$$

So $| \tau_{\bar{\chi}} | = | f(a) | \leqslant \sqrt{q}$.

Lemma (2): The number of special characters is δ.

This is lemma 7 in P. N. 4.

Lemma (3): $S'_{a,q} = \sum_{l=0}^{q-1} \eta^{al} \sum_{\chi'} \bar{\chi}_{\chi'}(l)$.

This is lemma 10 in P. N. 4.

Lemma (4): $\sum_{l} \eta^{al} \bar{\chi}_1(l) = 0$, when $\lambda > 1$

$= -1$, when $\lambda = 1$,

where $q = p^{\lambda}$.

See page 167 in P. N. 4.

Lemma (5): When $q = p^{\lambda}$, $\lambda \leqslant n$,

$$| S_{a,q} | \leqslant p^{\lambda-1} + np^{\lambda/2}.$$

Since $\lambda \leqslant n$,

$$S_{a,q} = p^{\lambda-1} + S'_{a,q}$$

$$= p^{\lambda-1} + \sum_{l} \eta^{al} \bar{\chi}_1(l) + \sum_{l} \eta^{al} \sum_{\chi'} \bar{\chi}_{\chi'}(l),$$

where in the last sum the principal character is excluded from summation and l runs through $0, 1, \ldots, q-1$.

So from lemmas (2), (4), the present one follows.

Lemma (6): If $\lambda \leqslant n$, $p^{\lambda} \geqslant (4n)^{2n/(n-2)}$,

$$| B_{a,p^{\lambda}} | \leqslant p^{-\lambda\nu/2}.$$

With the help of lemma (5), this can be easily verified.

Lemma (7): $| B_{a,q} | \leqslant 1 - 1/(4q^4)$, when $q \geqslant 3$.

$$| S_{a,q} |^2 = \left(\sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \cos \frac{2\pi a}{q} r^n \right)^2 + \left(\sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sin \frac{2\pi a}{q} r^n \right)^2$$

$$= \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sum_{s=0}^{q-1} \left\{ \cos \frac{2\pi a}{q} r^n \cos \frac{2\pi a}{q} s^n + \sin \frac{2\pi a}{q} r^n \sin \frac{2\pi a}{q} s^n \right\}$$

$$= \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sum_{s=0}^{q-1} \cos \frac{2\pi a}{q} (r^n - s^n)$$

$\leqslant q^2 - 2 + 2\,|\cos(\pi/q)|$; {for $(a, q) = 1$.}

$\leqslant q^2 - 2 + 2[(1 - (1/4q^2)]$; {for $q \geqslant 3$.}

$< [q - 1/(4q^3)]^2$.

So the lemma follows.

Lemma (8): When $n > n_o$, $q \leqslant (4n)^{2n/(n-2)}$,

$$|\,B_{a\,,\,q}\,|^t \leqslant 1/q^3.$$

This follows from lemma (7); for $t = n^9$.

Lemma (9): $|\,B_{a\,,\,q}\,|^t \leqslant 1/q^3$.

Let $\lambda = \alpha n + \mu$, $0 < \mu \leqslant n$.

Then from the proof of lemma (3) in P.N. 6, whether p divides n or not,

$$|\,B_{a\,,\,p^\lambda}\,| \leqslant 1/p^{\alpha t}\,|\,B_{a\,,\,p^\mu}\,|^t \leqslant 1/p^{\alpha t} \,.\, 1/p^{3\mu} \leqslant 1/p^{3\lambda};$$

[(from lemmas (6), (8).

Since, when $(m, k) = 1$,

$$B_{a\,,\,m} \times B_{a\,,\,k} = B_{a\,,\,km}\,,$$

from the above the lemma follows.

Lemma (10): $\sum\limits_{q=1}^{\sqrt{P}} A_q(N) \geqslant \frac{1}{2}$.

$$\left|\,\sum_{q=1}^{\sqrt{P}} A_q(N) - 1\,\right| \leqslant \sum_{q=3}^{\sqrt{P}} |\,A_q(N)\,|;$$

for $A_2(N) = 0$, $A_1(N) = 1$

$\leqslant \Sigma\,\varphi(q)/q^3$; from lemma (9)

$\leqslant 1/q^2 < \frac{1}{2}$.

Lemma (11): $|\,B_{a\,,\,q}\,| \leqslant n/q^f$.

(*a*) Let $p|n$, $\lambda = \alpha n + \mu$, $0 < \mu \leqslant n$.

Then from (3.47) in P. N. 6,

$$| B_{a,q} | = q^{-\nu} \, | B_{a,p^\mu} | \, p^{\mu\nu} \leqslant q^{-\nu} \prod_{p|n} p \leqslant nq^{-\nu}.$$

(b) Let p do not divide n. Then from 3.44, 3.45, in P. N. 6,

$$| B_{a,q} | \leqslant (q_2{}^n Q)^{-\nu} B_{a,q_1} \leqslant (q_2{}^n Q)^{-\nu} \prod_{p} | B_{a,p} |$$

But $| B_{a,p} | \leqslant n/\sqrt{p} \leqslant p^{-\nu}$, provided $p > n^{2n/(n-2)}$

So $$| B_{a,q} | \leqslant (q_2{}^n Q)^{-\nu} \prod_{p > n^{2n/(n-2)}} \{1/p^\nu\}$$

$$\leqslant (q_2{}^n Q)^{-\nu} . 2/q_1{}^f \leqslant 2/q^f ;$$

for $\prod_{p \leqslant n^{2n/(n-2)}} 1 \leqslant 2/(\prod_{p \leqslant n} p)^f$.

From (a) and (b) the lemma follows; for $t = n^9$ and so $f < \nu$.

Lemma (12): If every integer M for which $f < M \leqslant h$ is a sum of $s - 1$. nth powers $\geqslant 0$, and if m is the greatest integer such that

$$(m+1)^n - m^n < h - f,$$

then every integer M in the interval $[f, h + (m+1)^n]$ is a sum of s, nth powers $\geqslant 0$.

This is proved by L. E. Dickson: *Proof of a Waring theorem on fifth powers*, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 37. (1931). (549—553).

Lemma (13): If m is any positive integer,

$$N = M + a,$$

where M is a sum of $(2 \log N/\log 2) [m/(m-1)]^n$ nth powers and

$$0 \leqslant a \leqslant m^n.$$

Let $b_1 = [(N/2)^\nu]$, $N = q_1 b_1{}^n + r_1$, where $q_1 = [N/b_1{}^n]$, $r_1 < b_1{}^n$. Then $r_1 \leqslant N/2$.

Put $b_2 = [(r_1/2)^\nu]$, $r_1 = q_2 b_2{}^n + r_2$, where $q_2 = [r_1/b_2{}^n]$, $r_2 < b_2$. So $r_2 \leqslant N/2^2$.

Put $b_3 = [(r_2/2)^\nu]$ and so on.

Then $N = q_1 b_1^n + \dots\dots + q_l b_l^n + r_{l+1}$, where $r_l \leqslant N/2^l$, $b_l = [(r_{l-1}/2)^{\nu}]$, $q_l = [r_{l-1}/b_l^n]$.

Choose l so that

$$r_{l-1} \geqslant 2 \,.\, m^n > r_l \,.$$

Then $\qquad r_{l+1} \leqslant m^n.$

Now
$$\begin{aligned} q_l &\leqslant r_{l-1}/[(r_{l-1}/2)^{\nu}]^n \leqslant r_{l-1}/\{(r_{l-1}/2)^{\nu} - 1\}^n \\ &= 2/\{1 - (2/r_{l-1})^{\nu}\}^n \\ &\leqslant 2/\{1 - (2/2m)^{\nu}\}^n = 2\{m/(m-1)\}^n . \end{aligned}$$

Further $\qquad q_k \leqslant 2/\{1 - (2/r_{l-1})^{\nu}\}^n$, for $k = 1, 2, \dots l$.

So $q_1 + q_2 + \dots + q_l \leqslant 2l\{m/(m-1)\}^n$.

Now $N/2^{l-1} \geqslant r_l > 2 \,.\, m^n$.

So $l < (\log N)/\log 2$.

Thus the lemma follows.

Lemma (14): If every positive integer M such that $F < M \leqslant F + 2^n$, is the sum of s, nth powers, then every positive integer in the interval (F, β) is the sum of

$$s + (3/2)^n + (4/3)^n + 2(5/4)^n - 3,$$

nth powers, provided $n > n_o$.

Starting from the interval $(F, F + 2^n)$, by the repeated application of lemma (12) we get that every positive integer in the interval $(F, F + m^n)$ is the sum of

$$s + (3/2)^n + \dots + (m/m-1)^n$$

nth powers.

Now from lemma (13),

$$N = q_1 b_1^n + \dots + q_l b_l^n + r_{l+1} \,.$$

Since $q_1 + \dots + q_l \leqslant (2 \log N/\log 2)\,(m/m-1)^n$

we can put

$$N = \sum_{r=1}^{u} h_r^n + a$$

where $u \leqslant (2 \log N / \log 2)\,(m/m-1)^n$ and $F < a \leqslant F + m^n$.

{If $r_{l+1} < F$, add some of the nth powers $b_1^n, \ldots, b_l^n$, etc.}

Now $\beta = n^{5n^{11}}$.

So

$$(6/5)^n + (7/6)^n + \;\ldots\; + (m/m-1)^n + \frac{2 \log \beta}{\log 2}(m/m-1)^n$$

$$< (5/4)^n - 2, \text{ when } n > n_o.$$

and a requires at most $s + (3/2)^n + \;\ldots\; + (m/m-1)^n$ nth powers.

So the lemma follows.

Lemma (15): Let $3^n = l \,.\, 2^n + r$. and $n > n_o$.

If $(4/3)^n + 2\,(5/4)^n \leqslant r \leqslant 2^n - (3/2)^n - (4/3)^n - 2\,(5/4)^n$, every integer $\leqslant \beta$ is the sum of

$$2^n + l - 2$$

nth powers.

Now every integer $\leqslant l \,.\, 2^n$ is the sum of $2^n + l - 2$, nth powers. In virtue of the hypothesis every integer between $l \,.\, 2^n$ and $(l+1)\,2^n$ requires at most

$$2^n - (4/3)^n - 2\,(5/4)^n$$

nth powers.

From this and lemma (14), the present lemma follows.

Lemma (16): If $r \leqslant (4/3)^n + 2\,(5/4)^n$, every integer $\leqslant \beta$, is the sum of

$$2^n + l - 2$$

nth powers.

It can be easily verified that every integer in $(ul2^n, u3^n)$ is the sum of $u\,(l + r) - 1$, nth powers and every integer in $[u3^n, (ul+1)\,2^n]$ is the sum of $2^n - u\,(r-1) - 1$, nth powers, provided $(ul+1)\,2^n > u3^n$.

Now $u(l+r)-1$ and $2^n - u(r-1) - 1$ are each less than $2^n - (4/3)^n - 2(5/4)^n$, provided $\{1/(r-1)\}(4/3)^n + \{2/(r-1)\}(5/4)^n < u < \{1/(l+r)\}\{2^n - (4/3)^n - 2(5/4)^n\}$.

Now the above interval is greater than 1, when $r \geqslant 3$.

So u has an integral value and $(ul+1)2^n > u3^n$.

Hence when $r \geqslant 3$, every integer in the interval $[ul2^n, (ul+1)2^n]$ is the sum of

$$2^n - (4/3)^n - 2(5/4)^n$$

nth powers.

Obviously $r \neq 2$.

Let $\quad r = 1$

So $\quad 3^n \equiv 1 \,(\text{mod}\,.\, 2^n)$

Hence $\quad n \equiv 0 \,(\text{mod}\,.\, 2^{n-2})$

So $\quad n = 1, 2, 3, 4.$

Hence when $n > n_o$, from lemma (14), the present lemma follows.

Lemma (17): Let

$$2^n - (3/2)^n - (4/3)^n - 2(5/4)^n \leqslant r \leqslant 2^n - (l+3)$$

Then every integer $\leqslant \beta$ is the sum of $2^n + l - 2$, nth powers.

Now we can verify that every integer in the interval $[(ul+u-1)2^n, u3^n]$ is the sum of $2^n - u(2^n - l - r - 1) - 2$, nth powers; and every integer in the interval $[u3^n, (ul+u)2^n]$ is the sum of $u(2^n - r + 1) - 1$, nth powers.

Now we can verify that there is an integer u such that $2^n - u(2^n - l - r - 1) - 2$ and $u(2^n - r + 1) - 1$ are each less than $2^n - (4/3)^n - 2(5/4)^n$, when $n > n_o$ and $(ul+u-1)2^n < u3^n < (ul+u)2^n$.

Hence from lemma (14), every integer in $[(ul+u-1)2^n, \beta]$ is the sum of $2^n + l - 2$ nth powers.

Further, it can be verified that this is true for every integer less than $(ul+u-1)2^n$ also, for $u \leqslant (4/3)^n$. For every integer in $[l\,.\,2^n, (l+1)2^n]$ requires at most $2^n - 3$, nth powers. So the lemma follows.

Lemma (18): If $r \leqslant 2^n - (l+3)$, where $3^n = l2^n + r$, then every integer less than β and greater than $l \, . \, 2^n$ is the sum of $2^n + l - 2$ nth powers.

This follows from lemmas (15), (16), (17).

Lemma (19): If $b < 2^{(5/4)^n}$, then b requires at most $2^n + (3/2)^n + 0\,(4/3)^n$, nth powers.

In lemma (13), put $b = \mathrm{N}$, $m = 17$. Then

$$b = \mathrm{M} + a,$$

$$a \leqslant 17^n .$$

But from lemma (12), a is the sum of at most

$$2^n + (3/2)^n + \;.\;.\;.\; + (17/16)^n, \; n\text{th powers.}$$

But $$(4/3)^n + \;.\;.\;.\; + (17/16)^n = 0\,(4/3)^n .$$

$$(2 \log \mathrm{N}/\log 2)\;(17/16)^n \leqslant 2\,(5/4)^n\;(17/16)^n = 0\,(4/3)^n .$$

Hence the lemma follows.

Lemma (20): If $0 \leqslant f'(t) \leqslant 1/2$, $f''(t) \geqslant 0$, $g \leqslant t \leqslant h$, then

$$\sum_{t>g}^{h} \mathrm{E}\{\pm 2\pi i f(\mathbf{t})\} = \int_g^h \mathrm{E}\,\{\pm 2\pi i f(t)\}\,dt + 5\theta$$

Lemma (21): Let λ be real but not an integer and $\mathrm{G} < \mathrm{H}$. Then

$$\left| \sum_{x>\mathrm{G}}^{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{E}\,\{2\pi i \lambda x\} \right| < 1/2\{\lambda\} .$$

These are lemmas C, D in Vinogradow's paper. Hereafter I closely follow his paper. c is a constant independent of n but different on different occasions.

2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE NUMBERS u.

We take a set of numbers

$$s_1 = 1^n, 2^n, \;.\;.\;.\;, \mathrm{P}_1{}^n .$$

The difference of two successive values of s_1 is

$$s_1'' - s_1' \leqslant P_1^n - (P_1 - 1)^n < nP_1^{n(1-\nu)} .$$

Between every pair of successive numbers s_1' and s_1'', we introduce a new set of numbers of the form $s_1' + w^n$, where w is an integer and

$$0 < w < (s_1'' - s_1')^{\nu} .$$

Thus we get a new set s_2. The difference of two successive numbers of s_2 does not exceed

$$n^{1+(1-\nu)} P_1^{n(1-\nu)^2} .$$

Repeating this process, we obtain sets s_3, s_4, and so on. Let ξ denote a typical number of s_{k-1} and X the number of ξ's in s_{k-1}. The difference of two successive values of ξ is less than

$$n^{1+(1-\nu)+\,.\,.+(1-\nu)^{k-2}} . P_1^{n(1-\nu)^{k-1}} < n^n P_1^{n(1-\nu)^{k-1}}$$

$$\leqslant n^{n+1} P^{\sigma} .$$

$$P_1 > P^{1-\nu} , \text{ so } P_1^n > P^{n-1} .$$

Hence $\quad X > P^{n-1-\sigma}/n^{n+1}$.

Now we form a set of numbers u

$$u = \xi + v^n$$

where ξ runs over the numbers in s_{k-1} and

$$v = P, P+1, \ . \ . \ . \ , 2P - 1.$$

It is easy to see that the numbers u are all different and

$$P^n < u < 2^n P^n .$$

In the same way as we formed by means of P, P_1, the sets of numbers ξ, v, u, we form by means of R, R_1, the sets ξ_1, u_1, v_1. Let X_1 denote the number ξ_1. Then

$$X_1 > P^{(1-\nu/2)(n-1-\sigma)}/n^{n+1} .$$

3. An Integral.

Let y be an integer $0 < y \leqslant Y$.

We introduce the sums depending on α.

$$T = \sum_{x=1}^{P} E(2\pi i \alpha x^n);$$

$$T_1 = \sum_{x=1}^{3P} E(2\pi i \alpha x^n);$$

$$V = \sum_{v} E(2\pi i \alpha v^n);$$

$$V_y = \sum_{v_1} E(2\pi i \alpha y^n v_1{}^n);$$

$$S = \sum_{\xi} E(2\pi i \alpha \xi);$$

$$S_y = \sum_{\xi_1} E(2\pi i y^n \xi_1);$$

and the integral.

$$I_{y,N} = \int_0^1 T^{t-3}\, T_1\, V^2 S^2 V_y S_y E(-2\pi i \alpha N)\, d\alpha,$$

where for the interval of integration, we can substitute

$$-\tau^{-1} \leqslant \alpha \leqslant 1 - \tau^{-1}.$$

For every α in the last interval, we have

$$\alpha = (a/q) + z; \ (a, q) = 1; \ 0 < q < r; \ |z| \leqslant 1/q^{\tau}. \tag{2}$$

We divide the interval of integration into intervals of two classes. In the first class we put the intervals with

$$\alpha = (a/q) + z; \ (a, q) = 1; \ 0 < q \leqslant \sqrt{P}; \ -r^{-1} \leqslant z \leqslant r^{-1};$$

and in the second class the remaining intervals. The intervals in the first class do not overlap.

Corresponding to this division of the interval of integration, the integral is represented as the sum of two terms

$$I_{y,N} = H_{y,1} + H_{y,2}.$$

4. ASYMPTOTIC FORMULA FOR $H_{y,1}$.

Now we introduce the integrals

$$\varphi = \int_0^P E(2\pi i z x^n)\, dx;$$

$$\varphi_1 = \int_0^{3P} E(2\pi i z x^n)\, dx\,;$$

$$\psi = \int_P^{2P} E(2\pi i z x^n)\, dx\,;$$

$$\psi_y = \int_R^{2R} E(2\pi i z y^n x^n)\, dx\,.$$

In T, for x, we put

$$x = tq + r,\ r = 0, 1, \ldots, q-1,$$

where for every r, t takes all integral values satisfying the condition

$$0 < qt + r \leqslant P.$$

So $$T = \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} \sum_t E\{2\pi i(a/q + z)(qt+r)^n\}$$

$$= \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} E\{2\pi i a r^n/q\}\,.\,K_r\,;$$

where $$K_r = \sum_t E\{2\pi i z(qt+r)^n\}\,.$$

The function $f(t) = |z|(qt+r)^n$ satisfies in the interval of (3) the conditions of lemma (20).

So $$K_r = \int_{r/q}^{(P-r)/q} E\{2\pi i z(qt+r)^n\}\, dt + O(1)$$

$$= \varphi/q + O(1).$$

Hence

$$T = \varphi B_{a,q} + O(q) \tag{4}$$

Similarly we get

$$T_1 = \varphi_1 B_{a,q} + O(q) \tag{5}$$

$$V = \psi B_{a,q} + O(q). \tag{6}$$

and $$V_y = (\psi_y/q) \sum_{r=0}^{q-1} E(2\pi i a y^n r^n/q) + O(q).$$

But $$\sum_{v_1} E(2\pi i a y^n v_1{}^n/q) = (R/q) \sum_r E(2\pi i a y^n r^n/q) + O(q).$$

Hence

$$V_y = (\psi_y/q) \sum_{v_1} E(2\pi i a y^n v_1{}^n/q) + O(q). \tag{7}$$

Further

$$S = \sum_{\xi} E(2\pi i a \xi/q) + O(n \mid z \mid XP^{n-1}) \tag{8}$$

$$S_y = \sum_{\xi_1} E(2\pi i a y^n \xi_1/q) + O(n \mid z \mid X_1 P^{n-1}) \tag{9}$$

$$E(-2\pi i \alpha N) = E\{-2\pi i a N/q - 2\pi i z N_o\} + O(3^n \mid z \mid P^{n-1/4}); \tag{10}$$

$$\text{for } N_o - N_1 < N_o P^{-1/4} < 3^n P^{n-1/4}.$$

We put

$$Z = P, \text{ if } \mid z \mid \leqslant P^{-n} \tag{11}$$
$$Z = \mid z \mid^{-\nu}, \text{ if } \mid z \mid \geqslant P^{-n}.$$

Then we can verify that

$$\varphi = O(Z);\ \varphi_1 = O(Z);\ \psi = O(Z).$$

Let $T' = \varphi B_{a,q}$; $A = nZq^{-f}$; $r_1 = n^{-1} Z^{-1} q^{1+f}$.

With the help of lemma (11), it is easy to see that

$$T' = O(A).$$

Further since $N_o > \beta$, $q \leqslant \sqrt{P}$, we can verify that

$$tr_1 = O(P^{-1/4}) = o(1).$$

So $T^{t-3} = \{T' + O(q)\}^{t-3} = \{T' + O(Ar_1)\}^{t-3}$

$$= T'^{\,t-3} + O\{{}_{t-3}C_1 (cT')^{t-4} Ar_1 + {}_{t-3}C_2 (cT')^{t-5} A^2 r_1{}^2 + \dots\}$$
$$= T'^{\,t-3} + O(c^{t-3} A^{t-3})\{tr_1 + t^2 r_1{}^2/2! + \dots\}$$
$$= T'^{\,t-3} + O(c^t A^{t-3} tr_1),$$

where c is the constant in the O of $O(Ar_1)$, which is independent of n.

Now with the help of the above result and (5)—(10), we can verify that

$$T^{t-3} T_1 V^2 S^2 V_y S_y e^{-2\pi i \alpha N} = F_y E_y$$
$$+ O(c^t X^2 X_1 R A^t P^{-1/4}) \{P^n \mid z \mid + 1\}, \tag{12}$$

where F_y depends only on z, y, n and N_0 and

$$E_y = \overset{t}{B}_{a\,,\,q}(\sum_{\xi} e^{2\pi i (a/q)\xi})^2 \sum_{u_1} e^{2\pi i (a/q) y^n u_1} \,.\, e^{-2\pi i (a/q) N} \tag{13}$$

where $|E_y| = O(X^2 X_1 R q^{-3})$, [from lemma (9)

Now integrate (12) with respect to z between the limits $z = -\tau^{-1}$ and $z = \tau^{-1}$. Then the part of $H_{y\,,\,1}$ corresponding to any fixed a and q is

$$Q_y E_y + L,$$

where Q_y depends only on y, n and N_0. Now

$$L = O[c^t q^{-4} n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{-1/4} \int_0^{\tau^{-1}} Z^t (P^n |z| + 1)\, dz]$$

$$= O(c^t q^{-4} n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{-1/4}) \{\int_0^{P^{-n}} P^t dz + \int_{P^{-n}}^{\tau^{-1}} |z|^{1-tv} dz\}$$

$$= O(c^t n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n-1/4} \,.\, q^{-4}).$$

So $\displaystyle\sum_{q=1}^{\sqrt{P}} \sum_{(a\,,\,q)=1} L = O(c^t n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n-1/4})$.

Hence

$$H_{y\,,\,1} = Q_y D_y + O(c^t n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n-1/4});$$

$$D_y = \sum_{q=1}^{\sqrt{P}} \sum_a E_y\,. \tag{14}$$

5. ESTIMATION OF Q_y.

We sum up the equality

$$I_{y\,,\,N} = H_{y\,,\,1} + H_{y\,,\,2} \tag{15}$$

of § 3 for all values of N satisfying the condition

$$N_0 - N_0 P^{-1/4} < N \leqslant N_0\,.$$

The result of summation of the left side is equal to the number of solutions for x and N_1 of the system of inequalities

$$N_1 - N_0 P^{-1/4} < x^n \leqslant N_1\,, \tag{16}$$

where $N_1 = N_o - x_1^n - x_2^n - \ . \ . \ . \ - x_{t-3}^n - u - u' - y^n u_1$,
and x runs over the values 1, 2, . . . , 3P ; every x_i runs over the set 1, 2, . . . , P ; u, u_1 are the values described in § 2, and u' takes on the same values as u but independent of u.

Now with the help of (1), if $t < 3^n/2$, we can easily verify that

$$N_1 - N_o P^{-1/4} > P^n .$$

If $n > n_o$, $t < 3^n/2$. So the above is satisfied when $n > n_o$. We assume that $n > n_o$.

The number of solutions of (16) for every given N_1 is

$$N_1^{\nu} - (N_1 - N_o P^{-1/4})^{\nu} + O(1).$$

Since $N_o \geqslant \beta$,

$$N_1^{\nu} - (N_1 - N_o P^{-1/4})^{\nu} > 2P^{1-1/4}/n .$$

So the whole number of solutions of (16) is

$$\geqslant (1/n) X^2 X_1 R P^{t-1/4} .$$

When $q = 1$, that part of $H_{y,1}$ is

$$Q_y X^2 X_1 R.$$

So when $q = 1$

$$\sum_N H_{y,1} = Q_y X^2 X_1 R \{N_o P^{-1/4} + O(1)\} .$$

When $q \geqslant 2$, from lemma (16)

$$\left| \sum_N E(-2\pi i a N/q) \right| < \frac{1}{2(a/q)} = q/2a.$$

So by (13), when $q \geqslant 2$

$$\sum_N H_{y,1} = O\{Q_y X^2 X_1 R \sum_{q=2}^{\sqrt{P}} q^{-3} \sum_a q/2a\}$$

$$= O(Q_y X^2 X_1 R).$$

Hence for all q, $0 < q \leqslant \sqrt{P}$.

$$\sum_N H_{y,1} = Q_y X^2 X_1 R\{N_o P^{-1/4} + O(1)\} .$$

In the intervals of the second class

$$\alpha \geqslant \tau^{-1} \geqslant 1/(2n3^{n-1}\mathrm{P}^{n-\frac{1}{2}}).$$

So $\quad |\Sigma\, e^{-2\pi i\alpha \mathrm{N}}| < \dfrac{1}{2(\alpha)} = \mathrm{O}(n3^n\,\mathrm{P}^{n-\frac{1}{2}}).$

Hence

$$\sum_{\mathrm{N}} \mathrm{H}_{y,\,\mathrm{N}} = \mathrm{O}(\mathrm{P}^{t-2}\,\mathrm{X}_1\mathrm{R}n\,.\,3^n\,\mathrm{P}^{n-\frac{1}{2}})\ {}_0\!\int^1 \sum_u \sum_{u'} e^{2i\pi\alpha(u-u')}\,d\alpha$$

$$= \mathrm{O}(n\,.\,3^n\,\mathrm{P}^{n+t-\frac{3}{2}}\,\mathrm{X}\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}).$$

Hence

$$\mathrm{Q}_y\,\mathrm{X}^2\,\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}\,\{\mathrm{N}_0\,\mathrm{P}^{-\frac{1}{4}} + \mathrm{O}(1)\} = \sum_{\mathrm{N}} \mathrm{H}_{y\,,\,1}$$

$$= \sum_{\mathrm{N}} \{\mathrm{I}_{y\,,\,\mathrm{N}} - \mathrm{H}_{y\,,\,2}\}$$

$$\geqslant (1/n)\,\mathrm{X}^2\,\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}\mathrm{P}^{t-\frac{1}{4}} + \mathrm{O}(n\,.\,3^n\,\mathrm{P}^{n+t-\frac{3}{2}}\,\mathrm{X}\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}).$$

Since $\mathrm{N}_0 > \beta$, $k = [\log(12n^2) + 1]$

$$n\,.\,3^n\,\mathrm{P}^{n+t-\frac{3}{2}}\,\mathrm{X}\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R} = o(1/n\,\mathrm{X}^2\,\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}\mathrm{P}^{t-\frac{1}{4}}).$$

Hence when $n > n_1 > n_0$,

$$\mathrm{Q}_y\,\mathrm{X}^2\,\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}\mathrm{N}_0\,\mathrm{P}^{-\frac{1}{4}} > (c/n)\,\mathrm{X}^2\,\mathrm{X}_1\,\mathrm{R}\mathrm{P}^{t-\frac{1}{4}}$$

and so

$$\mathrm{Q}_y > (c/n)\,\mathrm{P}^t\,\mathrm{N}_0^{-1} > c\,.\,\mathrm{P}^{t-n}/n3^n. \tag{17}$$

6. ESTIMATION OF D_y.

It follows from the formula (13) that

$$\mathrm{E}_y = \sum_{\mathrm{N}_2} \mathrm{E}(-\,2\pi i a \mathrm{N}_2/q)\,\mathrm{B}^t_{a\,,\,q}$$

where $\qquad \mathrm{N}_2 = \mathrm{N} - \xi - \xi_1 - y^n u_1\,;$

Therefore $\quad \mathrm{D}_y = \sum_{\mathrm{N}_2} \sum_{q=1}^{\sqrt{\mathrm{P}}} \mathrm{A}_q(\mathrm{N}_2)$

and by lemma (10)

$$D_y \geqslant \tfrac{1}{2} N_2 = \tfrac{1}{2} X^2 X_1 R. \tag{18}$$

Therefore from (17), (18)

$$Q_y D_y > c X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n}/n3^n.$$

Since $N > \beta$, when $n > n_2$, we can verify that

$$c^t n^t X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n-\frac{1}{4}} = o\{X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n}/n3^n\}.$$

So from the above and (14), we get that

$$H_{y,1} > c X^2 X_1 RP^{t-n}/n3^n. \tag{19}$$

7. THE FUNDAMENTAL INTEGRAL.

Now we put $N = N_o$ and consider the integral

$$I_{N_o} = \sum_{y=1}^{Y} I_{y,N_o} = \int_0^1 T^{t-3} T_1 V^2 S^2 \sum_y V_y S_y E(-2\pi i\alpha N_o)\, d\alpha.$$

By dividing the interval of integration into two classes as in § 3, we write

$$I_{N_o} = H_1 + H_2. \tag{20}$$

From (19), we have

$$H_1 = \sum_y H_{y,1} > c.X^2 X_1 YRP^{t-n}/n3^n. \tag{21}$$

8. ESTIMATION OF H_2.

In the intervals of the second class

$$\sqrt{P} < q \leqslant \tau = 2n3^{n-1} P^{n-\frac{1}{2}};\ Y < (q/2)^{\nu}.$$

So

$$\sum_y V_y S_y = \sum_y \sum_{u_1} E(2\pi i\alpha y^n u_1)$$

$$\leqslant \sum_{u_1} \left| \sum_y E(2\pi i\alpha y^n u_1) \right|$$

$$\leqslant \sqrt{\{X_1 R \sum_x \left| \sum_y E(2\pi i\alpha y^n x)\right|^2\}},\ x \leqslant 2^n R^n$$

$$\leqslant \sqrt{\{X_1 R \sum_{y=1}^{Y} \sum_{y_1=1}^{Y} \big| \sum_{\substack{x \\ x \leqslant 2^n R^n}} E[2\pi i a x (y^n - y_1^n)] \big| \}},$$

$$= \sqrt{\{X_1 R (S_1 + S_2)\}},$$

where S_1 represents the coefficient of $X_1 R$ when $y^n \equiv y_1^n \pmod{q}$ and S_2 the other coefficient.

Now obviously

$$S_1 = 2^n R^n Y.$$

Now if $t = y^n - y_1^n \neq 0$, then $|t| < q/2$, $(a, q) = 1$.

Since $y \leqslant Y$ and $y_1 \leqslant Y$, when t is fixed, t cannot be represented in the above form $(y^n - y_1^n)$ more than Y ways. Further, since $|t| < q/2$, $(a, q) = 1$, if $at \equiv s \pmod{q}$, where $1 \leqslant s \leqslant q - 1$, then s is different for different values of t. So from lemma (16),

$$S_2 \leqslant \sum_{y} \sum_{y_1} \frac{1}{2(\alpha t)^{-1}}, t = y^n - y_1^n \neq 0,$$

$$\leqslant (Y/2) \sum_{t \leqslant Y^n} \left(\frac{at}{q} + \frac{\theta t}{q\tau}\right)^{-1}$$

$$\leqslant (Y/2) \sum \left(\frac{s}{q} + \frac{\theta}{2q}\right)^{-1} \qquad \text{(at most } Y^n \text{ terms)}$$

$$\leqslant Yq \sum {}^1/s \qquad (\quad " \quad " \quad)$$

$$\leqslant Yq \sum_{s \leqslant Y^n} {}^1/s$$

$$\leqslant Yq (n \log Y + 1)$$

$$\leqslant Y\, 2n 3^{n-1} P^{n-1/2} (n \log Y + 1)$$

Since

$$N_o > \beta,\ n \log Y + 1 < P^{1/2n^2}.$$

So $S_2 \leqslant Y n 3^n P^{n - 1/2 + (1/2n^2)}$.

Hence

$$S_1 + S_2 \leqslant R\,\{2^n Y R^{n-1} + [Y \,.\, n \,.\, 3^n P^{n-1/2 + (1/2n^2)}]/R\}$$

$$< R \,.\, 2n \,.\, 3^n P^{n - 3/2 + (1/n)}.$$

Therefore

$$\Sigma V_y S_y \leqslant R\sqrt{X_1}\sqrt{2n}\,.\,3^{n/2}\ P^{(n/2)-3/4+(1/2n)}$$

$$< c^n R\sqrt{X_1}\ P^{(n/2)-3/4+(1/2n)}$$

So $H_2 < P^{t-2} c^n R\sqrt{X_1} P^{(n/2)-3/4+(1/2n)} \int_0^1 \sum_u \sum_{u'} e^{2\pi i(u-u')\alpha}\, d\alpha$

$$< c^n X R\sqrt{X_1} P^{(n/2)-7/4+t+(1/2n)}\,.$$

Since $N_o > \beta$, and $k = [\log(12n^2)+5]$, by making use of results in §2, it can be verified that when $n > n_3$, $n_3 > n_0, n_1, n_2$,

$$c^n X R\sqrt{X_1} P^{(n/2)-7/4+t+(1/2n)} = o\,\{X^2 X_1 Y R P^{t-n}/n3^n\}\,.$$

So $H_2 = o(H_1)$. (22)

9. PROOF OF THEOREM I:—

From (20), (21), (22), when $N_o \geqslant \beta$, and $n > n_3$,

$$I_{N_o} > (c/n3^n)\,X^2 X_1 Y R P^{t-n} > 0\,.$$

But I_{N_o} is the number of representations of N_o in the form

$$N_o = x^n + x_1^n + \ .\ .\ .\ + x_{t-3}^n + u + u' + y^n u_1\,,$$

where $x, x_1, \ldots, x_{t-3}, u, u', u_1, y$ run over the set of numbers we have already considered.

The right hand side of the above equality is a sum of

$$t - 2 + 3k < 2\,.\,n^9 < (4/3)^n,\ n > n_4\,,$$

terms of the type h^n, $h \geqslant 0$.

Hence when $N_o \geqslant \beta$, $n > n_5$, where $n_5 > n_3, n_4$. (23)

N_o is a sum of $O(4/3)^n$, nth powers.

Now when $n > n_6$,

$$2^{(5/4)^n} > n^{5n^{11}} = \beta\,. \qquad (24)$$

Let $n_7 > n_6, n_5$, etc.

Then from (24) and lemma (19), when $n > n_7$

Every positive integer less than β is the sum of (25)

$$2^n + (3/2)^n + O(4/3)^n,$$

nth powers.

From (23) and (25) we arrive at the result that

$$g(n) \leqslant 2^n + (3/2)^n + O(4/3)^n. \tag{26}$$

But we know that

$$g(n) \geqslant 2^n + (3/2)^n + O(1).$$

From (25), (26), we obtain theorem I.

10. PROOF OF THEOREM II :—

From (23), when $n > n_0$ and $N \geqslant \beta$, N is the sum of $O(4/3)^n$, nth powers.

From lemma (18), if $l \cdot 2^n \leqslant N \leqslant \beta$, then N is the sum of

$$2^n + l - 2$$

nth powers.

If $N \leqslant l \cdot 2^n$, N is the sum of $2^n + l - 2$ nth powers.

If $N = l \cdot 2^n - 1$, N requires exactly $2^n + l - 2$, nth powers.

$$O(4/3)^n \leqslant 2^n, \; n > n_0.$$

From all these the theorem follows.

11. PROOF OF THEOREM III :—

Let $N = (j-1)3^n + l \cdot 2^n - 1$.

Now $N < 4^n$.

So N can be made up of 1, 2^n and 3^n alone.

Let us put

$$N = s \cdot 3^n + M,$$

where $$\begin{aligned} M &= (j-s-1)3^n + l\,.\,2^n - 1 \\ &= (j-s-1)\,\{l\,.\,2^n + r\} + l\,.\,2^n - 1 \\ &= (j-s)\,l\,.\,2^n + r\,(j-s-1) - 1. \end{aligned}$$

Let $r = 2^n - m$. Then from the hypothesis

$$m \leqslant l.$$

So $r\,(j-s-1) - 1 = 2^n\,(j-s-2) + 2^n - m\,(j-s-1) - 1$

Now $m\,(j-1) \leqslant l\,(j-1) < 2^n$.

Hence

$$N = s\,.\,3^n + (j-s)\,l\,.\,2^n + 2^n\,(j-s-2) + 2^n - m\,(j-s-1) - 1\,.$$

Hence N is the sum of

$$s + l\,(j-s) + (j-s-2) - m\,(j-s-1) - 1 + 2^n$$

nth powers.

$$\begin{aligned} s + l\,(j-s) + (j-s-2) - m\,(j-s-1) - 1 + 2^n \\ = 2^n + l + (j-s-1)\,(l-m) + j - 3 \\ \geqslant 2^n + l + j - 3\,. \end{aligned}$$

Hence the theorem III is proved.

Note added on 25-1-36.

In theorem II, n_0 may work out to be near 100. But by varying the above proof, the author has brought down n_0 to 7. Further it has been verified that $\{(3/2)^n\} \leqslant 1 - (l+3)/2^n$, for $4 \leqslant n \leqslant 100$. Hence it follows that

$$g\,(n) = 2^n + l - 2, \text{ when } 7 \leqslant n \leqslant 100.$$

Notes on the Comparative Anatomy of Some Indian Melaniidae

With Special Reference to *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata* (Deshayes)

By

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In continuation of my work on *Paludomus* (31) I undertook, some time ago, the study of *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata* (Desh), var. *tirouri* from the Coleroon river, and var. *confusa* from the Godavary canal, Cocanada. I was able to examine also *Melanoides tuberculatus* (Müller) and *Melanoides scabra* (Müller), and through the kindness of Dr. Baini Prashad, specimens of *Acrostoma baccata*. f. *bituberculata* Rao, *Acrostoma reevi*. f. *olivacea, Paludomus regulata* Benson, *Paludomus blanfordiana* Nevill, and *Stomatodon stomatodon* from the Indian Museum, Calcutta. I was not, however, able to make a detailed study of the specimens from the Indian Museum, as in almost all cases only a single, preserved specimen was available. This paper records comparative notes on those different forms.



Text-Fig. 1.—The gill-lamellae of Melaniids.

A. *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata*; B. *Melanoides tuberculatus*. C. *Paludomus regulata*; D. *Acrostoma baccata*; E. *Stomatodon stomatodon*; F. *Melanoides scabra*.

THE ANIMAL

Both the varieties of *Melania*, viz., *crenulata* and *tirouri*, are very much alike, differing only in size and to a little extent in colour. The account given here, though mainly for the variety *tirouri*, will apply equally well to the *confusa* variety also. Both the varieties are found in running water with a muddy bottom. When the streams are full they retire into the mud and can be seen only after the level of the water goes down. The *tirouri* variety is the hardier of the two and less susceptible to artificial conditions of life. It can be kept in the laboratory for several weeks, while the *confusa* variety is difficult to keep for more than a few days. The animals show habits similar to those of *Paludomus tanschaurica* (Gmelin) in coming usually to the water edge. *Melanoides tuberculatus* (Müller) is found usually along with *Paludomus* in slow moving streams with sandy bottom. The young ones of *Melanoides tuberculatus* (Müller) and *Melanoides scabra* (Müller) can float under the surface of water like some of the Hydrobiid molluscs. The adults are incapable of floating.

The general disposition of the organs is similar to what I described in *Paludomus* and does not call for any further detailed remarks. The body consists of about 5½ whorls. The foot is flat, quadrate and about 20 mm. by 17 mm. The anterior edge of the foot shows a transverse groove. The structure of the pedal glands is similar to what I described in *Paludomus*. The locomotion of the animal consists partly of gliding and partly of dragging movements, during which the shell does not always rest on the operculum. The foot glides forward for a short distance and then, the foot holding on to the substratum, the body is lifted and pulled forward.

The snout is longer than in *Paludomus* and measures about 8 mm. in length. It is heavily pigmented.

THE MANTLE AND MANTLE CAVITY

The general structure of the mantle and mantle cavity is the same as in *Paludomus*, but the mantle processes are different in shape, arrangement and probably in function also.

In *Melania crenulata* there are usually eleven processes of which the four on the left are the largest. The first process on the left side is almostly always bent over the shell, and sometimes the next two also clasp the outer lip of the shell, but by no means so constantly as the first process. The next eight processes, i.e., process III to X are connected by a kind of membranous expansion of the ventral epithelium, unlike the first two, which are separate. When the processes are contracted they appear like a continuous wavy membrane projecting

from the ventral surface of the mantle. The last or the eleventh process is remote from the other processes and situated opposite to the termination of the rectum and may be termed the anal or sutural process. It is narrower and larger than the others, being filiform. Like the first process on the left side, this sutural process clasps the inner lip or sutural margin of the shell constantly. The processes may be termed peripheral, median and sutural. The median processes, i.e., from the fourth to the tenth, show a tendency to a gradual diminution in size from left to right.



A.

B.

Text-Fig. 2.—Radular teeth of (A), *Paludomus regulata and* (B) *Paludomus blanfordiana.*

In the fully extended condition, the processes have a more or less conical basal part and a tapering, filiform, distal part which is usually tipped with black pigment. The lateral margins also contain usually a black pigment. In the first process, on the left side, it is the filiform part of the process that clasps the shell.

The general structure of the processes resembles that of *Paludomus,* but the cilia are better developed. In the outer or peripheral processes the cells show black pigment in their distal portions. Blood spaces are present in the processes as in the case of *Paludomus.*

From the way in which some of the processes constantly clasp the shell and from their constant number in all the specimens and from their relation to the spiral, broad, black lines found in younger shells, usually twelve in number with eleven interspaces, it seems very probable that they are responsible for the formation of the lines as Benson (7) suggested. The formation of the black transverse or spiral lines takes place after the formation of the shell and in the recently added part of the shell, the lines are not usually discernible.

In *Melanoides tuberculatus* the processes are similar in form and arrangement. In *Melaoides scabra* whose sculpture is different from that of a *Melanoides tuberculatus*, the mantle margin is not even, but shows a number of small processes, in which two varieties may be distinguished according to their size ; but this distinction is most probably due to differences in the degree of contraction. About 35 processes were counted. They are mainly prolongations of the mantle margin. Besides these, processes of the type found in *Melania crenulata* and *Melanoides tuberculatus* are also found, usually about 13 in number, of which three are on the left, nine are the median, connected processes, and one is the anal or sutural process.



Text-Fig. 3.—Radular teeth of (A) *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata* and (B) *Melanoides scabra*.

In *Paludomus regulata* the mantle edge shows a large number of processes, about thirty in number and uniform in size and appearance. The general outline and size of these processes are as in *Paludomus tanschaurica*. In *Paludomus blanfordiana* the mantle processes are seventeen in number, larger than in *Paludomus regulata*. The processes on the left are larger. The processes are all brownish in colour.

In *Acrostoma* and *Stomatodon* the mantle does not show any processes.

The histology of the mantle edge with reference to the shell glands resembles that of *Paludomus tanschaurica*, the shell glands opening into the supra-marginal groove.

The pallial circulation is of the interesting type described in *Paludomus tanschaurica*. *Acrostoma* also shows a circum-pallial vessel.

The hypobranchial gland is more prominent in sections than in the case of *Paludomus*.

The groove noticed in *Paludomus* on the mantle floor is not present in *Melania*; nor is the epithelium over the efferent ctenidial vein so much modified as in *Paludomus*. The osphradium is in the form of a long, simple ridge measuring about 10 mm.

The gill lamella in *Melania (Radina) crenulata* var. *tirouri* differs in shape from that of *Paludomus* and other species. The superior or efferent margin is slightly prolonged and the inferior or afferent margin is deeply cleft near the base. In *Melanoides scabra* the inferior margin is curved but not cleft. In *Melania tuberculatus* (Müller) the inferior margin is raised and slightly curved. In *Paludomus regulata* the gill lamella is rather tall and narrow in the upper part. In *Paludomus blanfordiana* the lamella is shorter and of more uniform width throughout and the inferior margin is concave. In *Stomatodon stomatodon* the lamella is triangular and the inferior margin is oblique and even. In *Acrostoma baccata* the lamella is broadly triangular.

THE DIGESTIVE SYSTEM

The general structure of the digestive system also resembles that of *Paludomus*. The animal feeds chiefly on aquatic vegetation, for in the rectal contents I found vegetable tissues besides sand grains and diatoms.

The buccal cartilages are rather L-shaped in transverse section. Under the sub-radular epithelium reduced cartilage-like structures are found in a better developed condition than in *Paludomus*.

THE RADULA

The central tooth in *Melania* is broad and short, the width or transverse measurement being nearly four times its height or longitudinal measurement. The base is almost even and does not show any backward protrusion as in *Paludomus*. Compared with *Melanoides scabra* and *Melanoides tuberculatus*, it is relatively much broader. It bears one big cusp and three smaller cusps on either side. The central cusp reaches nearly the base of the tooth. The sides are slightly protruding near the upper or anterior margin and not so much rounded as in *Melanoides scabra*. The lateral is not so much produced and oblique as in *Melanoides*; the basal prolongation is wider than in *Mela-*

noides scabra. The marginals are of the type seen in *Melanoides.* The radula of *Melanoides scabra* was described by Annandale and Prashad (3). I have however, given a complete sketch of the central and lateral for comparison. The radular teeth of *Acrostoma reevi* were sketched and described by Rao (27).

In *Paludomus regulata* the base of the central protrudes much more than in *Paludomus tanschaurica* and the laterals are broader and less obliquely bent. The marginals show prominent and larger cusps. In *Paludomus blanfordiana* the basal protrusion of the central cusp is a little less marked. The laterals are more oblique and the marginals approach those of *Paludomus tanschaurica.* In *Stomatodon stomatodon* the central is much broader than in *Paludomus* and bears a large number of uniform cusps. The lateral has rather blunt cusps and the inner marginal has numerous minute cusps, while the outer has about seven larger cusps.

The digestive gland occupies the apical whorls of the visceral mass and extends anteriorly to some extent on the ventral surface of the stomach. The ducts are five in number and open together in conjunction with oesophagus into the gutter found in the stomach.



Text-Fig. 4.—Radula teeth of *Stomatodon stomatodon.*

THE CIRCULATORY SYSTEM

The circulatory system of *Melania* resembles that of *Paludomus.* The pallial circulation has been referred to already. The renal vein is distinct from the efferent ctenidal vein. I made out a circumpallial vessel in *Paludomus blanfordiana, Paludomus regulata* and *Acrostoma, Melanoides tuberculatus* and *Melanoides scabra.* From the nature of the pallial circulation it is evident that the mantle has an important role in respiration.

THE EXCRETORY SYSTEM

The kidney, though of the same type as in *Paludomus,* is more elongate. As in *Paludomus* it extends partly into the mantle cavity and partly alongside of the style sac. The cavity is traversed by lamellae. In *Paludomus* the renal vein is seen on the middle of the ventral surface

and the lamellae present the appearance of radiating from the centre. In *Melania* the vessel runs on one side and hence the lamellae present the appearance of traversing the entire width of the kidney. The renal aperture is in a position similar to that found in *Paludomus.*

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The nervous system of *Melania crenulata* is, in general, of the type found in *Paludomus* and *Melania costata.* The cerebral ganglia are oval and the five nerves which they give rise to are the same as those in *Melania costata.* The proboscidian nerves are about 8 mm. long. The pleural ganglia are even more closely approximated to the cerebral than in *Paludomus.* The pallial anastomosis on the right side is longer than in *Paludomus* but shorter than in *Melania costata,* and slightly closer than in *Paludomus.* The statocyst is found in a position similar to that in *Paludomus* and *Melania costata.* It contains a single elliptic statolith. Each pedal ganglion gives off two stout pedal cords, an anterior and a posterior. Close to the origin of each posterior cord, two slender nerves arise. The visceral ganglion is triangular in outline.

In *Stomatodon* the pedal ganglia are large and round. The statocysts are large sacs and contain numerous oblong statoliths, of which one is larger than the others.

REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM

The reproductive system of *Melania* and *Melanoides* shows very interesting features which do not seem to have been described before. It differs from that of *Paludomus* as well as from that of the different viviparous genera described by Moore in his contributions on the South African Molluscs. As in the case of *Paludomus,* there is practically nothing to mark the sexes, except the stouter build of the body whorl of the shell in the female. When removed from the shell the female specimens can be distinguished to some extent by the slightly greyish yellow colour of the apical whorls which are of a blackish brown colour in the male ; but the distinction between the genital glands of the two sexes is not so marked as in *Paludomus.* In fact it required a patient investigation by smears and sections to determine the sex of the genital gland in immature specimens.

THE MALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM

The male reproductive system of *Melania* is of a much less specialised type than in *Paludomus,* and resembles that of *Faunus* to some extent. It consists of the testis, the vas deferens and the open groove and flap in the mantle cavity.

The testis occupies all the apical whorls and extends anteriorly to the posterior edge of the stomach. It overlies the digestive gland and almost surrounds it, except for a small portion on the columellar side.

The vas deferens runs on the collumellar side. It is a long, coiled duct. Its lower part on the ventral surface of the style sac is stout and thrown into about ten coils. In the variety *tirouri,* the coiled portion is found to be stouter than in the variety *confusa.* On entering the mantle cavity it passes into a wide, partially open furrow guarded by a flap. A penis is absent.



Text-Fig. 5.—Part of the male reproductive system of Melania (*Radina*) *crenulata* (testis not shown).—*v.d.* vas deferens; *v.d.,* swollen part of the vas deferens.

The testis consists of branched tubular follicles and lies close under the body epithelium being separated from it by a thin layer of muscle fibres and connective tissue. The structure of the tubules is similar to that of *Paludomus.* The eupyrene sperms are much longer than those of *Paludomus.* The vas deferens has the usual structure.

The deep groove and the flap, which constitute the lower part of the male reproductive system are lined by ciliated and glandular epithelium, more or less of the type found in the seminal vesicle of *Paludomus*. It is enveloped by a thick layer of connective tissue containing numerous blood spaces. In transverse section, the genital groove appears as a deep channel with its opening directed towards the mantle cavity and guarded by a flap on which the inner epithelium of the groove is continued.

In *Melanoides tuberculatus*, all the specimens examined by me, though quite a large number, happened to be female specimens, but it is not possible to draw any conclusions from this, till I have examined a large number from different localities.



Text-Fig. 6.—Section through the lower part of the vas deferens of *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata*.—

fl. flap; *m.c.* mantle cavity; *m.f.* mantle floor *m.r.* mantle roof; *v.d.* vas deferens.

THE FEMALE REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM

Ramanan (26) says that Melanias are oviparous. According to him " the eggs are laid enveloped in a mass of transparent jelly resembling a fleecy cloud and are usually found attached to the wall of the aquarium or the under surface of the leaves of aquatic plants." This must be mistake, for I found that *Melania, Melanoides, Acrostoma* are all viviparous, possessing a brood chamber packed with young ones in various stages of development.

Rao (27) remarked about the meagre information we have regarding the reproductive system of the Indian Melaniidae and mentioned a brood pouch in *Acrostoma,* but due to the state of preservation, the relation between the genital system and the brood pouch could not be made out.

In *Melania crenulata,* in both the varieties, the ovary occupies a position corresponding to the testis, and as already stated, is of a light greyish yellow colour. Seen under low magnification, it is seen to consist of minute racemose follicles overlying and projecting into the digestive gland. As in the case of the testis, it extends as far as the posterior end of the stomach. In a transverse section of the apical whorls, the ovarian follicles may be seen to extend between those of the digestive gland. The ovary is separated from the general body epithelium by a deeper layer of connective tissue than the testis. The follicles are smaller than in *Paludomus.*



Text-Fig. 7.—Diagram of a partial dissection of *Melanoides tuberculatus* showing the brood pouch and its opening.—*b.o.* opening of the brood pouch ; *b.p.* brood pouch ; *ct.* ctenidium ; *o.* ovary ; *o.d.* oviduct ; *os.* osphradium ; *r.s.* receptaculum seminis ; *rt.* rectum.

The oviduct is a slender duct and its lower part is of considerable interest. A figure of the lower part of the female is shown in Fig. 8. On opening the mantle cavity, on the extreme right, there is seen a fairly thick tube which opens by an elongate slit-like aperture. This tube is

the receptaculum seminis. Its posterior end, situated at the apex of the mantle cavity, is rounded, and a little below its apex or posterior end, it has on its left side a slender diverticulum continued into a minute coiled duct, which, passing up, joins the oviduct. The oviduct itself is a slender duct, which is apt to be overlooked in a dissection, since it passes in the connective tissue between the receptaculum seminis and the rectum. As the oviduct passes forwards, it comes to lie close to the receptaculum seminis, until finally it opens into its terminal region. The termination of the receptaculum seminis is continued as a very short furrow, shorter than in *Paludomus*.

The opening into the brood pouch is situated at a distance of about 3 mm. from the external opening of the receptaculum seminis. The brood pouch is placed under the mantle floor and is apparently developed as a system of tubular spaces in the connective tissue surrounding the oesophagus. In *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata* var. *tirouri* the breeding season commences in October, when very early stages of the embroyos may be seen in the brood pouch. The brood pouch is very extensive in *Melania*, terminating posteriorly in the region of the style sac. In the *confusa* variety, which I collected in the month of April, no embryos were found but the opening into the brood pouch was clearly visible, and in sections, a system of tubular spaces could be seen extending in the connective tissue beneath the mantle floor.



Text-Fig. 8.—The lower part of the female reproductive system of *Melania* (*Radina*) *crenulata*.—*b.o.* opening into the brood pouch. *c.d.* duct connecting oviduct and receptaculum seminis; *g.a.* genital aperture; *o.d.* oviduct; *r.s.* receptaculum seminis.

In the receptaculum seminis of the *tirouri* variety, I was able to observe in sections large masses of sperms, and in fresh material the examination of the contents showed the ova in the process of impregnation by the sperms.

The receptaculum seminis has an outer investment of muscular fibres and is lined on the inside by glandular and ciliated epithelium which is thrown into longitudinal folds that appear as finger shaped projections in tranverse sections. In structure it resembles that of *Paludomus*. The oviduct is very small and its narrow cavity is lined by ciliated epithelium. The duct connecting the receptaculum seminis and the oviduct is smaller than the oviduct and is lined by ciliated epithelium.

The structure of the reproductive system of *Melanoides tuberculatus* and *Melanoides scabra* is very similar to that described above; the former especially resembles *Melania crenulata* very closely. The opening into the brood pouch is comparatively larger than in *Melania* and slit-like; the receptaculum seminis is narrower. Gravid females were observed throughout the year. The brood pouch is shorter than in *Melania*.

The opening into the brood pouch is lined by ciliated columnar cells surrounded by muscle fibres. In the later stages the brood pouch, as seen in *Melanoides tuberculatus*, is divided into a number of chambers in each of which usually one embryo lies. The brood chamber is separated from the oesophagus by a partition of connective tissue.

In *Melanoides scabra* the opening into the brood pouch is large and provided with tumid lips; the oviduct is stouter. The duct of the receptaculum seminis also is thicker.

In *Acrostoma* the opening into the brood pouch is more removed from the genital opening. The aperture is narrow and slit-like.

The lower part of the female reproductive system in *Melania* can be homologised with that seen in *Paludomus*. A receptaculum seminis is present in both. The uterus, which is provided with thick glandular walls in *Paludomus*, is in the form of a simple thin duct in *Melania* and *Melanoides*. The slender duct connecting the spermatheca and the oviduct is probably a vestige indicating the origin of the receptaculum seminis as a diverticulum of the oviduct. The absence of very thick glandular walls in the lower part of the oviduct in *Melania* and *Melanoides* is significant. Such glandular tissue is found only in oviparous forms.

In *Paludomus regulata*, a single male specimen of which was available, the lower part of the male reproductive system was found en-

larged as in *Paludomus tanschaurica.* In *Stomatodon,* owing to the condition of spirit preservation, all that I could make out was that the lower part of the genital system was enlarged as in the male specimens of *Paludomus.*

My best thanks are due to Dr. Baini Prashad for the verification of the species and for placing at my disposal the specimens from the Indian Museum, Calcutta.

SUMMARY

(1) The anatomy of *Melania crenulata* is described with comparative notes of other Melaniidae.

(2) The foot and its glands have the same structure in the different forms.

(3) The mantle edge shows processes excepting in the case of *Stomatodon and Acrostoma.* The processes in *Melania* appear to play some part in the formation of the sculpture of the shell. The shell glands open into the supra-marginal groove.

(4) The osphradium presents a uniform structure in the family.

(5) The gill lamellae in the several forms studied show variations, which do not seem to be of taxonomic value.

(6) The pallial circulation shows interesting features in most of the forms. A circum-pallial vessel is found in all the forms studied except in *Stomatodon.* The mantle plays an important role in respiration.

(7) The structure of the radula shows variations in the family which have been found useful in the classification of the members of the family. Thiele (34) has used these characters as the basis of the sub-division into sub-families, Paludominae and Tiarinae, the Paludominae being characterised by a backward projection of the base of the central tooth and the Tiarinae by the strongly bent or produced laterals. From a comparison of the central teeth of different species I find that in *Melanoides* also the base is produced backwards a little, though by no means to such an extent as in *Paludomus.* In the forms studied by me the following types of radulae are noticed.

(a) Radular teeth with few blunt denticulations .. *Acrostoma*

(b) Radular teeth with pointed denticulations.

  (a′) Central with uniform cusps .. *Stomatodon*

  (b′) Central with one large cusp with smaller cusps on either side.

(1) Central short and transversely broadened; base of the central slightly protruding; laterals strongly bent .. *Melanoides*

(2) Central very much broadened and shorter; base of the central not protruding *Melania.*

(3) Central not broad; base prominently protruding; .. *Paludomus.*

The chief distinction between *Paludomus* and the Tiarinae lies in the width of the central teeth. The radula of *Stomatodon* shows little resemblance to that of the other Melaniidae.

(8) The structure of the kidney is similar in the different forms. A blood gland is absent and there is a separate renal vein.

(9) In the circulatory system the pallial circulation is a striking characteristic.

(10) The nervous system, so far as has been studied, presents variations with regard to

(a) the degree of approximation of the nervous centres

(b) the proximity of the right pallial anastomosis to the pleural ganglia

(c) the number of statoliths in the statocysts.

Melania crenulata shows a greater degree of concentration and a less distant right pallial anastomosis than "*Melania tuberculatus.*" *Paludomus* and *Stomatodon* possess several statoliths.

(11) The reproductive system presents two interesting types:—

(a) Without brood pouch .. *Paludomus.*

(b) With brood pouch .. Tiarinae

In the genera without the brood pouch the lower part of the male reproductive system is much enlarged and a penis is present. In the forms with a brood pouch, at any rate in *Melania,* the lower part of the male genital duct is an open groove. A receptaculum seminis is present and in *Melanoides* and *Melania* it is connected with the oviduct.

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A Study of Working Class Family Budgets

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THE OBJECT OF OUR ENQUIRY

The state of poverty in our country and the very poor standard of living of our people never fail to impress any one who studies the conditions of the mass of our countrymen. In the following paper a comprehensive study of the living conditions of workers in Madras, Coimbatore and Nellikuppam is attempted. Coimbatore and Madras are important centres of cotton textile industry while at Nellikuppam, the sugar factory of Messrs. Parry and Co. is located. In all we collected the budgets of nearly 200 working class families chosen from each representative economic group of workers.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The study is based on a questionnaire in which all items, important from the point of view of the working class have been included. The questionnaire can be divided into three main parts:—

1. General conditions including statements regarding meals, spare time, family strength, debt, etc.

2. Income of the family, including income from all other sources.
3. Expenditure, including all items of expense such as food, rent, clothing, miscellaneous, firewood, etc.

COLLECTION OF BUDGETS

During our investigation we experienced all the difficulties pointed out by the Royal Commission on Labour in connection with the collection of family budgets. The work was undertaken with the help of prominent persons in each of the places we chose for investigation. Workmen were directly approached and attempts were made to gain their confidence. The men were assured that the work was purely non-official and that the results of the investigation would not be communicated to their masters. In spite of these cautions however, the difficulties were many. We give them below:—

1. In the first place, the workers objected to our taking down every detail connected wth either their offices or families, lest we should bring them into trouble by reporting particular cases to their masters. In

such cases, the respective local leaders were of great help in impressing on the workmen, the absolute harmlessness of our enquiry. It was indeed a matter of considerable difficulty.

2. In the second place, the ignorance of the workmen was so great that it appeared rather an impossible task to get any reliable information from them. Usually they do not calculate and spend in such a way as to get the maximum amount of satisfaction out of the limited means at their disposal. Hence there is a general tendency among the workers to exaggerate certain items of expenditure. This difficulty was overcome by us through the help rendered by persons intimately known to them. It was indeed astonishing that, once they took us into their confidence, the workers were prepared to be cross-examined in any manner and for any length of time. The results we were able to obtain have in no small measure been due to the willing help rendered to us by local leaders.

3. Thirdly most of the workmen did not return home before nightfall and after a hard day's work, they were too exhausted to face critical examination.

4. The fourth difficulty was in regard to finding out the total number of members in each family. Many were unwilling to give a reply to this question if their families were large, lest they should become the victims of the evil eye. In view of the fact that often even educated people are unwilling to give out the truth in this matter the difficulty in the case of the workmen may very well be imagined. But here also we were able to get accurate figures since persons who knew the workers' ins and outs accompanied us.

5. In the fifth place, many were unable to give us the causes of their debts in detail though we have been able to get accurate figures with regard to the actual monetary estimates. Inadequate wages, marriages, funerals, excessive use of toddy, were some of the causes given by the workmen.

It is very difficult to collect family budgets even in the case of educated middle-class people, since not many maintain strict and accurate accounts. In the case of workers, who in addition to taking no interest in accounts-keeping, are also illiterate, cent per cent accuracy is practically impossible. But this much we can say with regard to the budgets we have collected—they give a fair indication of the conditions of our workers.

AN EXPLANATION OF THE TABLES

We have on the whole collected 196 budgets, 82 being from Nellikuppam, 84 from Coimbatore and 30 from Madras. To give a clear

idea of the real state of affairs, we have divided the budgets of each place into tabular statements. A mere glance at each of the statements would easily acquaint the observer with the real economic position of our workmen. Nine tabular statements have been prepared for each place. Table 2 is a class-war analysis of the budgets collected. Table 3 gives the number of family budgets in each income group (we have divided the budgets into 7 sections each group denoting the income range of the workers in it), which gives us a fairly good idea with regard to the average income each man can normally aspire to. The table represents fairly accurately, the general estimate of the income groups into which budgets may be divided even if the budgets of all the workers in a place are collected. Table 4 gives the number of persons in the families by income groups, while the next gives the number of wage-earners in each family according to income groups. This table helps one to ascertain easily the average income per head, taking into consideration all the persons dependent on the incomes. Tables 6 and 7 show the average family income and expenditure, according to income groups. The next table gives the group percentage of expenditure by income groups. That is to say, the average expenditure of a family in each group on the various items, such as, food, clothing, rent, fuel and lighting, interest on debts, and miscellaneous items is calculated from the budgets. Also, the corresponding figures for the whole, taking into consideration all the income groups, have been given. Lastly, table 9 indicates the extent of indebtedness in terms of months' pay according to income groups. We shall now proceed to give an account of the conditions in each of the places we have visited.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE TABLES: NELLIKUPPAM

We have collected 82 budgets from the workers, of Messrs. Parry & Co., and we give below the nine tables we have prepared relating to these budgets:—

1. *Mill-War analysis.*

Messrs. Parry & Co. East India Distelleries and Sugar Factory	.. 82

2. *Class-War analysis.*	Families.	Percentage.
Muhammadans	1	$1\frac{9}{41}$
Harijans	6	$7\frac{13}{41}$
Caste Hindus	75	$91\frac{19}{41}$
	82	100

Table 3. Number of family budgets by income groups.

Groups.	Families.	Percentage.
1. Below Rs. 10 P.M.	6	$7\frac{13}{41}$
2. Between Rs. 10 and Rs. 15	26	$31\frac{29}{41}$
3. ,, ,, 15 ,, ,, 20	21	$25\frac{25}{41}$
4. ,, ,, 20 ,, ,, 25	16	$19\frac{21}{41}$
5. ,, ,, 25 ,, ,, 30	3	$3\frac{27}{41}$
6. ,, ,, 30 ,, ,, 35	6	$7\frac{13}{41}$
7. Above Rs. 35 P.M.	4	$4\frac{36}{41}$
	82	100

Table 4. Number of persons in the family by income groups.

Income groups.	Persons living in the family.				
	Men.	Women.	Children.	Dependents.	Total.
1	1	1	1·66	0·17	3·83
2	1·27	1·58	1·38	..	4·23
3	..	..	..	..	4·47
4	..	..	..	..	5·37
5	2	2	3	..	7·00
6	1·83	2·67	1·5	..	6·00
7	2·5	1·75	2·25	..	6·50
All groups.					37·40

Table 5. Wage Earners.

Income groups.	Number of families with wage earners.			
	1	2	3	Total.
1	6			6
2	26			26
3	21			21
4	11	5		16
5	2	1		3
6	2	3	1	6
7	1	1	2	4
	69	10	3	82

Tables 6 and 7.

Income groups.	Families.	Total income.	Average income.	Total expenditure.	Average expenditure.
1	6	598 14 0	99 13 0	664 8 0	110 12 0
2	26	3,383 0 0	149 5 7	3,969 8 0	158 12 2
3	21	4,210 4 0	200 7 9	4,578 0 0	218 0 0
4	16	4,350 0 0	271 14 0	4,521 0 0	282 9 0
5	3	1,008 0 0	336 0 0	1,040 8 0	346 13 0
6	6	2,260 0 0	376 10 8	2,391 0 0	398 8 8
7	4	2,004 0 0	501 0 0	1,896 0 0	474 0 0
Total	82	17,814 2 0	217 3 11	19,060 8 0	232 7 1

Table 8. Group percentage of expenditure by income groups.

Number of budgets.	Gr. 1.	Gr. 2.	Gr. 3.	Gr. 4.	Gr. 5.	Gr. 6.	Gr. 7.	All groups.
	6	26	21	16	3	6	4	82
Food ..	56·9	55·3	51·0	49·5	53·1	50·3	46·9	51·40
Clothing ..	9·3	11·6	8·1	8·2	6·4	7·2	9·5	9·0
Rent ..	1·8	3·5	4·2	1·8	2·3	3·0	2·5	3·0
Fuel and lighting ..	9·0	8·6	8·8	7·8	6·9	6·5	8·8	7·6
Interest on debts ..	3·0	4·9	10·7	7·4	12·9	12·5	6·3	9·2
Miscellaneous ..	13·7	4·6	5·0	6·5	6·9	6·7	6·9	5·9
Others ..	6·3	11·5	12·2	18·8	11·5	13·8	19·1	13·9

Table 9. Extent of indebtedness in terms of months' pay.

Income groups.	Not indebted.	Below 3 months' pay.	3 to 6 months' pay.	6 to 12 months' pay.	12 to 18 months' pay.	Over 18 months' pay.	Percentage of indebted to total.
1	8	..	3	..	..	1	66·6
2	10	1	4	6	2	2	60·0
3	6	1	3	4	3	4	71·4
4	6	1	1	4	3	1	62·5
5		1	..	1	1	..	100·0
6				4		2	100·0
7	2			1		1	50·0

Tables 1, 2, and 3 require no explanation. Table 4 shows that the number of persons in the family goes on increasing as the family income increases. Increased income with increased dependents is in no way better than low income and less number to be maintained. Tables 6 and 7, give an idea of the total annual income and expenditure of each family. The average income per family in each group varies from Rs. 99-13-0 per annum to Rs. 501 per annum, while the expenditure side shows variations from 110-12-0 per annum to 474-0-0 per annum. Except in the case of families in group 7, we find a surplus of expenditure over income, which fact easily explains the cause of indebtedness. Striking an average for all the 82 families, the average income comes to Rs. 217-3-11 per annum while expenditure comes to Rs. 232-7-1. We again note an excess of expenditure over income. These figures show that workers in a large majority of cases do not earn even the bare minimum which may be taken as the subsistence level. For, when we take into consideration the average number of members in each family to be maintained on the meagre income, we are astonished at the very economical way in which they are forced to live. The average per capita income ranges from Rs. 26-1-0 per annum in group 1 to Rs. 125-5-0 per head in group 7, corresponding figures for expenditure being from Rs. 28 to Rs. 118-8-0 per annum. Even making some allowance for less consumption on the part of children, we find that the figures particularly in the lower income groups stand at a deplorably low level. Table 8 clearly indicates the percentage expenditure of each group under the various items. The figures are self explanatory. When the total available per capita resources are considered, the percentage expenditure on each item is staggeringly low. Table 9 indicates the debt position.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS : NELLIKUPPAM

On an examination of the figures given, one is tempted to conclude that the state of affairs is far from satisfactory. The standard of living is very low. Most of them live in the so-called-houses of their own, which are veritable dungeons in many cases. Many of them cannot help being debtors for the simple reason they cannot subsist without debts. Happily enough, one noteworthy factor about Nellikuppam is that the drink habit is not markedly prevalent among the industrial workers. Abstinence can prevent many evils ; but only a substantial increase in income can preserve the workers from further degradation. Otherwise, debtors will go on raising further loans till no more credit is available, and this will result in semi-starvation and further degeneration.

COIMBATORE

We shall next turn to a study of the budgets of the textile workers at Coimbatore.

Of the mills, the budgets of whose workers have been taken, the Kaleeswarar and the Coimbatore Spinning and Weaving Company alone are situated within the limits of the Municipality so that it would not be far from the truth to say, all town-dwelling workers can be found in these two mills. The mills other than these two are almost all of them situated in pucca villages, except perhaps the Sarda Mills in Podanur.

Workers cannot speak of any leisure at all during working days. Even on holidays, they have a tendency to idle away their leisure. The idea of some hobby or artistic pursuit is entirely unknown to these people. Most of them are illiterates ; hence their knowledge of things is so circumscribed that they are practically unable to make use of their leisure. Regarding diet, we find great variations at Coimbatore. There are many who live on *Kanji,* while others live on a frugal and meagre diet of rice twice a day.

As at Nellikuppam, it was in connection with the indebtedness of the worker that the greatest difficulty was experienced in conducting the inquiry. The rates of interest they give out are not quite reliable. As a matter of fact, the effective rate of interest would come to 12% or so, while they have borrowed perhaps at rates varying from 12 to 75 per cent ! Default in interest payment is common. But the principal amounts of the loans we have recorded are perfectly reliable.

At Nellikuppam, there is at least some union spirit while at Coimbatore, everything regarding unionism is dormant. It is only on occasions of strikes that the workers join together.

Passing on to the 'Income' section of the questionnaire, it can be safely asserted that at Coimbatore all the adult sons of the workers work in the mills. Although some at least among the female folk are working in the mills or elsewhere the workers do not easily acknowledge it. They generally think it below their dignity to own that their wives or sisters work in the mills. Hence arises the difficulty in collecting the budgets of women workers.

We rarely met with workers earning more than Rs. 30 per mensem. There does not seem to be much of unemployment among the textile workers at Coimbatore. Those who worked temporarily said, they did it of their own accord. Income from other sources is nil in most cases.

We allotted no column for the disposal of the savings of the workmen, because savings are rare, and if there are savings they might be mentioned in the remarks column. But though we have not recorded, we shall now give what little information was gathered in the course of conversation with the workers whose expenditure was below their income.

In some cases, after deducting the expenditure from the income, we told them that they should be saving something and asked them what they did with it or what they proposed to do. The majority of them said that they would build houses of their own or subscribe to the chit funds, and do lending business in a small way. One or two workers said that they maintained fixed deposits in a bank. One man admitted having a Savings Bank account in the post office. We must point out however, that we met these thrifty workers in the villages only.

Coming to the expenditure column, as we have pointed out before, the workers have no definite idea of their own expenditure. In many cases we had to mention the various articles of food and add up the prices item by item. Then we had to find out the total and verify it from the workers' own testimony. Their food is frugal and from the point of view of nutrition meagre. There is absolutely no variety in the food they eat. They use fruits and vegetables only occasionally and that too only when they get them free.

Buttermilk is used only once; either in the morning before going to the mills or in the night. But we have come across many not using buttermilk at all every day. Betels are extensively used. Together with coffee they account for a pretty large expenditure in many cases. It is a matter of gratification to see, that the drink evil is not prevalent to any great extent among the textile workers at Coimbatore. Perhaps there might have been a certain amount of concealment among the workers examined. On an average, every family among the textile workers spends 8 to 10 annas on firewood every month. Villagers get their firewood mostly free and if at all they spend on firewood it is very little. The town workers, on the other hand, spend more on firewood. The workmen in the villages said that their womenfolk go out in their spare time and bring firewood from the neighbouring forests. As regards clothing and bedding, there seems to be more exaggeration at Coimbatore than at Nellikuppam. On cross-examination of the requirements of some workers, we realised that three pairs of dhoties, three shirts and three angavastrams are the minimum requirements of the least fashionable among them for a year. Bedding of course becomes a permanent investment. They spend very little on medicine. They

try homely remedies for small ailments. Unless the case is very serious, they do not call in the doctor. Moreover every mill has got its own doctor. So far as Coimbatore is concerned, we have to contradict the prevalent belief that workers spend much on religious items. We usually asked them whether they subscribed annually or monthly to temples. In most cases the reply was in the negative. But they spend occasionally something on cocoanuts and fruits when they visit neighbouring temples. House rent absorbs a good portion of the income of the town-dwelling workers, though in the villages, many own houses themselves, while even when a rent has to be paid the amount is very small. Coimbatore being a merry town, the youthful among the workers attend cinemas quite often. But on the whole textile workers, particularly the villagers, spend very little on amusements and recreations—they cannot afford to do so. Very few cases there were among the workers examined, where the workers had to send money to any dependent abroad. The mills at Coimbatore impose fines on the workers pretty heavily. We are given to understand that on an average, every worker is likely to pay at least Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 every year.

We give below our tabular analysis of the position at Coimbatore.

COIMBATORE BUDGETS.

Table 1. Mill-War analysis.

Name of the mill.		Family Budgets.	Percentage.
Stanes 'A' mill	..	21	25·0
Stanes 'B' mill	..	13	15·5
Kaleeswarar mills	..	17	20·0
Ranga Vilas mills	..	16	19·4
Rajalakshmi mills	..	6	7·1
Radha Krishna mills	..	7	8·3
Other mills	..	4	4·7
Total	..	84	100·0

Table 2. Class-War analysis.

Class.		Families.	Percentage.
Untouchables	..	2	2·4
Mussalman	..	1	1·2
Christians	..	4	4·8
Hindus	..	77	91·6
All classes	..	84	100·0

Table 3. Family budgets according to income groups.

Income groups.		Family budgets.	Percentage.
Gr. 1.	Below Rs. 10 P.M.	6	7·14
Gr. 2.	Between Rs. 10 and Rs. 15	34	40·48
Gr. 3.	,, ,, 15 ,, ,, 20	17	20·24
Gr. 4.	,, ,, 20 ,, ,, 25	9	10·71
Gr. 5.	,, ,, 25 ,, ,, 30	8	9·52
Gr. 6.	,, ,, 30 ,, ,, 35	7	8·33
Gr. 7.	Above Rs. 35 P.M.	3	3·58
All groups		84	100·00

Table 4. Number of persons in the family by income groups.

Income groups.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Persons.	3·83	3·88	4·88	4·22	6·37	7·28	8·33

Table 5. Number of wage earners in the family by income groups.

Income Groups.	Number of families with wage earners.			
	1	2	3	Total.
1	5	1		6
2	26 (a)	7 (b)	1	34
3	2	12	3	17
4		6	3	9
5	1 (c)	5	2	8
6	2 (d)	3	2	7
7			3	3
Total	36 (42·86%)	34 (40·47%)	14 (16·67%)	84

Gr. 2(a). 4 families get other incomes through casual work.
Gr. 3(b). 1 family gets sundry incomes.
Gr. 5(c). 1 family gets income from business.
Gr. 6(d). 1 family gets income from land.

Tables 6 and 7. Average family income and expenditure by income groups.

Income groups.	Number of families.	Total income.	Average income.	Total expenditure.	Average expenditure.
1	6	610 8 0	101 12 0	761 0 0	126 13 4
2	34	5,072 0 0	149 12 10	5,455 0 0	160 7 1
3	17	3,408 0 0	200 7 6	3,378 0 0	198 11 3
4	9	2,459 0 0	273 3 7	1,960 0 0	217 12 5
5	8	2,565 0 0	320 10 0	2,312 0 0	289 0 0
6	7	2,666 0 0	380 13 9	2,259 0 0	322 11 5
7	3	1,300 0 0	433 5 4	1,155 0 0	385 0 0
Total	84	18,080 8 0	215 3 11	17,280 0 0	205 11 5

Table 8. Percentage expenditure of families by income groups.

Number of Budgets.	Gr. 1.	Gr. 2.	Gr. 3.	Gr. 4.	Gr. 5.	Gr. 6.	Gr. 7.	Total
	6	34	17	9	8	7	3	84
Food ..	53·65	48·94	48·99	44·10	39·96	44·62	43·63	47·10
Clothing ..	8·13	9·74	8·90	10·20	10·68	12·18	12·55	9·70
Rent ..	5·13	9·08	5·96	3·62	4·93	..	..	4·70
Fuel and lighting ..	10·04	8·83	8·94	11·32	11·67	11·59	9·34	9·30
Miscellaneous ..	10·63	6·62	12·91	14·69	15·10	15·94	9·34	12·40
Interest on debt ..	6·90	7·90	5·08	5·35	8·56	9·48	12·46	7·80
Others ..	5·52	8·89	9·22	10·72	9·10	6·19	12·68	9·00

Table 9. Extent of indebtedness in terms of months' pay according to income groups.

Income groups.	Not indebted.	Below 3 months' pay.	3 to 6 months' pay.	6 to 12 months' pay.	12 to 18 months' pay.	Over 18 months' pay.	Percentage of indebted to total.
1	1	2	1	1	1	..	85·33
2	11	4	4	8	3	4	67·64
3	6	1	4	2	3	1	64·70
4	5	1	1	1	1	..	80·00
5	1	2	2	1	..	2	87·50
6	2	..	1	3	..	1	71·43
7	1	1	..	1	..	..	66·66

Taking group 1, for a family of 3·83 members on an average, there is an average income of Rs. 101-12-0 per annum while the average expenditure for the same family comes to Rs. 126-13-4. Allowing for the fact that in almost all the groups payment under interest charges is not regularly made, the figures yet show that even for the poorest standard imaginable, the income is not sufficient. Moreover the fact that the figures under expenditure appear normal indicates that as far as possible restraint is practised and that with the limited means at their disposal honest efforts are made to make both ends meet.

Similarly, for an average family of 3.88 members in group 2, the average income comes to Rs. 149-2-10, while the average expenditure comes to Rs. 160-7-1. Borrowing is thus limited by their capacity to earn. Groups 5, 6, and 7 show a satisfactory balance, probably because all these happen to be village workers.

From tables 7 and 8, we find that the amounts spent on food articles alone for all the families would come to nearly 47·1 per cent. That is to say, for an average family of 4·79 members, actual food items alone take only a little over Rs. 100 per annum. If we include other necessary items that contribute to keep up the physique of the workmen, the figures would rise to about Rs. 150 per annum for an average family of 4·79 members. The figures show a grave state of affairs.

Thus with low incomes and consequently low expenditure, inadequate nourishment, inconvenient and bad houses, absolute dearth of spare time and recreation, wide illiteracy, and oppressive indebtedness, the family budgets clearly show, that we cannot speak of a standard of living of the workers because there is no standard at all.

MADRAS BUDGETS

The total number of family budgets we have collected in Madras is only 30, those drawing over Rs. 20 per mensem being most represented.

The same criticisms offered regarding conditions at Coimbatore are applicable here also. In regard to the use of spare time, education, trade unions, etc., the interest taken by the workers is almost similar. They do not seem to be much interested in their union. They are even indifferent towards it. The workers say that unions ought to pay more attention to welfare problems, especially housing, sanitation, education, provision of cheap credit and so on, if workers are to take any interest in the union.

The drink habit is certainly more prevalent here but coffee is consumed as a necessity by at least the principal earning member of the family in many cases. Some families use both toddy and coffee, others

neither. If there is money on hand they appear to have an inclination for toddy.

There is no supplementary income of any kind in many cases. In the case of the thirty families, whose budgets we have collected, all are indebted. The average debt per worker comes to Rs. 193 which is heavier than that at Coimbatore or Nellikuppam.

House rent takes away a much larger proportion of the workmens' income at Madras than in the other two places. Interest on debts is equally heavy. But evasions in the lower groups might be more common in Madras. Similarly fuel and lighting absorb a greater amount in Madras than in the other two places.

We give below the tables we have prepared with regard to the conditions of the workers at Madras.

Table 1.

Name of the Mill.		Budgets.	Percentage.
The United Spinning and Weaving Mills, Ltd.	..	17	56·66
The Buckingham Mill	..	6	20·0
The Carnatic Mill	..	7	23·34
All Mills	..	30	100·00

Table 2. Class-War analysis.

Christians	..	1
Mussalmans	..	1
Hindus	..	28
		30

Table 3. Number of family budgets by income groups.

Income groups.		Number of Budgets.	Percentage.
Gr. 1. Below Rs. 10 P.M.	..	3	10·0
Gr. 2. Between Rs. 10 and Rs. 15	..	3	10·0
Gr. 3. " " 15 " " 20	..	1	3·33
Gr. 4. " " 20 " " 25	..	8	26·67
Gr. 5. " " 25 " " 30	..	6	20·0
Gr. 6. " " 30 " " 35	..	4	13·33
Gr. 7. Over Rs. 35 P.M.	..	5	16·67
All groups	..	30	100·00

Tables 6 and 7. Average family income and expenditure according to income groups.

Income groups.	Number of families.	Total income.	Average income.	Total expenditure.	Average expenditure.
1	3	294 0 0	98 0 0	319 0 0	106 5 4
2	3	384 0 0	128 0 0	392 0 0	130 10 8
3	1	195 0 0	195 0 0	236 0 0	236 0 0
4	8	2,052 0 0	256 8 0	2,074 0 0	259 4 0
5	6	1,800 0 0	300 0 0	1,883 0 0	313 13 4
6	4	1,497 0 0	374 4 0	1,513 0 0	378 4 0
7	5	2,534 12 0	506 15 3	2,615 0 0	523 0 0
All	30	8,756 12 0	291 14 3	9,032 0 0	301 1 1

Table 8. Average percentage family expenditure by income groups.

Number of budgets.	Gr. 1.	Gr. 2.	Gr. 3.	Gr. 4.	Gr. 5.	Gr. 6	Gr. 7.	All groups.
	3	3		8	6	4	5	29
Food ..	42·6	48·9		44·8	45·3	43·7	46·8	46·0
Clothing ..	4·4	6·8		5·0	5·7	4·6	5·1	5·2
Rent ..	22·6	18·4		10·6	10·2	9·5	10·8	11·3
Fuel and lighting ..	10·6	9·1		10·9	8·6	9·5	7·1	9·1
Miscellaneous ..	11·3	10·9		13·1	10·2	13·1	5·6	9·9
Interest on debts ..				9·8	12·7	11·6	14·1	11·2
Others ..	8·5	5·9		5·8	7·3	8·0	10·5	7·3

Table 9. Extent of indebtedness in terms of months' pay.

Income groups.	Number of families indebted to Below 3 months' pay.	3 to 6 months' pay.	6 to 12 months' pay.	12 to 18 months' pay.	Over 18 months' pay.	Percentage of indebted to total.
1	..	..	2	..	1	100
2	..	2	1	..	..	100
3	..	..	1	..	..	100
4	2	3	3	..	..	100
5	..	..	5	1	..	100
6	1	1	1	1	..	100
7	3	..	..	1	1	100
All	6	6	13	3	2	100

COIMBATORE, MADRAS, AND NELLIKUPPAM—A COMPARATIVE STUDY

We have in the foregoing pages, dealt with the family budgets relating to each of the three places noted above. We shall now try to effect a comparative study.

Though the average income of a family at Nellikuppam is Rs. 223-5-6 as against 215-3-11 of a family at Coimbatore, the average expenditure at Nellikuppam comes to Rs. 232-7-1, as against Rs. 205-11-5 at Coimbatore. When we take into consideration the indebtedness of the workers in the two places, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. At Nellikuppam, out of the 82 budgets we have collected, 11 families are indebted to more than 18 months' pay, 20 families to the extent of 6 to 12 months' pay, 9 families to the extent of 12 to 18 months' pay, and 11 families to the extent of 3 to 6 months' pay and 4 families to the extent of less than three months' pay. The number of families not indebted stands at 28. The corresponding figures for Coimbatore are 9, 7, 17, 13, 11, and 27 respectively. The figures under payment of interest shows a larger percentage at Nellikuppam than at Coimbatore.

In round figures, the total debt of all the 82 families at Nellikuppam comes to Rs. 14,490 while at Coimbatore the total debt of all the 84 families comes to Rs. 9899. The average debt per family at Nelli-

kuppam is Rs. 176·7 as against Rs. 117·84 at Coimbatore. Thus the debt position accounts in a large measure for the increased expenditure of a family at Nellikuppam compared with one at Coimbatore.

Taking into consideration the expenditure under food items figures show that the labourers at Nellikuppam spend more on articles of consumption than those at Coimbatore. In house rent, firewood and lighting, the workers at Coimbatore spend more.

A careful scrutiny of the budgets shows and this was corroborated by our conversations with the workmen, that though devoid of many conveniences of a town, the workers at Nellikuppam have a slightly higher standard of life than the workers at Coimbatore. Perhaps if the workers of Nellikuppam were to adopt the diet of those at Coimbatore their debt position might be redeemed to some extent at least. The cost of living at Nellikuppam is certainly not higher than that at Coimbatore taking the prices of all the articles of consumption into consideration. Due allowance being made for the increased indebtedness of the workers at Nellikuppam, we are tempted to conclude, they are at least to a small degree better off than the workers at Coimbatore.

Since the budgets we have collected in Madras are small in number, we fear they might not be quite representative. One thing, however, is clear. Whereas at Coimbatore or Nellikuppam it is very difficult to see workers drawing more than Rs. 30 p.m., and the percentage of workers drawing more than Rs. 20 p.m., would be very low, in Madras the position appears to be different. The general wage level is higher in Madras than in the other places. But the cost of living in Madras is higher than that at either Coimbatore or Nellikuppam. Certainly the standard of living is not higher. Both Coimbatore and Madras appear to be sailing in the same boat, though Nellikuppam seems to be better than either of these two places.

The figures collected and tabulated clearly show that the average income of about Rs. 219 for an average family of nearly 5 persons is very inadequate. Their average expenditure with slight variations in these three places only shows that many of the workers have become reconciled to the inevitable. They borrow but only to a limited extent. Even the maximum borrowing that lies in their power unless repeatable every year with no necessity of repayment, cannot make them improve their standard of living. Borrowing can only help persons to tide over temporary emergencies. It is never a permanent antidote to the workers' sufferings .

ANNAMALAI UNIVERSITY

THE TEXTILE WORKERS' STANDARD OF LIVING

Prepared by

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1. Name of the Mill.
2. Name of the worker.
3. Serial number of the family.
4. Caste.
5. Occupation.

GENERAL CONDITIONS

1. Use of spare time.
2. Number and nature of meals taken.
3. Nature of education.
4. Indebtedness.
5. Member of any trade union organisation.

MEMBERS AND INCOME

Total number of members in the family.	Earning members.	Sex.	Age	Rate of wages or income.	Days in the year employed.	Annual Income.	Income from other sources.	Total Income.	Turnover.	REMARKS.

EXPENDITURE

ITEMS.	Amount spent.	REMARKS
1. Food 2. Miscellaneous 3. Drinks and drugs 4. Fuel and lighting 5. Clothing, bedding, etc. 6. Medical charges 7. Religious observances 8. House rent 9. Amusement and recreation 10. Remittance abroad 11. Interest on debts 12. Other expenses		

Śikhara

By

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In the whole range of the literature on Indian architecture there is no term more consistently and persistently misunderstood and misused than the term *Śikhara.* It is found equated with spire,[1] tower,[2] temple,[3] steeple,[4] and absurdly enough with *vimāna*[5] and *ratha.*[6] This[7] equation is something that could not be accepted either by a layman or by an expert. Of these the English terms are not found used in any technical sense,[8] and, if we may be guided by lexicons, we have to conclude that they refer to entirely different things.

A tower is explained as 'a building lofty in proportion to the size of its base either isolated or forming part of a castle.[9] This would give us the idea of a tall structure in a group of buildings, or a tall structure standing by itself. This term cannot, therefore, be used with reference to *Śikhara.*

Spire is an equally unhappy term to render *Śikhara* by. It means a 'tall structure rising from a tower or roof, etc., and terminating in a

1. HIIA : p. 266 ; also SOMTK : p. 25 ; also HIEA : I-p. 436 ; also EB : XII—p. 222 ; also IA : p. 17 ; also AIG : pp. 131, 137 ; also Rupam (24) : p. 3 ; also DHA : p. 588, 589-90 ; also H-IA : p. 27 ; but evidently Havell does not approve equating spire with *Śikhara ;* and elsewhere he equates it with the main portion of the dome ; also IAMS : p. 196 ; also R-IA : p. 58, though it must be pointed out that the author does not use the term *Śikhara ;* also MTD pp. 60, 85.

2. HIIA : p. 266 ; HIEA : I-p. 322 ; also IA : pp. 17, 18, 19, 25, 30-31. In this latter work there is a sad mixing up of tower and spire.

3. HIEA : I-pp. 322, 325, 407. Cf. the expression 'the *Śikhara* temple' in IA : p. 17.

4. HFAIC : pp. 18, 25 ; also IAMS : pp. 17, 18, 255 ; also R-IA : p. 59 ; also HIA : p. 57.

5. HIEA : I-pp-322, 325.

6. HIEA : I-p. 330.

7. Other terms used to refer to *Śikhara* are 'summit of tower' and 'tall dome.' Vide DHA : p. 591.

8. Compare for instance Stratton : *Orders of Architecture ;* Fullerton makes mention of these terms, but, so far as I can make out, they do not correspond to *Śikhara.*

9. NED : X-Pt. I-p. 198.

slender point, especially the tapering portion of the steeple of a cathedral or church, usually carried to a great height and constituting one of the chief architectural features of a building '.[10] This term may apparently be used with reference to *Śikhara* with some sense of appropriateness but then it should clearly have been defined as such. This has never been done. Again, this term cannot be scientifically used for more reasons than one. In the first place, *Śikhara* does not rise from the roof ; secondly, it does not terminate in a slender point ; and thirdly, it does not form the chief architectural feature of the building, though undoubtedly it forms an essential part of a building. Since the spire is said to surmount the tower[11] and since *Stūpi* surmounts *Śikhara*, we may with some amount of justice use spire with reference to *Stūpi*, though even here we must point out it is not very happy, because *Stūpi* is neither particularly tall nor tapering.

Equally unscientific is the use of the term steeple. This term is found used in three different senses.[12] It means ' a tall tower or building of great altitude in proportion to its length and breadth '. In this sense it cannot be equated with *Śikhara*, for this is only a part of building, as we shall make clear, and not the whole itself. It may also refer to ' a lofty tower forming part of a church or temple, or such a tower together with the spire or other superstructure by which it is surmounted '. In this sense it may refer to *Śikhara*, but with it something more, and hence it is not quite correct, unless the term is clearly defined. In a third sense also the term steeple is used, and that is with reference to ' the topmost portion of the tower or roof of a church '. In this sense it closely approximates to *Stūpi*. Thus we find that this term also cannot be correctly used with reference to *Śikhara*.

It is clear from what has been said that none of these terms can be used with reference to *Śikhara* with any degree of appropriateness. The question arises whether or not we have the right to use a particular term in a specific sense. No doubt we have ; only we must then define the term we choose and use it consistently ; and this has not so far been done. Such usage cannot, therefore, be said to have any scientific precision.

Still more unfortunate is the rendering of the term *Śikhara* by such expressions as temple, *vimāna* and *ratha*. The term temple denotes the whole building in which is enshrined the sacred idol, or the *sanctum sanctorum*, and sometimes, loosely no doubt, also the buildings associated

10. NED ix-pt. 1-p. 615.
11. Ibid : p. 900.
12. Ibid : p. 900.

with the *sanctum sanctorum* ; but it is never used with reference to any part of the temple itself, that is to say, the whole is never put for the part. The absurdity will be manifest, for in that case we have to translate the expression '*Śikhara* of a temple' by the expression 'temple of a temple', as this rendering will no doubt necessitate. The terms *vimāna*[13] and *ratha*[14] also involve the same absurdity as before. For, these terms also mean the temple, and not merely a part of it. Both these have their own *Śikharas*, and, therefore, these also cannot be used in the sense of *Śikhara*.[15]

No one of the five terms, constantly used with reference to *Śikhara*, can, therefore, be said to be correct or scientific. And their promiscuous usage at the hands of not merely writers on architecture, but also translators of inscriptions,[16] leads to only one conclusion that the writers and translators who used them had apparently no clear idea of *Śikhara*. Such wrong and loose usage may be excusable as regards foreign exponents of the subject, since they may not have had direct access to original Sanskrit texts, in which alone *Śikhara* is fully expounded. But, when the same term is wrongly used by writers [17] who betray their familiarity with Samskrit texts on the subject at every turn, it is time to tell them that they are wrong, for in the first place the word means neither a spire nor a tower nor a steeple nor a temple nor a *vimāna* nor a *ratha*, but something else, and in the second place, even if it did mean any one of these, it certainly could not then mean any other of the rest.

13. This is again another term very loosely used by writers on Indian architecture. The authors of *Śilpasastras* understood by this term merely *Prāsada*, the temple or *sanctum sanctorum*. The term is derived as follows: *nānamānavimānatvādvimānaḥ*. The author of *Mayamata* treats it as a synonym of *Prāsada* :

vimānaṁ bhavanaṁ haryaṁ saudhaṁ dhāma niketanaṁ

Chapter XIX, Verse 10.

This idea is well supported by the authors of *Mānasāra, Kāśyapaśilpa, Śilparatna*, etc. It is regrettable that an attempt has been made to interpret it in a different way: Cf. TMSTA : p. 2. Equally wrong is the statement that 'the name *vimāna* thus came to be applied to the tower of inner shrine or *sanctum* of the temple' (*Rupam* 22 : p. 55). Fergusson, on the other hand, correctly understands it, when he speaks of 'the principal part, the actual temple itself which is called the *Vimāna*' but he is evidently wrong, when he equates it with *Śikhara* (HIEA : I pp. 407, 442). Smith also understands it as the central sanctuary (Cf. ASIAR-GI : p. 216).

14. This also means a temple. Though it primarily means a wheeled temple, it is also found used with reference to a stationary temple. Cf. for instance the *Rathas* of Mamallapuram.

15. It is equally absurd to speak of '*vimāna* and *Śikhara* of a temple.' HO : II-p. 343.

16. DHA : pp. 589-90.

17. Such writers, as for instance, Coomaraswamy, Gangoly, etc.; also TMSTA ; also DHA : under *Śikhara*.

It is always in the best interests of a scientific study of any subject to define clearly the technical terms occurring therein, and this is particularly so in the subject of Indian architecture. If the writers had only taken care to investigate and understand the exact significance of the term *Śikhara*, much of the confusion and the consequent wrong theorisings and speculations could have been avoided. The authors of the *Three Main Styles of Temple Architecture*[18] have no doubt felt the confusion underlying the idea of *Śikhara* and they have defined what they understand by the term *Śikhara*. This is no doubt a great step forward, as the procedure is scientific. The present writer, however, differs from them in their idea of *Śikhara* : according to them a shrine has a *vimāna* or tower over it and this latter is surmounted by *Śikhara*, which bears a *Stūpi*. This point of view is obviously wrong, as it is not supported by any Samskrit text.

Not only is this term so loosely used with reference to itself, but it is used equally loosely as a distinguishing feature of different styles of Indian architecture. The expression '*Śikhara shrines*' has been popularised by that distinguished exponent of Indian architecture, Fergusson, with reference to, and as the characteristic feature of, the Indo-aryan type of buildings.[19] This nomenclature would have been significant, in case *Śikhara* was the characteristic feature of such shrines alone. But unfortunately it is a feature of every shrine. Gangoly says that *Dravidian* shrines also have their *Śikharas,* but he would exclude *Vesara* shrines.[20] Coomaraswamy accepts *Śikharas* for all the three types of structures, *Nāgara, Drāviḍa* and *Vesara,*[21] but he would accept the view that shrines of the Gupta temples are characterised by the absence of any kind of *Śikharas* and that *Śikhara* was a later day development, as he speaks of some shrines which 'have either never possessed *Śikharas* or did not originally possess *Śikharas*'.[22] Equally out of place is the statement of Bannerji that *Śikhara* formed a regular feature of Indian temples only from the beginning of the seventh century[23] A.D., that 'the Gupta temples did not possess any *Śikhara*',[24] and that the

18. TMSTA : p. 2.
19. HIIA : p. 75. Equally misleading is the expression Aryavarta *Sikhara*, used by Coomaraswamy (HIIA : p. 96) and '*Śikhara* temple' used by Havell (HIA : p. 57) and Bhandarkar (*Rupam* : '20: p. 12).
20. IA : p. 16.
21. HIIA : p. 107.
22. HIIA : pp. 78, 79 ; also notice the statement 'it is possible that their *Śikharas* are later day additions' ; also Rupam '22 : p. 51 ; this writer would have it that 'the Indo-Aryan *Śikhara* formed no part of the original temples which were flat on the roof.'
23. AIG : p. 153.
24. AIG : p. 131 ; Gurudas Sarkar says that 'it has not been possible to trace

architect who built the Gupta temples 'did not intend to build a *Śikhara* above the shrine'.[25] Again *Śikhara* is said to be 'the peculiarity of Hindu and Jaina architecture of Northern India'.[26] The confusion is further enhanced, because some writers are also found speaking of different kinds of *Śikharas*[27] and of 'the different elements constituting *Śikhara*',[28] and others make such statements as 'temples without *Śikharas*',[29] '*Śikharas* never have utilitarian purpose',[30] *Śikharas* are



Figures i—iv : These figures show how a square base could be modified.

back beyond the 5th or 6th century the authentic existence of *Śikhara* form in this country' (Rupam 22-p. 51).

25. AIG : p. 137.

26. HIEA : I-p. 322.

27. HIIA : pp. 79, 80, 95, 96, 107 ; also HIEA ; I-pp. 322-323 ; also HFAIC : p. 25; also SOMTK : p. 44; also EB : XII-p. 222.

28. SOMTK : p. 62.

29. HIIA : pp. 78, 79.

30. HIEA : I-p. 324.

rather 'an accessory than an essential' part of a temple,[31] 'Gupta temples did not possess a *Śikhara*',[32] etc

It will be clear from the foregoing that writers on Indian architecture, beginning with Fergusson and ending with the latest, Prof. P. K. Acharya,[33] have failed to clearly understand the true significance of *Śikhara*. As a result of this, possibly, the term has been wrongly rendered ; and this certainly has led to a large amount of confusion which prevents the average reader from understanding what the term means in the writings on the subject in English. And what is worse, this has resulted in a gross misunderstanding of the exact nature and function of *Śikhara* in the scheme of Indian Architecture.

It may be argued that the term *Śikhara*, like any other term in language, may have undergone change in its exact connotation in course of centuries and therefore it is unscientific to say, that the rendering given by well-known writers is wrong, for it proceeds on the assumption that the word could not have undergone any metamorphosis in meaning, an assumption that is evidently unscientific. In reply to such an argument we have only to say that we are here dealing with a technical term which finds constant mention in all treatises on Indian architecture in Samskrit and which is always assigned the same sense. It is clearly defined and clearly understood by all writers who have used this term, and nowhere is there any indication that the term has undergone any change in meaning. It can, therefore, be safely asserted that this term always meant and has always been meaning only one thing in Samskrit technical literature. Such is the conclusion that strikes one on reading through the varied original Samskrit texts on architecture,[34] describing *Śikhara*.[35]

31. HIIA: p. 80.

32. AIG: p. 131. The earlier writers whose views he was controverting were right as far as we could see. Like every other temple, the Gupta temples also possessed *Śikharas*, though not always the curvilinear type of *Śikharas*: Cf. also p. 137, where the author categorically states that 'the architect did not intend to build a *Śikhara*.' This statement is based on the same wrong assumption.

33. Cf. DHA: under *Śikhara*. The word cannot certainly have all the meanings ascribed to it. We are afraid that Prof. Acharya was guided in his translation by the rendering given by the editors of inscriptions. Cf. also TMSTA.

34. Cf. for instance MM., KS., MS., TS., SR., etc.

35. Compare DHA. under *Śikhara*. One cannot help giving expression to a sense of surprise that Prof. Acharya should have left the term in the midst of this confusion.

Śikhara 'invariably surmounts the cells in which the images are placed'[36] and it helps to indicate 'externally the presence and position of the cells'.[37] 'Both *Nāgara* and *Drāviḍa Śikharas*'—and we would add to it *Vesara Śikhara* also—'are towers rising above the *Garbhagṛha* of a temple'.[38] In these statements we have the exact position of *Śikhara* set forth for us, and these are in perfect agreement with the Samskrit texts. The parts of a temple according to all authorities on Indian architecture are six in number: beginning from the base they are: (i) *Adhiṣṭhana*—basement; (ii) *Pāda*—cella; (ii) *Prastara*—entablature; (iv) *Gala*—neck; (v) *Śikhara*—head;[39] and (vi) *Stūpi*[40]—finial. These various parts, it may also be mentioned, have to bear a fixed proportion to one another so far as their heights are concerned. The simplest of these proportions is as follows: the height of the building is twice its breadth. This height is to be divided into eight parts; and of these eight parts, one part will be the basement, two parts cella, one part entablature, one part neck, two parts head and one part finial.[41] Coming to the shape of *Śikhara*, it may be *Caturasra* (square), *Ṣaḍasra* (hexa-

36. SOMTK: also HIEA: The description of *Śikhara* as that 'which forms the termination of the upper portion of the body or *Vimāna* of the temple' (Rupam: '22: p. 42) is certainly wrong. This describes correctly the location of *Stūpi*.

37. HIEA: I-p.322.

38. HIIA: p. 83. Compare this statement with his description of the Surya Deol temple at Konark (HIIA: p. 116). He makes a strange distinction between roof and *Śikhara*, but does not make clear the respective position of each. This is rather confusing to say the least.

39. I purposely use the term *head* in preference to any other, and in this usage I have the authority of KS.; (See Chapter XIX-19); also TMSTA: p. 2, where the meaning of the term is correctly given; also the extract given in DHA. page 539 *śikharaṁ śiraḥ mūrdhā*'; also MM: p. 100; also Rupam 23 p. 29, '*Śikhara* is merely an exaggerated form of the human headgear': this identification is no doubt wrong.

40. I prefer this term, because it suggests also the fact that it is the final element in the structure. Cf. DHA: p. 588, where a very surprising statement is found made; 'above the dome (*stūpi*) are built in order *Śikhara*, *Śikhā*, *Śikhānta* and *Śikhāmaṇi*.' One needs scarcely say that this statement is obviously wrong. Cf. also HIIA: p. 115; Coomaraswamy is certainly right when he says that *Śikhara* is crowned by *Āmalaka* and this latter by *stūpi*.

Kāmikāgama does not accept this order of the parts of a temple. This reads *Gala* after *Śikhara* and adds *Āmalaka* after it. This would be truly descriptive of the north Indian temples—the so-called *Śikhara* shrines.

41. Cf. EAH: p. 52. This proportion is based on MS. Notice Ram Raz translates *Śikhara* by the term cupola. The proportion is also accepted by Gurudeva. Compare TS. Chapter II, verse 52, and the commentary thereon.

[The illustrations are from photographs secured by the author when he witnessed the staging of Act III of this drama at the temple theatre at Irinjalakuda, Cochin State ; and these, it is hoped, will help to give some idea of the costume and make up of the characters as they appear in what is called *Kūṭiyāṭṭam*.]



Fig. i A general view of the temple theatre.



Fig. ii. A general view of the interior of the theatre.

Fig. iii. Hanuman.

Fig. iv. Ravana.

PLATE III.



Fig. v. Sankukarna.



Fig. vi. Ravana, as he first appears on the scene.



Fig. v.



Fig. vi.

Figs. v—vi: These are copied from TMSTA. Figure v is there, described as a Kadamba temple, having 'simple form without *Śikhara* and without gable in front of the *Vimāna*.' The *Śikhara* however is very clear and it is surmounted by the *Stūpi*. Figure vi shows one of the Mahākutesvara shrines—a pure type of *Nāgara* shrine, where the square aspect of the base is very clear.

For the sketches v—ix I am indebted to the staff of the Engineering section of the University.

gonal) or *Aṣṭāsra* (octagonal) and *Vṛtta* (circular),[42] though, as a general rule, it may be said that the shape of *Śikhara* will agree with the shape of the structure. Here, however, it may be mentioned that the shape of *Śikhara* is not to be understood in the sense of the shape of the whole *Śikhara,* but in the sense that a horizontal section of it will have the shape mentioned, that is to say, it will be a pyramid or dome over a square or octagonal base or a cone over a circular base. This shape has further been utilised to classify temples into broadly three classes, *Nāgara, Drāviḍa* and *Vesara.*[43] Both the height and the shape of *Śikhara* have been subject to modification, as is only natural, in the course of the development of architecture and this also has been noticed by Samskritic writers[44]: but, so far as the shape is concerned, all the variations,[45] such for instance, as rectangular, apsidal, elliptical, etc., are directly associated with, and derived from, the primary shapes mentioned above and these, therefore, do not necessitate, much less indicate, any change in the fundamentals of the conception and function of *Śikhara.*

From the foregoing it will be clear what *Śikhara* is: it corresponds to the roof of the temple.[46] This roof is to be constructed with the same materials as that of the cella: it may be built of bricks or stone or of wood[47] and, according to Nārayaṇa, the same is to be covered with sheets of metal or plaited leaves to protect it from the inclemencies of weather.[48]

The roofing which is the last item in the construction of *Śikhara* becomes an important piece of work, particularly in those areas which are subject to heavy seasonal rainfalls.[49] Thus in Kerala its heavy

42. TS. Chapter II, Verse 71.
43. Ibid ; compare also KS. XIX-19:

nāgare caturasraṁ tadvasvasraṁ drāviḍe śiraḥ |
vṛttaṁ vesaraharmye tu śiraso vartanaṁ kramāt ||

44. Compare the relevant sections in MS., KS., MM., etc.
45. TS. Verses 65-70. The shapes other than those mentioned above are *dīrghā-caturasra, gajapṛṣṭha,* and *vṛttāyata.* MS. (Chapter XVIII—lines 90-100) adds to these *dīrghaṣaḍasra* and *dīrghāṣṭāsra.*
46. This idea is made clear in the SR(M) as well as in the TS. and its commentary. Also DHA: p. 588. It need not be a spherical roof.
47. EAH: p. 49. Materials prescribed for the structure are three, wood, brick and stone. When it is made of the same material, it is called *Śudhā,* when two, *Miśra* and when three *Saṁkīrṇa.* A general convention requires that the cella and *Śikhara* must be of the same material.
48. TS. II-50:

varṣātapavāraṇakalyaiḥ śulbādikalpitaiḥ phalakaiḥ
sāreṣṭakābhirvā vimānaśikharaṃ tataḥ supidadhātu

49. Ibid.

seasonal rains twice a year make it very necessary that there should be good roofing for her temples.[50] Such a necessity does not exist so far as the east coast temples are concerned. Thus, wherever heavy rains do not exist, proper roofing is not necessary and consequently *Śikhara* is found ornamented in varied ways. It will hence be found that climatic conditions play a great part in determining the nature of *Śikhara* whether it is roofed or ornamented[51] and not the type of building with which it is associated. Thus we have in Kerala all the three types of structures, *Nāgara* (see figures xii and xiii), *Drāviḍa*, and *Veśara* (see figures xiv and xv)—we are using these terms in the sense in which Sanskrit writers use them—and yet in spite of that, *Śikhara* square or octagonal or circular, is left unadorned, but covered with copper sheets or tiles and not rarely in some cases with plaited leaf or straw, to make it safe from the inclemencies of climate, particularly rains. This, then, is a point of view that deserves to be seriously emphasised in the consideration of *Śikhara*, that it is influenced in its construction by climatic considerations, a fact that no writer has so far touched upon.[52]

Śikharas may accordingly be of four different kinds: it may be plain or ornamented, roofed or unroofed. In other words we can have (i) plain roofed *Śikharas*, (ii) ornate roofed *Śikharas*, (iii) unroofed plain *Śikharas* and (iv) unroofed ornate *Śikharas*. All the four varieties we find existing in different parts of India. The first two varieties we find in plenty in Kerala (cf. figures xiii and xiv). The third practically the simplest of the type we find at Pattadakkal and in the early Gupta and Gupta shrines, while the last variety—in its common curvilinear form—we meet with in plenty in North India (see figures vi and vii).

50. One is inclined to smile merely when one reads through what looks like an authoritative pronouncement on Malabar temples. (Cf. AIG: pp. 139-140). The writer must confess he has not heard of the important discovery in large numbers of 'square shrines surrounded by one or more covered paths of circumambulation' with 'no *śikhara* over the sanctum.' One who is familiar with that part of the country must necessarily say that the author is writing on things with which he is quite unfamiliar and that his description conveys a totally wrong idea of Malabar temples. Now with reference to *Śikhara*, it is very doubtful if any one of the practising architects—and there are even now many, clever and well-versed, who earn their daily bread by this profession—would accept the view that the square shrines existing there have no *Śikharas*. This description certainly does no credit either to the author or to the temples. Compare figures xii-xv.

51. DA: p. 9. Rightly has it been said that 'architectural species adapt themselves to materials, to societies and to climates.' The other factors that enter into the determination of this are the materials used in the construction. Thus wooden structures need the protection of a roof, but not structures of stone.

52. See DA: page 9.



Fig. vii.
PRIMITIVE BENARES TEMPLE



Fig. viii.
TYPICAL BENARES TEMPLE



Fig. ix.
TYPICAL ORISSAN TEMPLE

Figs. vii—ix : These are copied from Mitra's *Indo-Aryans*, Volume II. These explain the variations of a square base. Figure vii represents the primitive shrine at Benares, while viii and ix are typical of Orissan and Benares shrines.

Fig. x.



Fig. xi.

Fig. x: Photo by the author of the famous temple at Tanjore and forms a typical instance of a *Drāviḍa* shrine.

Fig. xi: Photo for the author of the shrine at Chidambaram, the square character of which is perfectly clear. It is a typical *Nāgara* shrine.



Fig. xii.



Fig. xiii.

Fig. xii: Photo for the author of the Kitholli temple at Cranganore, Cochin State, a Saivite shrine. Here we have a square *Śikhara* tiled without any adornment.

Fig. xiii: Photo for the author of the shrine at Trichur, Cochin State. Here is a copper sheeted *Nāgara* shrine with its square *Śikhara* adorned.



Fig. xiv.



Fig. xv.

Fig. xiv : Photo for the author of the central shrine at Trichur ; a typical *Vesara* shrine : a simple copper sheeted *Śikhara*.

Fig. xv : Photo by the author of the shrine at Irinjalakuda—a *Vesara* shrine with its *Śikhara* copper sheeted and plain.



Fig. xvi.

Fig. xvi: Photo supplied by Mr. Rajendra Shankar of the temples at Mamallapuram. Notice the *Dīrghacaturasra*, *Aṣṭāsra* and *Caturasra* types of shrines.



Fig. xvii.

Fig. xvii: Photo supplied by Mr. Rajendra Shankar of the temples at Mamallapuram. Here is a typical instance of the *Gajapṛṣṭha* type of temple.

Śikhara, then, is an essential part of Indian structures and it discharges an essential architectural function; at the same time its exact shape, roofed or ornamented, is decided with reference to its having, or not having, to discharge the functions of an ordinary roofing. This important aspect cannot be forgotten in the consideration of *Śikhara.* It will also be clear that the English terms such for instance as tower, or spire or steeple or Sanskrit terms like *vimāna* or *ratha* cannot with scientific precision be used to denote *Śikhara.*[53]

Now that we have tried to understand very generally what *Śikhara* is in its simplest form, we may here briefly notice some of the interesting discussions associated with *Nāgara Śikhara.* The most authoritative statement on the subject of the shapes of *Śikhara,* as affording a basis for the classification of types of Indian temples is, so far as we know, that of Coomaraswamy[54]: *Nāgara* shrines are characterised by the curvilinear *Śikharas*; *Drāviḍa* shrines, by terraced pyramidal towers of which the dome is called *Śikhara*; and the *Vesara* type, by a combination of both. This statement of the learned writer is very much open to question, if we may regard it from the point of view of the statements of various Saṁskritic authorities on the subject.[55]

All authorities are agreed that *Nāgara* shrines are characterised by a square *Śikhara*: in other words it will be a pyramid on a square base, ending in a point.[56] That this is the approved shape for *Nāgara* shrines is not merely a matter of theory, but is also something actually borne out in practice as is seen in the extant architectural remains of the earliest as well as the latest structures.[57] When it is said that the *Nāgara Śikhara* is a square, the idea is that any horizontal section of the same must be a square. This primary aspect being satisfied, it may have manifold shapes, (see figs. i-ix) and even the bulging curvilinear *Śikhara* can have a square base.[58] Hence it has to be borne in mind that because a *Śikhara* has a bulging curvilinear outline, this particular

53. It deserves to be mentioned that the criticism we have here made does not apply to the hybrid nomenclature of *Indo-aryan Śikharas* and *Śikhara shrines*': for it is open to any writer to use a related expression to refer to the bulging curvilinear type of *Nāgara Śikhara.*

54. HIIA: p. 107; also EB-XII: p. 223.

55. Cf. MM. MS., KS., SR., KA., TS., etc.

56. Compare the chapter on architecture in HIIA, AIG, etc.

57. See the illustrations in HIIA, Rupam 1924 etc.

58. R. L. Mitra suggests that the earliest structures in India and outside, such as Egypt, Assyria and Babylon, were square or rectangular. He says that the 'rectangular plan is the most prevalent, even though apparently the shapes may seem to be different' and later on adds that 'generally speaking temples in northern India are not merely rectangular in form, but cubical in the form of their body.' If then this is the earliest shape utilised for temple construction, it may reasonably

feature need not be against the view of the traditional theorists. This essential aspect does not seem to have attracted the attention of the writers of the subject, including the earliest as well as the latest, Fergusson on one side and Coomaraswamy and Bannerji and Ramaprasada Chanda on the other.[59] Now with this basic conception that every *Nāgara* shrine must have a square section, the variations in actual form may be manifold, based on a straight line or a convex line or a concave line; and every genuine *Nāgara* shrine, brought under the category of Indo-Aryan or *Āryavarta,* or *Śikhara* shrine—if it may be rightly termed *Nāgara* shrine—must have this square section, whatever else it may or may not have. From this point of view the *Mahābodhi* temple at Gaya has to be characterised as a *Nāgara* shrine, the square aspect of which is very clear in every photograph published.[60] We may not here say that the Buddhists preferred the stern straight line, while the Hindus had their partiality for the more graceful curvilinear line.[61] We may not here see, as Coomaraswamy rightly says, a distinction between Buddhistic and Hindu architecture,[62] but only the basic feature of the Indian architecture of the *Nāgara* type. When once this aspect is correctly grasped, the discussion[63] of the origins of the curvilinear *Śikhara* and other allied topics come to have no value as regards the origin of *Śik-*

be assumed that the other forms, hexagonal, octagonal, circular, apsidal, and oval are all derivatives from the original square shape. This view would gain additional strength when it is also remembered that even the circular and octagonal forms, i.e., *Vesara* and *Drāviḍa* types of Malabar temples have a square shape inside—a piece of information given me by my friend Mr. Varma, Maramattu Parisodhakan, Cochin State. Coomaraswamy gives a different explanation for the origin of *Nāgara* and *Drāviḍa* types from the same prototypes (Cf. HIA: p. 98) which *may* be original, but is certainly not very elucidatory.

59. Compare the chapter on architecture in AIG. Also Rupam 1924: pp. 2-3; also AIG: p. 132;

60. Compare the photographs in the IA, HIIA, Rupam.

61. HIEA.

62. HIIA: Rightly does Dr. Bhandarkar say that 'it is an absurd solecism to characterise any style as Buddhistic or Jaina or Hindu merely from the accident of its employment under the service of any of these creeds' and that, 'the main current of Indian craft tradition is non-sectarian in character.' (Rupam 20: p. 11).

63. See the relevant sections in HIIA, HIEA, Rupam 1922-24 EB: XII-p. 222. Havell suggests (HIA: pp. 58-59) that the 'curvilinear *Śikhara* may be the technical modification of the conical hut' and this may or may not be true. We agree with him however when he says that 'the bamboo frame-work of the temple car cannot be the prototype of the temple itself,' but we cannot agree with him when he says that its source was in Mesopotamia or Persia and it was introduced into India by Aryan conquerors. (ibid: p. 60). Both in theory and practice the basic idea is so simple that one need not seek a foreign source for the square *Śikhara,* particularly because we get this form in primitive architectural remains as well as in the huts of the primitive hill tribes.

hara of the *Nāgara* type is concerned, but only as regards the bulging nature of the *Nāgara Śikhara*. These are essentially different questions and the solution of the one—and even here no final solution is yet arrived at—is no solution of the other. Unfortunately the writers themselves were under the impression that they were discussing the general question of the origin of *Śikhara* and not a sub-variety of it, because no one of them has cared to discuss the concave variety of the same which also is possible on a square base and for which instances are not rare. And from the general point of view there is no question to be solved, if *Śikhara* is understood in the way in which it has to be understood in the statements of Indian architectural authorities. Naturally, therefore, this discussion *has not* elucidated, and indeed *cannot* elucidate, the point the writers wish to elucidate. The square *Śikhara* may have straight line or concave or convex edge and the development from the first to the second or third is only a natural process, the result of evolution,[64] which necessarily happens whenever the practice of architecture is in a flourishing condition.[65] It deserves to be pointed here that fully developed concavity is a rare feature in Indian structures, though partial concavity is not rarely found in the temples on the West Coast.

Now *Nāgara Śikhara* may have a straight line or convex line. If the temple stands in a place where climatic conditions require a complete protection of *Śikhara,* it will be tiled or roofed with metal sheets or tiles or plaited leaves; where, however, such protection is not necessary, it may be left as it is. In this case *Śikhara* will be bare and such a condition is against the aesthetic ideas of the Hindus and naturally, therefore, a lavish wealth of ornamentation is expended on it, which consists, as is usually the case in Indian architecture, in the reproduction in

64. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that our ancient shrines, vestiges of which are not now available, must originally have been made of wood. (Cf. H. FAIC: p. 23). We do subscribe to this view, for a partiality for wood probably originating from the ancient convention, is still found in Kerala. And in the use of this material we may find the main reason why available remains of ancient shrines point to the fact that originally we had only straight-edged pyramidal roofs, for, according to Prof. H. Kishida, 'the straight line is the most rational when the material used in wood' (Cf. JA: p. 26). The bulging curvilinear nature of the north Indian shrines came in, when stone or brick came to replace wood in construction; and this naturally appears at a later stage in Indian architecture.

65. Compare R-IA: pp. 62-63. The author suggests the idea, though it is not clear. Naturally therefore the bulging curvilinear type of *Nāgara Śikhara* is a later day development: Cf. Coomaraswamy, Bannerji, etc. We cannot, however, agree with Coomaraswamy when he says that in modern temples of *Nāgara* type 'there is a tendency for form of the *Śikhara* to become smooth and straight sided,' if indeed he means by this that the straight line is a development from the curvilinear line. Cf. HIIA: pp. 116-17.

part, or whole, of the temple itself[66] and sometimes in other ornamentation, such for instance as the sculptured figures of an 'explicitly erotic character' in the temple at Konarak,[67] 'or a series of arches which are not exactly *Caitya* windows'.[68]

We may here mention that we have not been able to understand the significance of the statement made by Coomaraswamy that 'the square *Śikhara* consists of clearly defined storeys each of considerable elevation.'[69] Apparently he seems to differentiate it from the curvilinear *Śikhara*. If so, he is evidently wrong, for a square *Śikhara* is always a *Nāgara* shrine, whatever our modern critics may say, and conversely every *Nāgara* shrine must have a square *Śikhara*.[70] Possibly the reference here is to a *Nāgara Śikhara* surmounting an edifice, having more than one floor or *Tala*.

Enough now has been said to show that *Śikhara* is not a later day addition in *Nāgara* shrines, as some great writers seem to hold,[71] but that it is as old as Indian shrines themselves. Secondly, its bulging or curvilinear nature[72] is not the essential character of *Nāgara Śikharas*, variously called the Indo-Aryan or *Āryavarta* shrines: it is a subsidiary feature built into the square *Śikhara* as a matter of ornamentation in the course of the development of Indian architecture, and this explains the absence of the same in earlier structures of the *Nāgara* type in North India as also the later day shrines in other parts of India. The statement of Coomaraswamy that *Nāgara Śikhara* is 'an accessory rather than an essential' and that 'it begins to appear in the later Gupta period',[73] is perfectly clear and rational, if by the term *Nāgara Śikhara* we understand the curvilinear type of *Nāgara Śikhara* and not *Nāgara Śikhara*

66. HIIA: p. 109; also EB: Vol. XII—p. 223; also HIEA: II: pp. 137, 147.
67. HIIA: p. 116
68. AIG: p. 134.
69. HIIA: p. 95.
70. It is clear from what has been said that the identification of *Nāgara* shrines as set forth in the TMSTA, is evidently wrong.
71. Such for instance as Coomaraswamy, Gangoly, Bannerji, Rama Prasada Chanda, etc.
72. All writers on Indian architecture have correctly understood the bulging curvilinear portion as the *Śikhara*. In striking contrast to this stands the view of the authors of TMSTA, who take *Āmalaka* as *Śikhara*! This view is obviously wrong for *Āmalaka* cannot be identified with *Śikhara*. See the writer's paper on *Āmalaka*, Volume I of COJ. pp. 189-196.
73. HIIA: p. 96; also AIG: p. 153; '*Śikhara* becomes a regular feature of Indian temples from the beginning of the 7th century A.D.' Compare also page 137. 'The origin of the *Śikhara* or spire in Indian temple architecture is much later than the domination of the early Gupta Emperors in North India.'

in general.[74] Similarly, we can easily follow him when he says that the Indo-Aryan *Śikhara*—he means the bulging curvilinear *Śikhara*—' is not directly derived from the primitive type of bamboo construction '[75] and that it is ' a later development '[76] of the original square *Śikhara,* as we would have it, and not as he says ' produced by the reduplication of the vertically compressed storeys '[77] the true significance of which we are unable to grasp. It will also be seen from what has been said that the various theories advanced by scholars to explain the origin of *Śikhara*[78] of the curvilinear type of *Nāgara Sikhara*[79] have no direct bearing on the subject of the origin of *Śikharas.*[80]

74. See note 64.
75. HIIA : p. 83.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Cf. Rupam 22 ; also HIIA : p. 83.
79. Rightly has it been said that 'each genuine phase of architecture is indissolubly connected with the architecture before and after it.' (EAWA : p. iv). And in the bulging curvilinear variety of *Nāgara Śikhara* which, it is said, is not found outside India, we have an *indigenous* development of the original square pyramidal *Śikhara.*
80. *Nāgara, Drāvida* and *Vesara Shrines* is the subject of a paper in preparation by the writer in collaboration with his friend and colleague, T. B. Nayar, M.A. (*Lond.*), Lecturer in History and Archaeology.

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தொல்காப்பிய ஆராய்ச்சி.

(முன் தொடர்ச்சி)

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தொல்—பொருள்—சூத். 427. (செய். சூத். 115)

> "ஒத்தாழிசையு மண்டில யாப்பும்
> குட்டமும் நேரடிக் கொட்டினவென்ப"

இதற்குப் பேராசிரியர், நச்சினார்க்கினியர், இளம்பூரணராகிய மூவரும் ஒன்றோடொன் றொவ்வாத மூன்று உரைகள் எழுதுகிறார்கள். முரணுடைய மூன்றுரைகளும் பொருந்துமாறு கருதி ஆசிரியர் ஒரு சூத்திர மமைத்திருக்கமாட்டார். ஆகவே இதன் மெய்ப்பொருள் காணமுயலுதல் முறையாகும். இவற்றுள் பேராசிரியர் கூறும் உரையாவது :—

"ஒத்தாழிசைக் கலியின்கண்ணும் மண்டிலயாப்பின்கண்ணும் குட்டம்வருங்கால், அளவடிக்குப் பொருந்திவரும் தத்தம் பாக்கள்."

இச்சூத்திரத்துக்கு இவ்வாறு பொருள் கொள்ளுதலில்வரும் முரண்பாடுகளுக்குச் சமாதானம் காணலரிது.

(i) முதலில், 'ஒத்தாழிசை', 'மண்டிலம்', 'குட்டம்' என்ற மூன்றனோடும் ஆசிரியர் தனித்தனியே எண்ணும்மை கொடுத்து, ஓராங்கே இம்மூன்றும் 'நேரடிக் கொட்டின' என ஒருபடியாகக் கூறுவதால், இவை தம்முள் ஒத்து நேரடிக்குப் பொருந்தும் என்பதே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாகும். இதற்கு மாறாக, இவற்றுள் 'குட்டத்தை' மட்டும் வேறுபிரித்து, "அஃது 'ஒத்தாழிசை, மண்டிலயாப்பு' எனுமிரண்டின்கண்ணும் வருங்கால்" என்றுரைப்பது எப்படிப் பொருந்தும்? குட்டத்தோடு ஆசிரியர் கூட்டிவைத்த உம்மையை வாளா உண்டு விழுங்கி ஒழிப்பது முறையா? அன்றியும், ஒத்தாழிசை, மண்டிலயாப்பு என்ற இரண்டும் குட்டத்தோடு ஒரு நிலையவாய்க் கூட்டி எண்ணப்பட்டு, எல்லாம் எழுவாயாக 'ஒட்டின' எனும் பயனிலை கொள்ளநிற்கவும், பேராசிரியர் முதலிரண்டையும் எழாம் வேற்றுமையாக்கி, இறுதிநின்ற குட்டத்தைமட்டும் எழுவாய்ப் பொருளதாக் கொண்டு அவ்வெழுவாய்க்குச் சூத்திரத்தில் எங்குமில்லாத 'வருங்கால்' எனுமுடியாததோர் எச்சப்பயனிலை படைத்துக் கூட்டுதற்கவசியமும் ஆதாரமும் காட்டி

விளக்கினரில்லை. இன்னும் "ஒட்டின" என்னும் பன்மைவினை, எண்ணும் மைகளா லிணைக்கப்பெற்ற ஒத்தாழிசை மண்டிலயாப்பு குட்டம் என்ற மூன்று எழுவாய்ச் சொற்களுக்கும் ஒத்த ஒரு பொதுப் பயனிலையாகப் பொருந்தி நிற்பவும், முன்னிரண்டை ஏழாம் வேற்றுமை யுருபுதந்து விலக்கிவிட்டு, அவ்விரண்டின் கண்ணும் குட்டம்வரின் அக்குட்டம் நேரடிக் கொட்டும் என ஒருமை எழுவாய்க்குப் பன்மைப் பயனிலை காட்டுவது தவறுகுமே! இனி ஈரிடத்தும் வருங் குட்டங்கள் என்று எழுவாய்க்கும் பன்மைகொள்ள அமையுமென்பார்க்குப் பல இடங்களில் வருதலால்மட்டும் ஒரு பொருள் பன்மையாகமாட்டாது; இரண்டிலும் வருவது குட்ட மென்ற தொன்றேயாகையால், அஃதமை யாதெனக்காட்டி மறுத்திடுக. இவ்விடர்ப்பாடு பலவும் பேராசிரியர் உரையில் விலக்கற்கில்லை. இவை தம்மளவி லேயே இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு இவ்வுரை பொருந்தாமையை இனிதுகாட்டும். எனில், இப்பொருளிலெழும் முரண்பாடுகளிம்மட்டிலமையா.

(ii) இடையடி குறைந்தமை குட்டமெனத் தம் சிறப்புரைப் பகுதியிலிவரே குட்டத்தின் இலக்கணஞ்சுட்டியுள்ளார். எனவே, நேரடியிற் குறைந்துவரும் குட்டம் நேரடிக்கொட்டும் என்பது முற்றும் பொருந்தாக் குற்றமாவதன்றிச் சொல்லோடு பொருந்தும் நல்லுரையாகாது.

(iii) இனி, நேரடியைத் தமக்குரிமை கொண்ட பாக்களும் இடையடி குறைந்து வருதலையும் கொள்ளுமென்பதையே இச்சூத்திரம் கூறவந்ததென்னின், அதுவுமமையாமை காட்டுவன். இது கூறுவதே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாயின் "நேரடிப்பாக்களில் குட்டமுந்தோன்றும்" எனச் சுருங்க வமையாமல், ஒத்தாழிசை முதலிய பாவகை எண்ணிப் பின்னும் நேரடிக்கு என விதந்து கூறல் மிகையாகும். ஒத்தாழிசையும் மண்டிலமாகிய ஆசிரியமும் நேரடியே கொள்ளுமாகலான், அவற்றின்கண் குட்டமும் வரும் என்று கூறுவதே போதும்; மீட்டும் "நேரடிக்கு" என்று கூட்டியுரைத்தல் வேண்டா.

(iv) 'ஒத்தாழிசையும், மண்டிலமும், கலியுமாசிரியமுமான பாவகைகளும் குட்டம் எவ்வகைப்பாவிலும் வரத்தகும் சீர்குறைந்த அடியும் என இவர்தம் உரையிற் கூறுவதால் இவற்றை ஆசிரியர் ஒருபடியாக வைத்தெண்ணினரென்பது அமைவுடைத்தன்று. எல்லாப் பாக்களிலும் வரும் ஒருவித அடியைக் கலி, ஆசிரிய முதலிய பாவகைகளோடு ஒத்து ஒரு சேர நிறுத்தி எண்ணுவது இயைபும் இலக்கண முறையு மாகாது. சீர்குறைந்த அடியான் 'குட்டம்' இன்னின்ன பாக்களில் வருமென லொன்று; அன்றி நேரடியான நாற்சீரடிகளோடு கூடி இடையிடையே வந்து பொருந்துவது முண்டு எனல் ஒன்று; இவ்விரண்டி லொரு இயல் முறையை விடுத்து, நாற்சீரடிவரும் பாவகைகளையும் கூறி, அவற்றெடு அப்பாக்களில் அருகி வந்தமையுமொரு சீர்குறைந்த அடிவிசேடத்தையும் உடனெருங்கு நிறுத்திக் கூறுதற்கு எவ்வகை அமைவும் முறையும் இன்றியமையாமையும் காணலரிது. ஆகவே அக்கருத்தால் ஆசிரியர் சூத்திரம் யாத்திருக்க மாட்டாரென்ப தொருதலை.

(v) அன்றியும், ஆசிரியமும் கலியும் நேரடியையே யன்றி அளவு குறைந்த அடிகளையுங் கொண்டு வருதலுண்டு என்று ஆசிரியர் முன்னரே பாக்களினடிபற்றிக் கூறும் உரிய இடத்தில் தக்க தனிச் சூத்திரங்களால் விளக்கிவிட்ட பிறகு மீட்டும் அச்செய்தியை இங்கு வறிதே மிகைபடக் கூறுரன்ரே? 'ஈற்றயலடி' 'இடையும் வரையார்' என்ற செய்யுளியல் 68, 69, ஆவது சூத்திரங்களில் ஆசிரியத்துக்கும் 'முச்சீர் முரற்கை' என்ற இவ்வியல் 70 ஆவது சூத்திரத்தில் கலிப்பாவிற்கும் குறைந்த அடிகள் வந்தமையுமென விளக்கப்பட்டுளது. ஆகவே இச்சூத்திரம் முன் கூறியதையே மீண்டுங் கூறவந்ததெனின், மிகையால் ஆசிரியர்க்குப் பிழைப் பூட்டும். அதனாலுமிப்பொருளிதற்குப் பொருந்தாமை யறியப்படும்.

(vi) இன்னும், இங்கு மண்டில மென்பது ஆசிரியமென்றுரைகாரர் கூறுவது சரியானல், இதற்குப் பின்வரும் "மண்டிலம் குட்டம் என்றிவை யிரண்டும் செந்தூக்கியல......" எனும் சூத்திரம் நகைத்தற்கிடனும். 'ஆசிரியமும் குட்டமும் ஆசிரிய இயல' என ஆசிரியர் ஓர் இலக்கணம் கூறுவரா? எனவே "மண்டில யாப்பு" என்பதால் ஆசிரியமல்லாத பிறிதொன்றையே ஆசிரியர் இங்குக்கூறக் கருதினர் என்பது தெளியக்கிடக்கிறது.

(vii) மேலும், ஆசிரிய முதலிய பாவகைகள்பற்றி முன் பலபட விளக்கி முடித்து, இச்சூத்திரமுதல் பின் 'கூற்று மாற்றமும்' என்னும் இச்செய்யுளியல் 156 ஆவது சூத்திரம் வரை முறையே கலியிலக்கணம் கூறுவதால், இச்சூத்திரத்தில் கலியோடு ஆசிரியத்தை மீட்டு மிழுத்துக் கூட்டிக் கூறக் காரணமில்லை. இச்சூத்திரம் கலியிலக்கணம் கூற எழுந்த தென்னுமல், 'பாவிலக்கணமே கூறுகின்றது' என்று உரைத்தொடக்கத்தில் பேராசிரியர் காட்டியதும், தாமிதற்குக் கொண்ட பொருளுக்குப் பொருந்த வேண்டிப் புனைந்து கூறியதன்றி வேறில்லை. எனவே இங்கு இனைய பலதடைமுரண்களுக்கிடமான இவ்வுரை பொருந்தாமைதெளிதலெளிது.

இனி, நச்சினர்க்கினியரும் இளம்பூரணரும் இச்சூத்திரத்தில், பேராசிரியரைப் போலக் 'குட்டமும்' என்பதனும்மையைக் கழித்தொதுக்காமல், எண்ணும்மையாகவே கொண்டனர். எனினும் நச்சினர்க்கினியர் குட்டத்தைக் குறைந்து வருமடியெனவே கொண்டு, ஒத்தாழிசை, மண்டிலயாப்பு, சீர்குறைந்து வரும் குட்டம் ஆகிய மூன்றும் நேரடியான நாற்சீரடிக்குப் பொருந்தின' என்று பொருள் கூறினர்.

பேராசிரியர் மண்டில யாப்பை ஆசிரியமாகமட்டுங் கொள்ள, நச்சினர்க்கினியர் அதை மண்டலித்து வரும் ஆசிரியமும் வெண்பாவுமாகக் கூறினர். எனவே 'குட்டமும்' என்பதில் உம்மையை யொழிக்காமல் அதனை எண்ணும்மையாக வைத்து, அதையும் மற்ற முன்னிரண்டனேடு கூட்டி எண்ணியதும், மண்டிலயாப்பில் ஆசிரியத்தோடு வெண்பாவையும் சேர்த்தெண்ணியதுமான இரண்டுவேற்றுமை தவிர, பிறவாற்றுல் பேராசிரியர்போலவே இச்சூத்திரத்துக்கு இவரும்

பொருளமைத்து, ஒத்தாழிசைமுதல் சீர்குறைந்தகுட்டமீருக மூன்றும் நாற்சீரடிக்குப் பொருந்திவருமெனவே பொருள் கூறுவதால்மேலே காட்டிய பேராசிரியர் உரையைமறுக்கும் தடைமுரண்களில் முதலது நீங்கப் பிறவனைத்தும் இவருரையையும் மறுப்பனவாகும்.

இனி, இளம்பூரணர் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குக் கூறும் உரை மற்றிருவர் உரையிற் கண்ட பல தவறுகளைக் கொள்ளாமல் நடக்கின்றது ; குட்டமும் என்பதில் உள்ள உம்மையைப் பேராசிரியர் உரைபோல ஒழித்தொதுக்காமல் உள்ளபடிக் கொள்ளுகிறது. பேராசிரியர் நச்சினார்க்கினியர் உரைகளிற் போலக் குட்டத்தைச் சீர் குறைந்த அடியென்று கொண்டு, குறைந்த அடி நேரடிக்குப் பொருந்துமென ஒவ்வாவுரை கூறி நல்ல சூத்திரத்தை யல்லதாகச் செய்யாமற் குட்டத்தைக் கலி யுறுப்பான தரவெனக்காட்டிச் செவ்வமைதி பேணுகின்றது. எனில், மண்டிலத்தை மற்றிருவர் போலவே, இவரும் ஆசிரியமெனக் கூறுவதுமட்டும் அமைவுடைத் தாகாது.

மேலே பேராசிரியர் உரையை யாராயுங்கால் காட்டிய (v)-(vi) ஆவது முரண்பாடுகள் இவருரைக்கும் தடையாக நிற்கும். ஆசிரியத்திற்கு வரும் அடிவகைகளெல்லாம் முன்செய்யுளியல் 52, 53, 67, 68, 69 ஆவது சூத்திரங் களில் உலப்பக்கூறி விளக்கி விட்டதால் அதற்கு நேரடி பொருந்து மென்று இங்கு ஆசிரியர் மீட்டும் கூறுவதாகக் கொள்ளுதல் பொருந்தாது. மேலுமிச்சூத்திரம் கலியிலக்கணப்பகுதியின் முதற் சூத்திரமாதலானும் இதில் கலியன்றி ஆசிரிய உறுப்பை இங்குக் கூறற்கில்லை. இவருரையிற் குறைவு இவ்வளவே. மற்றிருவர் போலாது இச்சூத்திரம் சீர்குறைந்த அடியைக் குறியாமல் நேரடி பயிலும் பாவுறுப் புக்களையே சுட்டும் நோக்குடையதென இளம்பூரணர்கண்டு கூறினது பாராட் டத் தக்கது.

இனி, இச்சூத்திரம் நுதலும் நேரிய பொருள் தெளிதலெளிதாகும். இதற்கு முன்னெல்லாம் பிறபாவகை யிலக்கணங்கூறி முடித்து ஆசிரியர் இது முதல் 156 ஆவது சூத்திரம்வரை கலியிலக்கணம் வகுத்துச் செல்லுவதால், இதில் வரும் பகுதி யெல்லாம் கலியுறுப்புக்களாகவே கருதப்படல் வேண்டும்; முதலு மிறுதியுமான ஒத்தாழிசையும் குட்டமும் (தரவும்) கலியுறுப்புக்களாகலான், இடை நிற்கும் மண்டிலயாப்புமட்டும் கலியல்லாத ஆசிரியமாகக் கருதுதல் பொருந்தாது. அதுவும் கலியுறுப்பாதலே அமைவுடைத்தாம்.

(i) இச்சூத்திரங் கூறு மூன்றனுள் முதல் நிற்கும் 'ஒத்தாழிசை' 'கலி நால் வகை' யுளொன்றான கலிப்பாவன்று ; கலிப்பாவகைகளில் வரும் ஒத்து மூன்றிய லும் தாழிசையுறுப்பேயாகும். (செய். சூ-142). இவ்வாறன்றி, ஒத்தாழிசைக் கலிப்பாவையே குறிப்பதாகக் கொள்ளின் அப்பா முழுதும் அப்பாவுறுப்புக்களனைத் தும் நேரடி கொள்ளுமென்ற நியதியில்லாமையால், நாற்சீரடி கொண்டு நடக்கும் தாழிசையுறுப்புமட்டுமே இக்குச் சுட்டப்பட்ட தென்பதே பொருந்துவதாம்.

(ii) இறுதி நிற்கும் 'குட்டம்' என்பது கலியுறுப்பான தரவாகும். "குட்டம் எனினும் தரவெனினும் ஒக்கும்" என்று இளம்பூரணர் இச்சூத்திரவுரையில் கூறு தல் கவனிக்கத்தக்கது.

(iii) இனி இவற்றினிடை நிற்கும் மண்டிலயாப்பும் அடைவே 'அராக' மென்னுங் கலியுறுப்பே யாதல் வேண்டும்.

"'அராகம்' என்பது "அறுதுகடுகிச்சேறல்" என்று பேராசிரியர் 'எருத்தே கொச்சக' மென்னும் செய்யுளியல் 152 ஆவது சூத்திர உரையில் விளக்கியுள்ளார்.

உருண்டோடும் நடையுடைமை அராக வியல்பு.

"உருட்டுவண்ண மராகந் தொடுக்கும்" என்பர் ஆசிரியர் தொல்காப்பிய னரும் (செய். 232).

இனி, 'மண்டிலம்' என்பது 'வட்டமாயோடல்' அல்லது 'உருண்டோடல்' எனும் பொருட்டாம். (2, 3 பிங்கலம் 3919) (மதுரைத்தமிழ்ச்சங்க அகராதி 3 ஆம் தொகுதி பக்கம் 1601) புறநானூற்றுச் செய்யுள். 30ல் 'பரிப்புச் சூழ்ந்த மண்டி லம்' என்றும், புறப் பொருள் வெண்பாமாலே, வென்றிப்படலத்தில் "செலவொடு மண்டிலம் சென்று" என்றும், வருதலுங்காண்க. ஆகவே, மண்டலித்து அறுது உருண்டோடும் இயல்புடைய அராகமே மண்டிலயாப்பெனச் சுட்டப் பெறுவது அமைவுடைத்தாகும்.

இனி, இச்சூத்திரப்பொருள் வருமாறு:—

ஒத்தாழிசை, அராகம், தரவு என்ற மூன்றுகலியுறுப்புக்களும் நாற்சீரடி யான நேரடி பொருந்தி வருவனவாம் என்று புலவர் கூறுவர்.

இனி இப்பொருளே இதையடுத்து வரும் இரண்டு செய்யுளியற் சூத்திரங் களுக்கு மியைபுடையதாகும் என்பதை அவ்வச்சூத்திரப் பொருளாராய்வுழிக் காட் டுவன்.

செய்-சூ. 116

'குட்டம் எருத்தடி யுடைத்துமாகும்'

"தரவில் ஈற்றயலடி குறைந்து வரும்' என்பதே இதன் பொருளென உரை யாசிரியரும் பேராசிரியருங் கூறுவர்.

இனி, நச்சினர்க்கினியரோ இதில் 'எருத்தை'த் தரவென்றும் குட்டத்தைக் குறைந்த அடியென்றும் தாம் மேற் சூத்திரத்தில் கொண்டபடியே ஈண்டும் கூறித் "தரவினது ஈற்றடி குறைந்து வருதலே யுடைத்தாம்" என்று இங்குப் பொருள் கூறினர். 'எருத்து' எனுஞ் சொல் ஈற்றயலடிக்காதல்; தரவுக்காதல் பெயராகும். நச்சினர்க்கினியர் இங்கு "எருத்தை"த் தரவெனக்கொண்ட நிலையில், இச்சூத்திரத்

தில், அவர் தரும் பொருளுக்கு அவசியமான ஈற்றடிசுட்டுஞ் சொல் வேறின்மையால், இவர் பொருளுக்குச் சூத்திரம் இடந்தராமை வெளிப்படை.

இதில் 'குட்டத்தை'யே உரையாசிரியர் கூறியபடித் தரவெனக் கொள்ளின் 'குட்டம்' எனும் பெயரெழுவாய்க்குப் பயனிலையடையாய் நிற்கும் 'எருத்தடி' என்பது 'ஈற்றயலடி' எனும் பொருள் தருவது இனிது விளங்குவதாகும். இதனால், மேற் சூத்திரத்தில் நேரடிகொள்ளுமென்ற தரவின் ஈற்றயலடி ஒரோவழிச் சீர் குறைந்த அடியுமேற்கு மென்பதைத் தெரிவிக்கவே இச்சூத்திரம் எழுந்ததாகும். இப்படி ஈற்றயலடி குறைந்துவருதல் சிறுவரவிற்றென்று சுட்டற்கே, 'உடைத்துமாகும்' என இதில் ஆசிரியர் உம்மை கூட்டியுரைத்துள்ளார்.

பேராசிரியர் 'குட்டம் எருத்தடியின் கண்ணும்வரும்' என்று இதற்குப் பொருள்கூறி, "குட்டம் இடைவருவதன்றி ஒருபாட்டின் ஈற்றயலடிக் கண்ணே வந்தொழிதலும் உண்டு" எனச் சிறப்புரையானும் அப்பொருளை வலியுறுத்தினர். எருத்தடியை "ஈற்றயலடி" என்றிவர் கொண்டது பொருந்தும். குட்டம் குறைந்தவடியென்றால் இவர் கருத்தின்படி முந்திய சூத்திரத்தானே இவ்விலக்கணமடங்குமே. மீட்டொரு சூத்திரமிங்கு வேண்டா. நாற்சீரடிப்பாக்களில் எங்கும் குறைந்தவடி வருமென்று அதற்கிவர் பொருள்கூறினதாலேயே ஈற்றயலில் குட்டம் வரலாமென்பது போதருமே.

இனி, இவர்கருத்தின்படி இச்சூத்திரமே பொதுவாக எப்பாவினும் ஈற்றயலடி குட்டமாக (குறைந்ததாக) வரும் என விதிப்பதாகும். 'ஈற்றயலடியே ஆசிரியமருங்கிற்றோற்ற முச்சீர்த்தாகுமென்ப' (செய்-சூ. 68) என்று முன் தெளிவாகக் கூறிவிட்டாராகையால் இங்கு அவ்வாசிரியமல்லாத வேறு இன்னபாவினீற்றயலினும் குறைந்த குட்டம் வருமென விளக்காமல் வாளா கூறினராசிரியர். ஆகவே அவ்வாறு குற்றப் பட வரும் பொருளை இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குரியதாக ஆசிரியர் கருதியிராரென்பது ஒருதலை.

செய்-சூ. 117

'மண்டிலம் குட்டம் என்றிவையிரண்டும்
செந்தூக் கியல வென்மனார் புலவர்'

இதற்குப் பேராசிரியர் கூறும் பொருளாவது :—

"மேற்கூறிய மூன்றனையும் இன்னபாவென்பது உணர்த்தினன். அவற்றுள் இறுதிநின்ற மண்டிலமுங் குட்டமும் ஆசிரியப்பாவை உறுப்பாக உடைய" என்றவாறு.

இனி, நச்சினார்க்கினியரும், 'மண்டிலம்', 'குட்ட' மென்று முற்கூறியவையிரண்டும் ஆசிரியப்பாவின் கண்ணே பயில நடக்கும் என்று கூறுவர்புலவர்' என்றே இதற்குப்பொருள் கூறினர்.

இவ்விருவருரையிலுங் காணப்படும் முரண்பாடுகள் பலவாம். மண்டிலம், குட்டம் என்பவற்றிற்குரிய பொருளை இவ்வுரைகார ரிருவரும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குத் தாம் கூறும் உரையில் விளக்கவில்லை. முந்திய சூத்திரத்தில் 'மண்டிலத்தை' ஆசிரியமெனவும், குட்டத்தைக் குறைந்த அடியெனவும் இவர்கள் கூறியதால், அதுவே போதும்; அப்பொருளே இச்சூத்திரத்திலுமச்சொற்களுக்கு இவர் கொண்டா ரென்பதமையுமெனில், அது பொருந்தாமை காண்போம்.

முதலில் 'மண்டிலம்' என்பதே ஆசிரியப் பாவாமானால், அதனைச் செந்தூக் கியல என ஆசிரியர் கூறுவது எவ்வாறு இயையும்? செந்தூக்கு என்பதும் ஆசிரி யத்தையே குறிப்பதாம். 'செந்தூக்கென்பது ஆசிரியப்பா என்றவாறு' என்று பேராசிரியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ், சிறப்புரையில் வற்புறுத்தினர். முன், 'வஞ்சித் தூக்கே செந்தூக்கியற்றே' எனும் 71 ஆவது சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ் உரையிலும், செந் தூக்கென்பதை இவ்வுரைகாரரும் ஆசிரியமெனவே கூறியமைத்தது மிங்குச் சிந்திக் கத்தக்கது..எனவே 'ஆசிரியம் ஆசிரியத்தி னியல்புடையது' என இதில் ஆசிரி யர் கூறினர் என்பது நகைக்கிடனாவதன்றி நல்ல பொருளெதுவும் தருவதில்லை.

(2) இனி "ஆசிரியமும் குட்டமும் ஆசிரியப்பாவினை யுறுப்பாக உடைய" எனும் பேராசிரியர் கூற்றுப் பெரிதும் பிழைபடுவதாகும். ஆசிரியமாகிய 'மண்டிலம்' ஆசிரியப்பாவினையே தனக்கு உறுப்பாகக் கொள்ளுமா றெங்ஙனம் ஆகும்? ஒரு கால் 'மண்டிலம்' என்பது ஆசிரியப்பாவகைகளுள் சிலவாகிய 'நிலை மண்டலம்' 'அடிமறி மண்டல' மென்ற மண்டலித்துவரு மிரண்டனையே குறிக்குமெனினும், ஆசிரியப்பாவினுள் அதன் சிலவகையாயடங்கு மிவ்விரண்டும் தம்மினும் விரிந்த செந்தூக்கா மாசிரியப்பாவினைத் தமக்கு உறுப்பாயுடைய என்பதும் பொருந்தாது.

இதுவே போல, "ஒத்தாழிசையாகிற் கலிப்பாவினை உறுப்பாகவுடைய" என இவர் கூறுவதும் பழுதேயாகும். 'ஒத்தாழிசைக்கலி' கலிப்பாவகை நான்கனுள் ஒன்றாகும். "ஒத்தாழிசை" கலிப்பாக்களில் வரும் பலவுறுப்புக்களில் ஒருறுப்பே யாகும். எதுவாயினும் கலிப்பாவினை யுறுப்பியாகவும், ஒத்தாழிசையை யுறுப்பாக வும் கூறலாமன்றிக் கலிப்பாவினை ஒத்தாழிசைக்கு உறுப்பெனல் ஒருவகையானும் பொருந்தாது. அன்றியும்

(3) "குட்டத்தை" முன் 'ஒத்தாழிசையும்' எனவரும் சூத்திரத்தில் சீர் குறைந்துவரும் அடியென்று கூறிவைத்து, இச்சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ்ச் சிறப்புரையில் பேராசிரியர்,"இணைக்குறள், நேரிசை" என்ற 'இரண்டு ஆசிரியப்பாவகைகளே இரு வகைக் 'குட்டமாம்' என்று குறிப்பது, முன்னுக்குப் பின் முரண்படக் கூறும் குற்ற மாகும். 'குட்டம்', சீர்குறைந்த அடியையாதல், நேரிசை முதலிய ஆசிரியப் பாவ கையையாதல் குறித்தல்வேண்டும். இரண்டில் யாதானு மொன்றையே இச்சூத்திரங் களில் வரும் குட்டத்திற்குப் பொருளாகத் துணிவதைவிட்டு, முன் சூத்திரத்தில் குறைந்தஅடி எனவும், இச்சூத்திரத்திலதையே ஆசிரியப்பாவகை எனவும் கொள்ளு

தல் இலக்கண அமைவுடைத்தன்றாகும். பல வேறு பொருளில் ஒரே சொல்லை இலக்கண விதிகளில் ஆசிரியர் கூறி மயங்கவைப்பாரல்லர்.

(4) மேலும் 'குட்டத்தை' ஆசிரியப்பாவகை எனக் கொள்ளின், அப்பொருள் இங்கு ஆசிரியரின் இரு சூத்திரங்களையும் அலமரச்செய்யும். முன்னைச் சூத்திரத்தில், ஆசிரியப்பாவகை நான்கினையும் குறிப்பது ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாயின், 'ஒத்தாழிசையும் ஆசிரியப்பாவும்' என்று தெளிவாகக் கூறுவதை விட்டுத் தாம் எங்கும் பொருளை அல்லது இலக்கணத்தை விளக்கிக்காட்டாத "மண்டிலம், குட்டம்" என இரண்டு சொற்கள் பெய்து, ஆசிரியமொன்றைச் சுட்டமாட்டார். அதுவுமன்றி, பேராசிரியரிங்குக் கூறுமாறு, மண்டிலம், நாற்சீரடியே யாத்துவரும் நிலைமண்டில அடிமறிமண்டில ஆசிரியப்பாவகைகளை மட்டுஞ்சுட்டி, குட்டம், குறைந்த அடிகளை இடையிடைமிடைந்துயாத்த இணைக்குறள் நேரிசை ஆசிரியப்பாவகைகளையே குறிப்பதாயின் "மண்டிலத்தின்கண் குட்டம் வருங்கால்" என்று முன்சூத்திரத்தின் கீழ்ப் பேராசிரியர் கூறியது பொருந்தாக் கூற்றாகிமுடியும். மண்டில ஆசிரியப் பாக்களில், குட்டம் வருமாறில்லை. குட்டமாவன, மண்டிலப் பாவாகா. எனைத்து வகையானும் இவர் தம் கூற்றுக்கள் இடர்ப்பட்டழியும்.

இனி, முன் சூத்திரத்தில், 'நாற்சீரடியான மண்டலித்து வரும் ஆசிரியமும் வெண்பாவும் "மண்டிலத்துளடங்குமென விளக்கிய நச்சினார்க்கினியர், அதை மறந்தோ அல்லது அதற்கு மாறாகவோ, இச்சூத்திரவுரையில், அவ்விருபாக்களையு மடக்கிய மண்டிலம் அவற்றுளொன்றேயான 'ஆசிரியப்பாவின்கண் பயில நடக்கும் தன்மையை யுடைய" எனக் கூறுவதும் வியப்பையே விளைப்பதாகும். இவை பலவற்றானும் இச்சூத்திரத்திற்கு இவ்விருவர் தரும் உரையும் தக்கதன்று எனத் தெளியலாகும்.

இனி இதற்கு இளம்பூரணர் கூறும் உரையாவது :—"மண்டிலமாகக் கூறப் படும் பாவும் குட்டமெனக் கூறப்படும் பாவும் அகவலோசையியல்பின", இவர் மண்டிலத்தை ஆசிரியமெனவும், குட்டத்தைத் தரவெனவும் முன் சூத்திரத்திற் கூறினதால், அப்பொருளே இங்குங் கருதினரென்பதே பொருத்தமாகும். அவ்வாறு கொள்ளுவதில் மற்றை யுரைகாரருக்குக்காட்டிய தடைமுரண்களில் சில இவ்வுரையமைவின்மையை வலியுறுத்தும். ஆகையால், இதில் 'மண்டிலத்தை' அடிமண்டிலித்துவரும் அராகமாகவும், 'குட்டத்'தை யிவர் கூறியவாறே தரவெனவுங் கொள்ளுவதே இச்சூத்திரத்திற்குஅல்லலற்ற நல்ல பொருளமைவு அளிப்பதாகும்.

முன் 115 ஆவது சூத்திரத்தால் தாழிசை, அராகம், தரவு எனும் மூன்று கலியுறுப்புக்களும் அளவடிபயின்று வருமென விளக்கி, அதையடுத்து 116 ஆவது சூத்திரத்தில், அம்மூன்றனு ளொன்றான தரவு பெரும்பாலும் நேரடி பெறுவதியல் பாயினும், ஒரோவழி அதன் ஈற்றயலடி குறைந்து வருவதுமுண்டு எனத் தெரித்து

இச்சூத்திரத்தால் அத்தரவொழிய, தாழிசை, அராகமெனுங் கலியுறுப்பிரண்டும் செந்தூக்கியல் பெற்று நடக்கும் என்று ஆசிரியர் விளக்கினர் எனக் கொள்வதே இம்மூன்று சூத்திரங்களுக்கும் ஒத்து முரணற்று ஏற்புடைய பொருட்பொருத்தம் தருவதாகும். எனவே "அராகம், தரவு என்ற இவ்விரண்டு கலியுறுப்புக்களும் ஆசிரியத்தூக்கினியல் பெற்று நடக்குந் தன்மையன, என்று புலவர் கூறுப" என்பதே இச்சூத்திரத்துக்குப் பொருந்தும் பொருளாகும்.

தொல். பொருள். சூத்-62. (புறத்திணை சூத்-7)

"எஞ்சாமண்ணசை வேந்தனை வேந்தன்
அஞ்சுதகத் தலைச் சென்றடல் குறித்தன்று"

இது, முல்லைக்குப்புறனென்ற வஞ்சித்திணையியல்பை விளக்கும் சூத்திரம். இதற்கு நச்சினர்க்கினியர் கூறும்பொருளாவது :—

"எஞ்சாமண்ணசை=இருபெருவேந்தர்க்கும் இடையீடாகிய மண்ணிடத்து வேட்கையானே, அஞ்சுதகத்தலைச்சென்று=ஆண்டு வாழ்வோர்க்கு அஞ்சுதல் உண்டாக அந்நாட்டிடத்தே சென்று, அடல்குறித்தன்று=ஒருவேந்தனை ஒருவேந்தன் கொற்றங்கோடல் மாத்திரைத்து வஞ்சித்திணை-என்றவாறு" இவ்வுரையை விளக்கி நச்சினர்க்கினியர் தரும் சிறப்புரை வருமாறு :—

"ஒருவன் மண்ணசையானே மேற்சென்றால், அவனும் அம்மண் அழியாமற் காத்தற்கு எதிரே வருதலின், இருவர்க்கும் மண்ணசையான் மேற்சேறலுளதாகலின், அவ்விருவரும் வஞ்சிவேந்தராவ ரென்றுணர்க"

இவ்வுரை, சூத்திரச்சொல்லமைப்புக்குப் பொருந்தாமையோடு, வஞ்சியிலக்கணத்தை இழிதகுபழிமேற் கொள்ளும் பிழையாகவும் பண்ணுகிறது. "எஞ்சா மண்ணசை" என்ற தொடரை அதை அடுத்து நிற்கும் "வேந்தனை" என்ற இரண்டாம் வேற்றுமைச் சொல்லுக்கு மட்டும் அடையாக்கியமையால், அதற்கும், பின்னிற்கும் "வேந்தன்" என்ற எழுவாய்ச் சொல்லுக்குமேற்றி, அவ்வேந்தன் படையெடுத்து மேற்செல்லுதற்குக் காரணமே அயல் மன்னர் மண்ணிடத்து வேட்கையாகும், என்றார் நச்சினர்க்கினியர். "மேற்செல்லும் வஞ்சி வேந்தன் போர்கருதிப் படையெடுக்கும் நோக்கமே பிறவேந்தன் மண்ணைக்கவரும் வேட்கைதான்" என்று கூறுவதால், நாகரிக உலகம் மதிக்கும் போரறம் பிழைத்துத், தக்க காரணமின்றித் தவறெதுவுமில்லாத பிற மன்னர் நாட்டை வலியுடையான் தணியாத மண்ணசையாலே படையெடுத்துச் சென்று வென்றுகோடலே 'வஞ்சி' எனக் காட்டி அவ்வொழுக்கத்தைப் பழிக்கத்தகும் பிழையாக்கி முடிப்பதொன்றே பலனாகும்.

இவ்வாறு வலிச்செருக்கால் தவறற்ற பிறர் நாட்டைப் பறிப்பதுலகியலில் உண்டெனினும், அவ்வியலை வெறுத்து விளக்குவதை விட்டு, அறனாற்றி மூத்த

அறிவுடைய தொல்காப்பியர் போன்ற ஆசிரியர் அதை வேந்தர் கையாளத்தகும் போரறமாக்கி "வஞ்சித்திணை" என்று சிறப்பித்துக் கூறியிருக்க மாட்டார். நச்சினார்க் கினியர் கொள்கை தொல்காப்பியர் கருத்தன்றென்பதை அவர் சூத்திரச்சொல் லமைப்பே தெற்றெனத் தெளிப்பதாகும். "எஞ்சாமண்ணசையா லிருவேந்தர்" என்பது போலக் கூறாமல் "எஞ்சாமண்ணசை வேந்தனை" என்றே சூத்திரிப்ப தாலேயே, ஆசிரியர் கருத்து அஃதன்றென்பது வெளிப்படை. படைகொண்டு மேற்செல்லுதற்குப் போதியகாரணம் தனக்குரிய நாடு போதாமல் பிறர்நாட்டில் தணியாதவேட்கையுடைய அறமற்ற அயன்மன்னரைப் பொருதடக்கும் ஆண்மை யறமேயாகும். அவ்வாறடக்காவிடின் எஞ்சாமண்ணசை யுடையார் வஞ்சத்தால் வலிமிக வளர்த்து வலிகுறைந்த பிறர் நாட்டைக் கவருவ ராகையால், காலத்தே சென்று அத்தகையாரை வென்றடக்கி யாண்மை யறமாற்றுதல் போற்றத்தகும் போரறமாகும். அவ்வறமே தமிழ் மக்கள் கையாண்ட வஞ்சித்திணை எனத் தொல் காப்பியர் இச்சூத்திரத்தினிது விளக்கியுள்ளார். எனவே இச்சூத்திரத்துக்குரிய பொருளிதுவேயாகும்.

பொருள் :—"தணியாத மண்ணாசையுடைய வொரு வேந்தனை, வீரமுடைய வேறு வேந்தன் (முன்னவனின் தவறெண்ண நிறைவேறாதபடி, அவன் குற்ற நெஞ்சம் அஞ்சுமாறு படைகொண்டு அவனைப் பொருதடக்க மேற் செல்லுதலையே வஞ்சித்திணை குறிப்பதாகும்" இளம்பூரணரும் இதுவே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாகக் கொண்டு உரை கூறுகின்றார். "ஒழியாத மண்ணை நச்சுதலையுடைய வேந்தனை மற்றொரு வேந்தன் அஞ்சுதகத்தலைச் சென்றடல் குறித்தது" என்பது அவருரை. இப்பொருள் இச்சூத்திரச் சொற்கிடக்கையாற் றெளிவாகவும், அதை விலக்கி "எஞ்சாமண்ணசை"யை மேற்செல்லும் வஞ்சிவேந்தனுக்கு ஏற்றிக் கூறினது, அறங்கருதா மறம்பேணி அயலார் மண்ணிலாசை கூர்ந்து போர்மேற்கொள்ளுவதைப் போற்றத்தகும் வேந்தரொழுக்க மெனப் பேசும் ஒரு சில வடநூலார் கூற்றை இங்கு இத்தமிழரின் தவறற்ற போரறம் விளக்கும் இப்புறத்திணைச் சூத்திரத்துப் பொரு ளாகக் காட்டமுயலும் விருப்பமேயாகும். இம்முயற்சி காரணமாக நச்சினார்க்கினியர் படைத்துக் கூறும் சிறப்புரையில் இன்னும் சில தவறு காணப் பெறுவதுமியல் பாகும். அல்லதனை நல்லதெனச் சொல்லவரும் அல்லல்களுக் கெல்லையில்லை யென்பதன் உண்மையை இங்கிவர் சிறப்புரைச்செய்திகள் வலியுறுத்துகின்றன. "எஞ்சாமண்ணசை" அக்குற்றமுடையான் நாட்டின்மேல், அதை வெறுக்கும் வேந்தனைப் படையெடுக்கச் செய்யும் என விளக்குமாசிரியர் கருத்தை விடுத்து, மண்ணசையே போர்விரும்பி மேற்செல்லும் வஞ்சியொழுக்கத்துக்குப் போதிய நன்னோக்கமாகும்-எனக் காட்டப்புகுந்து, அதை விளக்கச் சிறப்புரை கூறுமிடத்து, நச்சினார்க்கினியரைத் தொடரும் இடர்ப்பாடுகள் பல.

(I) முதலில் படையெடுத்து மேற்செல்லும் வேந்தனை, எஞ்சாமண்ணசை யால் அவ்வாறு சென்றானென்று கூறி அவனைத் தவறுடையனாக்கிய குற்றம் மேலே காட்டப்பட்டது.

(II) இனி அவர் சிறப்புரையில் காணும் வேறு தவறுகளை இங்குக் காட்டுவன். பிறர் மண் உண்ணும் தணியாத தன் வேட்கை தன்னாட்டின்மேல் அயல் வேந்தன் படையெடையை உண்டு பண்ணியதெனும் நேரிய பொருளை விலக்கி மண்ணசையால் வந்த மாற்றானைத் தானும் தன்மண் காத்தல் காரணமாய் எதிர்த்து வருவானென்று சூத்திரத்தில் இரண்டாம் வேற்றுமையில் வரும், 'வேந்தனை' நச்சினார்க்கினியர் சுட்டலானார். எனில் மூலத்தில் "எஞ்சாமண்ணசை வேந்தனை" என்றிருப்பதால், மண்ணசையை அறவே தனக்கு இல்லாமல் விலக்குமாறில்லை. அதனால், தன்னாட்டின்மேற் படையெடுப்பை விளைக்கத் தான் கொண்டிருந்த மண் வேட்கையே மூலகாரணமென்று கொள்வதற்கு மாறாக, இவன் மண்ணைவேட்டு வந்த பிறவேந்தனை இவன் தன் மண்காக்கும் நோக்கொடு எதிர்வந்துதாக்குவன் என உரைகூறி அப்படித் தற்காப்பதும் மண்ணசை காரணமான வஞ்சியாகுமெனச் சிறப்புரையில் வற்புறுத்தலானார். இதிலெழும் ஏதங்களை அவர் கருதினாரில்லை போலும். முதலில் மண்ணாசைக் குற்றமிலனாகில் படையெடுத்து வந்த பகை வேந்தனை எதிர்த்துவருவது தன்மண் அழியாமற்காக்கும் அறமென்று கூறும் இவரே அத்தற்காப்புப் போர்விருப்பை, 'மண்ணசையான் மேற்சேறல்" என்று கூறுவதெவ்வாறு பொருந்தும்? தன்மண்ணைக் கவரவரும் பகைவனை எதிர்ப்பது ஆண்மையறமாகுமன்றி மண்ணாசைக் குற்றமாகாதே! மண்ணசையைக்குற்றமென்று கொள்ளாமல் மன்னருக்கு நல்லறமென்று கூறப்புகுவதால், இவ்வாறு தன்னாடழியாமற் செய்யும் காப்புப்போரையும் மண்ணசைப்போரெனக் கூறிப் போரறந்திறம்பிப் பிழைக்கவைத்தார்.

(III) இதுவும் போதாமல், தற்காப்பின் பொருட்டுத் தன்னாடு கவர வந்தானை எதிர்த்துத் தகைத்தலையும் வஞ்சியென வைத்து, வந்தானையும் எதிர்த்தானையும் ஒருசேர வஞ்சியராக்கி முடித்தார். இது, "வஞ்சி மேற்செலவு" என்று தெளிந்த தமிழிலக்கணத்தையே அலமரச் செய்யும் தவறாகும். வலிகருதிவந்த மாற்றானை எதிர்த்து மலைதல் தும்பைத் திணையாகுமெனத் தொல்காப்பியர் தெளிய வைத்திருப்பதை இவரிங்கு மறந்து கூறினார்.

"தும்பைதானே,

மைந்து பொருளாக வந்த வேந்தனைச்
சென்று தலையழிக்குஞ் சிறப்பிற் றென்ப"

என்பது தொல்காப்பியர்தரும் தும்பைத்திணை யிலக்கணம். எனவே பிறர் நாட்டின்மேற் படையெடுத்துச் செல்லுதலே "வஞ்சித்திணை" என்பதும் அவ்வாறு வரும் மாற்றானை எதிர்த்து மலைதலே "தும்பைத்திணை"என்பதும் தமிழர்புறத்திணையறமென்று ஆசிரியர் ஐயந்திரிபின்றி விளக்கிச் சூத்திரித்துள்ளார். இத்தகைய பண்டைத் தமிழர் போரறச் சிறப்பைப் போக்கிப் பொருந்தாப் புத்துரை கூறி நச்சினார்க்கினியர் பிழையுடன் பீழையுந்தருவது வருந்தத்தக்கதே.

இன்னும் இத்தும்பைச் சூத்திரமும் வஞ்சி யிலக்கணத்தை விளக்குதற் கொருவாறு உதவக் காண்போம். வஞ்சிவேந்தன் மேற்செலவுக்கு மண்ணசை காரணமில்லை; மண்ணசை யுடையானைப் பொருதடக்கும் வலியுடைமையே தகவுடைக் காரணமாகும் என்பதை வலியுறுத்து முகமாகவே, "மைந்து பொருளாக வந்த வேந்தனை" என்று படை யெடுத்துவரும் வஞ்சிவேந்தனின் பழுதற்ற போர் நோக்கம் இத்தும்பைத்துணைச் சூத்திரத்தில் தெளிக்கப்படுகிறது. நச்சினார்க்கினியர் கூறுமாறு, வஞ்சிக்கு மண்ணசையே காரணமாகக் காட்டுவது ஆசிரியர் கருத்தா மேல், மேலே வஞ்சிச்சூத்திரத்தில் மேற்செல்லும் வேந்தனுக்கு அவ்வடை கூறாமல் விடுத்ததோடு மீண்டும் இத்தும்பைச் சூத்திரத்திலும் அதையறவே மறைத்து வேறு கூறியிராரன்றே. இவ்வீரிடத்தும் ஆசிரியர் மேற் செல்லும் வேந்தனின் நோக்கை விளக்கத் தந்த சூத்திரங்களின் போக்கே, மண்ணசையை மன்னர் போரறமாக் கொள்ளுதலை மறுத்து நல்ல ஆண்மையறம்பேணுங் கடனை வலியுறுத்திப்போவது மிகவும் பாராட்டத்தக்கதாம். எனவே இவ்வஞ்சித்திணைச் சூத்திரத்துக்கு நச்சினார்க் கினியர் கூறிய பொருள், அறவொழுக் கோடொன்றாது, ஆசிரியர் கருத்துக்கு மாறாகும் என்பது எளிதிற்றெளியலாவ தோருண்மையாகும்.

தொல். பொருள் சூத்-192 (கற்பியல் சூத்-51)

"காமஞ்சான்ற கடைக்கோட்காலை
யேமஞ்சான்ற மக்களொடுதுவன்றி
அறம்புரி சுற்றமொடு கிழவனுங் கிழத்தியுஞ்
சிறந்தது பயிற்ற லிறந்ததன் பயனே"

இதற்கு இளம்பூரணர், 'உரைகூறல் மிகை யெனவும் சூத்திரத்தால் பொருள் விளங்குமெனவும்" கூறியமைந்தார். நச்சினார்க்கினியர் இச்சூத்திரத்துக்குத் தமது வழக்கம்போற் புத்துரை கூறமுயன்று பெரிதும் இடர்ப்படுவாராயினர். நின்றாங் கமையும் நேரிய பொருள் தராது தொடர்தொறுஞ் சொற்களைப் பிய்த்து இஷ்டம் போல் இடம் மாற்றி வைத்துப் புதுவதோர் சூத்திரமாகத் தைத்து மருள் வரும் பொருள் தருவாரானார்.

'கிழவனுங் கிழத்தியும், சுற்றமொடுதுவன்றி, அறம்புரிமக்களோடு, சான்ற காமங் கடைக்கோட்காலை, சிறந்தது ஏமஞ்சான்ற பயிற்றல், இறந்ததன் பயனே' என்பது இவர் கொண்டு கூட்டிக் கண்ட புதிய சூத்திரமாம்.

இதற்கு அவர் தரும் பொருளாவது.—

'தலைவனுந்தலைவியும், உரிமைச் சுற்றத்தோடே கூடி நின்று, இல்லறஞ் செய்தலை விரும்பிய மக்களோடே தமக்கு முன்னரமைந்த காமத்தினையும் தீதாக உட்கொண்ட காலத்திலே, அறம்பொருள் இன்பத்திற் சிறந்த வீட்டின்பம் பெறு

தற்கு ஏமஞ்சான்றவற்றை யடிப்படுத்தல், யான் முற்கூறிய இல்லறத்தின் பயன் என்றவாறு'' என்பதாம். இதன்மேல் அவர் தரும் விசேட வுரை வருமாறு :—

"சான்ற காமமென்றார், நுகர்ச்சி யெல்லாம் முடிந்தமை தோன்ற; இது கடையாயினர் நிற்குநிலே யென்றுணர்த்தற்குக் கடையென்றார்; ஏமஞ்சான்ற வாவன, வானப்பிரத்தமும் சந்நியாசமும் ; எனவே இல்லறத்தின் பின்னர் இவற்றின்கண்ணே நின்று, பின்னர் மெய்யுணர்ந்து வீடு பெறுப; என்றார். இவ்வீடுபேற்றினை யின்றியமையாது இல்லற மென்பது இதன்பயன். இது காஞ்சி யாகாதோவெனின், ஆகாது. நிலையின்மை சான்றோர் கூறக் கண்டுதெளிதல் காஞ்சி. இஃது அன்னதன்றிச் சிறந்த வீட்டின்ப வேட்கையால் தாமேயெல்லாவற்றையும் பற்றறத்துறத்தலின் அகப்பொருட்பகுதியாம்.'' என்பதாகும்.

இதில் காணப் பெறும் விபரீத வெதிரேக விளைவுகள் வியப்பினை விளைப்பனவாம்.

(1) முதலில் மனையறமாண்பு விளக்கும் கற்பியலில் துறவற வீறு கூறல் மாறுபாடாம். கற்பியலில் இல்லற விருப்பை விளைப்பதே முறையாக அதை வெறுத்து விலக்குந்துறவின் சிறப்பை விரிப்பது விந்தையன்றோ !

(2) துறவு கூறுவதே இச்சூத்திர நோக்கமாயின், இதில் அக்கருத்தோடு பொருத்தமற்ற பலசொற்றொடரை ஆசிரியர் அமைத்து வைத்தது வியப்பினும் வியப்பே. 'பிறப்பறுக்கலுற்றார்க்கு (தம்) உடம்பும் மிகை' ஆதலால் 'மற்றுந் தொடர்ப்பாடு' எதுவும் அவர்க்குஇடர்ப்பாடே யாமெனக் கூறவேண்டா. "சான்றோர் கூறவும் வேண்டாது தாமே எல்லாவற்றையும் பற்றறத்துறக்கும்' தலைவனுந் தலைவியும், தம்மில் ஒருவரை ஒருவர் துறவாமல் தொடர்வதே "தவமறைந்தல்லவை செய்யும்'' தவறாகும். அதனோடும் அமையாமல், துறவுபுகும் கிழவனும் கிழத்தியும் (உரிமைச்) சுற்றத்தோடு துவன்றித், தாம் துறவை விரும்பாமல் இல்லறஞ் செய்தலையே விரும்பிய மக்களோடு கூடிச் 'சிறந்ததான துறக்கந்தரும் துறவினைப்பயில முயலல் படிற்றொழுக்க மாவதன்றித் தவத் துறவு ஆவதன்றே. துறக்கம் வேண்டித் துறப்பவரிருவர் (கிழவனுங் கிழத்தியும்) அதனை வேண்டாது இல்லறஞ்செய்தலையே விரும்புந் தம்மக்களொடுஞ் சுற்றத்தொடும் துவன்றியது எற்றுக்கோ? இவ்வாறு யாரொடுந் தொடர்பறுக்காமல் எனைவரொடுந் துவன்றித் துறவுபுகும் இருமுது கிழவரும் வேண்டிய வெல்லாம் ஒருங்கு விடுத்துத் "தீரத்துறந்து தலைப்பட்டாராகார் ; மயங்கிவலைப்பட்ட மற்றையவரே'' யாகித், தவம் தாம் மேற்கொள்வதவமாகத் 'துறந்தார் போல் வஞ்சித்து வாழும் வன்கண்ண' ராகி முடிவர்.

(3) இன்னும், பொறியெறிந்து ஐந்தன் புலத்தையட்டு 'நோற்றலின் ஆற்றல் தலைப்படுதலே' அறத்துறவாகும். அதற்கு மாறாக நுகர்ச்சி யெல்லாமுடிந்தமைந்து, பொறிகளோடு புலனுஞ்செத்து, உளத்தோடு உடலுந்தளர்ந்து, "கடை

யாயினர். நிற்குநிலை'' எய்தித்தள்ளாடும் (குடுகுடு) கிழவனும் கிழவியும் தமக்கு இன்னும் பற்றுக்கோடா யுற்றாரெல்லாம் சுற்றத்தொடர் இறுகப்பபற்றித் துறவுபுகுவது 'தெண்ணீரடுபுற்கை' உப்பு காடி முதலாய துப்புரவு ஏதுமில்லார் பெரு நோன்பு பேசுவதுபோல்வதன்றோ ? இனையதொரு துறவின் திறத்தைத் தொல் காப்பியர் இங்குச் சுட்டிச் சூத்திரிக்கும் நோக்கந்தானென்னோ ?

(4) இனி "இல்லறத்தின் பின்னர்க் கடைநாள் துறவுநிலை நின்று மெய் யுணர்ந்து வீடுபெறுப ; இவ்வீடுபேற்றினை இன்றியமையாது இல்லறம் என்பது இதன் பயன்'' எனும் நச்சினர்க்கினியர் முடிபு, சைனர் துணிபா ? அன்றி ஆசிரியர் சிலருவக்கும் வைதிகமுடிபா ?

இனி 'துறவின்றித் துறக்கமில்லை; அதனல் வீடுபெற விரும்பும் இல்வாழ் வாரெல்லார்க்கும் துறவு இன்றியமையாததே' என்பது சமணர்மதம். சமணசமயமும் அதன் கொள்கைகளும் தமிழகத்தில் மூன்றாந் தமிழ்ச்சங்க முடிந்து சில நூற்றாண்டுகட்குப் பின்னரே பரவலாயின. சங்கத் தொகைநூல்கள் அனைத்துக்கும் சில நூற்றாண்டுகளாவது முந்தியது தொல்காப்பியம் என்பது தமிழர் யாவர்க்கும் ஒப்பமுடிவதாகும். தொல்காப்பியத்துக்குப் பிறகே அதை நூலாகக் கொண்டெழுந்த குறளில் இச்சமணக்கொள்கைக்கு மாறான தமிழர் பழவழக்குமரபற வொழுக்கங்களே கூறப்பெறும். குறள் கூறும் அறம் தமிழர் மரபென்பதில் ஐயமில்லை. வீட்டின்பமாகிய 'சிறப்பீனுமறம்'; 'அறனெனப்பட்டதே யில்வாழ்க்கை'

அவ்'வறத்தாற்றி னில்வாழ்க்கை'யை;
'வீழ்நாள் படாஅமை நன்றாற்றின்',

அஃது அவ்வில்வாழ்வார் பிறந்துழலும் 'வாழ்நாள் வழியடைத்து' வீட்டின்பச்சிறப்பீனும்.

இவ்வறனிழுக்கா இல்வாழ்க்கை, வீடுபெற விரும்பித் துறவு மேற்கொண்டு நோற்பாரினேன்மையுடைத்து. 'ஆற்றினெழுக்கி' என்ற குறளில் தமிழர் மனையறமரபு மாட்சி வலியுறுத்தப்படுகின்றது. இத்தமிழ் மரபுக்கு முழுதுமாருகத் துறவு துறக்கம் பெறுதற்கு இன்றியமையாத துணையெனப் பின்னெழுந்த சமணர் கொள்கையை அறப்பழைய தமிழர் மரபுகூறும் தொல்காப்பியர், தமிழர் மனையறம் கூறும் கற்பியலிறுதியில் தமிழரெல்லார்க்கும் வற்புறுத்த இச்சூத்திரம் செய்தாரென்பது எத்துணையியைபின்மையுடைத்து என்பதை எண்ணுவார்க்கு உண்மைதெளிவாகும். உலகத்தையும் மனையறவாழ்க்கையையும் வெறுக்குந் துறவு துறக்கம் பெறுதற்கின்றியமையாததென்னும் வேதகாலக் கொள்கை ஆரியருக்குமுடன்பாடில்லை என்றே தெரிகிறது. எதுவாயினுமாகுக. எனைத்தாயினும் இது, "அறனெனப்பட்டதே யில்வாழ்க்கை'', "அறத்தாற்றி னில்வழ்க்கை யாற்றின் (துறவாகிய) புறத்தாற்றிற் போஒய்ப் பெறுவதெவன்'' என்று இல்வாழ்ந்து செம்மாக்குந் தமிழர் மரபாகாது. துறவு நிலைகொள்ளாமல் வீடுபேறெய்த வொண்ணாதென்னும் பிறசமயத்தாரோ ஆண்மகனே அஃது அடைபவனுவான், பெண்ணாய்ப் பிறந்தோர்க்கு வீடுபேறெண்ணற்கில்லையென்பர்.

ஈண்டுக் கிழவனையுங் கிழத்தியையும் ஒருங்கே வீடுபெறவைக்கும் கூட்டுத் துறவொன்று கூறுவது எந்த வேதத்துணிவென்பதை நச்சினார்க்கினியர் விளக்காத தால் அதை நாம் தெளியொணுது. இஃது எதுவாயினுமாகுக. தமிழ்கூறு நல்லுல கில்வழங்கும் மரபும் தமிழ் நூல் இலக்கண இயல்புகளுமே கூறவந்த தொல்காப்பி யர், தங்குறிக்கோளை மறந்து ஈண்டுத் தமிழரின் அகப்புறப்பகுதிகளில் பிறபிற சம யக்கோட்பாடுகளையும் பேதுறப் பெயர்த்துப் பேசித் தலைதடுமாறினரெனக்கொள் ளப்போதிய காரணமில்லை. அதனுல் இவ்வுரை ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாகாமை விளக்க மாம்.

(5) இறுதியாகக் கற்பின் திறம் மலர்ந்த இல்லற இலக்கணமும் இன்பக்கூறும் கூறி முடித்துக் கடைசியில் துறவில் கற்பியலை முடித்துக் காட்டினரெனற்கும் இங்கு இடமில்லை; இது கற்பியலின் கடைசிச் சூத்திரமுமன்று. வீடுபேறுகருதி, அதுதர வன்மையற்ற கற்பறத்தைக் களைந்துவிட்டுச் சிறந்த துறவு புகவைத்த பிறகு, மனையறமாண்புக்கே வேண்டப்படும் வாயில்களையும், பிரிந்து வினைமுடித் துத் தன் தலைவியின் புணர்ச்சிவேட்டுத் தாழாது விரைந்து மீளும் தலைவனின் மரபுகளையும் விளக்கி ஆசிரியர் மீண்டுஞ் சூத்திரிப்பது பொருந்துவதன்றே.

இனைய பிற பின்னைய சூத்திரங்கள் பேசுவது கற்பாகிய இல்லற இலக் கணமேயாதலால், இவற்றின் முன்னிற்கும் 'காமஞ்சான்ற' எனும் இச்சூத்திரம் 'வானுறையுந் தெய்வத்துள் வைக்கப்படும்' இல்வாழ்வாரின் 'அன்புமறனு' முடைய மனையறவீறு கூறுதலையே நுதலும் அன்பினைந்திணைப் பகுதியாகிய கற்பிய லில் மனையறச் சிறப்பே விளக்குவதியல்பாகும். இதுவே ஆசிரியர் கருத்தாமென் பது, இச்சூத்திரச் சொற்றொடர்கள் நிரல்பட நின்றுங்குத் தரும் நேரிய செம்பொரு ளாலும் தெளிவாகும். அம்மெய்ப் பொருளை இங்கு இனிமேல் ஆராய்வோம்:—

காமஞ்சான்ற கடைக்கோட்காலை—முன் அம்பல் அலர்கட்கிடனுய், அவை தரும் அச்சத்தாலும் பிறபல சிறுதுனிகளாலும் சிறவாததாய்ப் பிறகு உழுவலன் புடையாரிருவரும் மணந்து பொருள் படைத்து மாண்டமனையறம் நிகழ்த்திக் கற்புக் கனிந்த அற்புக்கூட்டம் வீறு பெற்றுச் சிறந்த நாளில், ஏமஞ்சான்ற மக்களொடு துவன்றி•அறம்புரி சுற்றமொடு-தமக்கு எஞ்ஞான்றும் அன்புறும் இயற்கைத் துணை யாகச் சிறந்த தம்மக்களொடும் தம்மனையறத்திற்கு உரிமைச் சுற்றமாகிய பணியாளர் முதலிய பிற செயற்கைத்துணைவர் பலரொடும், கிழவனும் கிழத்தியும் சிறந்தது பயிற்றல்-தம் உழுவலன்பால் மனமாண்ட கற்புக் கூட்டத்திற்கு உரிமையுடையோ ரான தலைவனுந் தலைவியும் இவை பல்லாற்றுனும் மாண்புபெற்ற அன்பு கனிந்த கற்புக்கூட்டம் அனுசரித்தல், இறந்ததன்பயனே-முன் உளம் பொய்யாத உழுவலன் பால் தாமே தலைப்பட்டுத் தழுவி வழுவாக் களவொழுக்குக் கடைகூட்டி வைத்த பயனன்றிப் பிறிதன்றாம்.

சுருங்கச் சொல்லின், நல்வாழ்வெய்தி இல்வாழ்வார் இருமுதுகுரவரும் பின் பலவாறு சிறந்த தம் கற்பின் கூட்டமாய மனமாட்சிப் பேறெய்தலெல்லாம்,

முன் அவர் பிறர் கூற உற்ற சுற்ற முணர்ந்து உளேயச் சாலாத களவொழுக்கில் அவ்விருவரின் செவ்விய அறனிறவா அன்பொடு புணர்ந்த தூய காமக் கூட்டம் தொடர்ந்து துறைமுற்றிக் கடைகூட்டிய பயனேயாம் என்பதே இச்சூத்திரப் பொருளாகும்.

இஃது, அகப்பகுதியில் இக்கற்பியலில் இச்சூத்திர நிலே, இதன் சொல் அமைதி, தொடர்தொறும் செறிந்த சொல்லாக்கக் குறிப்புக்கள், தமிழ் வழக்கு, நூல் நுதலும் ஆசிரியர் குறிக்கோள் ஆகிய எல்லாவற்றோடும் இயைபும் இயலழகும் பெற்று முரணெதுவுமின்றிக் கிடைக்கும் நேரிய பொருளாம்.

Jagannātha Paṇḍita

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(*Continued from Page 95, Vol. V, No. 1*)

APPAYYA DĪKṢITA vs. JAGANNĀTHA PAṆḌITA (*Contd.*)

After elucidating the nature and scope of the two *śabdavṛttis—abhidhā and lakṣaṇā*—on which the operation of *vyañjanā vṛtti* is based, Jagannātha discusses in his *Rasagaṅgādhara* the important subject of *alaṅkāra*. He first lays down the general principle underlying the conception of *alaṅkāra* in *kāvya*, namely, that it is conducive to the development of *ramaṇīyatva* (beauty) of a *kāvya* which has the *vyaṅgya* sense (Rasa) as its soul. Abhinavagupta also in his *Locana*[1] explains the term *alaṅkāra* in relation to śabda and artha as that which creates in them an extraordinary power by which they become the chief means (*vyañjakasāmagrī*) of the suggestion of Rasa or of any other sense. Thus an alaṅkāra, a figure of speech, ornaments the body of the kāvya, viz., śabda and artha, only when they so ornamented lead to the suggestion of Rasa (the soul of poetry); and if there be no element of suggestion it ceases to be an *alaṅkāra*, just as a golden diamond necklace is not called an ornament for a dead body in that it does not contribute any beauty to it.

1. Upamayā yadyapi vācyo ʃ rtho ʃ laṅkriyate tathāpi tasya tadevālaṅkaraṇam yadvyaṅgyārthābh ivyañjanasāmarthyādhānam iti. vastuto dhvanyātmaivālaṅkāryaḥ. Kaṭakakeyūrādibhirapi hi śarīrasamavāyibhiḥ cetana ātmaiva tattaccittavṛttiviśeṣaucityasūcanātmatayā alaṅkriyate. tathāhi— acetanam śavaśarīram kuṇḍalādyupetamapi na bhāti; alaṅkāryasyābhāvāt . . . na ca dehasya kiñcidanaucityam iti vastuta ātmaivālaṅkāryaḥ; ahamalaṅkṛta ityabhimānāt. (Locana. N. S. Edition, pp. 74-75. 1911).

(a) *UPAMĀLAṄKĀRA*

Of all anaṅkāras *upamā* (simile) is the most important in that it is the source of many other alaṅkāras[2] ; hence it is explained first in most of the alaṅkāra treatises.

Jagannātha defines it as—*śādṛśyam sundaram vākyārthopaskārakam upamālaṅkṛtiḥ*—'similarity which leads to the realisation of aesthetic pleasure by sahṛdayas in that it beautifies the chief idea of the kāvya (in question).' He explains it further as similarity becoming the chief source of pleasure only in *upamā* and not in other alaṅkāras like *ananvaya* where negation of a second similar object, etc., become the chief elements of literary beauty, though there is *upamā* (similarity) associated with them ; so in *vyatireka* the negation, viz., the description of the inability of the upamāna to stand along with the upameya. In *rūpaka, apahnuti, pariṇāma, bhrāntimat, ullekha*, etc., based on the conception of *identity* between upamāna and upameya and in *dṛṣṭānta, prativastūpamā, dīpaka, tulyayogitā*, etc., based on the conception of *difference* between upamāna and upameya, the conception of sādṛśya is only a means of that of *metaphor* and *other figures of speech* leading to *camatkāra* and as such, is not the chief source of literary charm. In the instance—'*tvayi kopopamā bhāti cudhāṁśāviva pāvakaḥ*' where the upamāna, viz., fire in the disc of moon is known as the poet's invention, which leads finally to the realisation of *camatkāra* by sahṛdayas. This kind of upamā called *kalpitopamā*, some hold, is a *new alaṅkāra*, since it emphasizes the fact that there is no well-known upamāna other than the kavikalpita ; but Jagannātha contends that it is only a *variety of upamā*, since the reality (satyatva) of the upamāna and upameya is not emphasized in the definition of upamā. Not only this, upamālaṅkāra is explained in instances where upamāna and upameya do not in reality possess any *sādṛśya* but are viewed on the basis of *abhedādhyavasāya* (intro-susception) as possessing common attributes or as identical.

2. Upamaikā śailūṣī saṁprāptā citrabhūmikābhedān |
rañjayati kāvyaraṅge nṛtyantī tadvidām cetaḥ ||
. . . evamuktānekālaṅkāravivartanīyam upamā—
tadidam citram viśvam
brahmajñānādivopamājñānāt |
jñātam bhavatītyādau
nirūpyate nikhilabhedasahitā sā ||.
[Citramīmāṁsā, p. 5, S. N. S. Ed. 1907.]

Jagannātha illustrates *upamālaṅkāra* by the verse—

'Gurujanabhayamadvilokanāntaḥ
samudayadākulabhāvamāvahantyāḥ |
Daradaladaravindasundaram hā
hariṇadṛśo nayanam na vismarāmi || .

Oh! I cannot forget the moving beautiful lotus-eye of the deer-eyed damsel whose mind is agitated by the fear of elders' (presence) and by (the longing to) look at me!,

According to Jagannātha this verse is a good instance of that kind of *upamālaṅkāra* leading to the suggestion of *vipralambha śṛṅgāra* (*Rasopaskārikopamā*). This *Rasa* has arisen in a fitting manner on the basis of (1) the *ensuant* (*anubhāva*) viz., recollection (*smaraṇa,* conveyed by the two words '*na*' and '*vismarāmi*') which is mainly beautified by *upamā* contained in the compound—*daradaladaravindasundaram;* (2) the suggestion of *bhāvasandhi*—admixture of two *bhāvas*—*trāsa* (fear) and *autsukya* (anxiety) as given in the first half of the verse; and (3) the mental suffering (*santāpa*) suggested by the word '*hā*'.

(5) In his *Citramīmāṁsā*[3] Appayya Dīkṣita has given two definitions: (1) '*upamitikriyāniṣpattimatsādṛśyavarṇanam aduṣṭam avyaṅgyam upamālaṅkāraḥ,* (2) *svaniṣedhāparyavasāyisādṛśyavarṇanam tathā*—*Upamā* consists in a description of similarity between objects that stand fit for comparison, and it should be both devoid of any poetic demerits and different from the suggested sense; it is a description of a similarity which never culminates in its own negation.' These two definitions Jagannātha sets aside as unsatisfactory, as there is no precision either in thought or in language. He asserts that the word '*aduṣṭa*' does not serve any great purpose, though it suggests that sūtras like '*kālopasarjane ca tulyam*' and statements like '*yathā gauḥ tathā gavayaḥ*' containing the description of *sādṛśya* are not instances of *upamā.* He finally drags the opponent to accept the great principle, viz., *camatkārakāritva* which by itself (as shown above) is of great importance in estimating the place of figure of speech in poetry. Similarly the word '*sādṛśya*' in the definition is without purpose, since the definition may read satisfactory even without it—'*upamitikriyāniṣpattimadvarṇanam upamā*'. Moreover, this definition (*avyaṅgyam,* etc.) as given by Appayya Dīkṣita would be applicable only to instances of upamā being a *vācya alaṅkāra,* so that it does not include *pratīyamānopamā* within its scope. In the second definition the phrase

3. Vide Citramīmāṁsā, p. 17 and Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 161.

'*niṣedhāparyavasāyitvam*' is of no significance, in view of the fact that in the instances of *vyatireka* only—and not in upamā—the chief source of literary charm is the negation of similarity between the upamāna and the upameya, which is to be achieved by the description of sādṛśya.

To supply the defect in the first definition, Nāgeśabhaṭṭa interprets, however ingeniously, the term *avyaṅgya* by adding to it the word *prādhānyena*,[4] as *different from the chief suggested sense*, so that the pratīyamānopamā may also be included in the definable alaṅkāra, both vācya-and-pratīyamānopamās.

(6) In the classification of *luptopamā* Appayya Dīkṣita has stated[5] that 'the varieties of dharmaluptā in the vākya, samāsa and taddhita are also represented by *reduplication*; in the example '*paṭupaṭuḥ devadattaḥ*, the reduplication is operated on the authority of the rule '*prakāre guṇavacanasya*' in the sense of 'similarity'. *Jagannātha considers this view as both incorrect and unconvincing.* First, he objects to call instances like '*paṭupaṭuḥ*' *dharmaluptā*, since it involves also the elision of *upamāvācakaśabda* and so it may be termed *vācaka-dharmaluptā*. And the term *dharmaluptā*, he contends, generally means that variety where there is elision of *dharma* (point of similarity) only, or, the separate mention of varieties with the elision of one, two or more would be of no significance. Secondly, the statement that the reduplication of the word *paṭu* conveys similarity goes against the authority of the Mahābhāṣyakāra and his celebrated commentator Kaiyaṭa, who have explained the sūtra—*prakāre guṇavacanasya*—as enjoining reduplication of a word denoting quality when similarity is to be indicated (*dyotya*) only.

Here[6] again Nāgeśabhaṭṭa skilfully vindicates Appayya Dīkṣita by characterising Jagannātha's criticism as baseless. He argues that the elision of *upamāvācaka* does not take place even when similarity is *dyotya* by reduplication, as when it is conveyed by the abhidhā of a word i.e., *candra iva mukham* and *candrasuhṛnmukham*. And it is an admitted fact that ideas are known alike from both the *śabdas*—*vācaka* and *dyotaka*. Hence in cases of *dyotaka śabdas* like *nipātas* and *reduplication* the question of keeping it under the head of *vācaka-luptā* does not arise.

4. Vide R. G. vyākhyā., p. 162.
5. & 6. Vide R. G., p. 170.

(7) In illustrating the *vācakaluptopamā* Appayya Dīkṣita has cited[7] the verse—

'Rūpayauvanalāvaṇyaspṛhaṇīyatarākṛtiḥ |
purato hariṇākṣīṇām eṣa puṣpāyudhīyati ||.'

which Jagannātha has considered as *apaśabdaduṣṭa*—bad example containing ungrammatical expression. The word '*purataḥ*', he contends, means 'from the city' if the word is taken as the *puraśabda* with *tasil* suffix; but this sense does not suit to the context. The form *puraḥ* as a substitute of the word *pūrva* in the sense 'in front of' may be correct; but the form purataḥ is incorrect in that sense. On the basis of this explanation, he has even set aside as *apaśabdas* many popular usages of this word in the sense of 'in front of'.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, an eminent authority on grammar, easily defends[8] Appayya Dīkṣita and other writers as follows:—(1) First he says that some have accepted *purataḥ* as an independent *nipāta*. (2) Other suggestion is that from the word *pura* the suffix *atasuc* is enjoined on the strength of the sūtra—*dakṣiṇottarābhyām atasuc*—which enjoins the suffix even from other stems like *pura* in addition to those two, mentioned in the sūtra. (3) Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's own view is this:—The word is derived from the root *pur—to go in front*; it belongs to the tenth conjugation and when it has no *ṇic* suffix the *ka* suffix is operated and then the *tasi* suffix; hence the form *purataḥ*.

(8) While classifying *upamā* Appayya Dīkṣita has mentioned one variety called *uktārthopapādanaparā*'[9] (i.e.) that which substantiates an idea already described. He has illustrated this variety by the verse of Kālidāsa in his Kumārasambhava—

'Anantaratnaprabhavasya yasya
himam na saubhāgyavilopi jātam |
eko hi doṣo guṇasannipāte
nimajjatīndoḥ kiraṇeṣvivāṅkaḥ ||
"Whose countless wealth of natural gems is not
too deeply blemished by the cruel snow;
One fault for many virtues is forgot,
The moon's one stain for beams that endless flow." (*Ryder*).

7. Vide R. G., p. 171 and 172.
8. Vide R. G. vyākhyā., p. 172.
9. Vide R. G. p. 180 and 181.

where in the latter half it is stated that one defect will dwindle into insignificance in the midst of many good qualities; and to justify this, the poet has woven out the fine simile—'*indoḥ kiraṇeṣvivāṅkaḥ*'—just like the dark spot on the moon, Jagannātha first points out that Appayya Dīkṣita's explanation and illustration of this variety of upamā are *not exhaustive*, since the instance—

> 'Nayane śiśirīkarotu me
> śaradindupratimam mukham tava |

May your face like the autumnal moon cool my eyes!'

does not exactly come under the variety described above. He argues that the main theme (vācyavastu) described in the verse—*anantaratna-prabhavasya*—that the snow in the Himālaya mountain does not at all diminish his beauty is not substantiated by the simile—*indoḥ kiraṇeṣ-vivāṅkaḥ*—but the idea in the latter half, viz., that the flaw of a person or thing will not appear as a flaw in the midst of many good qualities, substantiating the main idea, is substantiated by the part—*indoḥ kira-ṇeṣvivāṅkaḥ*. In the second instance, however, the simile substantiates the main vastu. Hence he suggests another variety—vācyavastūpaskārikā—to include this instance, in case this main division of upamā is to be followed.

But Nāgeśabhaṭṭa explains away[10] this difficulty by interpreting the phrase—*uktārthopapādanparā*—as applying to both *vācyavastu* and *any other idea* described.

Jagannātha however contends that the verse—*anantaratnaprabhava-sya*, etc.—is an instance of a separate alaṅkāra *udāharaṇa*. He contends that the general statement that a flaw among many good qualities does not seem to be a flaw, cannot be complete unless it is exemplified in a particular case which is however supplied by the part—*indoḥ kiraṇeṣvi-vāṅkaḥ*. Hence it is not the citation of an upamāna. The particular is not to be accepted as a different entity from the general. So here there is no idea of difference to make out a clear case of *upamā*.

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, however, on the authority of other earlier Ālaṅkāri-kas, explains *upamā* in the instance—*anantaratnaprabhavasya*. He says that the idea of difference (between upamāna and upameya) is to be understood by taking the different properties, one general and one parti-cular, as it is generally explained in the instance of *abhinnadharmiko-*

10. Vide R. G. vyākhyā., p. 180 and 181.

pamā by the two determining adjuncts of upamānatā and upameyatā. Thus he goes even to the length of saying that *udāharaṇa* is not a separate alaṅkāra.

(9) While giving the varieties of two main divisions of *upamā—pūrṇā* and *luptā*—Appayya Dīkṣita has given[11] seven kinds under *pūrṇā* on the basis of different aspects of *sādhāraṇadharma* (beginning with *sādhāraṇadharmānugāmitā*) and he adds that these seven varieties cannot be explained under *luptā*, in view of the fact that the sādhāraṇadharma is to be anugāmin in all cases of *luptā*. Jagannātha, however, fancies that even without the anugāmidharma, varieties of luptā are found as in the *pūrṇā* on the basis of *bimbapratibimbabhāva*. In the instance—

'Malaya iva jagati pāṇḍuḥ
valmīka ivādhidharaṇi dhṛtarāṣṭraḥ |

like the Malaya (shines) Pāṇḍu in the world and like ant-hill (is) Dhṛtarāṣṭra on earth.'

The common attributes between Malaya Mountain and Pāṇḍu and between the ant-hill and Dhṛtarāṣṭra are not known; but on the strength of *ārthabimbapratibimbabhāva* (i.e.) *bimbapratibimbabhāva*[12] based on *arthāpatti* (presumption) the ideas—the sandalwood and the Pāṇḍavas in one instance, and the serpent and the Kauravas in the other are known as *identical*. And in addition to the traditional classification of *luptopamā* into *seven* main varieties (which are further classified into 19 or 26) Jagannātha gives it like *rūpaka eight* separate varieties with illustrations—*kevalaniravayavā*, *mālārūpaniravayavā*, *samastavastuviṣayasāvayavā*, *ekadeśavivartisāvayavā*, *kevalaśliṣṭaparamparitā*, *mālārūpaśliṣṭaparamparitā*, *kevalaśuddhaparamparitā* and *mālārūpaśuddhaparamparitā*.

(b) *UPAMEYOPAMĀLAṄKĀRA*

Next to *upamā* Jagannātha takes up *upameyopamā*[13] for full elucidation. He considers that it is not a new alaṅkāra but only a variety

11. Vide R. G. 181 and C. M., p. 18.

12. *Bimbapratibimbabhāva* is explained thus—'*vastuto bhinnayoḥ dharmayoḥ parasparasādṛśyādabhinnatayā adhyavasitayoḥ dvirūpādānam bimbapratibimbabhāvaḥ*'—*bimbapratibimbabhāva* consists in the separate description of two properties which are in reality different but superimposed as identical on the basis of mutual similarity.

13. Vide R. G., p. 196.

of *upamā*. He however defines it—'*tṛtīyasadṛśavyavacchedabuddhiphalakavarṇanaviṣayībhūtam parasparam upamānopameyabhāvamāpannayoḥ arthayoḥ sādṛśyam sundaram upameyopamā*—upameyopamā is similarity of two objects standing in the mutual relation of upamāna and upameya, and this similarity is the main theme of a description resulting in the negation of the third similar object and therefore becomes so beautiful as it would naturally lead a sahṛdaya to the realisation of the aesthetic pleasure.' He illustrates it by the verse—

> 'Kaumudīva bhavatī vibhāti me
> kātarākṣi ! bhavatīva kaumudī |
> Ambujena tulitam vilocanam
> locanena ca tavāmbujam samam ||

Oh fair-eyed ! you shine like moonlight and moonlight like yourself. Your eye resembles the lotus flower which also resembles your eye.'

In this instance both moonlight and the damsel are described as standing on mutual relation as both upamāna and upameya ; so also the lotus-flower and the damsel's eye. When one is compared to the other, it goes without saying that the other object resembles the first. The specific effort of comparison, therefore, results chiefly in the *negation of the third similar object.* Here the common attribute is one and the same thing, viz., *shining,* though the objects described are mutually changed in the process of comparison. In the Parasparopamā—

> '*taṭidiva tanvī bhavatī bhavatīveyam taḍillatā gaurī*

you are as tender as lightning and the creeper-like lightning is as white as yourself,' both lightning and damsel are described as both upamāna and upameya, but the common attributes in the two descriptions—tenderness and white colour—are different. This mutual comparison on the basis of different common attributes in the *parasparopamā* is described as *not aiming at the negation of the third similar object.* The *upameyopamā*, however consists in the description of two similar objects, both upamānas and upameyas on the basis of one common attribute and therefore effects the negation of the third similar object as the chief source of pleasure.

10. Appayya Dīkṣita, in his Citramīmāṁsā, defines *upameyopamā* thus[14] :—

> 'anyonyenopamā bodhyā vyaktyā vṛttyantareṇa vā |
> ekadharmāśrayā yā syāt sopameyopamā matā ||'

14. Vide R.G. pp. 198—200.

Upameyopamā consists (in the description of) mutual similarity (subsisting between upamāna and upameya) which is known either by suggestion or by any other significative power of śabda on the basis of one common attribute. He explains it further that this *upameyopamā* is to be distinguished from the *Ubhayaviśrāntopamā* thus ; in the latter similarity (upamā) is to be known from words by abhidhā and the relation, *pratiyogitva* or *pratiyogyanuyogibhāva* (i.e.) similarity having the upameya as *anuyogin* and upamāna as *pratiyogin*, is to be conveyed by words by *vyañjanā vṛtti*, so that both vṛttis operate *depending upon each other*, while in the former both the ideas—similarity and its relation—are known from words either by *abhidhā* or by *vyañjanā independently*. And the phrase—*ekadharmāśrayā*—emphasizes the fact that in the *parasparopamā* the common attributes, while two objects mutually change their *upamānopameyabhāva*, become different and do not therefore aim at the negation of the third similar object ; but in the *upameyopamā* it is one and the same and so it results in the *tṛtīyasadṛśavyavaccheda*, which is considered by all Ālaṅkārikas as the chief source of pleasure in this alaṅkāra.

Even this explanation of *upameyopamā* Jagannātha finds fault with and asserts that all adjuncts in the definition—*anyonyena, vyaktyā vṛttyantareṇa vā, ekadharmāśrayā*—do not exhaust the scope of *upameyopamā*. He says that *ekadharmāśrayatva* may be explained in the instance—

> 'Aham latāyāssadṛśītyakharvarm
> gauräṅgi ! garvam na kadāpi yāyāh |
> Gaveṣaṇenālamihāpareṣām
> eṣāpi tulyā tava tāvadasti ||.

Oh fair-limbed ! do not ever be puffed up with vanity that you resemble a creeper ; enough with the search (of similar objects) ; among other objects this (creeper) also resembles you.'

Here *tānava* (tenderness) is the common attribute ; yet this verse is not accepted as an instance of *upameyopamā* as it does not negate the third similar object though it emphasizes the fact that there are many objects similar to the damsel and the creeper, the search of them, however, being of no avail. It is not, however, possible to assert that both the ideas—*upamā* (similarity) and *its relation, anyonyapratiyogitva*, are known from words by one *śabdavṛtti* (i.e.) *abhidhā* or *vyañjanā*, for, in the well-known instance of *upameyopamā*—' *khamiva jalam jalamiva kham*—like sky (is) water and like water (is) sky ', the idea of similarity is to be associated with both *kha* (sky) and *jala* (water) and the relation, *pratiyogitva*, is to be

known through *saṁsargamaryādā* and not from a word by a *vṛtti* it is accepted by all śāstrakāras that the relation of *padārthas* (senses of words) conveyed by *śabda vṛttis* is not conveyed by them by a *vṛtti*—*vṛttivedyānām padārthānām saṁsargaḥ vṛttyavedya ityabhyupagamāt* (R. G., p. 200).

Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, however, tries[15] to vindicate Appayya Dīkṣita by his definition in his usual way. He says that by *vyaktyā vṛttyantareṇa vā bodhyā*, Appayya Dīkṣita does not mean that *upamā* (similarity) is to be conveyed by a word or words by one *vṛtti only* ; he, however, means that it is not to be conveyed by more than one *vṛtti*, so that the relation *pratiyogitva* when known through *saṁsargamaryādā* is not *vṛttivedya*. Or it may be said that *upamā* and its *relation* may be known by a *śabda-vṛtti* and by *some other means also*—*yathākathañcit bhāsamānatvam. This is only an ingenious device of a later commentator to defend the text from the charge of absurdity.*

15. Vide R. G. vyākhyā., p. 200.

Abhiṣeka-Nāṭaka

(An English Translation with Notes.)

EDITOR : K. R. PISHAROTI.

ACT VI.

[*Then enter three Vidyādharas*][1]

All. Ha, here we are, here we are.

All. Here we are quickly come from the summit of the Himalayas :

Third. Our minds intent on seeing the duel-

Second of Rāma who stands ready to kill Rāvana,

First. Rāma who is the glorious shining big banner of the *Ikṣvāku* race.[2] (1)

First. Citraratha ! These, the *Devas, Devarṣis, Sidhās,* and *Vidhyādharās,* stand crowded in the skies ! Therefore we shall avoid those hosts, and, standing in a quiet corner, observe the duel between Rāma and Rāvaṇa.[3]

Both. So be it.

[*Doing so*]

First. Ah ! Very fearful, indeed, is the field of battle ! Here indeed :[4]

1. As the Trivandrum edition will have it, all the closing incidents constitute a single act, of which the fight and death of Rāvaṇa form the *Viṣkambhaka.* One of the manuscripts utilised for the edition reads *The end of Act VI* in place of *Viṣkambhaka* and the main scene, according to the printed edition, is read as Act VII. This is the reading found in Trippunithura Samskrit College Manuscript ; and this is quite in keeping with the traditional view of the Cākyārs that the Rāmāyaṇa story is in twenty-one acts. See note I, Act I ; and consistently with this, this act has its own name. In view of these we style this *Viṣkambhaka* as Act VI.

2. Notice as before here is one verse recited by three different characters, which is a later day feature in Samskrit Dramas ; and this forms an argument against the assumed antiquity of this series of dramas.

3. This would suggest that the *Vidyādharas* are standing on a higher level and are more or less away from the scene of the fight.

4. Notice the interesting way in which the fight is described. The three *Vidyādharas* describe the fight and fall of Rāvaṇa. Thus the representation of the fight is avoided. If the same hand which wrote *Pratimānāṭaka,* or *Bālacarita* or *Ūrubhaṅga* wrote this drama, it is passing strange that the poet should

Like an ocean shines the battle field, heaving under the rays of the moon of the sword of the noble Rāghava, for it is filled with the waters of the bodies of *Rākṣasas*, the waves of noble monkeys, and the sharks of swords. (2)

Second. It is even so :

Here in the field of battle are quickly felled down hosts of *Rākṣasa* heroes like mountains cloven by the thunderbolt, some with their heads broken by rocks and trees, some killed by raining fists, some cut to pieces by the angry *Vānara* leaders, some strangulated (and hence lying) with eyes wide open and some with their lips bitten and fearful. (3)

Third. See these also, my friends !

With wide open mouths do these *Rākṣasas* rush in from all sides to kill in battle the hosts of *Vānaras*—*Rākṣasas*, carrying sharp swords, like dark lowering clouds, their eyes flushed red with anger and their hideous mouths wide open. (4)

First. Ah, indeed[5]—

Arrows are showered upon the *Vānaras* by the *Rākṣasas* :

Second. Mountains are thrown upon the *Rākṣasas* by the *Vānaras* :

Third. With the striking with fists and with knees

All. Wondrously terrible runs the conflict !

First. See you Rāvaṇa also !

Weilding his *Śakti* made of gold and driving his chariot, Rāvaṇa, with his jaws set terribly, is angry, like Rāhu, on seeing the full moon of Rāma at the rising mount. (6)

Second. See you Rāma also !

His left hand holding the bow and his right hand revolving an arrow, standing on the ground and observing his enemy

not have followed the same method. Evidently he is moved by the stage convention which prohibits the depiction of fight and death on the stage. And in this we have again an argument in favour of a late date for this drama, which cuts at the very root of the unity of authorship of the thirteen plays ascribed to Bhāsa.

5. As before, here also different speakers finish the sentence.

seated in the chariot, like the mountain lord Krauñca observing Kārtikeya ! (7)

Third. Here indeed :

By Rāvaṇa is thrown the *Śakti* similar unto the God of Death and by Rama smiling is it broken into twain. (8)

First.

Seeing his *Śakti* felled to the ground and with his eyes open wide with anger, Rāvaṇa rains a shower of arrows on Rāma. (9)

Second. Ha ! The glory of Rāma !

The shower of arrows rained on Rāma by the cloud of Rāvaṇa shines like rain on a bull. (10)

Third. He is indeed !

Raising aloft his fearful bow of gold and shaking off the terrible cluster of arrows, he is in the midst of the fray quickly rushing on foot at Rāvaṇa seated in the chariot, like a lion at the elephant. (11)

All. Ha, the whole place is bathed in effulgence ! What can this be ?

First. Ah ! Finding the combat unequal and hence afraid, Indra is sending the chariot driven by Mātali ![6]

Second. Seeing Mātali waiting near, Rāma ascends the chariot.

Third. He is indeed :

Seated in that chariot, the seat of Indra's victory and the source of destruction of the children of Diti, Rāma, the destroyer of *Rākṣasas*, shines like Śiva fighting against *Tripurās*. (12)

First. Ah ! The fight is waxing fierce !

Looking at this combat shrouded in a cloud of sharp arrows, between the man and the demon, the *Vānara* heroes

6. The purpose served by the introduction of Mātali is not very clear. It has no dramatic value, because it is not visualised by the audience. This introduction seems to emphasise the greatness of Rāvaṇa, which indirectly glorifies the greatness of Rama. Or, it may be that divine aid is sent to suggest that the destruction of Rāvaṇa is divinely ordained, for which Rāma is but the chosen instrument. Compare the last verse of the Act.

and *Rakṣasa* leaders have stopped their exchange of weapons. (13)

Second. Ah! Wonderful!

Moved this way and that by chariot protectors, these two, seated in the chariot and exchanging shower of arrows, appear like two Suns wandering in the sky and burning the earth with their rays. (14)

Third. See, friends, Rāvaṇa also!

Striking down the horses with the terribly speeding arrows, felling down the banner by sheer force, raining a shower of arrows and roaring and smiling and terrifying the lord of men! (15)

First. Here is Rāma:

Shrinking his body to the size of a dwarf, being thus set on in his chariot, he heaved a sigh; looking at the sharp arrow, his eyes become red and glow like the midday Sun; and helped by Mātali himself, the heroic king has sent the best of all weapons, the unrivalled *Brahmāstra.* (16)

Second. And that *Astra,*

discharged with all the force of Rāma's arm and fierce like the blazing midday Sun, has killed in battle the best of *Rākṣasas* and has returned quickly back to Rāma! (17)

All. Ha, ha, Rāvaṇa is killed.

First.

Seeing Rāvana killed, a rain of flowers is falling down and the divine trumpets are sounding! (18)

Second. Well, the divine purpose is accomplished.

First. Well, come along; let us also go and congratulate the all beloved Rāma.

Both. So be it.

[*Exeunt all*]
Viṣkambhaka[7]
[*End of Act VI*]

7. See note i. The whole act, it needs scarcely be mentioned, would be impressive on the stage only in case the actors can act very well. Otherwise, it will fall very flat. One could not resist the temptation that the whole drama is written or adapted for the Kerala theatre.

[ACT VII[1]]

[*Then enter Rama*]

Rāma.

Piercing now Rāvaṇa with the force of my arrows, I have quickly killed him ; I have now made the virtuous Vibhīṣana the king of Laṅka ; with my hands thus have I crossed over the ocean of my vow filled with deeds of strength and now in company with my friends, I enter Laṅka to console Sīta.[2] (1)

[*Entering*]

Lakṣmaṇa. Hail Victory, my sire ! Sire, here comes she unto the presence of my sire.

Rāma. Dear Lakṣmaṇa ![3]

If now I were to see Vaidehi who was forced away from me to dwell in the abode of enemies, my sorrow will, indeed, overcome my good sense. (2)

Lakṣmaṇa. As my Lord orders. (*Exit*).

[*Entering*]

Vibhīṣana. Victory, my lord !

Your wedded wife, now deprived of her sorrows through the valour of your arms, approaches you, like Lakṣmī of yore fallen from the *Daityas'* home, through your grace ! (3)

1. According to the printed text, this constitutes the main scene of Act VI. See note i Act VI.

2. Since there is only one character on the stage, this speech is a soliloquy. In this sense alone can the following speech be justified. See note following.

3. This is an interesting verse in as much as apparently it is against the tenour of the speech preceding; and one may even incline to the view that there is some lacunae in the text. It could be justified only by a process of interpretation. Rāma seems to say that the sight of Sīta will force him to give vent to his pent up feelings which will entail his doing something which may go against good sense. He must first prove to the world that Sīta is pure in thought and deed, before he can accept her as his queen. But if she comes before she proves her innocence, he could not withstand her and that means the world will condemn him and her. Hence the speech, which Lakṣmaṇa correctly understands. The speech means that in that state he does not want to see Sīta. Thus while here Rāma confesses his weakness, in his speech to Vibhīṣana, he takes a different attitude, quite befitting a public pronouncement. See note following.

Rāma. Vibhiṣaṇa! Even there let her wait, who has lived long a captive in the hands of the lord of *Rakṣasas* and has thus become a stain on the *Ikṣvākū* race. For the good name of my father, King Dasaratha, let her not, O king of Laṅka, come and see me.[4] Further:

> O king, he alone is a friend, who prevents one from plunging into improper things; otherwise, he is an enemy. (4)

Vibhīṣaṇa. Be pleased, my Lord!

Rāma. Sir, be pleased not to press me any further.

[*Entering*]

Lakṣmaṇa. Victory, Sire! Hearing of your opinion, she awaits your permission to enter fire.[5]

Rāma. Lakṣmaṇa, do as that virtuous woman[6] desires.

Lakṣmaṇa. As my sire orders. (*Walking about*) Alas, what a pity!

> Knowing the purity of the queen and hearing of the resolve of my sire, my mind is in a flux, being placed between a sense of duty and love.[7] (5)

Who is there?

[*Entering*]

Hanūmān. Hail, prince!

Lakṣmaṇa. Hanūmān, have you the power?[8] My sire orders thus.

4. Rāma makes it clear that Sīta should not see him then, for she is under a cloud. And so long as she is under the cloud she is a stain on the fair name of his family. One has necessarily to concede that Rāma is unnecessarily cruel to Sīta, though it must be admitted it is in the higher interests of *Dharma,* whose great custodian he is.

5. The news that Lakṣmaṇa conveyed to her, regarding the attitude of Rāma was like a thunderbolt to her and she naturally resolves upon the only course left open to her, namely to enter the flames. How she took the message is made clear in verse 6 following.

6. The term *pativṛtā* in this context is particularly significant, for it conveys the idea that if Rāma was cruel, it was not because he doubted her single hearted devotion, but it was only to convince the world.

7. This is an interesting speech, in which we have the key-note of Lakṣmaṇa's character revealed. Implicit obedience to his elder, even when it contravenes personal convictions and traditional *Dhārma,* constitutes the guiding note of his character.

Hanūmān. What does my prince think ?

Lakṣmaṇa. It is no use my thinking. Or why, we have only to carry out the wishes of the sire.[9] Let us go.

Hanūmān. As my prince desires.

[*Exeunt both*]

[*Entering*]

Lakṣmaṇa. Be pleased my sire ! Sire, a wonder, a wonder ![10] The worthy queen :

> Beautiful like a full blown lotus wreath, giving up all hopes of life and finding all your work useless, quickly entered the flames, like a swan the forest of lotus. (6)

Rāma. Wonderful, Wonderful ! Prevent, Lakṣmaṇa, prevent.

Lakṣmaṇa. As my sire orders. (*Going out and entering*).

Victory, my sire ![11]

> Like a golden wreath, she shines all the brighter for entering the fire. Unchanged she is in spite of having entered the fire.

Rāma. (*Wondering*) What's it, what's it ?

Lakṣmaṇa. Ah ! Wonderful !

[*Entering*]

Sugrīva. Hail, my lord !

> Who can indeed be the bowing figure who carries the daughter of Janaka alive from the blazing fire ?

8. As the text stands, the sentence is elliptical. Possibly the idea is that Hanūmān must command all his strength to listen to the message of Rāma.

9. See note 7.

10. The idea of *wonder* is not clear. Sīta announced her intention to enter the flames and Rāma gave her permission to do so. If then she does so, there is no scope for wonder, unless it is presumed that the brothers did not take her at her word. This assumption will be doing Sīta but meagre justice. The writer inclines to the view that there must be a difference in reading. Both in this as well as in Rāma's speech following, we might better substitute *atyāhitaṁ* instead of *āścaryaṁ ;* and such a reading will sit well with the statement of Rāma that it should be prevented.

11. We accept the reading in the Trippunithura Ms. and delete Hanūmān.

Lakṣmaṇa. Ha ! Here is approaching the divine Agni, leading the worthy queen before !

Rāma. Ha ! Here is the benign god Agni ! Let us approach Him.

[*All approach him*]

[*Then enter Agni leading Sītā*][12]

Agni. Here is the benign Lord Nārāyana ! Hail Lord !

Rāma. Benign lord, I bow to you !

Agni. Lord of *Devas,* you should not bow down to me !

Receive her, O best of men, the lady who is worshipped by all the worlds, the pure and spotless and sinless daughter of Janaka. (9)

Further :

Know the daughter of Janaka is Goddess Lakṣmi. She has followed you in human guise. (10)

Rāma. Blessed am I !

O Smoke-bannered God, I know that Vaidehi is pure, but thus have I done to satisfy the world. (11)

[*Divine Gandharvas sing in the postscenium*]

Obeisance to Lord Nārāyaṇa, the Cause of all the three worlds !

O Lord of the Universe ! Brahma is thy heart ; Rudra, thy anger ; the Sun and the Moon, thy eyes ; and Sarasvati, thy tongue, O Lord of Devas ! All the three worlds with Brahma and Indra and Maruts are created by thee ! Know, Lord, Sita is Lakṣmi who delights in her abode of waters and thou art Viṣṇu himself. Receive. (12)

[*Again in the postscenium others sing*]

This earth, when it went down into the waters, was raised by you in the garb of Boar ; by thee was the whole universe conquered by three steps, O lord of Devas ! The *Devas* are as well pleased with the destruction of Rāvaṇa as thou thyself art with Queen Sita by thy side !

12. Since *agnipraveśa* takes place behind the scenes, Agni has to appear on the stage. The whole scene following is intended to sing the glory of Rāma, as an incarnation of *Mahāviṣṇu.* It must, however, be pointed out that it has but little dramatic interest.

Agni. Noble sir, these, *Devarṣis, Sidhās, Gandharvas, Vidyādharas* and *Apsaras* glorify thee with thy greatness!

Rāma. Blessed am I.

Agni. Noble sir, this way, this way for your coronation!

Rāma. As my Lord orders.

[*Exeunt*]

[*In the postscenium*]

Hail! Lord! Hail! Protector! Hail! Noble sir! Hail! Your Majesty! Hail! Destroyer of Ravana! Hail! Long life to thee!

Vibhīṣaṇa. Here, here is His Majesty!

Having in battle crossed over the ocean of his vow, having recovered his innocent wife and being now crowned by all the Gods, his Majesty shines like the moon in clear sky.

Lakṣmaṇa. Ha! The *Vaiṣṇavite* splendour of my sire!

Surrounded by Yama, Varuṇa, Kubera, Vāsava, and other gods, he shines after the coronation, as desired by Daśaratha, like the God of Devas, the conqueror of Vṛtra.

[*Then enter the crowned Rāma accompanied by Sīta*]

Rāma. Dear Lakṣmaṇa!

That revered sire who to please my mother broke off my coronation though all preparations were made and I was seated on the throne, he himself, though long dead, it was gods' will, did crown me in person gladly!

Agni. Noble sir! Here are your subjects, headed by Bharata, and Śatrughna, come to welcome you, as desired by Mahendra.

Rāma. Benign Lord! Content am I.

Agni. Here are Mahendra and other *devas* singing thy greatness!

Rāma. Blessed am I.

Agni. Noble sir! What else dost thou desire?

Rama. If my benign Lord is pleased, what else should I desire?

[*Epilogue*]

May the earth be freed of sins! May the enemies all perish!
May Rajasimha rule over this our whole earth!

End of Act VII.
End of Abhiṣekanāṭaka.

Preliminary synthetic experiments in the Cytisine group

PART II.

Further experiments on the synthesis of Ewin's structure for Cytisine

By

S. N. Chakravarti and P. L. Narasimha Rao

(*Annamalai University*)

In this paper, we record the results of our attempts to realise some of the schemes outlined in Part I (Chakravarti and Venkatasubban, J. Annamalai University, 1933, *11*, 227). The first scheme that was tried is indicated below :—



6-Nitro-3-methylcinnamic acid (I) was prepared from 6-nitro-3-methylbenzaldehyde, which in its turn was obtained by a modification of the method of Monnet and Cartier (D. R. P. 113604. Compare F. Mayer, Ber., 1914, *47*, 406), and reduced to 6-amino-3-methyl-cinnamic acid (II) m.p. 195° by means of ferrous sulphate and ammonia. The latter was then diazotized and reduced to 3-methyl-6-hydrazino-cinnamic acid (III), and finally (III) was converted into 6-methyl-dihydro-N-aminocarbostyril (V) m.p. 117°, through (IV) essentially under conditions described by Emil Fischer for the preparation of 1-aminodihydrocarbostyril (Annalen 1883, *221*, 226). The final conversion of (V) into

(VI) has not yet been accomplished, as we have, so far, not been able to obtain (V) in sufficient quantities.

The next projected line of synthesis was by the way of 6-methyl-1 : 2 : 3 : 4-tetrahydroquinoline-8-carboxylic acid (VII). Attempts to prepare 6-methylquinoline-8-carboxylic acid by the oxidation of 6 : 8-dimethylquinoline met with only partial success, as yields were invariably low. The acid (VII) was eventually prepared by the method previously described (Chakravarti and Venkatasubban, Loc. cit. 237) and attempts are being made to convert the acid to (VIII) through the following alternative routes :—



Finally, we directed attention to the synthesis of 6-methyl-8-bromomethylquinoline (IX), which we hoped to be able to convert into (X) in the following manner :—



Preliminary attempts to prepare (IX), under conditions similar to those used for the preparation of 8-brom-methyl-quinoline (D. R. P. 98272; Ber., 1906, *39*, 2709; compare also J. C. S., *1935*, 1421) gave inconsistent results, but this, as well as the synthesis of antimalarials from (IX) is reserved for further studies by one of us (S. N. C.).

We have decided to publish this work in this incomplete state as one of us (P. L. N. R.) is unable to continue this work.

EXPERIMENTAL

6-Nitro-3-methylcinnamic acid (1). m-Tolualdehyde was obtained by the oxidation of m-xylene with chromyl chloride (Bornemann, Ber., 1884, *17*, 1464) and nitrated with a mixture of concentrated sulphuric and nitric acids below 0° (Monnet and Cartier, D. R. P. 21683, 113604). The mixture of the nitroaldehydes was isolated in the usual manner and distilled under reduced pressure. The product distilling over between 135-145/2 mm. was collected in two fractions, first two-thirds (A) and the last one-third (B). Each of these fractions were again fractionated in the manner shown below:—



None of the fractions crystallised readily on being cooled to 0°. The fractions C, X (the mixture of D and E), and F were then separately converted into p-toluidide in the usual manner. Each of the fractions first gave a crystalline toluidide, which on purification, melted at 89°, and the mother liquors from the fraction C, on standing gave a toluidide which on purification melted at 76°, and which proved to be the toluidide of 2-Nitro-3-methyl-benzaldehyde (Found N = 11·2%. $C_{15}H_{14}O_2N_2$ requires N = 11·0%).

Fraction F gave mainly the p-toluidide m.p. 89°. The latter on hydrolysis gave 6-Nitro-3-methyl-benzaldehyde, m.p. 44°, which was converted into 6-Nitro-3-methylcinnamic acid, m.p. 224° by the method previously described (Chakravarti and Venkatasubban, Loc. cit.).

6-Amino-3-methyl-cinnamic acid (II) A solution of the nitro-cinnamic acid (1·6 gm.) in dilute ammonia was added to a solution of ferrous sulphate (16 gm.) in water (30 c.c.), which had been heated to 90°. Concentrated ammonia (6 c.c.) was then gradually added to the mixture under vigorous stirring. After all the ammonia had been added, the contents of the flask were heated for a further ¼ hour, and filtered. The filtrate was concentrated to one-third its original volume and carefully acidified with concentrated hydrochloric acid, when the amino acid separated as a yellow powder in an yield of over 90%. On recrystallisation from alcohol it was obtained in prismatic needles, m.p. 195° (Found N = 8.1. $C_{10}H_{11}O_2N$ requires N = 7.9%).

The amino acid is readily soluble in alcohol and acetone sparingly soluble in hot water, benzene, and ether, and almost insoluble in petroleum ether.

6-methyl-dihydro-N-aminocarbostyril (V). The amino acid (10 gm.) was dissolved in dilute hydrochloric acid (14·6 c.c. of 25% in 70 c.c. water), and the solution allowed to cool when the hydrochloride separated in a crystalline form, which was diazotized by addition of the required amount of sodium nitrite. A clear diazo-solution results, from which the diazo-salt soon begins to separate. The solution was treated at once with a cooled solution of sodium sulphite (2½ mols. 17·9 gm.), and then with hydrochloric acid (1 mol., 8.5 c.c. of 25% HCl) and excess of Zinc dust. In a few minutes, the dark red colour of the solution changed to yellow, when the liquid was filtered from excess of Zinc dust, and the filtrate immediately reduced with sodium amalgam. When the reduction was over, the aqueous solution was separated, treated with large excess of concentrated hydrochloric acid, and heated on the water-bath till the liquid no longer reduced Fehling solution. The solution was then saturated with sodium hydroxide, when crude 6-methyl-dihydro-N-amino-carbostyril m.p. 96-102° (contaminated with a little 6-methyl-dihydrocarbostyril, m.p. 132-133°. Found C = 74·5 ; H = 7·0 ; $C_{10}H_{11}ON$ requires C = 74·5 ; H = 6·8%) separated. On recrystallisation from hot water 6-methyldihydro-N-amino-carbostyril separated in colourless plates m.p. 117° (Found C = 68·8 ; H = 7·0. $C_{10}H_{12}ON_2$ requires C = 68·2 ; H = 6·8%)

6-methyl-1 : 2 : 3 : 4 tetrahydroquinoline-8-carboxylic acid (VII). A number of experiments were made with the object of converting 6-8-dimethylquinoline into 6-methyl-quinoline-8-carboxylic acid by oxidation. Oxidation with chromic acid, selenium dioxide, and dilute nitric acid were tried, but yields obtained were not very satisfactory. Oxidation with large excess of chromic acid, yielded only the dicarboxylic

acid *m* p. above 300°. This substance is only sparingly soluble in water, alcohol and benzene. (Found C =60.6 H = 3.4 N = 6.7%. $C_{11}H_7O_4N$ requires C = 60.8 ; H = 3.2 ; N = 6.4%).

The tetrahydroquinoline carboxylic acid was eventually prepared by the method previously described (Chakravarti and Venkatasubban, Loc. cit.).

Bromination of 6 : 8-dimethylquinoline. 6 : 8-dimethylquinoline (10 gm.) was dissolved in chloroform (30 c.c.) and the solution saturated with dry hydrogen bromide, when a white precipitate was obtained. Bromine (10·2 gm.) was then added and the mixture carefully warmed on the waterbath till a clear red solution was obtained. The solution on being kept in a dessicator deposited the dibromide hydrobromide in orange red rhombic plates m.p. 125-140° (Decomp.). Yield almost quantitative.

When this substance is heated to 160°, it loses hydrogen bromide. In an experiment, when the solution of the substance in chloroform was heated for sometime, white needles were obtained which on decomposition in aqueous solution with alkali gave a colourless substance m.p. 58°, which crystallised from petroleum ether in needles and which analysed for a monobromo dimethyl quinoline. (Found : Br. = 33·5%. $C_{11}H_{10}NBr$ requires Br. 33.8%).

When, however, the above experiment was repeated the substance m.p. 58° could not be obtained again.

Experiments are in progress to prepare (IX) by various modifications of the method described in D. R. P. 98272.

Preliminary Synthetic Experiments in the cytisine group

PART III

Exploratory experiments on the synthesis of Cytisine, Sparteine, Lupinine and allied alkaloids

By

S. N. Chakravarti and P. L. Narasimha Rao

(*Annamalai University*)

The object of these experiments was to discover methods which could be eventually used for the synthesis of Lupinine, Sparteine, Cytisine and the allied alkaloids. It was realised from the outset that some of the successful experiments might lead to the formation of stereoisomerides of the expected alkaloids (Compare, Chemical Society, Annual Reports, 1933, 232). Attention has so far been directed by various workers to the synthesis of norlupinane (I), the new type of ring system which Karrer first assumed to be present in Lupinine (Helv. Chim. Acta., 1928 *11,* 1062), and which has since then been shown to be the essential building unit of several alkaloids obtained from plants belonging to Leguminoseae (Winterfield and Kneuer, Ber., 1931, *64,* 150 ; Spath and Gallinowski, Ber., 1932, *65,* 1526 ; Clemo and Raper, J. C. S., *1929,* 1927 ; Clemo and Ramage J. C. S., *1931*, 437, 3191 ; Ing., J. C. S., *1932,* 2778 ; *1933,* 504 ; Clemo and Raper, J. C. S., *1933,* 644 ; Kondo, Ochiai, Tsuda and Yoshida, Ber., 1935, *68,* 570).

The first attempt to synthesis norlupinane was made by Clemo and Ramage (J. C. S., *1931,* 437) in the following manner :—



Ethyl piperidine-2-carboxylate was condensed with r-bromobutyronitrile, the product hydrolysed, esterified, converted into a cyclic

ketone by means of sodium, and the product again hydrolysed and reduced by Clemensen's method. The final product, octahydropyridocoline, proved to be different from norlupinane and was later regarded as a stereoisomeride of the cis-trans decalin type, with the interesting feature that a tervalent nitrogen is implicated.

A product identical with norlupinane was obtained synthetically by Winterfeld and Holschneider (Annalen., 1932, *499*, 109) in the following way. 2-Pyridyl 1-methyl-2-pyrrolidonyl-3 ketone (II), prepared by condensation of α-picolinic ester and 1-methyl-2 pyrrolidone, on ketone hydrolysis gave 2-γ-methylaminobutylpyridine (III), the benzoyl derivative of which was reduced catalytically in presence of platinum oxide to the secondary alcohol of the corresponding piperidine derivative (IV). By the action of phosphorus pentabromide on this substance 2-α-δ-dibromobutylpiperidine (V) was obtained with loss of benzonitrile and methyl bromide. This bromide was cyclised by the action of sodium ethoxide to 1-bromo-octahydro-pyridocoline (VI), which could be reduced catalytically to octahydropyridocoline, identical in all its properties with norlupinane.



A second, elegant synthesis was effected by Clemo, Ramage and Raper (J. C. S., *1932*, 2959) by subjecting ethyl r-2-pyridyl-butyrate to a combined Bouveault and nuclear reduction, followed by halogenation, and cyclisation by withdrawal of hydrogen halide, thus :—



It is significant that both the above methods depended on a final ring closure at the Nitrogen atom.

Diels and Alder, probably had obtained norlupinane a little earlier, although the melting points of the picrate and the auri-chloride of their base were slightly lower (Annalen 1932, *498*, 16). They found that acetylene dicarboxylic ester and pyridine combine at ordinary temperature to give quinolizine-1 : 2 : 3 : 4-tetracarboxylic ester (VII), which on hydrolysis with aqueous potassium hydroxide furnishes quinolizine dicarboxylic acid, and from this quinolizine (VIII) itself is obtained by heating with lime. The latter on complete reduction gave octahydroquinolizine.



The only other recorded synthetic work in this field is the synthesis of α-norlupinone, recently effected by Ochial, Tsuda, and Yokoyama (Ber., 1935, *68*, 2291), by the transformation of indolizidine ring in the following manner :—



This synthesis should be of particular interest, because by an application of similar reactions it may be possible to convert Clemo's Octahydropyridocoline into norlupinane :—



This point is being investigated and an account of these experiments is reserved for a future communication by one of us (S. N. C.).

For the synthesis of the alkaloids themselves, we thought out a number of excellent schemes, but we at first directed our attention to the realisation of the following schemes, as the starting substance for these could be readily obtained :—

I (a)



I (b)



II (a)



II (b)



(Sparteine after Clemo)

III



Contrary to the statement of Bose and Sen (J. C. S., *1931*, 2843) N-methylpyridone and α-chloropyridine were readily obtained in excellent yields by the method of Fargher and Furness (J. C. S., 1915, *107*, 690), but attempts to condense α-chloropyridine with sodiomalonic ester and ethyl α : α : γ : γ—propane tetracarboxylate under a variety of different conditions were unsuccessful. This is rather unexpected for a halogen atom in 2-position in pyridine is fairly reactive and α-chloropyridine readily condenses with anthranilic acid, etc. In this connection it may be mentioned that C. S. Kuhn and Richter have recently reported that they were unable to condense α-bromopyridine with malonic ester (J. Amer.Chem., 1935, 57, 1928). On the other hand, Walter and McElvain have shown that such a reaction can be brought about with sodium ethoxide in absence of alcohol (J.Amer.Chem., 1935, *57*, 1891). One of us (S.N.C.) has not the least doubt, that a condensation of the type outlined in Scheme I can be effected and attempts are now being made to condense the more reactive Iodopyridine with the sodiosalts of the above esters (Compare Wibaut and Bastide, Rec. Trav. Chim., 1933, *52*, 493-498).

While the above work was in progress experiments were simultaneously instituted to explore the possibilities of the following schemes : —

(i)



(ii)



It should be certainly possible to bring about the above conversion as Mannich and Coworkers have shown that compounds containing Bispidine ring can be readily synthesised by similar methods (Ber., 1935, 68, 506 ; Ber., 1930, 63, 608).

Cytisine itself we are attempting to synthesise in the following manner :—

(i)



(ii)



Some progress has already been made in these directions, and we reserve the synthesis of these alkaloids along these and other lines for a future communication.

We are publishing this work in this incomplete state as one of us (P.L.N.R.) is unable to continue this work further, and as the senior

author (S. N. C.) wishes to reserve the subject for his work for some time.

EXPERIMENTAL

N-Methyl-ᾰ-pyridone was prepared under conditions essentially similar to those used by Fargher and Furness (Loc. cit.). It was, also, obtained by the oxidation of pyridine methosulphate with hydrogen peroxide, and by electrolytic oxidation, but the yields of the final compound by these methods were not so good.

For the preparation of a-chloropyridine, Fargher and Furness's condition was followed, but heating with phosphorus pentachloride was continued for 14 hours, instead of nine, till the whole of phosphorus pentachloride had disappeared and a homogeneous solution obtained, when an yield of over 95% of the chlorocompound was obtained.

Condensation Experiments. Attempts to condense *a*-chloropyridine with malonic ester and propane tetracarboxylic ester under usual conditions with (i) sodium ethoxide in alcoholic solution, (ii) equimolecular quantity of sodium in benzene suspension, were unsuccessful.

Experiments are now being made to obtain the expected condensation product by condensing Iodopyridine with the above esters under above conditions, and also at higher temperatures, e.g. in toluene and mesitylene solutions and with longer heating (30 hrs.).

α-Iodopyridine. α-Aminopyridine was first prepared from pyridine by the method of Tsitschibabin (Journ. Russ. Chem. Ges., 1914, *46,* 1216) and then converted into Iodopyridine through the diazonium salt (Wibaut and Bastida, loc. cit.).

Preliminary attempts to condense N-methyl α-pyridone with malonic ester through the aid of a little alcoholic potash or piperidine were unsuccessful.

Bispidine ring formation. Ethyl α : α : γ : γ-propane tetra-carboxylate was prepared by the method of Welch (J. C. S., *1931,* 674) and converted into the tetraamide in a quantitative yield under conditions similar to those used by Max Guthzeit and Jahn (J. Pr. 1898, (2), *66,* 1-15).

The tetra-amide on being heated at 250° in the manner described by Guthzeit and Jahn gave glutaric di-imide in a poor yield, which on electrolytic reduction gave a basic substance. Attempts are being made to improve the yield of the di-imide, and to materialise the schemes outlined in the introductory part.

Our thanks are due to the Chemical Society, London, for a grant which has defrayed part of the cost of the research materials used above.

Annamalai University,
18th January, 1936.

Chemical Investigation of Indian Medicinal Plants

Preliminary Chemical Examination of Cryptocryne Spiralis

PART V

BY

S. N. CHAKRAVARTI AND T. S. KUPPUSWAMY

(*Annamalai University*)

Cryptocryne spiralis (Tamil, Nattu-ati-vadayam) is the country Atis of the Madras Presidency. The root of the plant externally resembles Ipecacuanha, and a few years ago it attracted attention through several packages of it appearing in the London Market as 'False Ipecacuanha'. It is widely used by the native doctors of the Madras Presidency and Ceylon as a tonic and as a remedy for infantile vomiting, cough and fever.

A reference to the literature showed that no systematic work has been done on the chemical constituents of this plant. A more or less complete analysis of the root has now been made. We found during this investigation that the root does not possess any of the characteristic physiological properties associated with Ipecacuanha. It contains neither emetine nor cephaeline. We were, also, unable to detect the presence of any specific (organic) active principle.

EXPERIMENTAL

Preliminary tests for alkaloids and glucosides, gave only negative results. The aqueous extract of the roots gives a colouration with ferric chloride and a precipitate with lead acetate. It immediately reduces Fehling's solution.

100 gm. of finely powdered root were extracted with the following solvents successively in Soxhlet apparatus, and the extracts dried at 100°.

Petroleum ether (B. P. 35-50°)	extracted.	1·05	gm.
Ethyl Ether	,,	1	gm.
Chloroform	,,	·82	gm.
Absolute alcohol	,,	1·5	gm.

Petroleum ether extract. The extract was concentrated to a small volume and then extracted with acidified water. The acid extract did not give any precipitate with any of the usual alkaloidal reagents, and it did not give any of the tests of water-soluble glucosides. The concentrated petroleum ether extract was then evaporated to dryness, when a greenish residue was left, which is almost completely soluble in 90% alcohol. The residue is almost completely saponified by boiling with alcoholic Sodium Hydroxide, the unsaponifiable matter forming only a small proportion of the residue.

Ethyl ether extract. The residue obtained by removing the solvent was similar to the residue obtained from Petroleum ether. It did not contain any reducing sugar, tannin, glucoside, alkaloid or an acid. The residue is almost insoluble in petroleum ether and benzene, but dissolves readily in alcohol.

Chloroform extract gave a residue similar to above. In addition it contained some cautchouc like substance.

Absolute alcohol extract. On concentrating the hot extract and allowing it to remain, a white substance separated. This substance was insoluble in the usual organic solvents and it has not so far been possible to obtain it in a crystalline form. The residue obtained by evaporating the mother liquors to dryness is partly soluble in water. The aqueous solution of the residue gives a voluminous precipitate with lead acetate, and the filtrate from this gives a precipitate with basic lead acetate. It has not so far been possible to obtain any crystalline substance from these lead precipitates. The extract contains considerable quantities of glucose.

70% alcohol extract, cold distilled water extract, and boiling water extract had the usual characteristics. No active principle could be isolated from them. All the extracts give tests for reducing sugars.

Cold 1% hydrochloric acid extract. The extract had the usual properties and did not give any tests for alkaloid. On basification, it gave considerable quantities of a brown precipitate, which was insoluble in organic solvents. On being ignited, it left an infusible residue. This substance was found to have the properties of ferric phosphate.

Chemical Laboratory,
Annamalai University,
26th February, 1936.

University Notes

CONFERENCES

The Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar, P.C., C.H., LL.D., Vice-Chancellor of the University, opened the proceedings of the Eleventh All-India Educational Conference held at Nagpur in December, 1935.

The following members of the Staff attended as delegates of the University and read papers at the Conferences noted against their names.

Professor K. Rama Pisharoti & Professor C. S. Srinivasachariar	The Eighth All-India Oriental Conference at Mysore.
Mahavidwan R. Raghava Ayyangar	The First All-India Oriental Poets' Conference at Mysore.
Professor A. Narasinga Rao & Mr. B. Ramamurti	The Mathematical Conference, Delhi.
Professor S. Ramachandra Rao	The Annual Meeting of the Indian Academy of Science, Bombay.
Professor B. V. Narayanaswami & Mr. M. K. Muniswami.	The Nineteenth All-India Economic Conference, Dacca.

SPECIAL LECTURES

The following special lectures were delivered since the publication of the last issue.

Mr. K. R. Subrahmanyan, Professor, Maharajah's College, Vizianagaram.	The Ikshvakus of Andhra (3 lectures).
Mr. A. Gopala Menon, Professor, Maharaja's College, Trivandrum.	Agricultural Indebtedness and some remedies (3 lectures).
Dr. B. L. Manjunath, Professor of Chemistry, Mysore University.	The chemistry of Plant Products (3 lectures).
Swami Vipulanandaji, Ramakrishna Mission, Ceylon.	The Art of rhetoric in Tamil (3 lectures).
Professor Noguchi, Japan.	Japanese Art and Poetry (3 lectures).

TECHNOLOGY

The Syndicate has appointed a special committee to investigate the possibilities of starting at an early date a department of Oil Technology in this University.

TITLES

The University of Madras has conferred the Degree of Master of Oriental Learning on Mr. P. Panchapakesa Sastriar, Pandit in Samskrit, and the Bharata Mahamandal, the title of Mimamsaratnakara on Mr. V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, Lecturer in Samskrit.

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RESEARCH

Besides a large number of extension lectures delivered by the members of the Teaching Staff the following members have submitted papers to various conferences and Journals.

Rao Sahib Prof. C. S. Srinivasachariar.	The Genesis of the Diversion on Arcot in 1751.	All-India Modern History Congress, Poona.
	The Kaval System in the Tamil Country.	All-India Oriental Conference, Mysore.
	Edition of Bell's Empire in India.	
	Chapters XIV and XV of Historical material in the Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai (1736-1761).	Journal of Indian History.
	Tamil Weights, Measures and Currency.	The Ardra.
Mr. S. K. Govindaswami.	A Pala image of Ganapati.	Journal of Indian History.
	Some problems relating to the reign of Kulottunga III.	Journal of Indian History.
Dr. B. V. Narayanaswami Nayudu.	Agricultural Marketing.	The Madras Agricultural Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. I, 1935,
	Rural Debt Relief.	The Indian Co-operative Review, Vol. II, No. 4.
	Land Tenures in South India.	19th All-India Economic Conference.
Mr. V. G. Ramakrishna Ayyar.	Comments on the New Indian Constitution and Finance.	The Economic Journal, Vol. XLV, No. 178, 1935.

Mr. M. K. Muniswami.	Central Banking Technique.	Twentieth Century.
	Financial Future of the Indian Federation.	19th All-India Economic Conference.
Prof. A. Narasinga Rao.	Papers to the 9th Conference of the Indian Mathematical Society.	..
Dr. S. Sivasankaranarayana Pillai.	Paper to the 9th Conference of the Indian Mathematical Society.	..
Mr. B. Ramamurti.	On Rational Normal ruled surfaces.	Math. Annalen. Bd. III, Heft 4.
	A Geometric Interpretation of a theorem on Skew Symmetric functions.	Konin Akad. Van. Wetenschappen, Amsterdam, Vol. 37, No. 10.
	Linear Complexes related to a Rational Normal-curve.	Proc. of the Ind. Acad. of Sc. Vol. I.
	On the Osculating spaces of a Rational Norm-curve which cut a linear complex in null-variant complexes.	Journal. Ind. Math. Soc. Vol. I (New Series).
	On the Rational Norm-curve.	do. (Joint paper) with Dr. Vaidyanathaswami
	Paper to the 9th Conference of the Indian Mathematical Society.	..
Mr. S. Subrahmanian.	On a Property of Partial Correlation.	Jour. Royal Statistical Soc. Part I. '35.
	The Closure Property of 3-curves.	Proc. of the U. P. Academy of Sciences, Sept. 1935.
Dr. S. R. Rao.	Colloidalisation and cold-working of metals.	Current Science, Vol. 4, p. 24.
	Diamagnetism of Copper.	Proc. Ind. Acad. Sciences, Vol. 2, p. 249.
	Magnetism of Copper.	Nature, Vol. 136, 436.
	The Magnetic properties of colloidal powders of Metals.	Annual Meeting of the Indian Academy of Sciences. Bombay, Dec. 1935.
Mr. N. S. Subba Rao.	Nature of Atmospherics.	Nature, Vol. 136, p. 683.

Dr. S. R. Rao and K. C. Subrahmanian (Research student).	Diamagnetism of thallium single crystals.	Nature, Vol. 136, p. 336.
Dr. S. N. Chakravarti.	A note on the nitration of Methyl Salicylaldehyde.	Current Science, 1935, IV, 26-28.
Dr. S. N. Chakravarti and M. Swaminathan.	A new synthesis of 3 : 11 dimethoxy oxy-protoberberine and Synthesis of 2:3 methylene dioxy-11:12-dimethoxyoxy-protoberberine and 2 : 3 : 11 : 12-tetramethoxyoxyprotoberberine.	J. Ch. Sc. London, 1935, 293-95.
	O-aldehydo-carboxylic acids. —Part II.	
	A synthesis of 4-methoxy-phthalaldehydic acid and a new synthesis of opianic acid.	J. Ind. Chem. Soc.
Mr. T. S. Raghavan and Mr. K. R. Venkatasubban.	A note on the abnormal flowers of Cassia fistula.	Current Science.
Mr. A. Ramakrishna Reddy.	A note on the Collection of Paguridea from Porto Novo.	Current Science, Vol. III, No. 2.
	The Structure, Mechanism and Development of the Gastric Armature in Stomatopoda with a discussion as to its Evolution in Decapoda.	Jour. Ind. Acad. Sciences, Vol. I, 650-75.

TRANSLATIONS.

Prof. K. Rama Pisharoti.	(i) Bālacarita.	Journal of the Mythic Society.
	(ii) Vāstuvidya (in collaboration with Mr. V. K. R. Menon).	Calcutta Oriental Journal.
	(iii) Tantrasamuccaya.	Journal of Indian Art, Calcutta.

PAPERS.

	(i) Āmalaka	Calcutta Oriental Journal.
	(ii) Yavana—A Note ..	Indian Culture, Calcutta.
	(iii) Cults and Cult-acts in Kerala.	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

	(iv) Aesthetic Pleasure in Drama.	Calcutta Review.
	(v) Dohada	Journal of Indian Art, Calcutta.
	(vi) Sikhara	do.
	(vii) Vatsabhatti's Prasasti —A Fresh Study.	All-India Oriental Conference.
	(viii) An Interpretation of a Text from the Dhvanyāloka	
Mīmāmsaratna V. A. R. Sastri.	(i) Batrihari—a Bauddha?	
Mr. B. N. K. Sarma.	Catussūtrabhasya of Madhvacarya.	
	(i) Ancient Gita Commentary.	A rejoinder to Prof. Otto Schrader (I.H.Q.)
	(ii) The Underground Library at Kattatala.	(A.B.O.R.I.)
Mr. P. S. Naidu.	(i) Hormic Doctrine and the Gita.	Indian Philosophic Congress, 1935.
	(ii) Heisenburg's principle of uncertainty and its metaphysical implication.	Do.

PUBLICATIONS

The following books are expected to be published during this year:

Tattvabindhu with Tattvavibhavana by M.R.Ry. V. A. Ramaswami Sastriar, Avl.

Svarasiddhantacandrika by M.R.Ry. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastriar, Avl.

A book in Tamil on 'Acoustics' by M.R.Ry. R. K. Viswanathan, Avl.

MUSIC CONFERENCE

A Music Conference was held under the auspices of the Annamalai University, which was opened on the 15th February, 1936, by the Rt. Hon'ble V. S. Srinivasa Sastriar P.C., C.H., L.L.D., Vice-Chancellor of the University. The Hon'ble Dr. Rajah Sir Annamalai Chettiar, Kt., LL.D. was the President of the Conference and Mr. T. S. Sabhesa Ayyar, the Chairman of the Reception Committee. Prof. S. Somasundra Bharathiar, M.A., B.L., delivered the Inaugural Address. A large number of Musicians, Vidvans and Lovers of Music from various parts of the Madras Presidency attended the Conference.

Reviews

Dashopanishads, Vol. I, pp. i-xxxi, 1-45, 457-485. Published by the Theosophical Publishing House for the Adyar Library, 1935. Price Rs. 4.

The Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, has added one more work to their very useful series of publications and this is a welcome addition to the existing *Upaniṣadic* literature. The value of the edition is enhanced by the publication of the commentary by Śri Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin, which follows the teachings of the *Advaita* school. The name and word indexes that have been added at the close are very useful, while the printing and get-up leave nothing to be desired. The Pandits of the Library deserve to be heartily congratulated.

One has to confess to a sense of disappointment on reading through the preface of the volume. One expects that some light is thrown on the age and personality of Upaniṣad-Brahma-Yogin and that an estimate is given regarding the value of the commentary to the student of *Upaniṣads*. The writer, however, hazards a conjecture in the preface that '*Śamkara too had commented the text from the first chapter*' of the second *Āraṇyaka* of the *Aitareya*. This seems to be an idle conjecture, for this goes against the tradition of the commentators on Śamkara. It is surprising that it should have escaped the notice of the writer that the commentator is following the *Mādhva* tradition in treating the first three chapters of the second *Āraṇyaka* also as part of the *Upaniṣad*. These and other subjects, it is hoped, will find adequate treatment in the second volume.

K. R. P.

The Great Temple at Tanjore. By Mr. J. M. Somasundaram, Tanjore. (Price Re. 1 or 2 sh. net.).

I read with real pleasure and much profit the monograph of the Advocate Mr. J. M. Somasundaram on " The Great Temple at Tanjore ".

It is as informing as it is interesting. It gives in a nutshell all that is of abiding interest and of inspiring instruction about the genesis and development of this gem of medieval Tamilian architectural talent and genius. The temple at Tanjore is generally acknowledged to be the greatest and one of the finest in all the East. The brochure of

Mr. Somasundaram extracts the essence of all the literature and traditions bearing on this living monument of the Chola potentates in the art of architecture. It garners and marshals all the facts winnowed out of the chaff of fabled legends and fanciful fictions relating to this famous institution from its very inception down to the days of the last Mahratta prince, with whom perhaps its evolution has stopped so far.

The plans and plates of this great temple with several views of its shrines and quadrangles of annexes present to us picturesquely and perspicuously all that is presentable and of absorbing and abiding interest in the design, execution and finish of the several parts of this temple, sacred both to the pious pilgrims and to the reverent visitors, in short, to all those that worship at the altar either of religion or of Fine Arts. The superb smaller shrine of Sri Subrahmanyaswami in this temple-court is a marvellous work of perfect finish that poetises in stone the arts of architecture and statuary to the eternal wonder and glory of civilised humanity. The references to the monoliths such as that of the great carved Nandhi weighing over 25 tons, and of the dressed gneiss-pedestal of the gilded octagonal cupola on the top of the tall tower rising to a height of 250 feet above ground-level are aptly described in this book. The episodes of the old woman who piously and freely gave the famous monolith of the tower, and of the master architect who lavished voluntarily all his talent and expert-skill on the superb shrine of Subrahmanya for pure love of art, are appropriately touched by the author in this interesting brochure.

The appendices to this monograph afford a wealth of information to the students of South Indian Institutions. They present a magnificent picture of genuine piety and munificence of the potentates, princes, queens and princesses as well as of the distinguished nobility of the medieval Tamilaham in all their splendour. Mr. Somasundaram with a trained lawyer's insight has skilfully negotiated the cobwebs and 'cul de sacs' of fanatic fervour, and has wisely banked on all the trustworthy traditions and literature in choosing, classifying and co-ordinating all the facts and figures for his appendices, which considerably enhance their value, and greatly add to the merit of the monograph. I commend the book to all that are interested in South Indian Temples.

S. S. B.

A Survey of the Marketing of Fruit in India. By Messrs. O. R. Gadgil and V. R. Gadgil.

Considering the area which a single investigator had to cover, this work is an extremely creditable one and there are a number of interesting observations concerning all operations in the fruit trade of Poona from grower to the ultimate consumer.

We are told, that the majority of holdings under fruit, are comparatively small; "fruit production is mostly in the nature of a joint crop of the cultivator together with other crops."

The existence of a chain of middlemen between the grower and the consumer is indicated and the comparative helplessness of the grower himself, in the hands of these middlemen alluded to. The system of selling the standing crop to the pre-harvest contractor—the Khotidar—seems to be widely spread in the Poona district. The investigators emphasise, that in case of any dispute between the Khotidar and the grower, the latter is helpless: they therefore recommend that a proper agreement form should be evolved, which the contractors and the buyers, should be asked to sign. The Khotidar himself does not sell the fruits to the consumers, but entrusts the work to commission salesmen (Dalals). Commission is charged very often in the form of a flat rate per package. In Bombay, we are told, the salesman's commission comes to 42% of the total sale price; in Poona, it amounts to 11%. Often the Khotidar is a man of no means, and he obtains his finance from Marwaris at fairly high rates of interest. His business is often risky, and if he does not discharge all the instalments due to the actual growers, the latter are often unable to recover any money from him.

Apart from middlemen, Railways also come in for criticism, at the hands of the authors. They remark that "they had direct evidence from merchants and forwarding agents, (p. 118) to show that railway employees handle fruits very carelessly." But it must be admitted, that Railways are taking some steps to put down this evil.

Interesting statistical tables have been prepared by the authors, which support the views of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India: "Freight rates *are the heaviest single addition to the prime cost of produce,* exported by rail from the area of production." (Not discriminating between different kinds of fruits, and being levied at a flat rate per package, very often, the rates work out very high, in the case of low priced fruits, e.g., bananas: most of such fruits are transported on country carts.) We however feel that there is some repetition in the book, and the addition of an index would enhance the value of the book.

M. K. M.

Defective Sight: its cause and cure. By L. Kamesvaran, B.Sc., (*Hons.*). Published by The Nature-Cure Publishing House, Pudukotah, 1935.

This nicely got-up booklet of 36 pages is by Mr. L. Kamesvaran, an alumnus of this University, and the son of that veteran Naturopath Dr. K. L. Sarma of Pudukotah. He traces all eye-defects as Naturopaths do all diseases of the body, to fundamental constitutional disharmony; he recommends a change of diet, suitable baths, sun-gazing, massaging of the neck, palming, etc. Eye-glasses, he declares to be mere eye-crutches, and he says that they only make the defects worse in course of time. He claims to have treated granules and long-sight successfully by these methods; he is hopeful that all eye-troubles could be effectively cured if the rules he lays down in the pamphlet are observed carefully. It is written in a simple and easy manner; it is a welcome addition to Naturopathic literature.

C. R. M.

Cheap and Healthy Homes for the Middle Classes of India. By R. S. Deshpande, B.E., A.M.I.E., Engineer, Bombay P.W.D., Aryabushan Press, Bombay. Price Rs. 3.

This book seeks to place before the owner-builder helpful information relating to the construction and sanitary fittings of a cottage, house or mansion. It should prove particularly valuable in cases where professional experts are not available, as the author has incorporated the latest advances in the construction of walls, floors, roofs, etc.

The lay house-builder is somewhat apt to be puzzled by the chapter on Foundations and damp proof courses below the basement level. It is not clear whether the author considers concrete or Cuddapah slabs as efficient load distributors and damp proof material. The practice, long in vogue, of having a middle course of stone slabs, cement brick-work or Cuddapah slab at floor level seems to achieve both the aims to a great extent. The problem of preventing the ravages of white ants is a problem of great importance for which no practical solution is offered. The only effective method would be the location and destruction of the Queen Ant, and the laying of a layer of arsenic compounds mixed with mortar near ground level after clearing roots and other vegetation.

The author recommends a more general use of cement block walls, concrete staircases, roofs, lintels, etc., but the question of cost, the availability of materials and above all, of experienced artisans are likely to stand in the way.

Many may not also agree with the author regarding the reduction of the heights and widths of doors and windows from considerations of economy, for aesthetic as well as sanitary considerations have also to be taken into account.

It is to be regretted that with the spreading craze for novelty, brick arches, brick terraces which can be built efficiently and cheaply by the local artisan are suffering an undeserved neglect, and are not more commonly used by the professional expert.

With regard to plastering, a cement and sand preparation in the ratio of 1:12 with neat cement grout of 20 lbs. per 100 sq. ft. will prove an economic damp proof material and will strengthen walls of brick in mud. A cheap and efficient mode of flooring commonly in use, consists in placing a layer of brick jelly concrete and rubbing the surface smooth with 20 lbs. of cement per 100 sq. ft. after roughening the top surface. As regards the roof, the flat roof of a Madras terrace is found to be quite cool and free from leaks, though the author does not recommend them.

The book is a very helpful one, and will, let us hope, stimulate other publications on buildings, sanitation and water supply written with special reference to Indian conditions.

S. P. R.

Śrimad Bhagavadgītā. Chapter I. Translation of text and summary of the Commentary of Sri Hamsa Yogin. By R. Vasudeva Rao. Published by T. M. Janardhanam, the Suddha Dharma office, Mylapore. Pages 60.

This edition of the Bhagavadgītā presents a text extending over twenty-six chapters and including seven hundred and forty-five verses. Another feature of special interest in this work is it gives an abstract of an early and comparatively unknown commentary on the Bhagavadgītā written by Hamsa Yogin. Who this commentator was and when he flourished are questions yet unsettled. He thinks that the twenty-

four chapters of this text, excluding the first and the last entitled 'Gītāvatāra' and 'Brahmastuti', constitute the Gītā proper and that they give an exposition of the twenty-four dharmas of the Gāyatri. These twenty-four chapters are divided into four ṣatkas—the jñāna-ṣakta, the Chakhi--ṣatka, the kriyā-ṣatka and the yoga-ṣatka,—and these correspond to the four feet of the Gāyatrī. Hamsa Yogin then goes on to describe the contents of the chapters of the Gītā one by one. The six chapters of the jñāna-ṣatka deal respectively with the over-lordship of Nārāyaṇa, the manifold incarnations of the divinity, the system of hierarchs for the moral governance of the world, the disciplines which aid spiritual evolution, the supreme cause of the manifest world, and the essential nature of that cause. Bhakti-ṣatka treats of the nature of the evolving entity, the means such as, yajña, dāna and tapas, sattva, rajas and tamas, the twin methods of pravṛttī and nivṛtti, the infinity of divine manifestations intuited by the ideal bhakta, and the highest excellences of some of these manifestations. The karma-ṣatka inquires into the conditions governing the practice of concentration of mind, the goal of the aspirant after mukti, the path to realisation, the theory and practice of meditation, the nature of the paramahamsa, one who has mastered all the foregoing dharmas, and the clear vision of such an individual. The last ṣatka refers to the supremacy of the Ātma, the manifestation of prakṛti, the nature of the activity which leads to attainment, and of devotion, the excellence of synthetic knowledge and the transcendental state. A comparison of this novel interpretation of the message of the Gītā with the interpretations offered by the three great ācāryas is bound to be interesting. Mr. R. Vasudeva Rao has done a great service in placing before the English-knowing public this summary of the interesting commentary by Hamsa Yogin. The further instalments of this work are eagerly awaited. The author will do well to use the accepted transliteration of the Sanskrit words and the recognised diacritical marks.

R.R.

The Uṇādisūtras in Various Recensions. Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 7, Parts I, II and VI. Edited by Dr. T. R. Chintamani, M.A., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer in Sanskrit, University of Madras, Madras.

Parts I and II contain the Uṇādisūtras of Pāṇinīyan School with the commentaries thereon by Śvetavanavāsin and Nārāyaṇa respectively. As the editor says in his introduction, the commentators use their texts

that have been accepted by eminent commentators like Ujjvaladatta and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, and in addition, comment on the 14 sūtras dealing with the origin of the Sanskrit alphabet, which Ujjvaladatta and Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita have not considered. The editor has taken pains (*a*) to note the variations in the number of sūtras as commented (1) by Ujjvaladatta and Śvetavanavāsin and (2) Śvetavanavāsin and Nārāyaṇa, (*b*) to show the noteworthy differences in the commentaries of Śvetavanavāsin and Nārāyaṇa, and (c) to incorporate in the text the two recensions of Śvetavanavāsin's commentary from the sūtra 4—147 to the end; and these, we hope, are of importance and value for a critical student of grammar at the present day.

The authorship of these sūtras which are generally known as the *Pañcapādī,* is a matter of learned controversy, and the editor promises to discuss it in all detail in his General Introduction, which will appear in the last part of this series. The commentator Śvetavanavāsin has been assigned too cautiously by the editor to a period between 10th and 16th centuries before Nārāyaṇa (the author of the Prakriyāsarvasva) whose date has been definitely fixed as the latter half of the 16th century (and the former half of the 17th century).

Part VI comprises the Uṇādisūtras of *two* schools other than Pāṇinīyan, each with a commentary thereon. The first section of this part containing 795 sūtras is taken from Bhoja's great treatise on grammar called *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa,* which, as later references show, was originally known as *Śabdānuśāsana.* It seems that since the title Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa is more fascinating, it had a wider approbation even in the days of Bhoja, with the result that his Pariṣad Hall, some Paṇḍit of his court, one of his cowherds and two of his works—a treatise on the Alaṅkāra Śāstra and the great *Śabdānuśāsana*—all bore the title *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*—the necklace of (Goddess) Sarasvatī. The most important thing about Bhoja is that he 'has succeeded remarkably well in presenting in a cogent form what is found distributed in different works like the Aṣṭādhyāyī, Vārtika and Bhāṣya', so that his work was largely used by later writers like Nārāyaṇa who has been said to have incorporated in his Prakriyāsarvasva explanations of such words also as are not found in the original Uṇādisūtras but found in Bhoja's celebrated treatise.

The second section of this part containing 399 sūtras belongs to *Kātantra* school. The editor, on the authority of the commentator Durga Siṁha, rightly observes in his introductory note that these Uṇādi sūtras which are a part of the *Kṛt. section* in Śarvavarman's *Kātantra-*

vyākaraṇa, were originally composed by Vararuci *alias* Kātyāyana, and that Śarvavarman later on incorporated them in his work.

We heartily congratulate the learned editor on his stupendous task which, we eagerly hope, will be completed by the publication of the other parts and of his General Introduction.

V. A. R.

Planned Economy for India. By Sir M. Visvesvaraya (Bangalore Press.)

This book is an earnest and courageous attempt to set forth clearly the fundamental facts of Indian economic conditions and to suggest the lines on which Indian Economy should be organised and improved. The book is cyclopoedic in the range of its information and will no doubt be found a valuable *vade mecum* to the student as well as the general reader. The general plan of the book consists of first a survey of Indian economic conditions regarding Agriculture, Industries, Trade, Transport and Tariffs, Finance, Currency and Banking; and the second part of the book which is constructive elaborates a Ten-Year Plan for India. The plan and programme is elaborately set forth. Though the Ten-Year Plan put forward in the book is by its very nature tentative, it will be found sufficiently precise to form the basis of a working plan. While European countries have adopted a vigorous national economic policy, the Government of India have been content with merely maintaining law and order, policing the country and gathering the taxes, and in all important matters, the real economic interests of the country have been subordinated to the powerful vested interests of Great Britain, e.g., the constitution of the Reserve Bank, Exchange Ratio, Statutory Railway Board, Protection, Coastal Shipping Reservation, etc.

The author points out that India's political status as a dependency of Great Britain has stood in the way of formulation of sound administrative and business policies on national lines. The total neglect of Indian industries and the crowding into agriculture of about twice the population that it can reasonably bear have created a number of problems which can be solved only by the adoption of a comprehensive programme of economic reconstruction. Though it has become the fashion with some people to decry plans and planners, there have not been wanting careful thinkers both among professional economists and

trained administrators who urge the need for a planned economy in modern economic life. The old dogmatic faith in extreme *laissez faire* has lost its validity, and state intervention of one kind or another in economic life is now admitted to be both practicable and desirable. Attention may be drawn in particular to chapters 14, 15 and 16 of the book which set forth in detail the plan and programme of economic reconstruction. Whatever might be said about the merits of the scheme adumbrated in the book there is no doubt that it deserves the careful consideration of those who care for India's economic welfare, and cannot be put on the shelf as not practicable. Few men are better qualified to propound a scheme than the author of this book whose theoretical knowledge is enriched by his experience as a great administrator. The comparative statistical tables at the end of the book give us in a nut-shell a good deal of information which would otherwise have to be delved in the pages of Blue Books. There is a very detailed index and the get up of the book leaves nothing to be desired.

V. G. R.

॥ श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

॥ समासशक्तिविमर्शः ॥

। वे. सुब्रह्मण्यशास्त्री ।

॥ अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ॥

समासपदानां स्वबोध्ये अर्थे शक्तिरस्ति नास्तीति विवदन्ते तीर्थकराः । एकार्थीभाववादिनो वैयाकरणाः—घटपदात् घटत्वविशिष्टस्य बोधात्तत्पदस्य घटत्वविशिष्टे शक्तिरिव राजपुरुषादिसमासपदात् राजकीयपुरुषादिबोधात्तस्यापि तादृशार्थे शक्तिरेवेति वदन्ति । व्यपेक्षावादिनो नैयायिकास्तु समासघटकपदानां यथासंभवं शक्त्या लक्षणया वा विवक्षितार्थबोधसंभवेन समासे न शक्तिरिति प्रतिपादयन्ति । तदत्र स्वमतिशुद्धये पक्षद्वयमपि प्रतिपाद्यते ।

एकार्थीभाववादिनां वैयाकरणानामयमभिसन्धिः (१) चित्रगुः इत्यादौ शक्तिं विना चित्रगोस्वामिबोधो न संभवति । तथाहि गोपदस्य गोस्वामिनि लक्षणा गवि चित्रपदार्थस्य अभेदेनान्वय इति न संभवति, पदार्थस्य पदार्थैकदेशेन (पदजन्योपस्थितिप्रकारेण) अन्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् । नापि गोपदस्य शक्त्या गौः लक्षणया स्वामी चार्थः । गोः पदार्थत्वात् न तत्र चित्राभेदान्वये व्युत्पत्तिविरोध इति युक्तम् । युगपद्वृत्तिद्वयविरोधात् । अतः गोपदस्य चित्रगोस्वामिनि लक्षणा । चित्रपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकमिति वाच्यम् । तच्च न

युक्तम् (a) चित्रपदस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वे बहुव्रीहिसमासस्यैवासंभवात् । "अनेकमन्यपदार्थे" इति बहुव्रीहिविधायकं सूत्रम् । अन्यपदार्थे विद्यमानमनेकं सुबन्तं समस्यते स बहुव्रीहिसंज्ञक इति तदर्थः । अत्र विद्यमानत्वम् प्रतिपादकत्वम् । चित्रपदस्य चित्रगोस्वामिरूपान्यपदार्थप्रतिपादकत्वाभावे अनेकसुबन्तस्य तत्प्रतिपादकत्वाभावात् ।

(b) समासप्रयोजकसामर्थ्याभावाच्च । नैयायिकमते तत्पदप्रयोज्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयताप्रयोजकत्वरूपं एकवाक्यत्वमेव सामर्थ्यं वाच्यम् । चित्रगुपदजन्यबोधीयचित्रविषयतायाश्च चित्रपदप्रयोज्यत्वाभावेन गोपदस्य चित्रपदेनैकवाक्यताविरहात् । (c) घट इत्यत्रापि अन्त्यवर्णस्यैव घटवाचकतापत्तेः । नच केवलाकारश्रवणे घटबोधो नजायत इति न तन्मात्रस्य वाचकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । घकारादिपूर्ववर्णानां तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वाङ्गीकारेणादोषात् । तस्माच्चित्रगुरित्यादौ गोपदस्य चित्रगोस्वामिनि लक्षणां स्वीकृत्य चित्रपदस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वं न समञ्जसम् ।

एवं प्राप्तोदको ग्रामः इत्यत्र शक्त्यभावे उदककर्तृकप्राप्तिकर्मरूपार्थबोधो न सम्भवति । नच उदकशब्दस्यैव निरुक्तार्थे लक्षणायाः स्वीकारान्नानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । तात्पर्यग्राहकस्य स्ववाच्यार्थघटितार्थे लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वमितिनियमः । चित्रगुः इत्यत्र चित्रपदस्य स्ववाच्यचित्रघटिते चित्रगोस्वामिनि गोपदलक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वात् । तस्य भङ्गापत्तिः । उदकपदलक्ष्यार्थे उदककर्तृकप्राप्तिकर्मणि प्राप्तपदार्थप्राप्तिकर्तुः अघटकत्वात् । प्रकृतस्थले व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पने समासशक्तिकल्पनस्यैवोचितत्वात् ।

एवं पञ्चगवधनः इत्यत्र धनशब्दस्यैव पञ्चगवाभिन्नधनस्वामिनि लक्षणां स्वीकृत्य पूर्वतनभागस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वे पञ्चपदार्थगोपदार्थयोरभेदान्वयबोधाभावेन पञ्चगोपदयोस्सामानाधिकरण्याभावेन कर्मधारयत्वाभावाट्टच् न स्यात् । अतः समुदायशक्तिः स्वीकरणीया ।

एवं राजपुरुषः इत्यत्र शक्तिं विना गतिविरहः। तथाहि। राजपदलक्ष्यार्थस्य राजसंबन्धिनः अभेदेन पुरुषनामार्थे अन्वयो न संभवति। तण्डुलस्य स्वकर्मकत्वसंबन्धेन पाके अन्वयतात्पर्येण तण्डुलः पचति इति प्रयोगो न प्रामाणिकः। अतः प्रातिपदिकार्थनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिंप्रति विशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितिः कारणमिति वक्तव्यम्। तथाच पाकस्येव पुरुषस्यापि प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थित्यविशेष्यत्वात्तत्र राजपदार्थान्वयो न संभवति। वैयाकरणनये तु प्रातिपदिकार्थस्सर्वोऽपि प्रत्ययार्थ एवान्वेति। शुभ्रेण तण्डुलेन इत्यत्रापि शुभ्रपदार्थः प्रथमार्थाभेद एवान्वेति। चैत्रः इत्यत्रापि प्रतिपदिकार्थः चैत्रः प्रथमार्थप्रातिपदिकार्थ एवान्वेति।

राजपदार्थ पुरुषपदार्थयोरभेदान्वये राजपुरुषपदयोः समानाधिकरणत्वेन कर्मधारयत्वापत्तिः। राज्ञः पुरुषः इति विवरणवाक्यसमानार्थकत्वाभावश्च। विवरणवाक्येन राजस्वत्ववान्पुरुष इत्येव बोधोदयात्। नचेष्टापत्तिः। विग्रहवाक्यस्य समासशक्तिनिर्णायकत्वानुपपत्तेः।

राजपदस्य राजसंबन्धे लक्षणा इति मणिकारमताश्रयणेच विरुद्धविभक्तिरहित प्रातिपदिकार्थयोः अभेदान्वयस्य व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धत्वेन राजसंबन्धाभिन्नः पुरुष इति बोधप्रसङ्गः।

एवं उपकुम्भं इत्यत्र कुम्भपदस्य कुम्भसमीपे लक्षणा, उपपदं तात्पर्यग्राहकमिति न युज्यते। प्रणमतीत्यादौ प्रशब्दद्योत्यप्रकर्षस्य धात्वर्थनमनविशेषणतया बोधात् द्योत्यार्थविशेषणकशाब्दबुद्धावेव द्योत्यार्थोपस्थितेर्हेतुत्वात् उपशब्दद्योत्यसामीप्यस्य कुम्भविशेष्यतया बोधासम्भवात्। द्योत्यार्थविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधे द्योत्यार्थोपस्थितेः हेतुत्वान्तरकल्पने गौरवात्। तथाच विवक्षितार्थबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या समासे शक्तिस्सिद्ध्यति।

(२) किञ्च समासस्य अशक्तत्वे चित्रगुमानयेत्यादौ द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वेन चित्रगोस्वामिन अन्वयो न स्यात्। प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तेः। प्रकृतित्वं प्रत्ययविधानावधितापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वं। नतु स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन तादृशावधिताश्रयत्वं। तथा सति दण्डिनं पश्येत्यत्र द्वितीयार्थविषयत्वस्य दण्डपदार्थेनान्वयापत्तेः। दण्डपदस्यापि स्वरूपसम्बन्धेन निरुक्तप्रकृतित्वाश्रयत्वात्। प्रकृत्यर्थत्वञ्च न प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितिविषयत्वं। तथासति घटं पश्येति वाक्यात् आकाशविषयकदर्शनान्वयबोधापत्तेः। द्वितीयाप्रकृतिघटपदात् समवायेन आकाशस्योपस्थितत्वेन आकाशस्य प्रकृत्यर्थत्वात्। अपितु वृत्त्या प्रकृतिजन्योपस्थितविषयत्वम्। आकाशस्य घटपदात् वृत्त्या अनुपस्थितत्वान्नदोषः। तथाच प्रकृते प्रकृतिः चित्रगुपदमेव न गोपदम्। चित्रगोस्वामीच गोपदार्थः न वृत्त्या प्रकृत्यर्थ इति तेन द्वितीयार्थान्वयानुपपत्तिः। नच सन्निहितपदार्थनिष्ठविषयतानिरूपितविषयतासम्बन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिं प्रति प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितिः विशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन कारणमिति स्वीक्रियते। तथाच द्वितीयाविभक्तिसन्निहितगोपदार्थेन द्वितीयार्थान्वयसंभव इति वाच्यम्। प्राचीननैयायिकमते कुम्भपदलक्ष्यकुम्भसम्बन्धिना अभेदेनान्वितस्य उपपदार्थसमीपस्य द्वितीयार्थान्वयेन उपपदस्य कुम्भपदेन व्यवधानात् व्यभिचारान्निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावासम्भवात्। नच समासोत्तरप्रत्ययस्य समस्यमानपदार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिः स्वीक्रियत इति समासघटकगोपदार्थेन विभक्त्यर्थान्वयस्सम्भवत्येवेति वाच्यम्। प्रत्ययानामिति कॢप्तव्युत्पत्तिं परित्यज्य समासोत्तरेत्यादिव्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पने समासशक्तिकल्पनस्यैव युक्तत्वात्।

(३) चित्रगुः इति सुबन्तपदसाधुत्वायापि समासशक्तिस्वीकार आवश्यकः। प्रातिपदिकोत्तरमेव सुब्विधीयते। अर्थवच्छब्दस्वरूपस्यैव प्रातिपदिकत्वं। अर्थवदधातुरिति सूत्रात्। अर्थवत्त्वञ्च वृत्तिमत्त्वं। यदि चित्रगुपदस्य शक्तिर्नास्ति तदा अर्थवत्त्वाभावेन तस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाया अभावेन तदुत्तरं सुबुत्पत्तिर्न स्यात्। नच

शक्त्यभावेऽपि लक्षणया अर्थवत्त्वं संभवतीति वाच्यम् । बोध्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणेति वादिनां मीमांसकानां मते तत्संभवेऽपि शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणेतिवादिनां नैयायिकानां मते तदसंभवात् । वाक्ये शक्तेरभावेन समासात्मकवाक्यस्य शक्याप्रसिद्ध्या शक्यसम्बन्धरूपलक्षणाया अप्रसिद्धेः । तस्मात्समासस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञासिद्ध्यर्थं शक्तिस्वीकार आवश्यकः ।

(४) अपिच समासस्याशक्तत्वे पङ्कजपदस्यापि पद्मत्वावच्छिन्ने शक्तिर्न स्यात् । तद्घटकपदैरेव पङ्कजनिकर्तुः पद्मस्य बोधसंभवात् । नच अवयवशक्त्या पङ्कजनिकर्तृत्वेन बोधसंभवेऽपि पद्मत्वेन रूपेण बोधः विना समुदायशक्तिं न निर्वहतीति वाच्यम् । समास इव तत्रापि लक्षणया पद्मत्वविशिष्टबोधसंभवात् । तस्मात् पङ्कजपदात्पद्मत्वविशिष्टोपस्थितये तत्पदस्य तत्र शक्तिरिव समासपदानामपि तत्र तत्रार्थे शक्तिरावश्यकी ।

(५) ब्राह्मणः पण्डितः इति वाक्यात् ब्राह्मणोद्देश्यकाभेदसंसर्गकपण्डितविधेयकबोधो जायते । उद्देश्यस्य विधेयस्यच पृथक् पदाभ्यामुपस्थितेः । यदि समासे न शक्तिः तदा पण्डितब्राह्मणः इति समासादपि तथा बोधापत्तिः । पण्डितपदार्थस्य अभेदेन ब्राह्मणपदार्थे अन्वयेन तयोः पृथगुपस्थितेः तथान्वयबोधप्रयोजिकायास्सत्त्वात् । समासशक्तिस्वीकारे तु तत्र तयोः संसृष्टतयैवोपस्थितत्वात् पृथगुपस्थितेरभावान्नदोषः ।

(६) अतएव वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्षः इत्यत्र भक्षोद्देशेन प्राथम्यविधानं न संभवति एकप्रसरताभङ्गापत्तेरिति मीमांसकानां सिद्धान्तोऽपि संगच्छते । समासस्यावाचकत्वे पृथगुपस्थितेः सत्त्वेन भक्षोद्देश्यकप्राथम्यविधेयकबोधसम्भवेन तथाविधानसंभवात् । समासशक्तिस्वीकारे तु पृथगुपस्थितेरभावेन तथान्वयबोधासम्भवात्प्राथम्यविशिष्टभक्षविधानमुक्तं संगच्छते ।

(७) अपिच राज्ञि ऋद्धाभेदान्वयतात्पर्येण ऋद्धस्य राजपुरुषः इति प्रयोगो न प्रामाणिकः । एकार्थीभाववादिमते तदप्रामाणिकत्वं, घटपदार्थैकदेशे घटत्वे नित्यत्वान्वयतात्पर्येण नित्यो घटः इति प्रयोगवारणाय अवश्यं स्वीकरणीयायाः "पदार्थः पदार्थेनान्वेति नतदेकदेशेन" इति व्युत्पत्तेर्विरोधादेव सिद्धम् । राज्ञः राजपुरुषपदार्थैकदेशत्वेन तत्र ऋद्धपदार्थाभेदान्वयासंभवात् । तथा च न्यायसिद्धस्यार्थस्यानुवादकमेव "सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्न वृत्तस्य वा विशेषणयोगो न" इति वार्तिकम् । नच समासशक्त्यनङ्गीकारेऽपि राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजपदस्य राजसम्बन्धिलक्षकत्वेन राज्ञः राजपदार्थैकदेशत्वात् तत्र ऋद्धाभेदान्वयस्य निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात्तद्वाक्याप्रामाण्यं सिद्धमेवेति वाच्यम् । अलुक्समासे विभक्तेः श्रूयमाणत्वेन तदर्थान्तर्भावेण पूर्वपदलक्षणायां प्रमाणाभावः । तथाच शोभने वनेचरः विरूपाया दास्याःपुत्रः मिताया वाचस्पतिः इत्यादौ वनादीनां पदार्थैकदेशत्वाभावात् तत्र शोभनाद्यभेदान्वये निरुक्तव्युपत्तिविरोधविरहेण सविशेषणानामितिवार्तिकबलेनैव निरुक्तवाक्याप्रामाण्यस्योपपादनीयतया तद्वार्तिकस्य विधित्वकल्पने गौरवम् । वैयाकरणनयेतु अलुक्समासेऽपि शक्तिरेवेति न दोषः । एवं एकार्थीभावानङ्गीकारे कदाचित् राज्ञः पुरुष इति कदाचिच्च राजपुरुषः इति समासश्च विभाषासूत्रेणेवोपपादनीयः । व्यपेक्षाया उभयत्राविशिष्टत्वादिति तत्सूत्रस्य विधित्वकल्पने गौरवम् । वैयाकरणमतेतु एकार्थीभावविवक्षायां समासस्य व्यपेक्षाविवक्षायां व्यासस्य च सिद्धत्वेन विभाषासूत्रस्य अनुवादत्वमेवेति लाघवम् । अतोऽपि समासे शक्तिः स्वीकरणीयेति ॥

नैयायिकास्तु समासे शक्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावेन अनन्तसमासपदानां अप्रामाणिकानन्तशक्तिकल्पना न युक्ता । नच अर्थविशेषे द्वन्द्वादिविधायकं चार्थे द्वन्द्वः इत्यादि सूत्रमेव शक्तिग्राहकमस्तीति वाच्यम् । अर्थविशेषबोधकत्वं द्वन्द्वादिसंज्ञाचेत्युभयविधाने वाक्यभेदापत्तेः न तत्सूत्रेण अर्थविशेषबोधकत्वमपि विधीयते । अपितु द्वन्द्वादिसंज्ञामात्र-

मिति भवद्भिरेव प्रपञ्चितत्वात् । नच शक्त्यभावे विवक्षितार्थबोधानुपपत्तिः शङ्क्या । तद्घटकपदवृत्त्यैव तत्संभवात् ।

(१) यदुक्तम् चित्रगुरित्यादौ गोपदस्यैव चित्रगोस्वामिलक्षकत्वे बहुव्रीहिसंज्ञैव नस्यादिति । तन्न । अन्यपदार्थबोधप्रयोजकत्वरूपं अन्यपदार्थे विद्यमानत्वम् चित्रपदस्यापि संभवति चित्रगोस्वामिविषयकशाब्दबोधे चित्रपदगोपदयोस्समभिव्याहारस्य आकांक्षात्वेन चित्रपदस्य अन्यपदार्थबोधौपयिकाकांक्षाघटकत्वात् । अन्यपदार्थवाचकत्वञ्च भवन्मतेऽपि अनेकसुबन्तानां न संभवति । समुदायस्यैव वाचकत्वेन चित्रपदस्य तदवाचकत्वात् । अतः अन्यपदार्थवाचकघटकत्वात् अनेकसुबन्तानां अन्यपदार्थे वर्तमानत्वमुपपादनीयम् । अस्माभिस्तु तद्बोधौपयिकाकांक्षाघटकत्वात्तदिति को विशेषः ।

यदपि चित्रपदस्य तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वे व्यपेक्षासामर्थ्याभावेन समास एव न स्यादिति । तदपिन । यद्यपि चित्रपदजन्यचित्रोपस्थितिः समासजन्यचित्रगोस्वामिविषयकशाब्दबोधे न कारणमिति शाब्दबोधीयचित्रविषयता चित्रपदजन्योपस्थितिद्वारा न चित्रपदप्रयोज्या । तथापि चित्राभिन्नगोस्वामिविषयकशाब्दबोधस्य चित्रगोपदयोस्समभिव्याहाररूपाकांक्षाज्ञानजन्यतया तादृशशाब्दबोधीयचित्रविषयता बोधौपयिकाकांक्षाघटकचित्रपदप्रयोज्या । एवं गोविषयतापीति चित्रपदप्रयोज्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयताप्रयोजकत्वं गोपदे वर्तत इति न सामर्थ्यस्यानुपपत्तिः ।

यदपि घटादिपदेऽपि चरमवर्णस्यैव वाचकत्वापत्तिरिति । तदपिन । घटपदमेव घटरूपार्थे संकेतितं न चरमवर्णमात्रमिति घटपदमेव घटवाचकम् । समासघटकचित्रराजादिपदानि तु स्वस्वार्थसंकेतितानीति वाचकत्वेन क्लृप्तानि । तेषामेव लक्षणा कल्प्यते । तत्रापि प्रत्ययार्थान्वयसौलभ्याय चरमपदे लक्षणा स्वीक्रियते इति विशेषात् । किञ्च अन्त्यवर्णस्य वाचकत्वं पूर्ववर्णानां तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वमिति कोऽर्थः ? चित्रगुरित्यादौ चित्रपदशक्यार्थोपस्थित्यनन्तरम् गोपदलक्षणातात्पर्यग्रहवत् घकारादिवर्णजन्यार्थोपस्थि-

त्यनन्तरं चरमवर्णवाचकतातात्पर्यज्ञानादीनामसंभवात्। घकारशक्यार्थाप्रसिद्ध्या तदुपस्थितेरभावात्। अपितु घकारोत्तराकारोत्तरटकारोत्तराकारस्य वाचकत्वं न तु केवलाकारस्येत्यर्थो वाच्यः। तच्च नानिष्टम्। पौर्वापर्यविशिष्टचरमवर्णस्यैव पदत्वेन तस्यैवार्थवाचकत्वात्।

यदपि प्राप्तोदको ग्रामइत्यत्र प्राप्तपदस्य उदककर्तृकप्राप्तिकर्मणि उदकपदलक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वे स्ववाच्यार्थघटितार्थे लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वव्युत्पत्तिविरोध इति। तन्न। उदकपदलक्ष्यार्थे धात्वर्थप्राप्तेः क्तप्रत्ययार्थकर्तुश्च घटकत्वेन व्युत्पत्तिविरोधविरहात्। नच प्राप्तेति भागस्य पदसमुदायत्वेनावाचकत्वात्स्ववाच्यार्थाप्रसिद्ध्या निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोध इति वाच्यम्। दीर्घबहुव्रीहिसमासादावपि प्रत्ययाव्यवहितपूर्वपदे लक्षणां स्वीकुर्वाणानां नैयायिकानां मते तात्पर्यग्राहकभागस्य स्ववाच्यार्थघटितार्थे लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वव्युत्पत्तेरसिद्धेः। अपितु तात्पर्यग्राहकस्य स्वबोध्यघटकार्थघटितार्थे लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वनियमः। सचाव्यभिचरितः। प्रकृते प्राप्तेति भागबोध्यप्राप्तिकर्तुः उदकपदलक्ष्यार्थाघटकत्वेऽपि बोध्यार्थघटकप्राप्तेः कर्तुश्च तत्र घटकत्वात्। चित्रगुरित्यत्रापि चित्रपदबोध्यार्थघटकत्वस्य चित्रत्वविशिष्टसाधारण्येन तद्घटिते, बोध्यघटकचित्रत्वघटिते वा चित्रगोस्वामिनि लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वात्। एवमनुगतव्युत्पत्तिसंभवे चित्रगुः इति स्थलमात्रसाधारणव्युत्पत्तिं परिकल्प्य तस्येतरसाधारण्याभावेन व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरकल्पनाप्रयुक्तगौरवापादनमसङ्गतम्।

यदपि पञ्चगवधनः इत्यादौ पञ्चगोपदयोः सामानाधिकरण्यं न स्यात्। तदर्थयोरभेदान्वयविरहादिति। तदपि न। अभेदेन तत्पदार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वं स्वस्य तत्पदसामानाधिकरण्यम्। तत्पदार्थत्वञ्च तत्पदप्रयोज्यविषयताश्रयत्वं। एवं स्वार्थत्वमपि बोध्यम्। निरुक्तशाब्दबोधीयपञ्चादिविषयतायां तात्पर्यग्रहद्वारा साक्षादेव आकांक्षाघटकतया वा चित्रादिपदानां प्रयोजकत्वात् निरुक्तसामानाधिकरण्यस्य तत्पदयोरबाधितत्वात्।

॥ श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः ॥

॥ समासशक्तिविमर्शः ॥

(पूर्वतोऽनुवृत्तः)

॥ वे. सुब्रह्मण्यशास्त्री ॥

॥ अण्णामलैविश्वविद्यालयः ॥

यदपि राजपुरुष इत्यत्र राजपदलक्ष्यार्थराजसंबन्धिनः अभेदेन पुरुषपदार्थे अन्वयो न संभवति प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रकारकशाब्दबोधे प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितेः हेतुत्वादिति । तदपि न । तण्डुलकर्मकपाकान्वयबोधे द्वितीयान्ततण्डुलपदपचधातुसमभिव्याहारस्य आकांक्षात्वेन तण्डुलः पचति इत्यत्र निरुक्ताकांक्षाया अभावादेव तादृशबोधापत्तेरसंभवेन तद्वारणाय निरुक्तकार्यकारणभावकल्पनस्यानावश्यकत्वात् । अस्तु वा कार्यकारणभावः । तथापि कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ भेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारता निवेशनीया । अन्यथा नीलो घट इत्यत्र घटपदार्थे नीलपदार्थस्य अभेदान्वयबोधोदयेन व्यभिचारात् । नच तत्रापि नीलपदोत्तरप्रथमार्थे अभेद एव नीलान्वय इति अभेदप्रकारकबोधस्यैवोपगमेन न व्यभिचार इति वाच्यम् । अभेदस्य प्रकारतया भाने अभेदीयसंबन्धयोरपि शाब्दबोधे भानेन अधिकावगाहियोग्यतातात्पर्यज्ञानादीनां तत्सामग्रीकोटौ निवेशे विभिन्नविषयकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रतिबन्धकतायामवच्छेदकगौरवात् । नच नीलतादात्म्याभाववान्घटः सुन्दरः इति विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिप्रत्यक्षे विशेष्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानविधया नीलतादात्म्याभाववान्घटः इति ज्ञानं कारणम् । तच्च नीलतादात्म्यवान्घट इत्याकारकाभेदप्रकारकशाब्दबोधे बाधज्ञानविधया प्रतिबन्धकम् । निरुक्तज्ञानाभावघटिता शाब्दसामग्री । निरुक्तज्ञानघटिता प्रत्यक्षसामग्री । अतस्तयोः समावेशो न संभवति । एवञ्च शाब्दबोधसामग्रीकाले प्रत्यक्षसामग्र्यभावादेव प्रत्यक्षवारणसंभवात् निरुक्तप्रत्यक्षे अभेदप्रकारकशाब्दसामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धकत्वं न कल्पनीयमिति लाघवम् । अभेदसंसर्गकबोधाङ्गीकारे तु

नीलतादात्म्याभाववान्घट इति ज्ञानस्य बाधज्ञानत्वाभावात् सामग्रीसमावेशेन प्रत्यक्षापत्तिवारणाय शाब्दसामग्र्याः प्रतिबन्धकत्वं कल्पनीयमिति गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । अभेदस्य विशेषणविभक्त्यर्थत्वे प्रतियोग्यभावान्वयौ तुल्ययोगक्षेमौ इति न्यायेन घटो न नीलः इति वाक्यात् नीलतादात्म्याभावस्यैव घटे बोधःस्यात् न नीलभेदस्य । नञ्घटितनिरुक्तवाक्यादीनाञ्च नीलभेदबोधकत्वं सर्वानुभवसिद्धम् । अतः निरुक्तलाघवमपि बाधित्वा वाक्यजन्यभेदानुभव एव विशेषणविभक्तेरभेदार्थकत्वमपाकरोति । तादाम्यस्य संसर्गतया भाने तु प्रतियोग्यभावान्वयाविति न्यायेन न नील इति वाक्यात् तादात्म्येन नीलाभावः बोध्यते । स एव चान्योन्याभाव इति भेदबोधकत्वं निर्वहति । अयञ्च पक्षः भवतामप्यभिमत एव अनभिहितसूत्रे " यथा ईश्वरसुहृदः स्वयं निर्धना अपि तदीयधनेनैव तत्फलभाजः एवं गुणा अपि " इति कैयटोक्तेः । ईश्वरः=राजा । गुणाः=विशेषणपदानि । ईश्वरस्थानापन्नघटपदसुहृत्त्वं नीलपदस्य अभेदेन तदर्थान्वयित्वम् । तस्य निर्धनत्वं स्वार्थान्वय्यर्थकविभक्त्यप्रकृतित्वम् ।

किञ्च चैत्रः इत्यादौ चैत्रस्य प्रथमार्थे चैत्रे अभेदेनान्वयो वाच्यः । स च न संभवति । तथान्वयप्रयोजिकाया विरूपोपस्थितेरभावात् । तथाच प्रातिपदिकार्थप्रकारकेति कार्यकारणभावस्य नीलो घट इत्यत्र व्यभिचारात् कार्यतावच्छेदककोटौ भेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारता निवेशनीया । एवञ्च प्रातिपदिकार्थनिष्ठभेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धिं प्रति प्रत्ययजन्योपस्थितिर्विशेष्यतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति फलितम् । राजपुरुषः इत्यत्र च राजपदलक्ष्यार्थराजसंबन्धिनः अभेदेनैव पुरुषपदार्थे अन्वयोपगमेन निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिविरोधविरहात् ।

यदपि राजपदार्थपुरुषपदार्थयोरभेदान्वयबोधोपगमे राजपुरुष इत्यस्य कर्मधारयत्वापत्तिरिति । तदपि न । विना लक्षणां अभेदान्वयबोधजनकत्वस्यैव कर्मधारयप्रयोजकसामानाधिकरण्यरूपत्वाङ्गीकारात् । तत्पुरुषस्थले पूर्वपदलक्षणयैवाभेदान्वयबोधोपगमात् । न च नीलघट इति कर्मधारयेऽपि नीलरूपे शक्तनीलपदस्य तद्विशिष्टे लक्षणां स्वीकृत्यैव अभेदान्वयबोधनिर्वाह इति नोक्तस्य कर्मधारयप्रयोजकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । नीलः घट इति व्यस्त-

स्थलेऽपि तत्पदस्य लक्षणायाः सत्त्वेन तस्यास्सामासिकत्वाभावात् । विना सामासिकलक्षणां अभेदान्वयबोधजनकत्वस्यैव कर्मधारयप्रयोजकत्वात् । अथवा तत्तद्विभक्त्यन्तार्थविशिष्टे लक्षणां विना अभेदान्वयबोधप्रयोजकत्वमेव तथा । नीलघट इत्यत्र नीलपदस्य नीलविशिष्टे लक्षणायामपि विभक्त्यन्तार्थविशिष्टे लक्षणाया अभावेन सामञ्जस्यात् । विशेषणपदोत्तरविभक्तेः साधुत्वमात्रार्थकत्वात् । राजपुरुषः इत्यादि तत्पुरुषे तु राजपदस्य षष्ठ्यन्तराजपदार्थराजस्वत्वविशिष्टे लक्षणायाः स्वीकारात् । यद्यपि घनश्यामः इत्यादौ घनशब्दस्य घनवृत्त्यसाधारणधर्मे लक्षणा । तस्य च अभेदेन श्यामपदार्थैकदेशश्यामरूपे अन्वयः । घनशब्दस्य लक्षकत्वे तस्य उपमानबोधकत्वाभावेन उपमानानि सामान्यवचनैरिति समासो न स्यादिति तु न शङ्क्यम् । प्राधान्येन उपमानाबोधकत्वेऽपि असाधारणधर्मनिष्ठाधेयत्वनिरूपकत्वेन उपमानघनबोधकत्वात् । स्पष्टा चेयं रीतिः पुत्रीयतीति वाक्यजन्यबोधनिरूपणावसरे व्युत्पत्तिवादे । तथाच घनश्याम इत्यत्रापि लक्षणयैवाभेदान्वयबोधः । तथापि घनपदस्य विभक्त्यन्तार्थविशिष्टे लक्षणाया अभावेन कर्मधारयप्रयोजकसामानाधिकरण्यमस्त्येव । एवञ्च राजपदलक्ष्यार्थाभेदान्वयोपगमेऽपि न कर्मधारयत्वापत्तिः ॥

यदपि राजपदस्य संबन्धिलक्षकत्वे राज्ञः पुरुषः इति विग्रहवाक्यजन्यबोधसमानाकारबोधजनकत्वं समासस्य न स्यादिति । तदपि न । समासविग्रहयोः समानप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वनियमो नास्ति । चित्राः गावः यस्य चित्रगुः इत्यादिबहुव्रीहिसमासे व्यभिचारात् । तत्र विग्रहवाक्यजन्यबोधः यादृशविशेषणविशेष्यभावापन्नविषयकः तद्विपरीतविशेषणविशेष्यभावापन्नपदार्थविषयकशब्दबोधस्यैव समासेन जायमानत्वात् । व्याकरणमधीते वैयाकरणः इत्यत्र व्यभिचारेण विवरणविव्रियमाणवाक्ययोरपि समानप्रकारकबोधजनकत्वानियमात् । तत्र विवरणवाक्यात् वैयाकरणनये धात्वर्थविशेष्यकबोधस्य ; विव्रियमाणपदात् व्याकरणाध्ययनकर्तृबोधस्य च जायमानत्वात् । यदि "आख्यातं तद्धितकृतोर्यत्त्वर्थस्योपदर्शकं । गुणप्रधानभावस्य तत्र दृष्टो विपर्ययः ।" इति हर्युक्तेः विवरणवाक्यादपि अध्ययनकर्तुरेव बोध इत्युच्यते । तदा भवत्सिद्धान्तसिद्धस्य धात्वर्थमुख्यविशेष्यकबोधजनकत्वनियमस्य भङ्गः । एवं कृष्णसर्पः गीष्पतिः धनाधिपः

इत्यादौ समासविग्रहयोरेकाकारबोधजनकत्वं नास्ति । कृष्णसर्पपदात् कृष्णसर्पत्वरूप-जातिविशेषावच्छिन्नस्य कृष्णः सर्पः इति वाक्यात् कृष्णाभिन्नसर्पस्य च बोधात् । तस्मात्तादृशनियमे मानाभावात् न तदनुपपत्त्या राजपदस्य राजसंबन्धिलक्षकत्वानुपपत्तिः ।

यच्चोक्तम् राजपदस्य राजसंबन्धे लक्षणायाम् तस्य पुरुषे अभेदान्वयः स्यादिति । तदपि न। नामार्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तेः समासस्थले संकोचेन राजसंबन्धवान्पुरुष इति भेदान्वयबोधे बाधकाभावात् । इदन्तु बोध्यम् । नामार्थयोरभेदान्वयव्युत्पत्तेः राजपदस्य राजसंबन्धिनि लक्षणां स्वीकृत्य तस्य पुरुषनामार्थे अभेदान्वयः भट्टाचार्यसंमतः समीचीनः। समासस्थले निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तेः संकोचाङ्गीकारे विनैव राजपदे लक्षणां राजपदशक्यार्थस्य स्वत्वसंबन्धेन पुरुषनामार्थे अन्वयः साधीयान्। ननु राजपदस्य राजसंबन्धे लक्षणां स्वीकृत्य नामार्थयोरिति व्युत्पत्तिसंकोचेन राजसंबन्धस्य पुरुषे भेदान्वयः इति ।

यदपि उपकुम्भमित्यादौ कुम्भपदस्य कुम्भसमीपे लक्षणायां द्योत्यार्थोपस्थितेः द्योत्यार्थविशेषणकबोधजनकत्वनियमभङ्ग इति । तदपिन। प्रतिष्ठते इत्यत्र व्यभिचारेण तथानियमाभावात् । तत्र हि स्थाधातोः गत्यभावः अर्थः। प्रशब्देनतु गतिर्द्योत्यते । द्योत्यगतिश्च विशेष्यतया भासते । तस्मात्तत्र द्योत्यगतेरिव अत्र उपद्योत्यसामीप्यस्य कुम्भविशेष्यतया बोधे बाधकाभावात् । किञ्च द्योतकत्वं तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वम् । तात्पर्यञ्च विषयविशेषघटितशाब्दबोधघटितमित्यननुगतम् । एवं द्योत्यत्वमपि। तथाच द्योत्यार्थविशेषणकशाब्दबोधे द्योत्यार्थोपस्थितिः कारणमिति न अनुगतकार्यकारणभावः संभवति । अपितु पृथक् पृथगेव । प्रकर्षविशिष्टनमनविषयकशाब्दबोधं प्रति प्रशब्दसमभिव्याहृतनम्-धातुलक्षणाग्रहजन्यप्रकर्षविशिष्टोपस्थितिः कारणम्, उपकुम्भमित्यत्र कुम्भसमीपविषयकशाब्दबोधं प्रति उपपदसमभिव्याहृतकुम्भपदलक्षणाग्रहजन्यकुम्भसमीपोपस्थितिः कारणं इतिरीत्येति नापूर्वकार्यकारणभावकल्पनागौरवम् ।

तस्मात्समासघटकपदानां वृत्त्यैव विशिष्टार्थबोधसंभवात् न विशिष्टार्थबोधान्यथानुपपत्त्या समासशक्तिः सिद्ध्यति ।

(२) यदपि चित्रगुमानयेत्यादौ द्वितीयार्थान्वयानुरोधात्समासशक्तिः सिद्ध्यति इति । तदपि न । प्रत्ययानां प्रकृतित्वाश्रयार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वमेव स्वीक्रियते । एवञ्च गोपदस्य प्रत्ययविधानावधित्वरूपप्रकृतित्वस्य स्वरूपसंबन्धेनाश्रयत्वात्तदर्थेन चित्रगोस्वामिना द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वान्वयस्संभवति । नच दण्डिनं पश्येत्यत्र दण्डे दर्शनकर्मत्वान्वयापत्त्या नायं पक्षो युक्त इत्युक्तमेवेति वाच्यम् । संख्यातिरिक्तसुबर्थस्य प्रकृत्यर्थविशेष्यतया भाननियमात् दण्डिनं पश्येत्यत्र दण्डस्यैव द्वितीयार्थकर्मत्वे विशेषणतया अन्वयः आपादनीयः । तच्च न संभवति दण्डपदार्थस्य इनिप्रत्ययार्थसंबन्धिविशेषणत्वेनोपस्थितत्वेन 'एकत्र विशेषणतयोपस्थितस्य अन्यत्र विशेषणतया अन्वयो न' इति व्युत्पत्तिविरोधात् । तथाच निरुक्तव्युत्पत्तिबलेन द्वितीयार्थान्वयः संभवति । अथवा प्रत्ययानां सन्निहितपदार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिः स्वीक्रियते । निरुक्तस्थले गोपदस्य द्वितीयाविभक्तिसन्निहितत्वात्तदर्थेन चित्रगोस्वामिना विभक्त्यर्थकर्मत्वान्वयो न विरुद्ध्यते । उपकुम्भमित्यत्र नवीनमते विभक्तिसन्निहितकुम्भपदस्यैव कुम्भसमीपे लक्षणास्वीकारान्न तत्र व्यभिचारः । वस्तुतस्तु प्रकृतित्वं प्रत्ययत्वञ्च अनुगताननतिप्रसक्तं दुर्निर्वचम् । तथाहि न तावत्प्रकृत्युत्तरत्वं प्रत्ययत्वं प्रकृतिपूर्वबहुजादिप्रत्ययेष्वव्याप्तेः । नापि उत्तरवृत्तित्वपूर्ववृत्तित्वान्यतरसंबन्धेन प्रकृतिविशिष्टत्वम् प्रकृतिमध्यवर्तिनि अकच्प्रत्यये अव्याप्तेः । प्रत्ययविधानावधित्वरूपप्रकृतित्वस्य प्रत्ययत्वघटितत्वेन प्रत्ययत्वस्य प्रकृतित्वघटितत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयाच्च । नापि प्रत्ययपदवाच्यत्वं तत् तत्र ईश्वरसंकेते मानाभावात् । नापि पाणिनिसंकेतसंबन्धेन प्रत्ययपदवत्त्वं व्याकरणान्तरप्रणेतृपुरुषान्तरीयसंकेतसंबन्धेनप्रत्ययपदवत्त्वं, पुरुषविशेषीयसंकेतसंबन्धेन घटादिपदवत्त्वञ्चादाय विनिगमनाविरहात् । तथाच प्रत्ययत्वस्यानुगतस्याभावात् प्रकृत्यर्थेति अनुगतकार्यकारणभावासंभवेन अर्थविशेषं निवेश्य घटपदार्थविषयतानिरूपितविषयतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधं प्रति अम्प्रत्ययजन्यकर्मत्वोपस्थितिः विषयतासंबन्धेन कारणमिति रीत्या विशिष्य तत्र तत्र कार्यकारणभावो वाच्य इति चित्रगुमितिस्थले गोपदार्थचित्रगोस्वामिनिष्ठविषयतानिरूपितविषयतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधे अम्जन्यकर्मत्वोपस्थितिर्विषयतया कारणमित्यङ्गीकारे गौरवस्याभावात् । तस्मान्न प्रत्ययार्थान्वयानुरोधेन समासशक्तिः सिद्ध्यति ॥

(३) यदपि समासस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञासिद्धये शक्तिस्वीकार आवश्यक इति । तदपि न । अनन्तसमासपदानां अप्रामाणिकानन्तशक्तिकल्पने गौरवात् अर्थवत्सूत्र-घटकार्थवत्पदस्य वृत्तिमदविषयकप्रतीत्यविषये लक्षणा स्वीक्रियते । तथा च प्रातिपदि-कसंज्ञाप्रयोजकमर्थवत्त्वं वृत्तिमदविषयकप्रतीत्यविषयत्वं वृत्तिमत्तद्घटितोभयसाधारणमिति वृत्तिमद्घटितसमासस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञासिद्धिः ।

अथवा समासस्यार्थवत्त्वाभावेन अर्थवत्सूत्राप्रवृत्तावपि कृत्तद्धितसमा-साश्च इति सूत्रेण प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा सिद्ध्यति । अर्थवच्छब्दस्वरूपस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञामुक्त्वा कृत्तद्धितसमासेति सूत्रकरणेनैव समासो न वृत्तिमानिति स्पष्टं प्रतीयते । नच कृत्तद्धितसूत्रस्य विधायकत्वे वाक्यस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाव्यवच्छेदः कथमिति वाच्यम् । पदार्थसंसर्गरूपवाक्यार्थस्य आकांक्षालभ्यतया वाक्ये तत्र शक्तिग्राहकप्रमाणाभावेन च वाक्यस्यार्थवत्त्वाभावेन अर्थवत्सूत्राप्रवृत्त्या प्रातिपदि-कसंज्ञायाः अप्राप्तेः तद्व्यवच्छेदस्यानावश्यकत्वात् । एवं कृदन्ततद्धितान्तसमासानां पदसमुदायत्वेनार्थवत्त्वाभावात् पूर्वसूत्रेण प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञाया अप्रवृत्तौ कृत्तद्धितेति सूत्रेण तेषां प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा विधीयते । नच कृत्, इयान् इत्यादीनां अर्थवत्त्वेन संज्ञा प्राप्तैवेति वाच्यं । तयोरर्थवत्त्वेऽपि प्रथमस्य धातुत्वेन द्वितीयस्य च प्रत्ययत्वेन अधातुः अप्रत्यय इति पर्युदासकरणेन संज्ञाया अप्राप्तत्वात् । नच संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तग्रहणं नेति परिभाषया कृत्तद्धितान्तलाभो न संभवतीतिवाच्यम् । परिभाषाया असार्वत्रिकत्वात् । नचैवमपि तद्धितान्तग्रहणे तद्धितपूर्वकस्य बहुपटुशब्दस्य संज्ञा न स्यादिति तद्धितविशिष्टस्य संज्ञा विधीयत इति वक्तव्यम् । तथाच मध्यस्थिततद्धितस्य पच-तकि इति भागस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा स्यादिति वाच्यम् । सूत्रस्थतद्धितपदेन स्वाव्य-वहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन तद्धितविशिष्टप्रकृतिघटितसमुदायतद्धितान्तान्यतरस्य विवक्षणेन सामञ्जस्यात् । अकच्प्रकृतिभूतस्य पचतीति भागस्य तत्प्रत्ययोत्तरत्वाभावेन प्रथमद-ळस्य, तद्धितान्तत्वाभावेन द्वितीयदळस्य चाभावेन पचतकि इत्यत्रातिव्याप्तेरनवका-शात् । नच कृदन्तस्य संज्ञाविधाने 'कृद्ग्रहणे गतिकारकपूर्वस्यापि ग्रहणम्' इति परि-

भाषया कारकपूर्वकृदन्तस्य मूलकेनोपदंशेति भागस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञापत्तौ सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोरिति तद्घटकसुपो लोपापत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । परिभाषाया असार्वत्रिकत्वेनादोषात् । आकरादौ कृत्तद्धितसूत्रस्य नियमपरत्ववर्णनन्तु वाक्यशक्तिवादिमताभिप्रायेण । तस्मात् कृत्तद्धितसूत्रेण समासस्य प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञासंभवात्र सुबन्तसमासपदसाधुत्वाय शक्तिः स्वीकार्या ॥

(४) नापि पङ्कजपदप्रतिबन्ध्या समासशक्तिः सिद्ध्यति । पद्मत्वेन रूपेणोपस्थितये समुदायशक्तेस्तत्रावश्यकत्वात् लक्षणया च तन्निर्वाहासंभवात् । तथाहि न तावत्पङ्कजेति समुदायस्य लक्षणा संभवति समुदायस्याशक्तत्वे शक्याप्रसिद्ध्या तत्संबन्धरूपलक्षणाया असंभवात् । नापि डप्रत्ययस्य ; प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्यर्थानन्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वेन डप्रत्यये प्रकृतिभूतपदार्थानन्वितपद्मत्वविशिष्टार्थबोधकत्वस्यासंभवात् । यदि च नैयायिकमते यथा कृतपाकः इति समासे पाककृतिमति न पाकशब्दस्य लक्षणा घञन्तस्यावाचकत्वात् । नापि घञ्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकृत्यर्थानन्वितार्थबोधकत्वस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वात् । अपितु पचधातोरेव तादृशार्थे लक्षणा । प्रत्ययानां प्रकृत्येकदेशार्थान्वितस्वार्थबोधकत्वस्य स्वीकारेण न तत्र सुबर्थान्वये विरोधः । तथा पङ्कजेत्यत्र पङ्कपदस्य तदुत्तरजनेर्वा पद्मत्वविशिष्टे लक्षणा संभवतीत्युच्यते । तदापि तत्र समुदायशक्तिरङ्गीकरणीया । पङ्कादिपदशक्तिज्ञानाभावेऽपि पङ्कजपदात्पद्मत्वविशिष्टोपस्थितिर्जायते । सा च लक्षणया न निर्वहति । शक्यार्थज्ञानाभावे शक्यसंबन्धरूपलक्षणाग्रहासंभवात् । अतस्तत्र समुदायशक्तिः । समासे तु समासघटकपदशक्तिग्रहसत्त्वएव विशिष्टार्थबोधो जायत इति लक्षणया निर्वाहस्संभवति । समासशक्तिवादिवैयाकरणमतेऽपि समासघटकप्रत्येकपदशक्तिज्ञानमपेक्षितम् । राजपुरुषसमासघटकराजपदस्य चन्द्रार्थकत्वज्ञानदशायां समासात् नृपपुरुषबोधानुदयात् । अत एव भवतां निषादस्थपत्यधिकरणविरोधपरिहारोऽपि संगच्छते । तथाहि समासस्य शक्तत्वे निषादस्थपतिशब्दस्य निषादाभिन्नस्थपतौ निषादसंबन्धिस्थपतौ च शक्तत्वात् लक्षणाकल्पनादिगौरवानवकाशात् लाघवात्कर्मधारयाश्रयणमिति सिद्धान्तविरोधमाशङ्क्य, निषादस्थपतिशब्दस्य हर्यादिपदवन्नानार्थकत्वेन विधिवाक्यगत-

तच्छब्दस्य तात्पर्यसन्देहे सति, समासघटकप्रत्येकपदशक्त्युपस्थापितार्थातिरिक्ताविषयकत्वादन्तरङ्गः कर्मधारयीयशक्तिग्रहः । तदतिरिक्तार्थविषयकत्वेन तत्पुरुषीयशक्तिग्रहः बहिरङ्गः। अन्तरङ्गशक्तिग्रहे लाघवात्कर्मधारयसमासः स्वीक्रियते इत्यर्थकेन "शक्तिग्रहेऽन्तरङ्गत्वबहिरङ्गत्वचिन्तनं" इति भागेन परिहार उक्तः । पदघटकवर्णानामिव समासघटकपदानामनर्थकत्वे उक्तपरिहारासंगतिः स्पष्टैव ।

अत एव भूतपूर्वगत्याश्रयणक्लेशं विनैव महाबाहुः इत्यत्रात्वं सिद्ध्यति । अन्यथा समासघटकपदस्य अनर्थकत्वे अर्थवद्ग्रहणे नानर्थकस्येति परिभाषया आन्महतस्समानाधिकरणेति सूत्रे अर्थवत एव महच्छब्दस्य गृहीतत्वात् समासघटकमहच्छब्दस्यात्वं न स्यात् । 'जहत्स्वार्था तु तत्रैव यत्र रूढिर्विरोधिनी' इत्युक्तेः विरोधिरूढ्यभावे अजहत्स्वार्थाया एव वृत्तेः स्वीकृतत्वात् । तथाच समासघटकपदशक्तिज्ञानं विना विशिष्टार्थाबोधात् लक्षणया विशिष्टार्थबोधो निर्वहति । पङ्कजपदे तु प्रत्येकपदशक्तिज्ञानं विनापि पद्मत्वविशिष्टोपस्थितिर्जायते इति विशेषः । तस्मान्न पङ्कजपदप्रतिबन्द्या समासशक्तिः सिद्ध्यति ॥

(५) यदपि पण्डितब्राह्मणः इति समासात् ब्राह्मणपण्डितयोरुद्देश्यविधेयभावेनान्वयबोधवारणाय समासे शक्तिः स्वीकार्येति । तदपि न । पृथगुपस्थितेः उद्देश्यावधेयभावेनान्वयबोधप्रयोजकत्वे नानार्थकहर्यादिपदात्पृथगुपस्थितानां अश्वसूर्यादीनां उद्देश्यविधेयभावेनान्वयापत्तिः । न च हरिपदात्कदाचिदेकस्यैवार्थस्योपस्थितिरिति संभवति । तत्पदस्य यावत्सु अर्थेषु शक्तिर्गृहीता तावतां अर्थानां स्मरणस्य पदज्ञाने सत्यवर्जनीयत्वात् । परन्तु तात्पर्यानुरोधेन एकैकस्यार्थस्य शाब्दबोधे भानम् । नच विभिन्नपदजन्योपस्थितिरेव पृथगुपस्थितिपदेन विवक्षितेति नोक्तदोष इति वाच्यम् । एकार्थीभाववादिनामपि समासघटकप्रत्येकपदशक्तिज्ञानस्य पूर्वोक्तरीत्या आवश्यकत्वेन पदज्ञानस्य च एकसंबन्धिज्ञानविधयैव पदार्थस्मारकतया प्रत्येकपदार्थोपस्थितेः पृथगुपस्थितिरूपायाः अवर्जनीयत्वात्तथान्वयबोधापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् । यदिच समुदायशक्त्यधीनविशिष्टार्थोपस्थित्यसमानकालीनाया एव पृथगुपस्थितेः तथाशाब्दबोधहेतुत्वोपगमेन न समा-

सात् उद्देश्यविधेयभावेनान्वयापत्तिरित्युच्यते । तदा ब्राह्मणोद्देश्यकाभेदसंसर्गकपण्डित-विधेयकशब्दबोधे प्रथमान्तब्राह्मणपदप्रथमान्तपण्डितपदसमभिव्याहारः आकांक्षा । तादृशकांक्षाज्ञानाभावाच्च न समासाद्विधेयत्वावगाहिबोधः इति कृतमनन्तसमासानां शक्तिकल्पनया ।

(६) एवमेव वषट्कर्तुः प्रथमभक्षः इत्यत्र भक्षोद्देश्यकप्राथम्यविधेयकबोधो न संभवतीति प्राथम्यविशिष्टभक्षविधानोक्तिः संगच्छते । एकप्रसरताभङ्गापतितिरित्यस्य समास-घटकपदयोरुद्देश्यविधेयभावेनान्वयाबोधकत्वव्युत्पत्तिभङ्गापत्तिरित्यर्थः । सा च व्युत्पत्तिः पूर्वोक्ताकांक्षाज्ञानकारणतामूला । एवं समासघटकपदार्थनिष्ठविधेयतानिरूपि-तोद्देश्यतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधं प्रति समासघटकपदजन्योपस्थितेः विशेष्यतया स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिबन्धकत्वान्न तत्र तथान्वयबोधः संभवति । नचैवं सति एतादृशप्रतिबध्यप्रतिबन्धक-भावकल्पनया गौरवमिति वाच्यम् । अनन्तसमासपदानां अनन्तशक्तिकल्पना-पेक्षया गौरवविरहात् ॥

(७) यदपि विभाषासूत्रस्य, सविशेषणानां वृत्तिर्नेति वार्तिकस्य च विधित्व-कल्पने गौरवमिति । तदपि न । राजसंबन्ध्यभिन्नः पुरुषः इति बोधविवक्षायां राजपुरुष इति समासस्य राजनिरूपितस्वत्ववान्पुरुष इति बोधविवक्षायां राज्ञःपुरुष इति व्यासस्य च सिद्धत्वेन विभाषासूत्रस्य नैयायिकमतेऽप्यनुवादकत्वात् । सविशेषणानामिति वार्तिकस्यापि समर्थसूत्रभाष्यस्थेन सापेक्षमसमर्थवद्भवतीति वचनेन सिद्धस्यैवार्थस्यानुवाद-कत्वान्न विधित्वकल्पनागौरवम् ।

वस्तुतस्तु अनन्तसमासपदानां अनन्तशक्तिकल्पनापेक्षया स्थितस्य सूत्रस्य वार्तिकस्य च विधित्वकल्पने न गौरवमिति बोध्यम् ॥

अपिच समासस्य वाचकत्वे शशशृङ्गादिपदानां अर्थाप्रसिद्ध्या वृत्तिमत्त्वाभावेन अर्थवत्सूत्राप्रवृत्त्या प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञानुपपत्तिः । नैयायिकमते तु अर्थवत्त्वाभावेऽपि प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञा उपपादितैव । नच बौद्धशशशृङ्गस्यार्थस्य प्रसिद्ध्या नार्थवत्त्वानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । बौद्धार्थे मानाभावात् तस्य चान्यत्र प्रपञ्चितत्वात् । तथाच समासघटकपदवृत्त्यैव विवक्षितार्थबोधसंभवात् समासे न शक्तिरिति व्यवस्थापयन्ति ॥

। इति समासशक्तिविमर्शः ।

NYAYAKULISA

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R. RAMANUJACHARI

AND

K. SRINIVASACHARI

॥ श्रीः ॥

स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ।

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[1]वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिर्णयम् ।
[2]अन्यथाख्यातिपक्षस्था वर्णयन्ति कुमारिलाः ॥

अत्रकिल वादिविप्रतिपत्त्या संशयः । ज्ञानानां हि प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये द्वे अपि स्वत इति सांख्याः । द्वे अपि परत इति नैयायिकाः । अप्रामाण्यं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं परत इति बौद्धाः । प्रामाण्यं स्वतः अप्रामाण्यं परत इति मीमांसकाः । तत्र तावत्

स्वाभाविकत्वमुभयो र्विरोधान्नोपपद्यते ।
[3]कथं ह्यन्यानपेक्षस्य विपरीतात्मसंभवः ॥

तस्मात्

1. प्रामाण्यस्य गुणाधीनस्वरूपपरतस्त्वे वेदस्यापौरुषेयतया तस्मिन्नाप्तोक्तत्वरूपगुणासंभवेन तज्जन्यज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं न सिद्ध्येदिति भावः ।

2. अन्यथाख्यातिशब्दिताप्रमाणज्ञानविशेषाङ्गीकर्तृमतेनापि प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वसिद्धावप्रामाण्यमेवानभ्युपगच्छतो ज्ञानसामान्यस्य याथार्थ्यवादिनो वेदान्तितः स्वस्य निष्प्रतिपक्षं प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वं सिध्यतीत्याशयेनात्रान्यथाख्यात्यङ्गीकर्तृकुमारिलपुरस्कार इति ध्येयम् ॥

3. स्वगतधर्मविषये कारणनिरपेक्षस्य ज्ञानस्य कथं परस्परविरुद्धप्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यरूपस्वभावसम्भवः । कारणसापेक्षस्य तु कारणवैचित्र्यात् स सम्भवेदपीति भावः । आत्मशब्दोऽत्र स्वभाववाची ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां साध्यसाधनता यदि ।
तावेव खलु दृश्येते गुणदोषौ प्रति द्वयोः ॥

यस्य यत्कार्यं तस्य तदन्वयव्यतिरेकावेव तत्त्वे प्रमाणम् । गुणदोषान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिनी प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये इति ते अपि तत्कारणके निश्चीयेते । न च [4]गुणेन प्रामाण्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावन्यथासिद्धौ दोषनिरासार्थत्वादिति वाच्यम् । दोषस्यापि[5] गुणनिरासार्थतयान्यथासिद्धेरप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । [6]न चैवमस्त्विति वाच्यम् । [7]तत्राप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकयोस्तुल्यत्वात् । गुणनिरासार्थो दोषस्यान्वय इति चेत् विपरिवर्तप्रसङ्गात्[8] । [9]नन्वप्रामाण्यं स्वतः [10]दृष्टव्यभिचारस्य निश्चयानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्; किमेवं निश्चयो नास्तीति विपरीतं[11] सिध्यति । तदाहि संशय एव स्यात् । तदेवाप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न । भिन्नविषयत्वात् । प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यगोचरो हि संशयः । अर्थगोचरे ते इति । ततोऽर्थगोचराप्रामाण्यनिश्चयो नोपपद्यते । [12]तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणदोषयोः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वे सिद्धे । नन्वेवं निःस्वभावत्वं ज्ञानस्य

4. नैयायिकाभिमतं प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वं मीमांसको दूषयति गुणेनेत्यादिना । अतः प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वमेव युक्तमिति भावः ।

5. नैयायिकः प्रतिवदति दोषस्यापीत्यादिना ।

6. अप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वप्रसङ्गमिष्टापत्त्या बौद्धः परिहरति न चैवमिति ।

7. नैयायिकः प्रतिवदति तत्रापीति । गुणप्रामाण्यविषय इव दोषाप्रामाण्यविषयेपीत्यर्थः ।

8. तथाच मीमांसकमतमेव किमिति नाङ्गीक्रियत इति भावः ।

9. बौद्ध एव विपरिवर्तं व्यावर्तयन् युक्त्यन्तरेण स्वपक्षं साधयति नन्वित्यादिना ।

10. दृष्टव्यभिचारस्य पुरुषस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयानुपपत्तेरिति भावः ।

11. विपरीतं = अप्रामाण्यम् ।

12. नैयायिकः स्वपक्षसाधनमुपसंहरति तस्मादित्यादिना । सिद्धे इति द्विवचनान्तम् ।

प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न । विषयपरिच्छेदस्वभावत्वात् । यथार्थपरिच्छेदः प्रामाण्यम् । अयथार्थपरिच्छेदोऽप्रामाण्यम् । कथं तदुभयपरित्यागे अर्थपरिच्छेदसिद्धिरिति चेन्न । अपरित्याज्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तयोस्साधारणमेव ह्यर्थपरिच्छेदं ब्रूमः । शिंशुपापलाशादिष्विव वृक्षत्वम् । न चासाधारणरूपातिरिक्तमत्र नोपलभामह इति वाच्यम् । यद्व्यावृत्तौ यन्नव्यावर्तते तत्ततोर्थान्तरमिति निष्कर्षात् । प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययो र्मिथो-व्यावृत्तावपि [13]अर्थप्रकाशात्मनो ज्ञानरूपस्योभयत्रोपलब्धेः । ननु च गुणात्प्रामाण्या-भ्युपगमेऽनवस्थानं स्यात् । नैवं इन्द्रियादिवद्गुणस्यापि सत्तया कारणत्वोपपत्तेः । [14]गुणज्ञानं तु प्रामाण्यकारणमिति नाभ्युपगच्छामः । प्रामाण्यनिश्चये तु [15]तस्यापि हेतुत्वमस्ति । तर्हि तत्रानवस्थेति चेन्न । तत्रावयोस्समानत्वात् । स्वतः प्रामाण्य-वादिनोऽपि कौमारिलस्य न तावत्स्वेन वस्प्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति स्वज्ञापकदास्थेयम् । तस्यापि तथेति । कथं तर्हि परिष्ठानं[16] । स्वपरनिर्वाहकेनानुमानेन[17] अनुव्यवसाया-दिकं हि (अनुमानं हि) विषयविषयिणोरात्मव्यवसाययो (व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययो) [18]रव्यभिचारमेकहेलया दर्शयतीति नापरापेक्षा । [19]एषमपि चेदनाश्वासः अव्यभिचारः (न [20]व्यभिचारः) क्वचिदपि स्यात् । तथा च कथं संशयः । अप्रसिद्धशिरस्कस्य तस्यायोगात् । एवं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो गुणसंवादज्ञानायत्तः । न च संवादेऽप्यनवस्था ।

13. अर्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपो यो ज्ञानस्याकारः तस्येत्यर्थः ।
14. गुणज्ञानं प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ न कारणम् । अपि तु ज्ञप्ताविति भावः ।
15. तस्यापि=गुणज्ञानशब्दितस्य, व्यवसायरूपं ज्ञानं प्रमा गुणजन्यत्वादित्यनु-मानस्यापि ।
16. परिष्ठानं=पर्यवसानम् ।
17. अनुमानेन=उक्तगुणज्ञानवक्ष्यमाणगुणसंवादज्ञानार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमरूपेण ।
18. अव्यभिचारं=प्रामाण्यम् ।
19. मदुक्तार्थेऽस्मिन्नविश्वासेन स्वतः प्रामाण्यमेवाङ्गीक्रियते चेदित्यर्थः ।
20. व्यभिचारः=अप्रामाण्यम् ।

नानाजातीय बहुसामग्रीसमत्वस्य[21] क्वचिदपि व्यभिचाराभावात् । एवमर्थक्रियाज्ञान विशेषोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः । गुणसंवादार्थक्रियाज्ञानानि स्वप्नेऽपि भवन्तीति चेन्न । स्वप्नजा-गरयोर्मिथः प्रतिसन्धानाप्रतिसन्धानाभ्यां विशेषस्य स्वध्यवसानत्वात् । तथाहि स्वप्नदशायां कस्याञ्चिदनुभूतान्धविशेषास्स्वप्नदशान्तरे व्यावर्तन्ते । जागरद-शायां तु मिथोऽनुसन्धीयन्त इति विशेषः । तस्मात्संवादकारण (ज्ञान?) गुणज्ञानार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः । न [22]चानवस्थेति । ये तु वदन्ति प्रामाण्यं स्वेनैव निश्चीयत इति तत्स्वयंप्रकाशवादे तेषां शोभते । अन्येषां कथं स्वयंप्रकाशस्य (अस्वयं प्रकाशस्य ?) ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रामाण्यगोचरत्वं । यदि प्रामाण्यैक-देशभूतस्यार्थतथात्वस्य (अर्थस्य ?) स्यगोचरत्वमिति मतं कस्तत्र विप्रतिपद्यते । यत्प्रय-स्यद्भिस्साध्येत । यदि[23] हि स्वगोचरप्रकाशस्स्वयम् । किमस्माकं हीयते, अथार्थमात्रं न प्रामाण्यांशं ब्रूमः । किन्तु तथात्त्वमिति चेत्किमिदं तथात्त्वमिति । यथा ज्ञाने भासते तथावस्थितिरिति चेन्न । आत्मानमनवभास्यात्मगोचरत्वं (यथात्मगोचरत्वं ?) तथावस्थितिरिति भासनानुपपत्तेः ।

यथात्वप्रतियोगिको हि तथा भावः । अथ तत्वगत्या तथाभूत एवार्थ इति तथात्व गोचरत्वमिति चेत् ; हन्तैष पूर्वोक्तो विषयपरिच्छेद इति कस्तत्र विप्रतिपद्यते ।

21. समत्वं = एकरूपत्वं एकरूपेण कार्यसाधकत्वम् ।

22. अनुमानात्मकस्योक्तज्ञानत्रयस्य स्यपरनिर्वाहकत्वाभ्युपगमादिति भावः ।

23. विप्रतिपत्त्यभावमेव स्वस्य हान्यभावेनोपपादयति यदिहीत्यादिना ।

यदि च तथात्वमनवभासते (अवभासते?) कथं प्रामाण्यसन्देहः पश्चात् । न [24]हि प्रामाण्यांशं तथात्वमपहायांशान्तरयोः प्रकाशापूर्वत्वयोस्संशय इति युक्तम् । तयोरव्यभिचारात् । न च प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणो विषयः प्रामाण्यमिति युक्तम् । न हि प्रमाणमात्रस्यायमर्थतथात्वलक्षणो विषय इति वक्तव्यम् । ज्ञानमात्रस्येत्यभ्युपगमनीयत्वात् । अन्यथा हि प्रमाणानां प्रमाण्यं नाम धर्मः स्ववेद्य इत्युक्तेऽपि प्रतिज्ञातं ज्ञानमात्रस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं न सिध्येत् । इदमपि चात्र विकल्पनीयम् । किमर्थतथात्त्वं प्रतीयते उत प्रमीयत इति । यदि प्रतीयते किं तेन । प्रामाण्यासिद्धेः । न हि प्रतीत इत्येवार्थस्सिध्येत् । तथात्वे वा किं प्रामाण्यपरीक्षणेन । अथ प्रमीयते कथं ज्ञानमात्रसाधारणत्वम् । ज्ञानमात्रप्रयुक्तमपि क्वचित्परेण बाध्यत इति चेत् कथं प्रमितस्य बाधः । तथात्वे च न क्वचिदाश्वास इति ॥

न च वेदोपयोगोऽपि तस्य पक्षस्य दृश्यते ।
गुणात्प्रामाण्यनिष्पत्तौ स्वेन ज्ञानं किमुत्तरम् ॥

मीमांसका हि वेदप्रामाण्यंनिर्णिनीषया स्वतः प्रामाण्यसाधनाययतन्ते । न चास्मिन्पक्षे वेदोपयोगं पश्यामः । गुणाधीने प्रामाण्यजन्मनि तदभावात् वेदप्रामाण्यं न सिध्यति । तत्र स्वनैव स्वप्रामाण्यवेदनं किं कुर्यात् । कामं च स्वेनैव स्वप्रामाण्यमवगम्यताम् । निर्णयस्तु परत एव । भवतैवाप्रमाणसाधारणमित्युक्तत्वात् । नन्वपवादरूपमप्रामाण्यज्ञानं दृष्टप्रामाण्यविरोधात् न कल्पयितुं शक्यमिति चेन्न । संप्रतिपन्नेषु अप्रमाणज्ञानेष्वपि तुल्यत्वात् ।

24. अयमर्थः ; अनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपतया प्रमाण्यस्य तत्र तथात्वरूपस्या बाधितत्वस्यावभासेन तदंशे संशयासंभवेऽपि अनधिगतत्वात्मकापूर्वत्वार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपयोरंशान्तरयोस्संशय संभवेन प्रमाण्यसंशयउपपद्यत इति न युक्तं वक्तुम् । तयोर्नियमेन भानात् तद्विषये संशयोदयासंभवात् । अतः अबाधितत्वांश एव संशय इति वक्तव्यम् । सच अनुभूयमानः तस्य नियमेन भानांगीकारे नोपपद्यत इति ।

तत्र बाधकं दृश्यत इति चेन्न । कारणदोषज्ञानेनापि कल्प्यत्वेना[25]भ्युपगमात् । दोषोऽपि वेदे नास्तीति चेन्न । गुणाभावात्कल्पनोपपत्तेः[26] । तथाहि—

यदा कार्यत्वविज्ञानं प्रामाण्यस्य गुणं प्रति ।
तदा हि कारणाभावात् कार्याभावोऽनुमीयताम् ॥

गुणाभावात्प्रामाण्याभावेऽनुमिते च पारिशेष्यात् अप्रामाण्यमेव वेदस्य स्यादिति । स्या (नस्या ?) देतत् । दोषस्याप्रामाण्यकवारणतत्तदभावे तदपि न स्यादिति । एवमपि सन्देहात्प्रामाण्यनिर्णयानुपपत्तिरेव । स्वत एव निश्चीयत इति चेन्न । प्रमित्यनुपपत्तेः । तथापि प्रामाण्यस्य परित्यागो न युक्तेति चेन्नायं तर्कः[27] । [28]प्रामाणिकविषयस्य परित्यागस्यैव तत्वात्[29] । प्रामाणिकपरित्यागो ह्यनिष्टः अप्रामाणिकस्वीकारश्च । अप्रतिपन्नस्यापि प्रामाण्याभावस्यानुमाने चोक्तो हेतुः कारणभा[30]वोऽनन्यथासिद्ध एव । गुणप्रामाण्ययोः कार्यकारणभाव एवासिद्ध इति चेदागतोऽसि पन्थानम् । तत्रोक्तो हेतुः । अपि च—

उभयोश्चेदुभौ हेतू ज्ञानं नानुभुयात्मकम् ।
वक्तृभावे भवेद्दोषो वेदनित्यत्ववादिनाम् ॥

यदि च वेदं नित्यं मीमांसकाः साधयेयुः तेषां तत्स्ववधाय कृत्योत्थापनम् । ज्ञानं हि प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेत्येव । नान्यत्संभवति । वेदाच्च ज्ञान मुत्पन्नम् । तद्यदि

25. कारणदोषबाधकप्रत्यययोः कल्पकोयोर्मध्ये एकाभावेप्यन्यनाप्रामाण्यज्ञानस्य कल्प्यत्वाभ्युपगमादित्यर्थः ।

26. कल्पनोपपत्तेः = प्रामाण्याभावकल्पनोपपत्तेः ।

27. अयं न समीचीनतर्क इत्यर्थः । प्रामाणिकार्थस्य परित्यागो न युक्त इत्यस्यैव समीचीनतर्कत्वमिति भावः ।

28. तदेवोपपादयति प्रामाणिकेत्यादिना ।

29. तत्वात् = अयुक्तत्वात् ।

30. कारणाभावः = कारणाभावरूपः ।

मू० अथवाऽस्मिन् पूरणीयं सामान्येनेदमादिकम् ।
विशेष्यं तु तदर्थः स्यात्प्रायशो वा विशेषणम् ॥ ५ ॥

पाषाणे गन्धो नास्तीति भिन्नं वाक्यम् । इति वाच्यमित्यनयोस्तात्पर्यग्राहकत्वम् । तथाचेदमिति न वाच्यमित्यन्वयः । इदंशब्दस्य गन्धवाचकत्वेऽपि उत्सर्गतो नपुंसकत्वम् इतिशब्दस्य पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वप्रतिपादकत्वमर्थः । बोधाकारस्तु पूर्ववत् ।

श्लोकार्थस्तु—**अस्मिन्** वाक्ये । सामान्यत इदंशब्दादिकमध्याहर्तव्यम् । तादृशेदंशब्दार्थस्तु पूर्वविशेष्यम् । ननु अध्याहृतेदंशब्दस्य गन्धार्थकत्वे पुंस्त्वानुपपत्तिः । नचोत्सर्गतः पदानां नपुंसकत्वमिति वाच्यम् । यत्पदप्रतिपाद्यार्थपरामर्शकत्वमिदमादीनां यत्र तत्र तेषां तत्समानलिङ्गकत्वस्यैवाभियुक्तसम्मतत्वेन तादृशनियमस्य स्वपरामृश्यमानार्थबोधकपदान्तरासमवधानविषयत्वादित्याशयेनाह—**प्रायशो वा विशेषणमिति** । तथा चेदंशब्दस्य पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वमर्थः । तदर्थकपुल्लिङ्गपदान्तरसमवधानाभावात्प्रकृते नपुंसकत्वम् । इतिशब्दस्य गन्धनिष्ठत्वप्रतिपादकत्वमर्थः । तथा च पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वं गन्धनिष्ठत्वप्रतिपादकाप्रमाणोक्तिविषयीभूतमित्यन्वयबोधः । ननु नच गन्धस्य पाषाणसंबन्धाभाव इति वाच्यमित्यत्राध्याह्रियमाणेदंशब्दस्य विशेषणीभूतगन्धपरामर्शकत्वं विशेष्यभूतपाषाणसंबन्धाभावपरामर्शकत्वं वा न संभवति । उभयोरपि पुंस्त्वादत आह—**प्रायश इति** । तत्र तुल्यवित्तिवेद्यतया उत्तरकालीनमानसेन वा लभ्यस्य पाषाणसंबन्धाभावाधिकरणत्वस्य गन्धवृत्तित्वस्य वा परामर्शकमिदमादिपदमिति भावः ॥ ५ ॥

अध्याहारं विनाप्याह—

मू० अथवा पूर्वलक्ष्योक्तितादात्म्येत्यर्थभागिनः ।
भावान्तार्थस्य वचसो नञप्रामाण्यभेद्यता ॥ ६ ॥

पाषाणे गन्धो नास्तीत्येकं पदमनुकरणं विलक्षणानुपूर्वीविशिष्टतादृशवाक्यपरम् । अभेद इतिशब्दार्थः । वाच्यमित्यत्र कृत्यप्रत्ययो भावार्थकत्वाद्यर्थः । तद-

न्तस्य वचेरुक्तिरर्थः । नञर्थस्त्वप्रामाण्यम् । तथा च तादृशानुपूर्वीविशिष्टाभिन्नं वाक्यमप्रमाणमिति बोधः ॥

श्लोकार्थस्तु—इतिशब्दपूर्वेण पाषाणे गन्धो नास्तीति पदेन लक्ष्या बोध्या या **उक्तिः** तादृशानुपूर्वीविशेषविशिष्टा तस्या **यत्तादात्म्यं** अभेदः तद्रूपो य इत्यर्थः विशेष्यतया तदन्वितस्य भावप्रत्ययान्तवचिधात्वर्थस्य वाक्यस्य नञर्थाप्रामाण्यविशेष्यत्वमिति ॥ अत्र च पाषाणे गन्धवत्त्वं नास्तीति वाच्यमित्यत्र पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वादिबोधस्तु न साक्षात्, किन्तु पाषाणे गन्धवत्त्वं नास्तीति वाक्यात्तादृशवाक्यस्योपस्थितौ तदुत्तरकालीन इति भावः ॥ ६ ॥

ननु पाषाणे गन्धवत्त्वं नास्तीत्यादिशब्दार्थकवच्यादिसमभिव्याहारस्थले सेयं रीतिः संभवति, नतु ज्ञानविशेषबोधकमनशक्यादिस्थले मन्तव्यं शक्यमित्यादौ इत्यतस्तत्साधारणीं रीतिमाह—

मू० विशेष्यत्वादिना भेद्यान्वयी बोध इतेर्बलात् ।
भावान्तवचिमन्यादिप्रतिपाद्योऽप्रमेति वा ॥ ७ ॥

गन्धवत्त्वपदस्य गन्धविशेष्यकत्वमर्थः । तस्य वच्याद्यर्थे ज्ञानेऽन्वयः । तत्र वचिधात्वर्थः शाब्दबोधः । मनधात्वर्थो मानसबोधः । शकिधात्वर्थः स्वोक्तार्थविशेष्यकाप्रामाण्यप्रकारकबोधः । तत्रगन्धवत्त्वादिपदार्थस्य गन्धविशेष्यकत्वादेरन्वयः । अथवा—गन्धवत्त्वपदस्य गन्ध एवार्थः । तस्य विशेष्यित्वादिसंबन्धेन ज्ञानेऽन्वयः । तिङन्तार्थस्य पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य प्रकारितासंबन्धेन तत्रान्वयः । अथवा—पाषाणे गन्धवत्त्वं नास्तीति तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । पाषाणनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वप्रकारतानिरूपितगन्धनिष्ठविशेष्यत्वमितिशब्दार्थः । तस्य ज्ञानेऽन्वयः । नञर्थस्त्वप्रमात्वमिति ॥

श्लोकार्थस्तु—विशेष्यित्वादिसंबन्धेन गन्धादिरूपविशेष्यसंबन्धी यः भावप्रत्ययान्तवचिमन्यादिप्रतिपाद्योऽर्थः **बोधः** सः अप्रमेति वा । न च पाषाणे गन्धवत्त्वं नास्तीति वक्तुं युक्तं शक्यमुचितमित्यादौ भावे तुमुन् । इत्युक्तिर्न युक्तेत्यर्थ इति

संप्रदायः । तत्र युक्तत्वानुचितत्वे अप्रमात्वरूपे । अशक्यत्वं तु साधकशून्यत्वमिति विवेकः ॥

इदानीं प्रसङ्गादितिशब्दप्रभावमाह—

मू० लक्षणा चैकवाक्यत्वं विषयत्वविपर्ययः ।
व्युत्पत्तीनां च संकोच इतिशब्दस्य वैभवः ॥ ८ ॥

यथा पूर्वोक्तस्थल एव गन्धवत्त्वपदस्य गन्धविशेष्यकत्वार्थे लक्षणा विभिन्नतिङादिघटितत्वाद्भिन्नवाक्यत्वप्रसक्तावपि एकवाक्यत्वं गन्धवत्त्वपदस्य मुख्यविशेष्यताप्रयोजकप्रथमान्तपदत्ववत्त्वेऽपि तदर्थस्य प्रकारत्वं नामार्थयोः साक्षाद्भेदान्वयस्याव्युत्पन्नत्वेऽपि व्युत्पत्तिसंकोचात्तथान्वयबोध इत्यादि । एवमन्यत्राप्यूह्यम् ॥ श्लोकार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ॥ ८ ॥

मू० संबोधनं ग्रन्थकृतो ननोरर्थ उदीरितः ।
अन्वेति च यथायोग्यं कर्मत्वेन ततस्ततः ॥ ९ ॥

उदाहरणञ्चास्य—ननु मङ्गलं विघ्नध्वंसं प्रति वा समाप्तिं प्रति वा न कारणम् । विनाऽपि मङ्गलं नास्तिकादीनां ग्रन्थेषु समाप्तिदर्शनात्—इति । विनापदस्याभावसामानाधिकरण्यमर्थः । मङ्गलमित्यत्र द्वितीयार्थः प्रतियोगित्वम् , तस्य विनापदार्थैकदेशाभावेऽन्वयः, ससंबन्धिकत्वात् । विनापदार्थस्य चरमवर्णरूपसमाप्तावन्वयः । ग्रन्थेष्वित्यत्र घटकत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । वर्णेषु चरमत्वं च स्वघटितग्रन्थघटकवर्णप्रागभावासमानकालीनत्वम् । तस्या दर्शनं ज्ञानम् , ज्ञाप्यत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य कारणभेदे वाकारद्वयसमभिव्याहृतस्य समाप्तिपदस्य विघ्नध्वंससमाप्त्यन्यतरदर्थः । यत्तु विघ्नध्वंसपदस्य विघ्नध्वंससमाप्त्यन्यतरार्थकत्वं समाप्तिपदस्य वा स्यादित्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहाद्विघ्नध्वंससमाप्त्यन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नस्य वारद्वयं भानं स्यादित्याशङ्क्य प्रथमोपस्थितत्वात्प्राथमिकपदस्यैव लक्षणेति केषांचित्समाधानम्, अन्येषां च यस्मिन्पदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्तस्यैव लाक्षणिकत्वम् । वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्य लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वात् । उभयत्र वाकारसमभिव्याहारोऽप्रामाणिकः । अतो नोभयत्र वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्थलेऽन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नस्य वारद्वयं भानापत्तिरिति च समाधानान्तरम् । तदुभयमप्यसमीचीनमिति भाति । तथाहि—एकपदस्योभयान्यतरत्वा-

वच्छिन्नोपस्थापकत्वे वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्येव शक्त्या स्वोपस्थाप्यैकतरार्थविलक्षणान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नघटकैकपदार्थोपस्थापकपदान्तरसमभिव्याहारस्यापि ज्ञानं प्रयोजकम् । अतो विघ्नध्वंसपदस्य प्रथमोपस्थितत्वेऽपि समाप्तिपदश्रवणात्प्रागन्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नोपस्थापकत्वासंभवेन तस्य प्रथमोपस्थितत्वमकिञ्चित्करम् । एवं यस्मिन्पदे इत्यादि समाधानमप्यसङ्गतम् । यतः उत्तरपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारं विना पूर्वपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारोऽनुभवविरुद्धः । तथाहि—घटं वा पटं वाऽऽनयेति घटं पटं वाऽऽनयेत्येवानुभवसिद्धः प्रयोगः । न तु घटं वा पटमानयेति प्रयोगानुभवः शक्यते नाटयितुम् । तत्र घटं वा पटं वाऽऽनयेत्युभयत्र वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्तेनैव प्रत्याख्यातः । तेन यस्मिन्पदे इत्यादिग्रन्थार्थपर्यालोचनायां यत्र घटं पटं वाऽऽनयेत्युच्यते तत्र पटपदस्य लक्षणा । यत्र घटं वा पटमानयेत्युच्यते तत्र घटपदस्य लक्षणेत्यर्थः स्वरसतो लभ्यते । स चानुभवविरुद्धः । किन्तु सर्वत्रोत्तरपदस्यैव लक्षणा तत्रैव वाकारसमभिव्याहारः । घटं वा पटं वाऽऽनयेत्यत्र घटपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्तु घटपदं न घटत्वावच्छिन्नोपस्थापकमिति तात्पर्यं ग्राहयति । पटपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्तु पटपदं घटपटान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नोपस्थापकमिति तात्पर्यं ग्राहयति । नच वैपरीत्ये विनिगमनाविरह इति वाच्यम् । पूर्वपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारं विनाप्युत्तरपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारस्य, उत्तरपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहारं विना पूर्वपदे वाकारसमभिव्याहाराभावस्य च विनिगमकत्वमित्यादिकमालोचनयीम् । विनापीत्यत्रापिशब्दस्वारस्यान्मङ्गलसामानाधिकरण्यमपि सूच्यते । तथाच मङ्गलप्रतियोगिकाभावसमानाधिकरणमङ्गलसमानाधिकरणनास्तिकादिकर्तृकग्रन्थघटकसमाप्तिज्ञानज्ञाप्यविघ्नध्वंससमाप्त्यन्यतरनिरूपितकारणतावद्भेदवन्मङ्गलमित्यन्वयबोधः । तत्र ननुपदस्य ग्रन्थकारसंबोधनमर्थः । तस्य कर्मतासंबन्धेन कारणभेदेऽन्वयः । ग्रन्थकारसंबोधनकर्मत्वं नाम ग्रन्थकारसमवेतबोधजनकव्यापारजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वमिति सर्वं सुस्थम् ॥ श्लोकार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ॥ ९ ॥

प्रसंगाच्चेच्छब्दस्यार्थमाह—

सू० **स्वानुमत्यतिपाते तद्विशिष्टे वा विशङ्कने ।**
जिज्ञासायां क्वचिच्चेत्तद्धेयता कर्तरि क्वचित् ॥ १० ॥

उदाहरणं चास्य इतिचेन्नेति। तत्र स्वस्यानुमतिः अभ्युपगमापरपर्यायो ज्ञानविशेषः। तस्या **अतिपातः** अभावः। तदर्थकश्चेच्छब्दः। तत्र यत्र चेदित्यनन्तरं पृथङ्नञ् श्रूयते तत्र चेत्पदसमभिव्याहृतनञ एवानुमत्यभावोऽर्थः। यत्र पृथङ्नञ्न श्रूयते किंत्विति चेदित्येव तत्र चेदित्यस्य तदर्थकत्वं बोध्यम्। तत्र न कारणमित्यत्र विशिष्टकारणभेदस्य प्रकारितासंबन्धेन मङ्गलस्य विशेष्यितासंबन्धेनानुमतावन्वयः, इतिशब्दप्रभावात्। तत्र चेच्छब्दार्थः स्वानुमत्यभावः—स्वनिष्ठानुमत्यभावः। स च नैकदा स्वनिष्ठानुमत्यभावत्वेन विशिष्टरूपेण चेच्छब्देन प्रतीयते। किन्तु स्वनिष्ठत्वं विधेयतया, अनुमत्यभावश्चोद्देश्यविधया। तथाच तादृशविशिष्टभेदप्रकारकमङ्गलविशेष्यकानुमत्यभावः स्वनिष्ठः इति विशिष्टबोधः। यत्र इति चेदनन्तरं पञ्चम्यन्तपदं श्रूयते तत्र पञ्चम्यन्तार्थज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वस्यानुमत्यभावेऽन्वयः। केचित्तु तज्ज्ञानप्रयोज्यत्वं पञ्चम्यन्तार्थः। तस्य स्वनिष्ठत्वेऽन्वयः। प्रयोज्यत्वं स्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः। प्रतिबद्धयाभावसंबन्धप्रतिबन्धकयोः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावस्य सिद्धान्तसिद्धत्वात्। प्रकृते शिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वानुमानादिति यदि स्यात्तदा तादृशानुमत्यभावः शिष्टाचारविषयत्वज्ञानजन्यमङ्गलविशेष्यकसमाप्तिकारणत्वप्रकारकानुमितिप्रयोज्यस्वनिष्ठत्ववानिति विशिष्टबोध इत्याहुः। प्रकारान्तरेणाह—**तद्विशिष्टे वा विशङ्कन** इति। स्वानुमत्यभावविशिष्टशङ्कायामित्यर्थः। शङ्का स्वोक्तार्थविशेष्यकाप्रामाणिकत्वप्रकारकज्ञानम्। प्रकृते तु केवलज्ञानमेव शङ्का। तत्र स्वानुमत्यभावो नाम प्रतिबद्धयत्वम्, न तु पूर्वोक्तः। तत्र नञ एव प्रतिबद्धयत्वमर्थः। चेच्छब्दस्य शङ्कार्थः। तत्र मङ्गलादेः विशेष्यित्वादिनाऽन्वयः। कारणत्वानुमानादित्यत्र पञ्चम्यर्थो निरूपितत्वम्। अन्वयश्चास्य प्रतिबद्धयत्वे। तथा च मङ्गलविशेष्यकयथोक्तभेदप्रकारिका शङ्का निरुक्तानुमाननिरूपितप्रतिबद्धयत्वाश्रयीभूतेति विशिष्टबोधः। यत्रेति चेदित्येव श्रूयते तत्र जिज्ञासेतरार्थकस्थले सर्वत्र नञ्शब्दः प्रयोक्तव्य इत्यभिप्रायो ग्रन्थकारस्य। अत्र केचित्पूर्वपक्षयन्ति। इति चेन्नेत्यत्र यदि नञः प्रतिबद्धयत्वमेवार्थः तर्हि तदनन्तरं—यत्र पञ्चम्यन्तपदं श्रूयते तत्र तदर्थतन्निरूपितत्वविशिष्टप्रतिबध्यत्वप्रकारकबोधसंभवेऽपि—यत्र पृथक् पञ्चम्यन्तपदं न श्रूयते, किन्त्विति चेन्नेत्यनन्तरं शिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वमनुमीयत इत्येव, तत्र का गतिः। नहि निरूपका-

विशेषितप्रतिबध्यत्वप्रकारकबोधः क्वचित्स्वारसिकः सन्ननुभूयते । अतोऽयमर्थोऽनुपपन्नइति । अत्रास्मद्भ्रातरः—यत्र पृथक् पदं न श्रूयते तत्राप्यत इति पञ्चम्यन्तं पदमध्याहार्यमिति—प्राहुः । युक्तं चैतत् । इति चेन्नेत्यत्र सर्वैरेवं विवरणं क्रियते—इतिचेन्न । कुतः, यतः शिष्टाचारविषयत्वेन मङ्गलस्य समाप्तिसाधनत्वमनुमीयते अत इत्यर्थ इति । तस्मादेतद्विवरणपर्यालोचनया अत इत्यादिकमध्याहार्यमेव । अत्रोक्तपक्षद्वयमेकविषयकमेव । विषयान्तरमप्याह—**जिज्ञासायां क्वचि**दिति । अत्रोदाहरणम्—द्रव्यत्वजातौ किं मानम् ? न तावत्प्रत्यक्षम्, घृतजतुप्रभृतिषु द्रव्यत्वाग्रहादितिचेन्न । कार्यसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वजात्यनुमानादिति । अत्र द्रव्यत्वजातिविषयकप्रमाकरणविषयकजिज्ञासा कार्यसमवायिकारणतावच्छेदकत्वविषयक-द्रव्यत्वजात्यनुमितिज्ञाननिवर्तनीया इति बोधः । तादृशानुमितिज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वं कथं द्रव्यत्वजातिप्रमाणजिज्ञासायाः इच्छाया विषयसिद्धिमात्रनिवर्तनीयतया प्रमाणजिज्ञासाया प्रमाणसिद्धिमात्रनिवर्त्यत्वादिति चेत् । द्रव्यत्वजातावनुमितिज्ञाने द्रव्यत्वजातिविषयकानुमि-त्यात्मकप्रमाकरणज्ञानस्याप्यौचित्यावर्जनीयतया परम्परयाऽनुमितिज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वस्य, तस्य विशिष्टानुमितिज्ञानस्यानुमानज्ञानरूपतया साक्षाद्वा तन्निवर्तनीयत्वस्य प्रमाणजिज्ञासायां सत्त्वात् । अत्रानुमानपदमनुमितिज्ञानपरम् । निरूपितत्वं पञ्चम्यर्थः । नञर्थस्तु निवर्त्यत्वम् । तस्य चेच्छब्दार्थे जिज्ञासायामन्वयः ।

नन्वत्र जिज्ञासायां द्रव्यत्वजातिप्रमाणविषयकत्वं दुर्लभम् । न च मानपदार्थस्य विषयताविशेषसंबन्धेन जिज्ञासैकदेशे ज्ञानेऽन्वयात्तल्लाभ इति वाच्यम् । विचारासहत्वात् । किमत्र किंशब्दार्थविशेषितस्य मानपदार्थस्य विषयतासंबन्धेनान्वयः, उत किंशब्दार्थस्यापि प्रातिस्विकरूपेण विषयतासम्बन्धेनान्वयः, आहोस्विद्द्रव्यत्वजातौ किं मानमित्येकं वाक्यम् । तत्र मानविशेष्यकजिज्ञासाविषयप्रकारकाभेदसंसर्गकबोधः प्रथममुत्पद्यते । तत इतिचेदिति श्रवणे तत्र विषयतासंबन्धेन मानपदार्थमात्रस्यान्वय इति । नाद्यः, जिज्ञासायाः द्रव्यत्वजातिप्रमाणमात्रविषयकतया जिज्ञासान्तर्भावेण तद्विषयकत्वाभावात् तद्विशेषि-तप्रमाणविषयकत्वस्य जिज्ञासायां दुर्घटत्वात् । अत एव न द्वितीयोऽपि । नापि तृतीयः, इतिशब्दपरिक्षयापत्तेः ; भिन्नवाक्यतया प्रतीयमानानां वाक्यानामेकवाक्यतासम्पादन-स्येतिशब्दप्रभावत्वेन तद्घटितभिन्नवाक्यैः प्रातिस्विकरूपेण बोधासंभवात् । यद्यपि जिज्ञासा-

विषयत्वोपलक्षितस्य मानस्य विषयतया ज्ञानेऽन्वयं स्वीकृत्यैकवाक्यतापि संघटते । जिज्ञासायाश्चोपलक्षणतया निवेशेन जिज्ञासाविषयकत्वाभावेऽपि न क्षतिरिति वक्तुं शक्यते । तथापि न तावत्प्रत्यक्षं घृतजतुप्रभृतिषु द्रव्यत्वाग्रहादित्यस्य भिन्नवाक्यत्वं दुर्वारमेव ।

अत्रायं समाधिः । यत्र किंशब्दसमभिव्याहृतनन्वित्यादिग्रन्थोत्तरं इतिचेन्नेति श्रूयते तत्रेतिशब्दपूर्वमेकमेव पदमव्ययं विशिष्टतादृशवाक्यपरम् । इतिशब्दार्थस्तु प्रतिपाद्यत्वं तस्य चेच्छब्दार्थेऽन्वयः । तत्र किंशब्दः यद्याशङ्काविषयपरः तदा चेच्छब्देनाप्याशङ्काभिधीयते । यदि जिज्ञासाविषयपरः तदा चेच्छब्देनापि जिज्ञासाभिधीयते । तत्र द्रव्यत्वजातिविषयकप्रमाकरणं जिज्ञासाविषयीभूतमित्यादिबोधस्तु तादृशपदोपस्थाप्यवाक्यघटकीभूतपदज्ञान इति बोध्यम् ॥

अत्र केचित् बभ्रमुः—निपातानां द्योतकत्वात् अयं पक्षः सर्वोऽप्यनुपपन्नः । तत्र ननुपदस्य तदर्थविशेष्यत्वेनाभिमतार्थबोधकपदे स्वार्थान्तर्भाविण लक्षणातात्पर्यग्राहकत्वोक्तिसंभवेऽपि चेत्पदस्य तथा वक्तुमयुक्तत्वादिति ॥

तन्न, निपातानां द्योतकत्वस्य नैयायिकसिद्धान्तविरुद्धत्वात् । अन्यथा नञः शक्यतावच्छेदकनिरूपणं एवकारशक्यतावच्छेदकनिरूपणं च **दीधितिकृतां** विरुद्ध्येत । अथ निपातानां द्योतकत्वस्य नैयायिकसंप्रदायविरुद्धत्वे इवशब्दस्य न सादृश्यार्थकत्व , किन्तु सादृश्यप्रतियोगिवाचकपदस्यैव तत्सादृश्यावच्छिन्ने लक्षणेति तत्र ग्रन्थकृतां निरूपणं तव विरुद्ध्येतेतिचेन्न । तत्र चैत्र इव मैत्रः, चैत्रमिव मैत्रमानयेत्यादौ चैत्रमैत्रपदयोः समानलिङ्गवचनकत्वानुपपत्तिरूपबाधकप्रतिसंधानेन तथोक्तेः । अत एव इवशब्दार्थप्रतियोग्यनुयोगिवाचकपदयोरपि समानवचनकत्वादिना भाव्यमिति व्युत्पत्त्यन्तरं स्वीकृत्यैवशब्दस्य सादृश्यार्थकतां केचिदाचक्षते । स्यादेतत् । निपातार्थस्य मुख्यविशेष्यतया भानं नैयायिकसंप्रदायविरुद्धमिति । नैष दोषः । पुरुषे दण्डो नवेति संशयस्य दण्डाभावदण्डोभयविशेष्यतानिरूपितपुरुषवृत्तित्वनिष्ठप्रकारताशालित्वमुपपादयता **गदाधरभट्टाचार्येण** निपातार्थविशेष्यकत्वस्यापि सूचितत्वादिति । अथात्र पक्षत्रयेऽपि क्वचिद्विशेष्यत्वादिना प्रथमाद्यन्तार्थस्यान्वयबोधार्थं

क्वचित्पूर्वपदेन वाक्यबोधार्थं च इतिशब्दस्यावश्यकत्वमापतितम्। तथाच यत्रेतिशब्दसमभिव्याहारो नास्ति, यथा आत्मवादे मुक्तावल्यम्—नातिरिच्यते चेत् तर्हि समूहालम्बने नीलाकारः पीताकारः स्यादिति। तत्र का गतिः? अत्र केचित् तत्रापि इतिशब्दोऽध्याहर्तव्य इत्याहुः। वस्तुतस्तु चेच्छब्दो द्विविधः। यद्यर्थ एकः आशङ्काद्यर्थकोऽपरः। तत्र तावत् यत्रेतिशब्दसमभिव्याहारो न दृश्यते तत्र यद्यर्थक एव चेच्छब्द इत्यवधेयम्॥ **तद्वेद्यता कर्तरि क्वचित्।** तत्र तच्छब्देनाशङ्का जिज्ञासा चाभिधीयते। तद्विशेष्यत्वं क्वचित्तदाश्रयस्यैव। यथा—शब्दाश्रयत्वेनाकाशस्य कारणत्वे कान्यथासिद्धिरिति चेत्पञ्चमीति गृहाण इति। शब्दाश्रयत्वावच्छिन्नत्वप्रकारेण कारणत्वप्रकारकाकाशविशेष्यकग्रहविरोधिग्रहविषयीभूतान्यथासिद्धिर्जिज्ञासाविषयीभूतेति तत्रेतिपदपूर्वाव्ययात्मकतादृशपदोपस्थाप्यवाक्यस्यार्थः। कथमितिचेदित्थम्। शब्दाश्रयत्वेनेत्यनन्तरमितिशब्दोऽध्याहर्तव्यः। तदर्थे प्रकारत्वे तृतीयान्तार्थस्य शब्दाश्रयत्वावच्छिन्नत्वस्यान्वयः तस्य कारणत्वपदार्थे कारणत्वग्रहेऽन्वयः। अथवा-इतिशब्दमनध्याहृत्य तृतीयार्थस्यावच्छिन्नत्वस्य प्रकारितासंबन्धेन कारणत्वग्रहेऽन्वयो वाच्यः। यद्वा—तृतीयार्थस्यावच्छिन्नत्वस्य कारणत्वग्रहरूपकारणत्वपदार्थैकदेशकारणत्वे स्वरूपसंबन्धेनान्वयः। नचात्र घटादिकं प्रतीत्यस्याध्याहर्तव्यतया शब्दाश्रयत्वावच्छिन्नघटादिनिरूपितकारणत्वाप्रसिद्ध्याऽप्रामाण्यापत्तिरितिवाच्यम्। इष्टापत्तेः। अभिनिवेशेनच प्रयोगात्। पक्षत्रयेऽपि विरोधिग्रहविषयत्वस्य सप्तम्यर्थस्यान्यथासिद्धावन्वय इति बहवः। तत्र सप्तम्या विरोधिग्रहविषयत्वार्थकत्वं न स्वारसिकमिति प्रतिभाति। वस्तुतस्तु कारणत्व इत्यनन्तरं संभाव्यमाने सतीति पूरणीयम्। आनुभाविकं चैतत्। कान्यथासिद्धिरित्यनन्तरं गृहीतव्येति पूरणीयम्। अत एव पञ्चमीति गृहाणेत्युत्तरम्। इदानीं सप्तम्यर्थस्य प्रयोज्यत्वस्य गृहीतव्येत्यत्र तव्यप्रत्ययप्रकृत्यर्थे ग्रहेऽन्वयः। तथा च शब्दाश्रयत्वावच्छिन्नत्वप्रकारकसंभावनाविषयीभूतकारणताप्रयोज्यग्रहविषयीभूतान्यथासिद्धिः केत्यर्थः। तत्र संभावनाविषयीभूतकारणताप्रयोज्यत्वं सविशेषणे हीति न्यायेन कारणत्वसंभावनाप्रयोज्यत्व एव पर्यवस्यति। अन्यथासिद्धिग्रहेच कारणत्वसंभावनायाः प्रयोजकत्वमबाधितमेव। कारणत्वं संभाव्यैवान्यथासिद्धेर्निरूप्यत्वात्। यद्वा कारणत्वपदं पूर्ववृत्तित्वपरं तत्संभावनाप्रयोज्यत्वे न कापि विप्रतिपत्तिरित्यादिकमवसेयम्। अत्र चेदन्तार्थस्य तादृशवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यजिज्ञासाया अध्याह्रियमाणत्वभिति-

पदार्थेऽन्वयः । पञ्चमीत्यत्र विषयत्वमितिशब्दार्थः । तथाचैतादृशवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यजिज्ञासाश्रयस्त्वं पञ्चमान्यथासिद्धिविषयकज्ञानवान् भूया इति बोधः । एवं पञ्चमीति गृह्यतामिति यत्र श्रूयते तत्र तादृशवाक्यप्रतिपाद्यजिज्ञासाश्रयत्वत्समवेतः पञ्चमान्यथासिद्धिग्रहो भूयादित्यर्थः । जिज्ञासान्वितस्याध्याहृततृतीयान्तयुष्मच्छब्दार्थस्य तृतीयार्थसमवेतत्वद्वारा ग्रहेऽन्वयादित्यादिकं तत्र तत्र स्वयमूहनीयम् । श्लोकार्थस्तु उक्तः ॥ १० ॥

मू० तथापि स्यादबाध्यत्वे यद्यपि स्यादनादरे ।
यदि चेषदनिष्टत्वे तदा तज्जन्यवेदने ॥ ११ ॥

प्रथमस्योदाहरणम्—यद्यपि स्नेहत्वं नित्यवृत्तितया न कार्यतावच्छेदकम् । तथापि जन्यस्नेहत्वं तथा बोध्यमिति । अत्र स्नेहत्वं नित्यवृत्तित्वप्रयोज्यकार्यतावच्छेदकभेदवदिति बोधे यद्यप्यर्थस्यानादरस्याप्रयोजकत्वज्ञानरूपस्य विषयतया, अप्रयोजकत्वरूपस्य वा स्वरूपसंबन्धेन भेदेऽन्वयः स्वीकर्तव्यः । अत्र शुद्धस्नेहत्वे कार्यतावच्छेदकभेदो हि जलत्वजात्यसिद्धिप्रयोजकतयोपन्यस्यते । स च न तथा भवितुमीष्टे । जन्यत्वविशेषितस्नेहत्वस्य कार्यतावच्छेदकत्वमादाय जलत्वजातिसिद्ध्युपपादनसंभवादितिभावः । तदेवाह—तथापि जन्यस्नेहत्वं तथा बोध्यमिति । तथापीत्यस्य शुद्धस्नेहत्वविशेष्यककार्यतावच्छेदकभेदप्रकारकज्ञानाप्रतिबद्धग्रहत्वमर्थः । तस्य तथा बोध्यमित्यत्र कार्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानेऽन्वयः । तथा चा प्रयोजकनित्यवृत्तित्वप्रयोज्यकार्यतावच्छेदकभेदवत् स्नेहत्वमिति प्रथमवाक्यार्थः । स्नेहत्वविशेष्यककार्यतावच्छेदकभेदप्रकारकज्ञानाप्रतिबध्यकार्यतावच्छेदकत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूतं जन्यस्नेहत्वमिति द्वितीयवाक्यार्थः । यत्र बोध्यमिति न श्रूयते किन्तु तथापि जन्यस्नेहत्वं कार्यतावच्छेदकमित्येव तत्र निरुक्तज्ञानाप्रतिबध्यज्ञानविषयत्वपर्यन्तं तथाप्यर्थः । तस्य कार्यतावच्छेदकत्वेऽन्वय इत्यादिकं द्रष्टव्यम् ।

द्वितीयोदाहरणम्—यदिच हस्तादौ शरीरव्यवहारो न भवति तदाऽन्त्यावयवित्वे सतीति विशेषणीयम् । अत्र नञ्समभिव्याहृतभूधातुनाऽभावोऽभिधीयते । आख्यातेन प्रतियोगित्वम् । ईषदनिष्टत्वं यदि चेत्यनेनोच्यते । तच्च बलवद्द्वे-

षाविषयत्वम् । तथाच बलवद्द्वेषाविषयहस्तादिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वाश्रयः शरीरव्यवहार इति प्रथमवाक्यार्थः । द्वितीयवाक्यार्थे इतिशब्दानन्तरं अनेनेति पूरणीयम् । तत्र यदि लक्षण इति सप्तम्यन्तलक्षणपदमध्याह्रियते । तदा विपूर्वकशिष्धातूत्तरस्य भावकर्मणोरित्यधिकारविहितस्यानीयर्प्रत्ययस्य साधुत्वार्थकत्वम् । विपूर्वकशिष्धातोर्घटितत्वमर्थः । लक्षण इत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो निष्ठत्वम् । अन्त्यावयवित्वे सतीत्येकं पदम् । तादृशानुपूर्वीविशेषविशिष्टवाक्यपरम् । इतिशब्दार्थश्च प्रतिपाद्यत्वम् । अनेनेत्यत्रेदंशब्दार्थो धर्मः । तृतीयार्थो निरूपितत्वम् । तथाच सप्तम्यन्तसत्पदसमभिव्याहृतान्त्यावयवित्वपदप्रतिपाद्यान्त्यावयवित्ववैशिष्ट्यरूपो यो धर्मस्तन्निरूपितघटितत्वं निरुक्तलक्षणनिष्ठमिति बोधः । यदिच लक्षणमिति प्रथमान्तलक्षणशब्दोऽध्याह्रियते, तदा कर्मण्यनीयर्प्रत्ययः । कर्मत्वं च प्रकृते आश्रयत्वम् । तथाचानीयर्प्रत्ययार्थस्याश्रयस्याभेदेन लक्षणेऽन्वयः । शेषं पूर्ववत् । यदि लक्षणवाक्य इति सप्तम्यन्तलक्षणवाक्यशब्दोऽध्याह्रियते, तदाऽन्त्यावयवित्वे सतीत्यव्योपस्थापिततादृशानुपूर्वीविशेषविशिष्ट इत्यर्थाभेदे, सचाध्याहृततृतीयान्तेदंशब्दार्थवाक्येऽन्वेति । शेषं पूर्ववत् । एवं लक्षणवाक्यमिति प्रथमान्तलक्षणवाक्यशब्दाध्याहारपक्षेऽप्यूहनीयम् । पक्षचतुष्टयेऽपि कृत्यप्रत्ययत्वेन रूपेणेष्टसाधनत्वमनीयर्प्रत्ययार्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य प्रकृत्यर्थे । इष्टं च प्रकृतेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणं बोध्यम् । अत्र लक्षणशब्देन न केवलं चेष्टावत्त्वत्वेन रूपेण चेष्टावत्त्वरूपशरीरलक्षणमुपस्थाप्यते । केवलचेष्टावत्त्वस्यान्त्यावयवित्वघटितत्वाभावेन बाधापत्तेः । नाप्यन्त्यावयवित्वविशिष्टचेष्टावत्त्वत्वरूपेण तादृशविशिष्टधर्मस्यान्त्यावयवित्वघटितत्वे निर्विवादेन प्रकृतानुपयोगात्तादृशविशिष्टलक्षणे पुनरन्त्यावयवित्वघटनाया इष्टसाधकत्वाभावात् । किन्तु चेष्टावत्त्वघटितलक्षणत्वेन सामान्यतः शरीरलक्षणत्वेन वा । एवं लक्षणवाक्यशब्देन न केवलं चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमित्यानुपूर्वीविशेषविशिष्टवाक्यत्वेन, नाप्यन्त्यावयवित्वे सति चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमिति तादृशानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यत्वेन वा रूपेण लक्षणवाक्यमुपस्थाप्यते । किन्तु चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमिति वाक्यघटितलक्षणवाक्यत्वेन सामान्यतः शरीरलक्षणवाक्यत्वेन वेति बोध्यम् ।

केचित्तु लक्षणशब्देन चेष्टावत्त्वेन रूपेण चेष्टावत्त्वरूपलक्षणमुपस्थाप्यते । विपूर्वकशिष्धात्वर्थो विशेष्यत्वम् । शेषं पूर्ववत् । युज्यते चैतत् । अन्त्यावयवित्वे

सति चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरलक्षणमिति ज्ञानेऽन्त्यावयवित्ववैशिष्ट्यनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतायाः चेष्टावत्त्वे सत्त्वात् । एवं लक्षणवाक्यशब्देन चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमित्यानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यत्वेनैव रूपेण लक्षणवाक्यमुपस्थाप्यते । अन्त्यावयवित्वे सति चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमिति वाक्यं शरीरलक्षणपरमित्याकारकज्ञानेऽन्त्यावयवित्वे सतीति पदस्याव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमिति वाक्ये प्रकारतयाऽन्त्यावयवित्वे सतीति वाक्यनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतायाः चेष्टावत्त्वं शरीरत्वमितिवाक्ये विद्यमानत्वान्न काप्यनुपपत्तिरित्याहुः । एतन्मते तादृशविशेष्यतायामतिव्याप्तिवारणरूपेष्टप्रयोजकत्वमक्षतमेवेति ध्येयम् ।

इत्थं च तदेत्यत्र तच्छब्देन शरीरव्यवहारनिष्ठहस्तनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वमुपस्थाप्यते । विशेषणानां लक्षणघटकत्वं विशेषणवाचकपदानां लक्षणवाक्यघटकत्वं चातिव्याप्त्यादिवारणप्रयोजनकत्वमनिश्चित्यानावश्यकत्वेनाध्यवसीयते । तत्रातिव्याप्तिवारणप्रयोजनकत्वं तदघटितस्यालक्ष्यसाधारणतामनध्यवसाय न व्यवस्यते । तच्चातिव्याप्तिनिरूपकाधिकरणे लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकशून्यत्वनिश्चये स्यादिति प्रकृते लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकीभूतशरीरव्यवहारविषयत्वस्य हस्तादिनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वज्ञानं तद्घटकत्वज्ञानजनकमित्यादि ॥ ११ ॥

मू० प्रयोज्यत्वेऽपि वा तुल्ययुक्तिकत्वे क्वचिद्भवेत् ।
परिसंभावनाहेतुत्वार्थकत्वं तयोः क्वचित् ॥ १२ ॥

क्वचित् प्रयोज्यत्वं तदेत्यत्र दाप्रत्ययार्थः । यदिचार्थस्तु पूर्ववत् । यथा यदिच पर्वते धूमोऽस्ति तदा वह्निः पर्वतेऽस्तीति । तत्र तच्छब्देन धूमनिष्ठपर्वतवृत्तित्वमभिधीयते । दाल्प्रत्ययेन प्रयोज्यत्वम् । अन्वयश्चास्य वृत्तित्वे । वाकारेणात्रापि पूर्वोक्तार्थ एव युज्यत इत्युक्तं भवति । क्वचित्तुल्ययुक्तिकत्वं दाल्प्रत्ययार्थः । यथा एकः पटत्वस्य जातित्वाभावं मनुते । अन्यस्तु घटत्वस्य । तत्र पटत्वजातित्ववादी अपरं प्रति प्रत्यवतिष्ठते—यदिच घटत्वं जातिः तदा पटत्वमपि जातिरिति । अत्रापि यदिचार्थः पूर्ववत्,

बलवद्द्वेषाविषयत्वस्य तत्राप्यविशिष्टत्वात्। तदेत्यत्र तच्छब्दस्य घटत्वनिष्ठजातित्वमर्थः। तुल्ययुक्तिकत्वं दाल्प्रत्ययार्थः जातित्वेऽन्वेति। केचित्तु यदिचेत्यस्य क्वचित्संभावनार्थकतामाचक्षते यत्र तादृशोऽर्थो वक्तुरपि सम्मतः यथा—यदि च घटत्वं जातिरित्यत्रैव। तदर्थसंभावना च विषयतया जातित्वेऽन्वेति। क्वचित्तदाशब्दस्य हेतुत्वार्थकत्वमपि। हेतुत्वं जन्यत्वम्। यदिच तत्र दण्डो वर्तते तदा घटोत्पत्तिरपीति। अत्र तत्पदस्य दण्डोऽर्थः जन्यत्वं दाल्प्रत्ययार्थः। तस्य घटेऽन्वय इत्यादिकं स्वयमूहनीयम् ॥ १२ ॥

इदानीं प्रसङ्गवाक्यघटकचशब्दासमभिव्याहृतयदिशब्दार्थं श्लोकद्वयेन स्पष्टयति।

मू० आहार्यधीर्यदेरर्थः चक्षते केचिदन्यथा।
तदभिव्याहृतस्यैव तर्हेरर्थान्तरार्थता ॥ १३ ॥

व्यापनारोप्यताभेद्यसंबन्धित्वात्ययाश्च तत्।
समीचीनं न तद्भाति यतो बहु निरर्थकम् ॥ १४ ॥

आहार्यज्ञानविषयत्वं यदिशब्दार्थ इति सम्मतम्; यथा—यदि पर्वते वह्निर्नस्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति। अत्र वह्निशब्दार्थान्वितो नञर्थाभावो मुख्यविशेष्यः। पर्वतवृत्तित्वं तदंशे प्रकारः। अथवा—वह्निरेव मुख्यविशेष्यः। तदंशे पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वं प्रकारः। नञ्समभिव्याहृतासधात्वर्थाभावान्वितप्रतियोगित्वस्य तिङर्थत्वात्। आहार्यज्ञानविषयत्वं यदिशब्दार्थः, तच्च पर्वतविशेष्यकवह्निप्रकारकज्ञानोत्तरकालीनज्ञानविषयत्वम्। अन्वयश्चासधात्वर्थे। लिङ्त्वेन रूपेण लिङर्थो न विवक्षितः। तथाच वन्ह्यभावः पर्वतविशेष्यकवह्निप्रकारकज्ञानोत्तरकालीनज्ञानविषयपर्वतनिरूपितवृत्तित्वाश्रयः इति, वह्निः तादृशज्ञानोत्तरकालीनज्ञानविषयपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगीति वा तदर्थः। तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादित्यत्र तर्हीत्यस्य वन्ह्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वं वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वं वार्थः। तस्यापि यथायोगमन्वयः। अत्र तु लिङ्त्वेन रूपेणापत्तिरर्थः धात्वर्थेऽन्वेति। तथाच वन्ह्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानज्ञाप्यं यत् पर्वतवृत्तित्वमापत्तिविषयीभूतं तदाश्रयो धूमाभाव इति, वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगि

त्वज्ञानज्ञाप्यः यः पर्वतनिष्ठाभावः आपत्तिविषयः तत्प्रतियोगी धूम इति वा वाक्यार्थः ।

अत्र केचिद्व्याचक्षते । यदि वह्निर्न स्यादिति वाक्यं तात्पर्यग्राहकम् । तत्समभिव्याहृतस्य-तर्हिशब्दस्यैवार्थान्तरार्थकत्वमिति । किं तदर्थान्तरमित्याह—**व्यापनेति** । व्यापनं व्यापकत्व-मित्येकः पक्षः । तथा च तर्हिशब्दस्य पर्वतविशेष्यकज्ञानविषयत्वोपलक्षितो यो वह्निः तत्प्रति-योगिकाभावव्यापकत्वमित्यर्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य नञर्थ एव । तथाच पर्वतविशेष्यकज्ञानविष-यत्वोपलक्षितवह्न्यभावव्यापको धूमाभावः आपत्तिविषयपर्वतवृत्तित्ववान् इति, धूमः पर्वत-विशेष्यकज्ञानविषयत्वोपलक्षितवह्न्यभावव्यापकापत्तिविषयीभूतपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगीति वा बोधः । आरोपितत्वं तर्हिशब्दार्थ इति द्वितीयः पक्षः । तच्च वह्न्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वारोप-जन्यारोपविषयत्वं वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वारोपजन्यारोपविषयत्वं वा । तस्य यथायोग्यमन्वयः । तदा च वह्न्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वारोपजन्यारोपविषयपर्वतवृत्तित्ववान् धूमाभाव इति, वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वारोपजन्यारोपविषयपर्वतनिष्ठाभाव-प्रतियोगी धूम इति वा बोध इति । भेद्यसंबन्धात्ययस्तर्हिशब्दार्थ इति तृतीयः पक्षः । अत्र पक्षे यदि वह्निर्न स्यादितिवाक्यस्याप्यर्थवत्त्वमेव । वक्ष्यमाणैरर्थैक्यदूषणन्तु न तृतीयपक्षे । किन्तु पूर्वपक्षद्वय एव इत्यवसेयम् । अत्र यदिशब्दस्य पर्वतसंब-न्धित्वाभावोऽर्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य नञर्थे । असधातोः वृत्तित्वप्रकारकाहार्यज्ञानमर्थः । विषयत्वमाख्यातार्थः । अथवा-पर्वतसंबन्धित्वमेवार्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य वह्नौ । नञ्समभिव्याहृता-सधातोः अभावप्रतियोगित्वप्रकारकाहार्यज्ञानमर्थः । विषयत्वमाख्यातार्थः । तथाच पर्वतावृत्ति-वन्ह्यभावः पर्वतवृत्तित्वप्रकारकाहार्यज्ञानविषयः पर्वतवृत्तिवह्निः पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्व-प्रकारकाहार्यज्ञानविषयत्ववानिति वा प्रथमवाक्यार्थः । द्वितीये तर्हीत्यस्य न केवलं पर्वता-वृत्तित्वं पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वं वार्थः । तथा सति तर्हीत्यस्य वह्न्यभावस्य पर्वतवृत्तित्वे वह्नेः पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वे इत्यादिविवरणासंगत्यापत्तेः । किन्तु वन्ह्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वत-वृत्तित्वज्ञानविरोधिज्ञानविषयत्वविशिष्टपर्वतावृत्तित्वम् । अन्वयश्चास्य नञर्थे । अथवा-वह्निविशेष्य-कपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वप्रकारकज्ञानविरोधिज्ञानवषयत्वविशिष्टपर्वतवृत्तित्वं तदर्थः । अन्व-यश्चास्य धूमे । तथाच वह्न्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानविरोधिज्ञानवषयत्वविशिष्टपर्वतावृत्ति-त्ववान् धूमाभावः पर्वतवृत्तित्वप्रकारकापत्तिविषयः, वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वज्ञा-

नविरोधिज्ञानविषयत्वविशिष्टपर्वतवृत्तित्ववान् धूमः पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वप्रकारकापत्तिविषय इति वा बोधः। असधात्वर्थवृत्तित्वप्रकारकापत्त्यन्वितविषयत्वस्य नञ्समभिव्याहृतासधात्वर्थाभावप्रतियोगित्त्वप्रकारकापत्त्यन्वितविषयत्वस्य वाऽऽख्यातार्थत्वात्।अत्र प्रथमवाक्ये वृत्तित्वप्रकारकाहार्यज्ञानत्वेन रूपेणासधात्वर्थता। द्वितीये च वृत्तित्वादिप्रकारकापत्तित्वेनेति विशेषः। अत्र च धातोः लक्षणाभ्युगम एव दोषः। नन्वसधातोर्वृत्तित्वादिमात्रमर्थः। आख्यातस्य लिङ्त्वेन कदाचिदाहार्यज्ञानं कदाचिदापत्तिश्चार्थः। तत्र धात्वर्थस्य प्रकारितयाऽन्वयः। तस्य विषयतया मुख्यविशेष्येऽन्वय इति न धातोर्लक्षणाकल्पनापत्तिः। आख्यातस्यापत्त्यर्थकत्वं तवापि सम्मतम्। अत एव यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादित्यस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपद्यत इति चेन्न। लिङ्त्वावच्छिन्ननिरूपितवृत्तिज्ञानप्रयोज्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति धातुपदनिरूपितवृत्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितेः हेतुतायाः स्वर्गकामो यजेतेत्यादौ क्लृप्तत्वेन लिङ्त्वावच्छिन्नार्थस्य धात्वर्थविशेष्यतयान्वयासभवात्। नच त्वयेव मयापिवलिङर्थापत्त्यादेर्विशेषणतयैव धात्वर्थेऽन्वयः स्वीक्रियत इति वाच्यम्। तथापि पर्वतावृत्तित्वपर्वतवृत्तित्वयोः पर्वतवृत्तित्वपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वयोः परस्परविरुद्धतयाऽहार्यशाब्दबोधानङ्गीकारमते पर्वतावृत्तिधूमाभावत्वावच्छेदेन पर्वतवृत्तित्वस्य, पर्वतवृत्तिधूमत्वावच्छेदेन पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य च बोधासंभवात्। नच पर्वतवृत्तिधूमे पर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वस्य स्वरूपसंबन्धेन नान्वयः स्वीक्रियते। अपि तु स्वज्ञानविषयत्वादिनयेन केनचित्सम्बन्धेन। एवं पर्वतावृत्तिधूमाभावत्वावच्छिन्ने पर्वतवृत्तित्वस्यापीति वाच्यम्। भूतले घटसत्तादशायां भूतले घटो नास्तीति प्रयोगवारणाय निरूपितत्वसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नधात्वर्थवृत्तित्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितस्वरूपसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नाश्रयत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति वृत्तित्वार्थकधातुसमभिव्याहृताख्यातसमभिव्याहृतयत्किंचित्पदनिरूपितवृत्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितेर्विशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन कारणत्वस्य, नञ्समभिव्याहृतासधात्वर्थाभावनिष्ठनिरूपितत्वसम्बन्धाविच्छन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितस्वरूपसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगित्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतासम्बन्धेन शाब्दबोधं प्रति नञ्समाभिव्याहृतासधातुसमभिव्याहृताख्यातसमभिव्याहृतयत्किंचित्पदनिरूपितवृत्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितेः कारणत्वस्य च वाच्यतया स्वेच्छाधीनसम्बन्धेन तादृशान्वयबोधस्य व्युत्पत्तिविरुद्धत्वात्।

प्रकृते तादृशव्युत्पत्तिसङ्कोचकल्पने च तवैव गौरवमिति तृतीयपक्षे दूषणं मनसि निधाय प्रथमपक्षद्वये दूषणं प्रकाशयति **समीचीनं न तदीत । बहु** बहुपदघटितं वाक्यं । **निरर्थकं** स्यादिति शेषः । सम्भवति सार्थकत्वे निरर्थकत्वकल्पनाया अन्याय्यत्वादिति भावः । तस्मात्प्रथमोक्तस्वपक्ष एव समीचीन इति तात्पर्यम् । (१४)

ननु त्वन्मतेऽपि यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति वाक्यस्याप्रामाण्यापत्तिः । नचेष्टापत्तिः । तादृशवक्तरि आप्तत्वव्यवहारस्य सर्वानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । यदा पर्वते वह्निर्नास्तीत्यभिदधानं पुमांसं प्रति पर्वतवर्तिनं धूममुपदर्शयन् यदि कश्चिद्ब्रूयात् यदि वह्निर्न स्यात् तर्हि धूमोऽपि न स्यादिति । तदा मध्यस्थः किमेनं सत्यवादिनमामनुते । इत्यत आह—

मू० अभिवेशाभियुक्तानां वाक्यानामप्रमाणता ।
तेषामवश्यवाच्यत्वात् प्रयोगो न विहन्यते ॥ १५ ॥

अभिवेशः आग्रहात्मको ज्ञानविशेषः । अप्रमाणता इष्टैवेति शेषः । तर्हि किमर्थं प्रयोक्तव्यमित्यत आह **तेषामिति ।** तादृशवाक्यानामित्यर्थः । **अवश्यवाच्यत्वादिति ।** पर्वते वह्निविरहमभिदधानस्य पुंसः वह्निविरोधिवह्न्यभावबुद्धिप्रतिबन्धकतदापादकापत्तिरूपमानसज्ञानोपधायकस्वार्थबोधार्थत्वेनावश्यवाच्यत्वादित्यर्थः । तथाच मुख्यतात्पर्यविषयं पर्वते वह्निमत्त्वमुपादाय वक्तरि सत्यवादिताव्यवहार इति भावः । (१५)

प्रसङ्गादापत्तिवाक्यघटकलिङाद्यर्थमाह ।

मू० प्रसङ्गवाक्ये चापत्तिर्लिङादिभिरुदीर्यते ।
अन्ये वदन्त्यवाच्यत्वमयुक्तत्वं परे जगुः ॥ १६ ॥

आपत्तिर्लिङाद्यर्थः तस्य धात्वर्थेऽन्वय इति स्वमते तत्रान्वयबोधः पूर्वोक्त एव । अवाच्यत्वमापत्तिवाक्यघटकलिङाद्यर्थ इति केचित् । अवाच्यत्वमनिष्टापत्तित्वं । तच्च

[1]स्वानिष्टत्वे सति स्वज्ञानकारणसमवहितत्वं । तस्य धात्वर्थेऽन्वयः । धूमविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्त्यभावप्रतियोगित्वज्ञानं प्रति वह्निविशेष्यकपर्वतनिष्ठाभावप्रतियोगित्वज्ञानस्य धूमाभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानं प्रति वह्न्यभावविशेष्यकपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानस्य वा कारणत्वान्नानुपपत्तिरिति । बोधप्रकारस्तु पूर्ववत् । परेतु अयुक्तत्वमापत्तिवाक्यघटकलिङाद्यर्थ इत्याहुः । अयुक्तत्वं युक्तिशून्यत्वम् । युक्तिः प्रमाणं । प्रमापकशून्यत्वं भ्रमविषयत्वमिति यावत् । तस्य धात्वर्थेऽन्वयः ॥ १६ ॥

मू० बाधकाभावमन्ये तु लिङाद्यर्थं प्रचक्षते ।
सत्पदप्रकृतिर्धर्ममाचष्टे तद्यथोचितम् ॥ १७ ॥

अन्ये तु बाधकाभाव एवापत्तिवाक्यघटकलिङाद्यर्थ इत्याचक्षते । स च बाधकशून्यत्वेन संभाव्यमानत्वं । बाधकं च स्वज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकम् तच्छून्यत्वप्रकारकसंभावनाविषयत्वं लिङर्थः । तस्य धात्वर्थेऽन्वयः । युज्यते चैतत् । धूमाभावनिष्ठपर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानं प्रति हि पर्वते धूमवत्त्वज्ञानं प्रतिबन्धकम् । तच्च पर्वते वह्न्यभावज्ञाने सति न संभवति व्यापकाभावज्ञाने व्याप्यज्ञानस्यासंभवादिति धूमाभावे पर्वतवृत्तित्वज्ञानप्रतिबन्धकं नास्तीति तच्छून्यत्वेन संभाव्यमानत्वं धूमाभावनिष्ठपर्वतवृत्तित्वादेरक्षतमिति । सच्छब्दपूर्वशब्दो भावं बोधयति । सच्छब्दस्तु यथायोगं सन्तमर्थम् । स च यत्र सविषयकधातुना सह समभिव्याह्रियते । तत्र विषयत्वम् । यथा अभावस्य वैशिष्ट्यं संबंधान्तरं सत्सिद्ध्यतीति । संबन्धान्तरत्वप्रकारकसिद्धिविषयीभूतमित्यर्थः । यत्र भूतार्थप्रत्ययान्तेन तत्रोत्तरकालीनत्वम् । यथा अतिशयितः सन्निद्रातीत्यादौ शयनोत्तरकालीननिद्रावानित्यर्थः । यत्र भविष्यदर्थकप्रत्ययान्तेन तत्र पूर्वकालीनत्वम् । यथा तृप्तिं प्राप्स्यन् सन्नभ्यवहरतीति । तृप्तिप्राप्तिपूर्वकालीनाभ्यवहारवानित्यर्थः । यत्र वर्तमानार्थकप्रत्ययान्तेन समभिव्याह्रियते तत्र समानकालीनत्वम् यथा दण्डमवलम्बमानः सन् गच्छतीति । दण्डावलम्बनसमानकालीनगमनवानित्यर्थः । एवं गच्छन्तं सन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ चैत्रविशेष्यकगमनप्रकारकदर्शनवांस्त्वमिति बोधः । दण्डवन्तं सन्तं गच्छन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ दण्डावलम्बनसमानकालीन-

1. स्वपदार्थोऽत्र वक्ता ।

गमनविशिष्टचैत्रविषयकदर्शनवानिति बोधः । तृप्तिं प्राप्स्यन्तं सन्तमभ्यवहरन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ तृप्तिप्राप्तिपूर्वकालीनाभ्यवहारविशिष्टचैत्रविषयकदर्शनवानिति बोधः । शयितं सन्तं निद्रावन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ शयनोत्तरकालीननिद्राविशिष्टचैत्रविषयकदर्शनवानिति बोधः । शयानं सन्तं निद्रावन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ शयनसमानकालीननिद्राविशिष्ट-चैत्रविषयकदर्शनवानिति बोधः इत्यादिकमूहनीयमिति ॥ १७ ॥

प्रसंगात्सच्छब्दप्रभावमाह ।

मू० असौ पट्टाभिषिक्तः सन्निति साम्राज्यकर्मणि ।
क्वचिद्भग्नोद्यमो जज्ञे बाधते तं स्वयं क्वचित् ॥ १८ ॥

असौ सच्छब्दः इतिशब्दस्य साम्राज्ये पट्टाभिषिक्तः तत्तुल्यप्रभाव इत्यर्थः । तत्तुल्यप्रभावत्वं च तत्प्रसक्तिकस्थलप्रसक्तिकत्वे सति तत्प्रयोज्यकार्यप्रयोजकत्वम् । यथा घटो भूतलवृत्तिरिति ज्ञायत इत्यत्रेतिशब्दप्रसक्तौ सच्छब्दः प्रयुज्यते भूतलवृत्तिः सन् ज्ञायत इति । क्वचिच्च भग्नोद्यमः संपद्यते । यथा भूतले घटो नास्तीति ज्ञान-मस्य जातमित्यादावितिशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । सच्छब्दस्योद्यमः परं भज्यते । दृश्यते च क्वचित् इतिशब्दसंबन्धयोग्यताविधुरावेशः सच्छब्दः । यथा दण्डमवलम्बमानः सन्नुपयातीत्यत्र प्रयुज्यमानः सच्छब्दः तमितिशब्दं बाधते । प्रभवतश्च व्यक्तमुभावपि संबन्धिपदं गौणतामापादयितुं सच्छब्दपूर्वपदस्य धर्मलाक्षणिकत्वात् । विपर्यासयति च विषयतां सच्छब्दः । भूतलवृत्तिर्घटो ज्ञायत इति सच्छब्दवियुज्ञाने वाक्ये भूतलवृत्तित्वं धर्मितावच्छेदकतया भासते । घटो भूतलवृत्तिः सन् ज्ञायत इत्यत्र विधेयकोटिप्रविष्ट-तया । संकुचन्ति च भूयस्यो व्युत्पत्तयः सच्छब्दसमभिव्याहारवशात् । न हि प्रथमाद्य-न्तार्थस्य भेदसंबन्धेन साक्षान्नामार्थे धात्वर्थे वा अन्वयो व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धः । कल्पयति च कांचन व्युत्पत्तिमधिकां सच्छब्दः । यथा गच्छन्तं सन्तं चैत्रं पश्येत्यादौ सच्छब्दोत्तरद्वि-तीयायाः निरर्थकत्वेऽपि आवश्यकत्वम् । एवं गच्छत्पदोत्तरद्वितीयाया अपीत्यादिकं चिरमालोकनीयम् ॥ १८ ॥

मू० आकारार्थो विषयिता शब्द इत्यपरे जगुः ।
इतिना पौनरुक्त्याच्च नाभेदार्थत्वमिष्यते ॥ १९ ॥
तादृग्वाक्यजधीतुल्यविषयत्वार्थतापि नो ।
प्रत्यक्षाद्यव्यापकत्वाच्छब्देन पुनरुक्तितः ॥ २० ॥

भूतले घट इत्याकारकं ज्ञानमित्यत्राकारशब्दार्थो विषयिता । सा च वारद्वयं प्रतीयते । घटपदार्थो घटत्वावच्छिन्नः इतिशब्दार्थनिरूपितत्वद्वारा एकविषयितायामन्वेति । भूतल इत्यत्र सप्तम्यन्तार्थो भूतलवृत्तित्वमपि इतिशब्दार्थद्वारा अपरविषयितायामन्वेति । तयोरेकत्रापरस्यावच्छिन्नत्वसंबन्धेनान्वयः । तथाच भूतलवृत्तित्वविषयित्वावच्छिन्नघटविषयित्ववत् ज्ञानमिति घटविषयित्वावच्छिन्नभूतलवृत्तित्वविषयित्ववत् ज्ञानमिति वा बोध इति स्वमतम् । अपरे तु भूतले घट इत्येकं पदमव्ययं तादृशविलक्षणानुपूर्वीविशिष्टपरम् । इतिशब्दार्थोऽभेदः । आकारशब्दार्थो वाक्यम् । तत्कत्वं तज्जनकत्वं । तथाच तादृशविलक्षणानुपूर्वीविशिष्टवाक्यजनकं ज्ञानमिति बोधः । भूतले घट इत्येतादृशशब्दप्रयोगं प्रति भूतलवृत्तित्वप्रकारकघटविशेष्यकज्ञानस्य कारणत्वान्नानुपपत्तिरित्याहुः । अत्र केचिदाचक्षते । एवं रीत्या भूतले घट इत्याकारकं ज्ञानं भूतले घट इति शब्दजनकम् इति वाक्ये पौनरुक्त्यापत्त्याऽप्रामाण्यापत्तिरिति । अन्येतु तत्रेष्टापत्तिमेव स्वीकुर्वन्ति । अत्र केचित् भूतले घट इत्येकं पदमव्ययं भूतलवृत्तित्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितघटत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकार्थकम् । आकारशब्दार्थश्चाभेदः । तथाच भूतलवृत्तित्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितघटत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकाभिन्नं ज्ञानमित्यन्वयबोधं स्वीकुर्वन्ति । तन्मतं दूषयति **इतिनेति** । आकारशब्दस्याभेदार्थकत्वन्न संभवति इतिशब्दस्याभेदार्थकतया पौनरुक्त्यापत्तेः । इदमापाततः । इतिशब्दस्य यद्यभेदार्थकतामङ्गीकुर्मः तदा स्यादेवाकारशब्दस्येतिशब्दप्रतिपाद्यार्थप्रतिपादकत्वात्पौनरुक्त्यम् । परंतु इतिशब्दस्यार्थबोधकत्वमेव नाङ्गीकुर्मः । नचैवमितिशब्दस्य नैरर्थक्यात्प्रयोगानुपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम् । पूर्वशब्दस्याव्ययतात्पर्यग्रहणायेतिशब्दप्रयोगावश्यकत्वादिति । यदाच तात्पर्यग्राहकस्यैवेतिशब्दस्याभेदप्रतिपादकत्वमध्यवसीयते । तदा न प्रयुज्यत एवाकारशब्दः । भूतले घट इति

ज्ञानमित्येव तदानीं प्रयोगादित्यादि। केचित्तु भूतले घट इत्येकं पदं अव्ययं तादृशवाक्य-परम्। समानविषयकत्वमाकारशब्दार्थः। तादृशवाक्यसमानविषयकत्वं च तादृशवाक्यजन्य-शाब्दबोधसमानविषयकत्वमित्याचक्षते। तन्मतमुपन्यस्य दूषयति **तादृगिति**। तादृक् तादृशानुपूर्वीविशेषविशिष्टं यद्वाक्यं तज्जन्या या धीः तत्तुल्यविषयत्वार्थकत्वमपि न संभवतीत्यर्थः। तत्र युक्तिमाह **प्रत्यक्षाद्यव्यापकत्वादिति**। प्रत्यक्षादाव-संभवादित्यर्थः। अयं भावः। समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपि-तेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिप्रत्यक्षाद्यनन्तरं अयं घट इत्याकारकं ज्ञानमस्य जातमिति व्यवह्रियते सर्वैः। स चानुपपन्नः स्यात्। तादृशवाक्यसमानविषयक-त्वस्य तत्रासंभवात्। तादृशवाक्याद्धि समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वनिष्ठावच्छेदकताका-भेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिबोधो जन्यते। तादृशप्रत्य-क्षादिकं तु समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यता-शालि। कथंकारमनयोः समानविषयकत्वम्। ननु तद्वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधसमानविषयकत्वं नाम तद्वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबोधनिष्ठविशिष्टविषयिताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबन्धकतानिरूपित-प्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकविशिष्टविषयिताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपितप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छे-दकविशिष्टविषयिताश्रयत्वमेव। भूतलवृत्तित्वप्रकारकघटविशेष्यकज्ञानस्य भूतले घट इति वाक्यजन्यभूतलवृत्तित्वप्रकारकघटविशेष्यकशाब्दबोधनिष्ठा या भूतलवृत्तित्वविशिष्टघटत्वा-वच्छिन्ननिरूपितविषयिता तद्घटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबन्धकतानिरूपितप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकवि-शिष्टविषयिताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपितप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकविशिष्टविषयिताक-त्वेन तत्समानविषयकत्वोपपत्तिः। एवं विशेषणतासंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटभेदत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारता-निरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिज्ञानं प्रति अभेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकार-तानिरूपितेदन्त्वावाच्छन्नविशेष्यताशालिबुद्धेरिव समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वप्रकारतानि-रूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिबुद्धेरपि प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् तादृशवाक्यजन्यशाब्द-बोधनिष्ठाभेदसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताघटितध-र्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबन्धकतानिरूपितप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकविशेषणतासंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटभेदत्वाव-च्छिन्नप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपितप्रतिब-

न्धकतावच्छेदकसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यतायास्तत्राक्षतत्वात् । इत्यत आह **शब्देन पुनरुक्तित** इति । तथाच यदि समानविषयकत्वमीदृशं स्यात् तदा अयं घट इत्याकारकं अयं घट इति वाक्यजन्यशाब्दबुद्धिप्रतिबध्यतावच्छेदकविषयिताघटितधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतिबध्यतानिरूपितप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकविषयिताशालि प्रत्यक्षमस्य जातमिति (शब्दान्तरसमभिव्याहृतम्) वाक्यं यदा प्रयुज्यते तदा अयं घट इति वाक्यजन्येत्यादेः पौनरुक्त्यापत्तिः अयं घट इत्याकारकमित्यनेनैव तत्सिद्धेरित्यर्थः ।

अत्र वदन्ति । घटत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालीत्यर्थकतास्वीकारपक्षेऽप्ययं दोषः समानः । तादृशविषयिताया एव तथाविधप्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकत्वादिति । नच तादृशविषयितात्वेनायं घट इत्याकारकमित्यनेन बोधः । अयं घटइतिवाक्यजन्येत्यनेन तु प्रतिबन्धकतावच्छेदकत्वेनेत्येकरूपेण वारद्वयं भानाभावान्न पौनरुक्त्यमिति वाच्यम् । एवमपि अयं घट इत्याकारकसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नघटत्वनिष्ठप्रकारतानिरूपितेदन्त्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यताशालिप्रत्यक्षमस्य जातमिति वाक्ये तव पौनरुक्त्यापत्तिः तादृशविषयतायाः तादृशविषयतात्वेनैव वारद्वयं भानात् । एवं अयं घट इत्याकारकमयं घट इति शब्दजनकं प्रत्यक्षमस्य जातमिति वाक्ये तादृशजनकतात्वेन तादृशशब्दजनकतायाः वारद्वयं भानात्पौनरुक्त्यम् । तत्रेष्टापत्तौ ममापि प्रकृतवाक्ये तुल्यमिति । अनुभवविरोधस्तूभयोः समान इति ॥ २० ॥

मू० घटकत्वं ददात्यर्थस्तद्धीविषयतापि वा ।
निर्धारणविभक्त्यर्थो मध्येशब्दार्थ उच्यते ॥ २१ ॥

प्रथमस्योदाहरणम् । तदान्त्यावयवित्वे सतीति विशेषणं शरीरलक्षणे देयमिति । शरीरलक्षणनिरूपितघटकत्वाश्रयीभूतमिति तन्निरूपितघटकत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयीभूतमिति वा बोधः । निर्धारणविभक्त्या योऽर्थः प्रतिपाद्यते स एव मध्येशब्देनापि प्रतिपाद्यते इत्यर्थः । निर्धारणविभक्त्यर्थोऽन्यत्र प्रतिपादितोऽपि न्यूनताभङ्गाय प्रकृते किञ्चित्प्रतिपाद्यते । तत्र निर्धारणविभक्तिः पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इत्यत्र । पुरुषाणामित्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थो

भेदोऽभेदश्च । तत्र पुरुषपदार्थस्याभेदे निरूपितत्वसंबन्धेनान्वयः । अभेदस्य चानुयोगितासंबन्धेन विष्णुपदार्थे उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकघटकतयान्वयो विष्णोः पुरुषाणामित्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थभेदे प्रतियोगितयान्वयः । तस्य चानुयोगितया पुरुषेऽन्वयः । पुरुषस्य च पुनर्भेदे प्रतियोगितासंबन्धेनान्वयः । तस्य चानुयोगितासंबन्धेनोत्तमपदार्थेऽन्वयः । तस्य चाभेदसंबन्धेन विष्णुपदार्थेऽन्वयः । तथाच पुरुषाभिन्नो विष्णुः विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषान्योत्तमाभिन्न इति बोधः । अत्राभेदमात्रस्य निर्धारणविभक्त्यर्थत्वे विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषस्योत्तमस्य सत्त्वेऽपि पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिः । पुरुषाभिन्ने विष्णौ उत्तमाभेदसत्त्वात् । अतो भेदार्थकत्वं स्वीकृतम् । नच भक्षितेऽपि लशुने न शान्तो व्याधिः विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषोत्तमस्य सत्त्वेऽपि विष्ण्वात्मकोत्तमपुरुषे विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषान्यत्वस्य सत्त्वेन तादृशवाक्यप्रामाण्यापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वादिति वाच्यम् । विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषान्यत्वस्योद्देश्यतावच्छेदकीभूतोत्तमत्वावच्छेदेनान्वयस्वीकारेण विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषोत्तमस्य सत्त्वे तादृशवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यविरहात् इदानीं विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषान्यत्वस्योद्देश्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकत्वाभावादिति । अथ विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषस्योत्तमत्वसंभावनादशायां पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिवारणाय निर्धारणविभक्तेर्भेदार्थकत्वमपि स्वीकृत्य तादृशभेदस्य प्रातिलोम्यानुलोम्याभ्यां वारद्वयं भानस्वीकारप्रयासस्तु नादर्तव्यः । किन्तु पुरुषाणामुत्तम इत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थाभेदस्योत्तमपदार्थेऽन्वयं स्वीकृत्य पुरुषाणामुत्तम इत्यस्योद्देश्यत्वं विष्णुरित्यस्य विधेयत्वमित्युद्देश्यविधेयभाववैपरीत्यमेव स्वीकार्यम् । तावता विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषस्योत्तमत्वसंभावनायां पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यवारणसंभवात् । तदानीमुद्देश्यविधेयभावमहिम्ना पुरुषाभिन्नोत्तमत्वव्यापकत्वस्य विष्णुत्वे लाभेन विष्ण्वन्यपुरुषस्याप्युत्तमत्वे तादृशव्यापकभावबाधात् । नचैवमपि पुरुषोत्तमो विष्णुरिति वाक्यस्य पुरुषाणामुत्तमो विष्णुरिति वाक्यस्य च परस्परवैलक्षण्यानुपपत्तिः । उभयत्रापि पुरुषाभिन्नोत्तमत्वावच्छेदेन विष्णुतादात्म्यस्य बोधेन विषयवैलक्षण्याभावादिति वाच्यम् । पुरुषोत्तमो विष्णुरित्यत्र पुरुषोत्तमपदार्थयोरभेदः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते पुरुषाणामुत्तमो विष्णुरित्यत्र प्रकारतयेति विषयतावैलक्षण्येन, पुरुषपदार्थेऽभेदसंबन्धस्य प्रतियोगित्वस्योत्तमपदार्थेऽनुयोगित्वस्य भानेन विषयवैलक्षण्येन च वैलक्षण्योपपत्तेरिति । नच पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इत्यत्र विष्णुपदार्थस्योद्देश्यत्वमुत्तमप-

दार्थस्य विधेयत्वञ्चानुभवसिद्धमिति वाच्यम् । तादृशानुभवस्य निर्मूलत्वादिति चेन्न । एवं सति प्रमेयानामभिधेयं द्रव्यमिति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तेः । अथ तद्वारणाय पुरुषाभिन्नो-त्तमत्वावच्छिन्नविष्णुत्वावच्छिन्नयोः प्रमेयाभिन्नद्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नाभिधेयत्वावच्छिन्नयोश्च मिथः उद्देश्यविधेयभावः स्वीक्रियताम् । तेन च परस्परोद्देश्यविधेयभावमहिम्ना परस्परव्याप्यव्या-पकभावो लभ्यते । तथाच प्रमेयाभिन्नद्रव्यत्वव्यापकत्वस्याभिधेयत्वे सत्त्वेऽप्यभिधेयत्व-व्यापकत्वस्य प्रमेयाभिन्नद्रव्यत्वेऽसत्त्वात् न प्रमेयानामभिधेयं द्रव्यमिति वाक्यस्य प्रामा-ण्यापत्तिरिति चेत् । एवं सत्यपि पदार्थानामभिधेयं प्रमेयमिति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तेर्दुर्वार-त्वात् । पदार्थाभिन्नप्रमेयत्वव्यापकत्वस्याभिधेयत्वे अभिधेयत्वव्यापकत्वस्य पदार्थभिन्न-प्रमेयत्वे च सत्त्वात् । ममत्वप्रामाण्यं स्फुटमेव । अथ प्रकृते व्यापकत्वं न समानाधि-करणाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकधर्मावच्छिन्नत्वरूपम् । किंत्वभाववदवृत्तितत्कत्वमेव । एवञ्चाभिधेयत्वाभावस्य पदार्थाभिन्नप्रमेयत्वाभावस्य चाप्रसिद्धत्वान्न तादृशवाक्यस्य प्रामा-ण्यापत्तिरिति चेत्; एवमपि द्रव्याणां गुणाधिकरणं समवायिकारणमिति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिः । द्रव्याभिन्नसमवायिकारणत्वाभाववदवृत्तित्वस्य गुणाधिकरणत्वे, गुणाधिकरण-त्वाभाववदवृत्तित्वस्य द्रव्याभिन्नसमवायिकारणत्वे च सत्त्वेन तादृशार्थबाधाभावात् ।

यत्तु लघुधर्मसमनियतगुरुधर्मस्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वानङ्गीकारमते निर्धारण-विभक्तेः भेदार्थकत्वस्वीकारप्रयासो न कर्तव्यः । किन्तु परस्परोद्देश्यविधेयभावलभ्यव्या-प्यव्यापकभावः । व्यापकत्वं च स्वाभाववदवृत्तितत्कत्वम् । तत्समानाधिकरणाभाव-प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वावच्छिन्नभेदवद्धर्मकत्वं वा । उभयथापि न क्षतिः । तथाहि स्वाभाववदवृत्तितत्कत्वं स्वनिष्ठान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकाभाववदवृत्तितत्कत्वम् । अन्यथा अतिप्रसंगात् । एवञ्च प्रमेयानामभिधेयं द्रव्यमिति वाक्यस्य न प्रामाण्यापत्तिः । न वा द्रव्याणां गुणाधिकरणं समवायिकारणमिति वाक्यस्य । तस्य द्रव्याभिन्नत्वविशिष्टसम-वायिकारणत्वत्वस्य समनियतशुद्धसमवायिकारणत्वत्वापेक्षया गुरुत्वेनाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छे-दकतयान्वयितावच्छेदकीभूततादृशगुरुधर्मावच्छिन्नस्वनिष्ठप्रतियोगिताकाभाववदवृत्तिगुणाधि-करणत्वकत्वरूपगुणाधिकरणत्वव्यापकत्वाप्रसिद्ध्या तद्बोधकत्वासंभवात् । नन्वेवमपि

पुरुषाणां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः। पुरुषाभिन्नोत्तमत्वत्वस्य समनियतशुद्धोत्तमत्वत्वापेक्षया गुरुत्वेनाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितानिरूपकाभाववदवृत्तिविष्णुत्वकत्वरूपविष्णुत्वव्यापकत्वाप्रसिद्ध्या तद्बोधकत्वासंभवादिति चेन्न। यत उत्तमत्वत्वं उत्कर्षत्वम्, तथाच पुरुषाभिन्नोत्तमत्वत्वं सामानाधिकरण्यघटितसामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन पुरुषाभिन्नत्वविशिष्टोत्कर्षत्वम्। तत्समनियतत्वं न शुद्धोत्कर्षत्वस्य तस्य सिंहादिनिष्ठमृगोत्कर्षेऽपि सत्त्वात् तत्र निरुक्तविशिष्टोत्कर्षत्वस्यासत्त्वादिति।

तन्न। एवमपि पदार्थानां गुणाधिकरणं समवायिकारणमित्यादिवाक्यानां प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तेर्वज्रलेपायितत्वात्। तस्मान्निर्धारणविभक्तेः भेदार्थकत्वं स्वीकृत्य प्रातिलोम्यादिप्रयासोऽवश्यादर्तव्यः। भेदार्थकत्वमात्रस्वीकारे घटानां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिः विष्ण्वन्यघटान्योत्तमाभेदस्य विष्णौ सत्त्वात्। अतोऽभेदार्थकत्वस्वीकारः। अथ लघुसमनियतगुरुधर्मस्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वे निर्धारणविभक्तेरभेदार्थकत्वस्वीकारमन्तरेणापि घटानां विष्णुरुत्तम इति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं शक्यते वारयितुम्, उद्देश्यान्वितभेदविशेष्यतापन्नस्य प्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वसंबन्धेनैव भेदान्वयस्वीकारेण विष्ण्वन्यत्वविशिष्टघटत्वस्य समनियतघटत्वापेक्षया गुरुत्वेनाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदाप्रसिद्ध्या तद्बोधकत्वासंभवादिति चेन्न। लघुधर्मसमनियतगुरुधर्मस्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वमनङ्गीकृत्यान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकत्वसंबन्धेन प्रकृत्यर्थस्य भेदेऽन्वयस्वीकारे समवायिकारणानां पृथिवी गन्धवतीति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यानुपपत्तिः। पृथिव्यन्यत्वविशिष्टसमवायिकारणत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदवद्गन्धावच्छिन्नाभिन्ना पृथिवीत्यन्वयबोधो वक्तव्यः। सच न संभवति। पृथिव्यन्यत्वविशिष्टसमवायिकारणत्वस्य स्वसमनियतपृथिव्यन्यत्वविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वापेक्षया गुरुत्वेनाभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदस्याप्यप्रसिद्धत्वेन तद्बोधकत्वासंभवात्। अतो न प्रकृत्यर्थस्यान्वयितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वसंबन्धेन विभक्त्यर्थभेदेऽन्वयः स्वीकर्तव्यः। किन्तु अन्वयितावच्छेदकसमव्यापकरूपावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वसंबन्धेनैव। एवं च समवायिकारणानां पृथिवी गन्धवतीत्यत्र पृथिव्यन्यत्वविशि-

ष्टसमवायिकारणत्वस्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वेऽपि तत्समव्यापकस्य पृथिव्यन्यत्वविशिष्टद्रव्यत्वस्यावच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदमादाय तादृशवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यमिति वाच्यम् । एवं च घटानां विष्णुरुत्तम इत्यत्रापि विष्ण्वन्यत्वविशिष्टघटत्वस्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वेऽपि तत्समव्यापकस्य शुद्धघटत्वस्यावच्छेदकतया तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदमादाय तादृशवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तेर्दुर्वारत्वात् विभक्तेरभेदार्थकत्वमावश्यकमिति । एवंच निर्धारणविभक्तेरभेदो भेदश्चार्थ इति सिद्धे यत्र पुरुषाणां मध्ये विष्णुरुत्तम इति प्रयुज्यते तत्र मध्येशब्दस्यैवाभेदो भेदश्चार्थः । अन्वयस्तु पूर्ववदिति । श्लोकार्थस्तूक्तः । अत्र केचित् । मध्येशब्दः षष्ठ्याद्येः निर्धारणार्थत्वस्फुटीकरणार्थ एवेत्यपिप्राहुः इत्यास्तां विस्तरः ॥ २१ ॥

मू०　अवधित्वमपेक्ष्यार्थस्तद्धीविषयताऽपि वा ।
भेदश्च वर्जयित्वादेर्ल्यबर्थश्चाविवक्षितः ॥ २२ ॥

उदाहरणञ्च प्रथमस्य कुलालत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालपितृत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वे गौरवमिति । अत्र कारणत्वावच्छेदकत्वपदं कारणतावच्छेदकत्वप्रकारकज्ञानपरम् । विरोधिज्ञानविषयत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । अन्वयश्चास्य गौरवे । तथाच कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठं कुलालत्वमपेक्ष्य गौरवं कुलालपितृत्वविशेष्यककारणतावच्छेदकत्वप्रकारकग्रहविरोधिग्रहविषयीभूतमित्यन्वयबोधः । अथवा कारणतावच्छेदकत्व इत्यनन्तरं संभाव्यमाने सतीति पूरणीयम् । सतिसप्तम्याः प्रयोज्यत्वमर्थः । संभाव्यमानाभिन्नकारणतावच्छेदकत्वप्रयोज्यत्वं कारणतावच्छेदकत्वसंभावनाप्रयोज्यत्व एव पर्यवस्यति । यद्वा कारणतावच्छेदकत्वपदं कारणतावच्छेदकत्वसंभावनापरम् । प्रयोज्यत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । गौरवमित्यनन्तरं संभाव्यत इति पूरणीयम् । तत्र संभावनायां कारणतावच्छेदकत्वसंभावनाप्रयोज्यत्वमन्वेति । तथाच कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठं कुलालत्वमपेक्ष्य गौरवं कारणतावच्छेदकत्वसंभावनाप्रयोज्यसंभावनाविषयीभूतमित्यन्वयबोधः । युज्यते चैतत् । कुलालपितृत्वस्य प्रथमतः कारणतावच्छेदकत्वमसंभाव्य गौरवं न केन चिदुद्भावयितुं शक्यमिति । अत्र कुलालपितृत्वमपेक्ष्येत्यत्रापपूर्वकेक्षधात्वर्थः अवधित्वं अवधिमत्त्वम् अवधितानिरूपकत्वं । अवधित्वंचेदम-

स्माद्गुर्विति प्रतीतिसाक्षिकस्वरूपसंबन्धविशेषः । अथवा अवधित्वं निरूपितत्वम् । तथाच कुलालत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालपितृत्वस्य गौरवमित्यस्य कुलालत्वनिरूपितकुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठगौरवमित्यर्थः । प्रकृते गौरवमवच्छेदकगौरवम् । तच्चाधिकपदार्थघटितत्वम् । कुलालत्वघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितत्वमिति यावत् । अत्र कुलालत्वनिरूपितत्वमव्याहतमेव । नच कुलालत्वघटकपदार्थाप्रसिद्धिः तस्याखण्डपदार्थरूपत्वादिति वाच्यम् । स्वस्यैव स्वघटकत्वोपगमात् । तत्पर्याप्तसंख्या एकत्वसंख्येति नानुपपत्तिः । नचैवं रीत्या गौरवनिरुक्तौ कुलालत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालपितृत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वे गौरवमित्यत्रानुपपत्तिः । तत्र निरुक्तरीत्या शाब्दबोधाङ्गीकारासंभवादिति वाच्यम् । तत्र गौरवपदस्य स्वाश्रयघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितधर्मवृत्तित्वरूपत्वात् । तथाच कुलालत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वाश्रयधर्मघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितधर्मवृत्तित्वं कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वनिष्ठमित्यन्वयः । संख्यायाः न्यूनत्वाधिकत्वे चानुपदमेव निर्वक्ष्येते । अत्र कारणतावच्छेदकत्वस्य कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठत्वांशेऽप्रामाण्यमिष्टमेव । उक्तवाक्यस्याभिनिवेशप्रयुक्तत्वादित्यवसेयम् । एवं कुलालत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालपितृत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वं गुर्वित्यत्र कुलालत्वपदं कुलालत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वपरम् । तेन कुलालत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वाश्रयधर्मघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितधर्मवृत्तित्वाश्रयीभूतं कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वमित्यन्वयबोधः । धर्मितावच्छेदकत्वांशे भ्रमत्वानङ्गीकारे तु कुलालपितृत्वस्येत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थो न वृत्तित्वं किन्तु वृत्तित्वेन संभाव्यमानत्वम् । अस्य वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यग्रहे तु गुरुपदमपि यथोक्तगुरुत्वेन संभाव्यमानपरं द्रष्टव्यम् । कुलालपितृत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वे लाघवमित्यत्र तु कुलालत्वनिष्ठं कुलालपितृत्वघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्यान्यूनसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितत्वं कुलालत्वविशेष्यककारणतावच्छेदकत्वप्रकारकसंभावनाप्रयोज्यसंभावनाविषयीभूतमित्यन्वयबोधः । कुलालपितृत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वमपेक्ष्य कुलालत्वस्य कारणतावच्छेदकत्वे लाघवमित्यत्र तु कुलालपितृत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकत्वाश्रयधर्मघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्यान्यूनसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितधर्मवृत्तित्वम् कुलालत्वनिष्ठकारणतावच्छे-

दकत्वनिष्ठमित्यन्वयबोधः । यत्रतु अपेक्षयेत्येव श्रूयते तत्रापेक्षाशब्दार्थो निरूपितत्वम् । तृतीयार्थो वैशिष्टयम् । अन्वयश्च पूर्ववदित्यवसेयम् । एवं दण्डमपेक्ष्य दण्डरूपस्य कारणत्वे गौरवमित्यत्र दण्डनिष्ठकारणतावच्छेदकसंबन्धघटकपदार्थपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्या-पर्याप्त्यधिकरणपदार्थघटितसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्वं दण्डरूपनिष्ठकारणत्वनिष्ठमित्यन्वयबोध इत्यादिकं स्वयमूहनीयम् । वर्जयित्वेत्यत्र तु भेदो धात्वर्थः । आदिपदात् विहाये-त्यादेः परिग्रहः ।यथा नित्यद्रव्याणि विहाय वृत्तिमत्त्वं साधर्म्यमिति । अत्र पदार्थानामित्य-ध्याहार्यम् । नित्यद्रव्याणीत्यत्र प्रतियोगितानिरूपकत्वं द्वितीयार्थः । विपूर्वकधात्वर्थो भेदः । ल्यबर्थश्चाविवक्षितः । अन्वयश्चास्य पदार्थे । तथाच नित्यद्रव्यप्रतियोगिकान्योन्या-भाववत्पदार्थनिरूपितसाधर्म्यत्ववत् वृत्तित्वमित्यन्वयबोधः ॥ २२ ॥

मू० न्यूनाधिकत्वे संख्याया व्याप्यव्यापकते न हि ।
सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्विरहेऽप्यवगाहनात् ॥ २३ ॥

द्रव्याण्यपेक्ष्य पार्थिवानि न्यूनसंख्याकानीत्यत्र शाब्दबोधो विचार्यते । अत्र द्रव्यपदं द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापरम् । निरूपितत्वमपेक्ष्यार्थः । तस्य न्यूनत्वेऽन्वयः । एवं पार्थिवाण्यपेक्ष्य द्रव्याण्यधिकसंख्याकानीत्यत्र पार्थिवपदं पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापरम् । निरूपितत्वमपेक्ष्यार्थः । तस्याधिकत्वेऽन्वयः । तथा च द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यान्यूनसंख्या-पर्याप्त्यधिकरणानि पार्थिवानि, पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकर-णानि द्रव्याणीति च बोधो जायते । तत्र पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायां द्रव्यत्वाव-च्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यान्यूनत्वम् द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायां पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्या-धिकत्वं च किमिति संदेहः । अत्र न्यूनत्वं व्याप्यत्वम् । तच्च तत्समानाधिकरणभेदप्रति-योगितावच्छेदकत्वे सति तत्समानाधिकरणत्वम् । द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकरणे जलादौ पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यावद्भेदस्य पृथिव्यां तत्समानाधिकरणत्वस्य च सत्त्वा-न्नानुपपत्तिः । नच द्रव्याण्यपेक्ष्य समवायिकारणानि न्यूनसंख्याकानीति वाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तिः संख्याया व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वेन द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकरणे पृथि-

व्यादौ प्रत्येकं समवायिकारणत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यावद्भेदस्य सत्त्वादिति वाच्यम् । समवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् । द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकरणे समवायिकारणत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकताकभेदस्यासत्त्वेनानुपपत्त्यभावात् । एवमधिकत्वं व्यापकत्वम् । तच्च तत्समानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितानिरूपितसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकताशून्यत्वे सति तन्निष्ठसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकताकभेदसमानाधिकरणत्वम् । तादृशश्च पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याव्यापकत्वं द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याया-मव्याहतमेवेति केषांचिन्मतम् । तदनेन दूष्यते । यद्येवं न्यूनत्वाधिकत्वे संख्यायां स्यातां तदा यत्र भूतले दश घटाः सन्ति पटाश्च षट् तत्रैतान्घटानपेक्ष्यैते पटा न्यूनसंख्याका इति सर्वैर्व्यवह्रियते । स च व्यवहारो नोपपद्यते । तावद्घटत्वावच्छिन्न-पर्याप्तसंख्यायाः तावत्पटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायाश्च परस्परसामानाधिकरण्याभावात् । एवमेतान् पटानपेक्ष्यैते घटा अधिकसंख्याका इति सर्वैर्व्यवह्रियते । सोऽपि न स्यात् । तावद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायास्तावत्पटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्याधिकरणपटवृत्तिभेदप्रतियो-गितानिरूपितसमवायसंबन्धावच्छिन्नावच्छेदकतावत्त्वेन तच्छून्यत्वाभावादित्यर्थः । ननु किमिदमारोप्य शिरश्छेद्यते । यतो न्यूनत्वशरीरे सामानाधिकरण्यं अधिकत्वशरीरे च समानाधिकरणभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वं च निवेश्य वयं दूष्यामहे । यद्येवं विशेषणं नोपाददामः तदा कस्य कक्षमवलम्बस इति चेत् । तर्हि यत्र दश घटाः सन्ति पटाश्च दश तत्र तावद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायां तावत्पटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यायाञ्च परस्परन्यूनाधिकभावव्यवहारः स्यात् । परस्परसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वात् परस्परावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभावसमानाधिकरणत्वाच्च । अतः सामानाधिकरण्या-दिनिवेशेनैव बोधो वक्तव्य इति । (२३)

मू० न न्यूनाधिकसंख्यत्वे यत आत्माश्रयो भवेत् ।
तत्रान्यथा निरुच्येते किमत्रैवापराध्यते ॥ २४ ॥

अत्र केचित् द्रव्याण्यपेक्ष्य पार्थिवानि न्यूनसंख्याकानीत्यत्र द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेत-

संख्यान्यूनसंख्याकसंख्यावन्ति पार्थिवानीति बोधः । द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नेषु प्रत्येकं समवेता यावत्य एकत्वादिसंख्याः तावन्न्यूनसंख्याकत्वस्य पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्यासु विद्यमानत्वान्नानुपपत्तिः । एवं पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्याधिकसंख्याकसंख्यावन्ति द्रव्याणीत्येव पार्थिवान्यपेक्ष्य द्रव्याण्यधिकसंख्याकानीत्यत्र बोध इति न कदाचिदनुपपत्तिरिति वदन्ति । तन्मतमनेन दूष्यते । पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यायाः द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यान्यूनत्वस्यापि तन्न्यूनसंख्याकत्वरूपस्य, द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यायां पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नसमवेतसंख्याधिकत्वस्य च तदधिकसंख्याकत्वरूपस्यैव निर्वाच्यतया आत्माश्रयप्रसङ्गात् । अनवस्थापत्तेश्च । यदि च तत्र न्यूनत्वाधिकत्वे अन्यथा निरुच्येते तर्हि प्रकृत एव तथा निरुच्येतां । किं तावत्पयन्तीक्रमणेनेत्यर्थः ॥ २४ ॥

मू० व्याप्यव्यापकते याभ्यां निरूप्येते विशेषतः ।
तद्रूपवत्त्वरूपे तु ते स्यातामिति मन्महे ॥ २५ ॥

तद्रूपावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्याप्यत्वम् । तद्रूपावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकत्वं च। **विशेषतः** संख्यात्वव्याप्यव्यापकरूपाभ्यां **याभ्यां** धर्माभ्यां **निरूप्येते** अवच्छिद्येते । **तद्रूपवत्त्वरूपे** तादृशव्याप्यतावच्छेदकव्यापकतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वरूपे **ते** संख्यानिष्ठन्यूनत्वाधिकत्वे स्यातामित्यक्षरार्थः । द्रव्याण्यपेक्ष्य पार्थिवानि न्यूनसंख्याकानीत्यत्र द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतावच्छेदकसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणानि पार्थिवानीत्यन्वयबोधः । पार्थिवान्यपेक्ष्य द्रव्याण्यधिकसंख्याकानीत्यत्र तु पार्थिवत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकतावच्छेदकसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणानि द्रव्याणीत्यन्वयबोधः । एवं च यत्र भूतले दश घटाः सन्ति पटाश्च षट् तत्रैतान् घटानपेक्ष्य एते पटा न्यूनसंख्याकाः, एतान् पटा-

नपेक्ष्य एते घटा अधिकसंख्याका इति व्यवहारश्चोपपद्यते । एवं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिसम्बन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतावच्छेदकत्वं नाम, तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदको यो धर्मः तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्माधिकरणमात्रवृत्तिः, तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वम् । तावद्घटत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्ता या दशत्वसंख्या तत्पर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकीभूतो यस्तावद्घटान्यतमत्वरूपो धर्मः तत्समानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकः तादृशधर्माधिकरणमात्रवृत्तिश्च षड्घटान्यत्वरूपो धर्मः, तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकः षट्त्वरूपसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मः तदवच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वं षण्णां घटानामस्तीति नैतान् घटानपेक्ष्य एते पटा न्यूनसंख्याका इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिः । एवं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्याप्यतानिरूपितपर्याप्तिसंबन्धावच्छिन्नव्यापकतावच्छेदकत्वं नाम, तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभावसमानाधिकरणो यः, तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकस्तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वम् । षट्पटनिष्ठा या षट्त्वसंख्या तत्पर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकीभूतो यः षट्पटान्यतमत्वरूपो धर्मः तदवच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकान्योन्याभावसमानाधिकरणतद्धर्मसमानाधिकरणान्योन्याभावप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकश्च तावत्पटेतरचतुर्व्यक्तितदन्यतमत्वरूपो धर्मः, तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकीभूतो यो दशत्वरूपसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मः तदवच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वस्य दशघटेषु विद्यमानत्वान्नैतान् पटानपेक्ष्यैते घटा अधिकसंख्याका इति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिरिति सर्वं समञ्जसम् । अथैतच्छाखात्रयारोहो निरर्थकः । सर्वत्र न्यूनत्वमपकर्षः, अधिकत्वमुत्कर्षः षट्पटनिष्ठबहुत्वसंख्यापेक्षया दशघटनिष्ठबहुत्वसंख्यायामुत्कर्षस्य, दशघटनिष्ठबहुत्वसंख्यापेक्षया षट्पटनिष्ठबहुत्वसंख्यायामपकर्षस्य च सकलानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । नच त्र्याद्यपेक्षया एकस्य द्वयोश्च न्यूनसंख्याकत्वं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । एकत्वे द्वित्वसंख्यायां च बहुत्वत्वशून्यत्वस्यैव न्यूनत्वरूपत्वात् । नचैवं द्व्याद्यपेक्ष्यैकस्मिन् न्यूनसंख्याकत्वं न स्यादितिवाच्यम् । तत्रैकत्वसंख्यायामनेकत्वत्वशून्यत्वस्यैव न्यूनत्वरूपत्वादिति चेन्न । अननुगमापत्तेः । किञ्च इदमस्माद्बहुतर-

मित्यादिप्रतीतौ निरुक्ताधिकसंख्याकत्वस्यैव विषयत्वसंभवेन संख्यायामुत्कर्षापकर्षाख्य-जातिसद्भावे मानाभावः। बाधकश्च तादृगुत्कर्षापकर्षयोः सांकर्यप्रसंगः। तथाहि। चतुर्निष्ठसंख्यावधिकोत्कर्षं विहाय षण्णिष्ठसंख्यावधिकापकर्षः त्रिनिष्ठसंख्यायां, षण्णिष्ठसंख्यावधिकापकर्षं विहाय चतुर्निष्ठसंख्यावधिकोत्कर्षः सप्तनिष्ठसंख्यायां, उभयोश्च पञ्चनिष्ठसंख्यायां समावेश इति। अपिचैतादृशोत्कर्षापकर्षाभ्यां द्रव्यनिष्ठसंख्यासु न्यूनाधिकभावनिर्वाहसंभवेऽपि गुणादिनिष्ठसंख्यासु न्यूनाधिकभावस्य निर्वाहयितुमशक्यत्वात् अयमारंभः सार्थकएव॥ २५॥

मू० समव्याप्यव्यापकते निरूप्येते यतस्तदा।
तद्वत्त्वरूपे ते स्यातामर्धत्वेन विशेषिते॥ २६॥

यत्र दश घटाः सन्ति पटाः पञ्च तत्रैतान् घटानपेक्ष्यैते पटा अर्धन्यूनसंख्याकाः, एतान् पटानपेक्ष्यैते घटा अर्धाधिकसंख्याका इति व्यवह्रियते। तत्र किमिदमर्धत्वविशिष्टन्यूनत्वार्धत्वविशिष्टाधिकत्वं वेति प्राप्ते अभिधीयते। **समव्याप्यव्यामकत्वे यतः** संख्यात्वव्याप्ययादृशरूपाभ्यां **निरूप्येते** अवच्छिद्येते। **तद्वत्त्वरूपे** तादृशव्याप्यत्वयापकत्वावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वरूपे **अर्धत्वेन विशेषिते** अर्धन्यूनत्वाधिकत्वे स्यातामित्यक्षरार्थः। अयमर्थः। तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यार्धन्यूनत्वन्नाम तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यासमव्याप्यतावच्छेदकधर्मवत्त्वम्। तच्च तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मसमानाधिकरणो यो धर्मः स्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वस्वाधिकरणधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्माधिकरणमात्रवृत्तिधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वोभयसंबन्धेन तद्विशिष्टसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मवत्त्वम्। दशघटपर्याप्तदशत्वसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकदशघटान्यतमत्वसमानाधिकरणो यः पञ्चघटान्यतमत्वरूपो धर्मः तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वस्य पञ्चत्वत्वे सत्त्वात्तादृशोभयसंबन्धेन तावद्धटान्यतमत्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यापर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मसमानाधिकरणधर्मविशिष्टो यः पञ्चत्वत्वरूपो संख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मः, तदवच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वस्य पञ्चघटेषु सत्त्वान्नानुपपत्तिः। एवं तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यार्धाधिकत्वन्नाम तद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यासमव्यापकतावच्छेदकसंख्यात्व-

व्याप्यधर्मवत्त्वम् । तच्च स्वाधिकरणस्वभिन्नस्वावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकतद्धर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तसंख्यानिष्ठसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मावच्छिन्ननिरूपितपर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकयत्किंचिद्धर्माधिकरणैतदुभयमात्रवृत्तित्वसंबन्धेन यत्किंचिद्धर्मविशिष्टधर्मावच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मवत्त्वम् । स्वं पञ्चघटान्यतमत्वम् । तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकत्वम् पञ्चनिष्ठपञ्चत्वसंख्यावृत्तिपञ्चत्वत्वस्यास्ति । पञ्चत्वत्वस्य सर्वत्रैकत्वात् । तदवच्छिन्ननिरूपितपर्याप्त्यवच्छेदकधर्मः प्रागुक्तपञ्चघटव्यतिरिक्तपञ्चघटमात्रनिष्ठतावदन्यतमत्वमपि । एवं च स्वाधिकरणे स्वभिन्नतादृशधर्माधिकरणेचैतदुभयमात्रे वृत्तित्वम् दशघटान्यतमत्वस्येति निरुक्तसंबन्धेन यत्किंचिद्धर्मविशिष्टधर्मो दशघटान्यतमत्वम् । तदवच्छिन्नपर्याप्तिनिरूपकतावच्छेदकीभूतो यो दशत्वरूपसंख्यात्वव्याप्यधर्मस्तदवच्छिन्नसंख्यापर्याप्त्यधिकरणत्वस्य दशघटेषु विद्यमानत्वान्नानुपपत्तिरित्यादिकं सुदूरतरमालोचनीयम् ॥ २६ ॥

मू० गुणादौ द्वित्वमेकत्वमथ द्वित्वादिकं पुनः ।
तद्वृत्तित्वविशिष्टान्यतरत्वादि प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ २७ ॥
द्वौ वा त्रयो वा चत्वारो भेदा यत्र निवेशिताः ।
द्वित्वत्रित्वचतुष्ट्वादिसंज्ञास्तेषां प्रकीर्तिताः ॥ २८ ॥

ननु गुणादावयमेक इत्यादिशब्दः प्रयुज्यते । तत्रैकशब्दस्य कोऽर्थः । न तावदेकत्वसंख्याविशिष्टः, गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारात् । अथ सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनैकत्वसंख्याविशिष्ट एव एकशब्दार्थः, घटनिष्ठैकत्वसंख्यायाः सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन घटरूपे सत्त्वादेकमिदमिति प्रयोगोपपत्तिः । अथ सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेन संख्याविशिष्टस्याप्येकशब्दार्थत्वे इमौ रूपरसावेक इति प्रयोगापत्तिः । एतद्रूपरसयोरुभयोरपि सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनैकत्वसत्त्वादिति चेन्न । प्रत्येकं वर्तमानसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव वृत्तिनियामकत्वस्वीकारात् । फलानुरोधित्वात्कल्पनायाः । यथा स्फटिके लोहितप्रतीत्या स्फटिकनिष्ठलौहित्यसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव संबन्धता न तु भूतलादिनिष्ठसामानाधिकरण्यस्येति । अथ प्रत्येकवृत्तिलौहित्यसामानाधिकरण्यमादाय यथेमौ स्फटिकौ लोहितावित्येकमेव जपाकु-

सुमगतं लौहित्यमुभयोरवभासते । एवं रूपरसयोः प्रत्येकं वर्तमानमेकत्वसामानाधिकरण्यमादाय इमौ रूपरसावेक इत्येकमेवाश्रयगतमेकत्वमुभयोरवभासतां । प्रत्येकवृत्तिसामानाधिकरण्यस्य प्रत्येकस्मिन् वृत्तिनियामकतायाः त्वयापि वाच्यत्वादिति चेत् । एक इत्याकारकप्रतीतावुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैवैकत्वांशे संबन्धत्वोपगमात् । तथाचैकस्मिन् रूपे इदमेकमिति प्रतीत्या रूपनिष्ठतद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव वृत्तिनियामकत्वम् । नतु रसनिष्ठतत्तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यस्यापि वृत्तिनियामकत्वं स्वीक्रियते । एवञ्चेमौ रूपरसावेक इत्यत्र नास्मत्क्लृप्तवृत्तिनियामकयोः प्रत्येकवृत्तिसामानाधिकरण्ययोः संबन्धभावः । तयोरुद्देश्यतावच्छेदकीभूतरूपरसव्यक्तिनिष्ठवक्ष्यमाणद्वित्वानवच्छिन्नत्वात् । किन्तु द्वित्वावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव संबन्धत्वं संभावनीयम् । तस्य च वृत्तिनियामकत्वन्नास्माभिरुपकल्प्यते फलबलात् । स्फटिकादौ तु इमौ द्वौ स्फटिकौ लोहिताविति प्रतीतेः प्रत्येकवृत्तिसामानाधिकरण्यस्य तादृशस्फटिकद्वयवृत्तिसामानाधिकरण्यस्य वा संबन्धतास्वीकारेणोपपत्तिः । अथैवमेकं गुणत्वमित्यत्र कथमुपपत्तिः सामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनापि गुणत्वे एकत्वसंख्याविरहादिति चेन्न । तत्र सामानाधिकरण्यघटितसामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनैव गुणत्वे एकत्वस्य विषयत्वाङ्गीकारादतिप्रसक्तेश्च पूर्वोक्तदिशैव वारणीयत्वात् । अथैवमपि घटात्यन्ताभावः एक इति प्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः । तत्रोभयत्र समवायघटितसामानाधिकरण्यविरहादिति चेन्न । तत्र विशेषणतासंबन्धघटितसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव संबन्धत्वोपगमात् । अथ भावत्वाभाव एक इति प्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः । तत्र विशेषणताघटितसामानाधिकरण्यस्याप्यभावादिति चेन्न । तत्र समवायविशेषणताद्वयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यविशेषणत्वोभयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव संबन्धत्वोपगमात् । अथैवमपि आश्रयनाशजन्ययत्किंचिद्रूपनाशं विषयीकृत्यायं नाश एक इति प्रत्ययानुपपत्तिः तत्र निरुक्तसंबन्धस्य कस्याप्यसंभवादिति चेन्न । तत्र कालिकसंबन्धघटितसामानाधिकरण्यस्यैव संबन्धत्वोपगमादित्यादिकं स्वयमूहनीयम् । स्यादेतत् । एक इत्याकारकप्रतीतौ क्वचित्समवायः क्वचित्समवायघटितसामानाधिकरण्यं क्वचिदुभयत्र समवायघटितसामानाधिकरण्यसमवायैतदुभयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यं क्वचित्समवायविशेषणताद्वयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यं क्वचित्समवायविशेषणताद्वयघटितसामानाधिकर-

ण्यविशेषणत्वैतदुभयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यं क्वचित्तु समवायकालिकविशेषणत्वोभयघटितसामानाधिकरण्यमित्यादिनानासंबन्धानां संबन्धत्वाङ्गीकारे गौरवमिति चेन्न। न हि तावत्संबन्धानां तत्तत्संबन्धत्वेन संबन्धता स्वीक्रियते येन गौरवं स्यात्। किन्तु समवायस्यैकसंबन्धता। सामानाधिकरण्यानां तु सर्वेषां सामानाधिकरण्यत्वेनापरसंबन्धतेत्याशयेन गौरवाभावात्। अथैवं रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शसंख्यापरिमाणसंयोगेति विभागवाक्ये रूपमेकं रस एकः गन्ध एकः स्पर्श एकः एवं क्रमेण सर्वैरपि विद्वद्भिः शिष्याणां बोधनं क्रियते। तत्रैकपदस्य का गतिः। नच तत्र रूपत्वावच्छिन्नं यदेकत्वसामानाधिकरण्यं तदेव संबन्धतया स्वीकार्यमिति वाच्यम्। तथा सति यत्र रूपत्वेन रूपेण घटपटकुड्यकुसूलादिनानापदार्थगतनानारूपाणि विषयीकृत्य रूपाण्येकमिति प्रयुज्यते। तदा तादृशवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यापत्तेरिति। नैष दोषः। तत्रैकपदस्यैकधर्मावच्छिन्नार्थकत्वात्। स च धर्मो रूपत्वं रूपत्वनिष्ठं यदेकत्वसामानाधिकरण्यघटितं सामानाधिकरण्यं तस्यैकं रूपत्वमिति प्रतीत्यनुरोधेन संबन्धतायाः स्वीकर्तव्यतया रूपत्वस्यैकत्ववत्त्वेऽविवादात्। तदेतत्सर्वमभिप्रेत्य एकार्थसमवायादिनैव तादृशव्यवहारोपपत्तौ गुणे गुणानङ्गीकारादिति दीपिकायां स्थितमिति चेन्न। एतद्धटरूपमेकमिति वाक्यजन्यप्रतीतौ यद्येतद्धटरूपत्वावच्छिन्नसामानाधिकरण्यसंबन्धेनैतद्धटनिष्ठैकत्वविशिष्टमेवावभासते। तदैकस्मिन् घटे द्वे रूपे उत्पन्ने इत्याद्यभिदधानं पुमांसं प्रति एतद्धटवृत्तिरूपमेकमिति वाक्यं न प्रयुञ्जीरन्। न हि ततो जायमाना धीस्तथाविधसंशयं निवर्तयितुमीष्टे। परिभावयतु तावदिदं स्वयमेव नयने निमील्य मनसा अन्नंभट्टः घटे वर्तमानं रूपं तद्वृत्त्येकत्ववत्त्वेन विदानोऽपि कश्चित्पुमान् अस्मिन् रूपान्तरोत्पत्तिं संशेते न वेति। एवं रूपत्वादावेकत्वादिसामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानेऽपि रूपत्वान्तरसंभावनाविरोधाभावाद्रूपत्वान्तरं संदिहानं प्रति एकं रूपत्वमिति प्रयोगानुपपत्तिरिति। न हि रूपत्वमेकत्वसमानाधिकरणतया अजानानो रूपत्वान्तरसंभवं किमिति संदिग्धे। तस्मादनुभवविरोधादन्नंभट्टवचनमनादरणीयम्। यद्येतद्धटवृत्तिरूपमेकमित्यस्य भिन्नरूपासमानाधिकरणमित्यर्थः रूपत्वमेकमित्यस्य स्वाश्रयप्रतियोगिकान्योन्याभावासमानाधिकरणरूपत्वकमित्यर्थः। तथाप्येकं रूपं ज्ञातं एकं रूपं जानामीत्यादावेकपदं तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नपरमावश्यकम्। न हि तत्र स्वभिन्नरूपासमानाधिकरणत्व-

रूपमेकत्वं विषयः रूपान्तरस्यापि तद्भूतले तदानीं सत्त्वात्। ज्ञानमात्रंत्वेकरूपस्यैवेति। एकस्मिन् घटे द्वे रूपे उत्पन्ने एकं शुक्लमपरं नीलमित्यत्रैकपदस्य तद्व्यक्तित्वावच्छिन्नार्थकत्वमावश्यकमिति सर्वत्रैव तथास्त्वित्याशयेनाह **गुणादाविति**। गुणादिनिष्ठं यदेकत्वं तत्तद्व्यक्तित्वादिरूपमित्यर्थः। ननु यत्र रूपमेकं रस एक उत्पन्न इत्यत्रेमौ रूपरसौ द्वाविति सर्वैर्व्यवह्रियते। तत्र किमदं द्वित्वं न तावत्संख्यारूपं गुणादौ तदसंभवात्। आश्रयगतद्वित्वादिभानन्तु पूर्ववदेव निरसनीयम्। अथापेक्षाबुद्धिविशेषविषयत्वमेव द्वित्वमिति चेत्। विषयतायाः व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वे मानाभावेन प्रत्येकमपि द्वित्वादिप्रत्ययापत्तिः। अत आह **द्वित्वादिकं पुनरित्यादि। तत्तदिति**। यादृशव्यक्तीनां द्वित्वादिकं वक्तव्यं तत्तद्व्यक्तिवृत्तित्वविशिष्टतावदन्यतरत्वादिकमेवेत्यर्थः। अयं भावः। यत्र रूपरसौ द्वाविति प्रयुज्यते तत्रैतद्रूपरसवृत्तित्वविशिष्टैतद्रूपरसान्यतरत्वावच्छिन्नत्वं द्वित्वमिति यत्रैतद्रूपरसस्पर्शास्त्रय इति प्रयुज्यते तत्रैतद्रूपरसस्पर्शवृत्तित्वविशिष्टतावदन्यतमत्वत्वावच्छिन्नत्वं त्रित्वमिति संज्ञेत्यादिकं स्वयमूहनीयम्॥ २८॥

मू०　वैलक्षण्ये भवेत् यद्वापदमप्यथवेति च।
परन्त्वपितुकिन्तूनां वैलक्षण्यमुदीरितम्॥ २९॥

विरुद्धत्वं च भिन्नत्वं वैलक्षण्यं द्विधा मतम्।
विरोधिज्ञानविषया विकल्पोत्तरसप्तमी॥ ३०॥

प्रथमस्योदाहरणं यथा न च यत्र शरीरे चेष्टा न जाता तत्राव्याप्तिरिति वाच्यम् तादृशे प्रमाणाभावादित्यनन्तरं, अथवा चेष्टावदन्त्यावयविवृत्तिद्रव्यत्वव्याप्यजातिमत्त्वं तदिति। तादृशे प्रमाणाभावादित्यत्र तादृश इत्यनन्तरं शरीर इति पूरणीयम्। शरीर इत्यत्र सप्तम्यर्थो विशेष्यत्वम्। तादृशपदं चेष्टानधिकरणत्वपरं, प्रकारित्वं सप्तम्यर्थः। तथाच शरीरविशेष्यकचेष्टानधिकरणत्वप्रकारकप्रमाकरणाभावज्ञानज्ञाप्याप्रामाण्याश्रयीभूतं तादृशवाक्यमित्यन्वयबोधः। अथ तादृशप्रमाणविरहज्ञानज्ञाप्याव्याप्तिविरहकं शरीरलक्षणमिति सामान्यतः शरीरलक्षणत्वावच्छिन्नविशेष्यकमानसबोधो जायते। अथवेत्यनेन पूर्वोक्ता-

र्थवैलक्षण्यं प्रतिपाद्यते । पूर्वोक्तार्थबोधोत्तरतादृशमानसज्ञानविषयीभूताव्याप्तिविरहज्ञापकातिरिक्तज्ञापकज्ञाप्याव्याप्तिविरहकत्वं तत् । अन्वयश्चास्य तत्पदार्थे शरीरलक्षणत्वावच्छिन्ने । यद्वा पूर्वोक्तचेष्टाधिकरणत्वलक्षणभिन्नत्वमर्थः । तस्यापि तत्पदार्थे अन्वय इति ॥ द्वितीयस्योदाहरणम् । न हि दृश्यत्वमदृश्यत्वं वा कस्य चित्स्वभावादाचक्ष्महे । परन्तु महत्वोद्भूतरूपादिकारणसमुदायवशाद्दृश्यत्वं तदभावे चादृश्यत्वमिति । अत्र स्वभावादित्यनन्तरमितिशब्दः पूरणीयः । तथा ऽदृश्यत्वमित्यनन्तरमपि । अत्र परन्तुशब्देन पूर्वोक्तिवैलक्षण्यमुत्तरोक्तौ प्रतीयते । तच्च तद्विरुद्धार्थकत्वमिति ॥ तृतीयस्यार्थः विकल्पसूचकपदादुत्तरा या सप्तमी सा विरोधिज्ञानं विषयः स्वप्रतिपाद्यं यस्याः सा तथा उदाहरणञ्चास्य—तस्य नित्यत्वे भूतले घटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गादिति । अत्र तत्पदमभाववैशिष्ट्यपरम् । विशेष्यत्वं षष्ठ्यर्थः । नित्यत्वपदं नित्यत्वज्ञानपरम् । विरोधिज्ञानविषयत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । घटानयनानन्तरमपीत्यपिशब्दस्वारस्यात्स्वाव्यवहितोत्तरघटाभावोत्तरकालीनत्वं सूच्यते । तथाचाभाववैशिष्ट्यविशेष्यकनित्यत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविरोधिज्ञानविषयो यो घटानयनोत्तरकालीनघटाभावबुद्धिप्रसङ्गस्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ ३० ॥

मू० ज्ञानज्ञाप्यत्वविषया सेति कश्चिन्प्रचक्षते ।
समानयुक्तिकत्वार्था क्वचिदेषा विलोक्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

अत्र प्रथमस्योदाहरणम् इदमेव पूर्वोक्तं । तस्येत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थो विशेष्यत्वम् । नित्यत्वपदं नित्यत्वज्ञानपरम् । ज्ञाप्यत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । तस्य प्रसंगेऽन्वयः । ज्ञानं च संभावनात्मकं बोध्यम् । ज्ञायते हि तस्य नित्यत्वं संभावयतो यथोक्तातिप्रसङ्ग इति । द्वितीयस्योदाहरणम्—समवायस्यातिरिक्तत्वे अभावस्यापि वैशिष्ट्यं संबन्धान्तरं सिद्ध्येदिति । अत्र समवायस्येत्यत्र षष्ठ्यर्थो विशेष्यत्वं, अतिरिक्तत्वपदमतिरिक्तत्वसिद्धिपरम् । समानयुक्तिकत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । तच्च स्वजनकसमानजनककत्वं स्वं समवायातिरिक्तत्वसिद्धिः तज्जनक यल्लाघवज्ञानं तत्समानजनककत्वं संबन्धान्तरत्वप्रकारकसिद्धेरिति अत्रापि लाघवज्ञानसंभवादितिभावः । यदि चात्र सिद्ध्येदित्यत्र स्यादिति प्रयुज्यते तदा समवायस्येत्यत्र

षष्ठ्यर्थो निष्ठत्वम् । अतिरिक्तत्वपदं यथाश्रुतार्थकमेव । समानयुक्तिकत्वं सप्तम्यर्थः । तच्च स्वज्ञापकज्ञाप्यत्वम् । अन्वयश्चास्य संबन्धान्तरघटकभेद इत्यवसेयम् ॥ ३१ ॥

म० अयोगं योगमपरैरत्यन्तायोगमेव च ।
व्यवच्छिनत्ति धर्मस्य निपातो व्यतिरेचकः ॥ ३२ ॥

व्यतिरेचको निपात एवकारः क्वचिदयोगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति अयोगव्यवच्छेदबोधं जनयति । अयोगः उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकसमानाधिकरणाभावप्रतियोगित्वम् । तस्य व्यवच्छेदोऽभावः व्यापकत्वमिति यावत् । यथा अयं शङ्खः पाण्डुर एवेति विशेषणसंगतैवकारेण शङ्खत्वसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वाभावः पाण्डुरत्वे बोध्यते । क्वचिदत्यन्तायोगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति अत्यन्तायोगव्यवच्छेदबोधं जनयति । अत्यन्तः उद्देश्यतावच्छेदकव्यापको योऽयोगः अभावः तद्व्यवच्छेदः तदप्रतियोगित्वम् । यथा सरोजं नीलं भवत्येवेत्यादौ क्रियासंगतैवकारस्थले सरोजत्वव्यापकात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगित्वं नीलभवनरूपधात्वर्थे बोध्यते । क्वचिदपरैर्योगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति अपरयोगव्यवच्छेदबोधं जनयति । अपरैर्विशेषान्यैर्यो योगस्तादात्म्यादिसंबन्धः तद्व्यवच्छेदस्तदभावः । यथा पार्थ एव धनुर्धर इत्यादौ विशेष्यसंगतैवकारस्थले पार्थान्यतादात्म्याभावो धनुर्धरे बोध्यत इत्यादि यद्यपि बहु वक्तव्यम् । तथापि ग्रन्थान्तरेषु बहुशः प्रपञ्चितत्वात् विस्तरभयाच्च विरम्यते ॥ ३२ ॥

श्रीत्रिंशच्छ्लोकीटीका सेयं पट्टाभिरामेण ।
क्षिप्ता वक्षसि साक्षात् कौसुममालेव दक्षिणामूर्तेः ॥
पट्टाभिरामपोतग्रथिता सेयं प्रसूनमालेव ।
त्रिंशच्छ्लोकीटीका भ्रियतां पुरसुन्दरी देवी ॥

शुभमस्तु

इति तार्किकचूडामणिपट्टाभिरामशास्त्रिकृता त्रिंशच्छ्लोकीटीका समाप्ता

॥ समाप्तोऽयं ग्रन्थः ॥

NYAYAKULISA

Edited with Introduction and Notes

By

R. Ramanujachari

And

K. Srinivasachari

|| श्रीः ||

स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ।

[1]वेदप्रामाण्यसिद्ध्यर्थं स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिर्णयम् ।
[2]अन्यथाख्यातिपक्षस्था वर्णयन्ति कुमारिलाः ॥

अत्र किल वादिविप्रतिपत्त्या संशयः । ज्ञानानां हि प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये द्वे अपि स्वत इति **साङ्ख्याः** । द्वे अपि परत इति **नैयायिकाः** । अप्रामाण्यं स्वतः, प्रामाण्यं परत इति **बौद्धाः** । प्रामाण्यं स्वतः, अप्रामाण्यं परत इति **मीमांसकाः** । तत्र तावत्

स्वाभाविकत्वमुभयोर्विरोधान्नोपपद्यते ।
[3]कथं ह्यन्यानपेक्षस्य विपरीतात्मसंभवः ॥

तस्मात्

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां साध्यसाधनता यदि ।
तावेव खलु दृश्येते गुणदोषौ प्रति द्वयोः ॥

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1. प्रामाण्यस्य गुणाधीनत्वरूपपरतस्त्वे वेदस्यापौरुषेयतया तस्मिन्नाप्तोक्तत्वरूपगुणासंभवेन तज्जन्यज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं न सिद्ध्येदिति भावः ।

2. अन्यथाख्यातिशब्दिताप्रमाणज्ञानविशेषाङ्गीकर्तृमतेनापि प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वसिद्धावप्रामाण्यमेवानभ्युपगच्छतो ज्ञानसामान्यस्य याथार्थ्यवादिनो वेदान्तिनः स्वस्य निष्प्रतिपक्षं प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वं सिद्ध्यतीत्याशयेनात्रान्यथाख्यात्यङ्गीकर्तृकुमारिलपुरस्कार इति ध्येयम् ॥

3. स्वगतधर्मविषये कारणनिरपेक्षस्य ज्ञानस्य कथं परस्परविरुद्धप्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यरूपस्वभावसम्भवः । कारणसापेक्षस्य तु कारणवैचित्र्यात् स सम्भवेदपीति भावः । आत्मशब्दोऽत्र स्वभाववाची ।

यस्य यत्कार्यं तस्य तदन्वयव्यतिरेकाविव तत्त्वे प्रमाणम् । गुणदोषान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधायिनी प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये इति ते अपि तत्कारणके निश्चीयेते । न च [1]गुणेन प्रामाण्यस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकावन्यथासिद्धौ दोषनिरासार्थत्वादिति वाच्यम् । दोषस्यापि[2]. गुणनिरासार्थतयान्यथासिद्धेरप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात् । [3]न चैवमस्त्विति वाच्यम् । [4]तत्राप्यन्वयव्यतिरेकयोस्तुल्यत्वात् । गुणनिरासार्थो दोषस्यान्वय इति चेत्; विपरिवर्तप्रसङ्गात्[5] । [6]नन्वप्रामाण्यं स्वतः [7]दृष्टव्यभिचारस्य निश्चयानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्; किमेवं निश्चयो नास्तीति विपरीतं[8] सिद्ध्यति । तदा हि संशय एव स्यात् । तदेवाप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न । भिन्नविषयत्वात् । प्रामाण्याप्रमाण्यगोचरो हि संशयः अर्थगोचरे ते इति । ततोऽर्थगोचराप्रामाण्यनिश्चयो नोपपद्यते । [9]तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणदोषयोः प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वे सिद्धे । नन्वेवं निःस्वभावत्वं ज्ञानस्य प्रसज्यत इति चेन्न । विषयपरिच्छेदस्वभावत्वात् । यथार्थपरिच्छेदः प्रामाण्यम् । अयथार्थपरिच्छेदोऽप्रामाण्यम् । कथं तदुभयपरित्यागे अर्थपरिच्छेदसिद्धिरिति चेन्न । अपरित्याज्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । तयोस्साधारणमेव ह्यर्थपरिच्छेदं ब्रूमः । शिंशुपापलाशादिष्विव वृक्षत्वम् । न चासाधारणरूपातिरिक्तमत्र नोपलभामह इति वाच्यम् । यद्व्यावृत्तौ यन्न व्यावर्तते तत्ततोऽर्थान्तरमिति निष्कर्षात् । प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ययोर्मिथो

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1. नैयायिकाभिमतं प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वं **मीमांसको** दूषयति—गुणेनेत्यादिना । अतः प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वमेव युक्तमिति भावः ।

2. **नैयायिकः** प्रतिवदति—दोषस्यापीत्यादिना ।

3. अप्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वप्रसङ्गमिष्टापत्त्या **बौद्धः** परिहरति—न चैवमिति ।

4. **नैयायिकः** प्रतिवदति--तत्रापीति। गुणप्रामाण्यविषय इव दोषाप्रामाण्यविषयेऽपीत्यर्थः।

5. तथाच मीमांसकमतमेव किमिति नाङ्गीक्रियत इति भावः ।

6. **बौद्ध** एव विपरिवर्तं व्यावर्तयन् युक्त्यन्तरेण स्वपक्षं साधयति—नन्वित्यादिना ।

7. दृष्टव्यभिचारस्य पुरुषस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चयानुपपत्तेरिति भावः ।

8. विपरीतं—अप्रामाण्यम् ।

9. **नैयायिकः** स्वपक्षसाधनमुपसंहरति—तस्मादित्यादिना । सिद्धे इति द्विवचनान्तम् ।

व्यावृत्तावपि [1]अर्थप्रकाशात्मनो ज्ञानरूपस्योभयत्रोपलब्धेः। ननु च गुणात्प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमेऽनवस्थानं स्यात्। नैवम्। इन्द्रियादिवद्गुणस्यापि सत्तया कारणत्वोपपत्तेः। [2]गुणज्ञानं तु प्रामाण्यकारणमिति नाभ्युपगच्छामः। प्रामाण्यनिश्चये तु [3]तस्यापि हेतुत्वमस्ति। तर्हि तत्रानवस्थेति चेन्न। तत्रावयोस्समानत्वात्। स्वतःप्रामाण्यवादिनोऽपि कौमारिलस्य न तावत्स्वेन स्वप्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति स्वज्ञापकादास्थेयम्। तस्यापि तथेति। कथं तर्हि परिष्ठानम्[4]। स्वपरनिर्वाहकेणानुमानेन[5]। अनुव्यवसायादिकं हि (अनुमानं हि) विषयविषयिणोरात्मव्यवसाययो(र्व्यवसायानुव्यवसाययो) [6]रव्यभिचारमेकहेलया दर्शयतीति नापरापेक्षा। [7]एवमपि चेदनाश्वासः, अव्यभिचारः (न [8]व्यभिचारः) क्वचिदपि स्यात्। तथा च कथं संशयः। अप्रसिद्धशिरस्कस्य तस्यायोगात्। एवं प्रामाण्यनिश्चयो गुणसंवादज्ञानायत्तः। न च संवादेऽप्यनवस्था। नानाजातीयबहुसामग्रीसमत्वस्य[9] क्वचिदपि व्यभिचाराभावत्। एवमर्थक्रियाज्ञानविशेषोऽपि द्रष्टव्यः। गुणसंवादार्थक्रियाज्ञानानि स्वप्नेऽपि भवन्तीति चेन्न। स्वप्नजागरयोर्मिथः प्रतिसन्धानाप्रतिसन्धानाभ्यां विशेषस्य स्वध्यवसानत्वात्। तथाहि— स्वप्नदशायां कस्याञ्चिदनुभूता विशेषास्स्वप्नदशान्तरे व्यावर्तन्ते। जागरदशायां तु मिथोऽनुसन्धीयन्त इति विशेषः। तस्मात्संवादकारण(ज्ञान ?)-

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1. अर्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपो यो ज्ञानस्याकारः तस्येत्यर्थः।
2. गुणज्ञानं प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ न कारणम्, अपि तु ज्ञप्ताविति भावः।
3. तस्यापि = गुणज्ञानशब्दितस्य, व्यवसायरूपं ज्ञानं प्रमा गुणाजन्यत्वादित्यनुमानस्यापि।
4. परिष्ठानं = पर्यवसानम्।
5. अनुमानेन = उक्तगुणज्ञानवक्ष्यमाणगुणसंवादज्ञानार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमरूपेण।
6. अव्यभिचारं = प्रामाण्यम्।
7. मदुक्तार्थेऽस्मिन्नविश्वासेन स्वतः प्रामाण्यमेवाङ्गीक्रियते चेदित्यर्थः।
8. व्यभिचारः = अप्रामाण्यम्।
9. समत्वं = एकरूपत्वं, एकरूपेण कार्यसाधकत्वम्।

गुणज्ञानार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमेन प्रामाण्यनिश्चयः । न चानवस्थेति[1] । ये तु वदन्ति प्रामाण्यं स्वेनैव निश्चीयत इति तत्स्वयंप्रकाशवादे तेषां शोभते । अन्येषां कथं स्वयंप्रकाशस्य (अस्वयंप्रकाशस्य ?) ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रामाण्यगोचरत्वम् । यदि प्रामाण्यैकदेशभूतस्यार्थतथात्वस्य (अर्थस्य ?) स्वगोचरत्वमिति मतम् , कस्तत्र विप्रतिपद्यते यत्प्रयस्यद्भिस्साध्येत । यदि[2] हि स्वगोचरप्रकाशस्स्वयम् , किमस्माकं हीयते ? अथार्थमात्रं न प्रामाण्यांशं ब्रूमः, किन्तु तथात्वमिति चेत् , किमिदं तथात्वमिति । यथा ज्ञाने भासते तथावस्थितिरिति चेन्न । आत्मानमनवभास्यात्मगोचरत्वं (यथात्मगोचरत्वं ?) तथावस्थितिरिति भासनानुपपत्तेः ।

यथात्वप्रतियोगिको हि तथाभावः । अथ तत्त्वगत्या तथाभूत एवार्थ इति तथात्वगोचरत्वमिति चेत् ; हन्तैष पूर्वोक्तो विषयपरिच्छेद इति कस्तत्र विप्रतिपद्यते ? यदि च तथात्वमनवभासते (अवभासते ?) कथं प्रामाण्यसन्देहः पश्चात् । [3]न हि प्रामाण्यांशं तथात्वमपहायांशान्तरयोः प्रकाशापूर्वत्वयोस्संशय इति युक्तम् । तयोरव्यभिचारात् । न च प्रमाणाप्रमाणसाधारणो विषयः प्रामाण्यमिति युक्तम् । न हि प्रमाणमात्रस्यायमर्थतथात्वलक्षणो विषय इति वक्तव्यम् । ज्ञानमात्रस्येत्यभ्युपगमनीयत्वात् । अन्यथा हि प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं नाम धर्मः स्ववेद्य इत्युक्तेऽपि प्रतिज्ञातं ज्ञानमात्रस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यं न सिद्ध्येत् । इदमपि चात्र विकल्पनीयम् । किमर्थतथात्वं प्रतीयते, उत प्रमीयत इति । यदि प्रतीयते किं तेन । प्रामाण्यासिद्धेः ।

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1. अनुमानात्मकस्योक्तज्ञानत्रयस्य स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वाभ्युपगमादिति भावः ।

2. विप्रतिपत्त्यभावमेव स्वस्य हान्यभावेनोपपादयति—यदि हीत्यादिना ।

3. अयमर्थः—अनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपतया प्रामाण्यस्य तत्र तथात्वरूपस्याबाधितत्वस्यावभासेन तदंशे संशयासंभवेऽपि अनधिगतत्वात्मकापूर्वत्वार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपयोरंशान्तरयोस्संशयसंभवेन प्रामाण्यसंशय उपपद्यत इति न युक्तं वक्तुम् । तयोर्नियमेन भानात् तद्विषये संशयोदयासंभवात् । अतः अबाधितत्वांश एव संशय इति वक्तव्यम् । स च अनुभूयमानः तस्य नियमेन भानांगीकारे नोपपद्यत इति ।

न हि प्रतीत इत्येवार्थस्सिद्धयेत् । तथात्वे वा किं प्रामाण्यपरीक्षणेन । अथ प्रमीयते कथं ज्ञानमात्रसाधारणत्वम् । ज्ञानमात्रप्रयुक्तमपि क्वचित्परेण बाध्यत इति चेत्; कथं प्रमितस्य बाधः । तथात्वे च न क्वचिदाश्वास इति ॥

न च वेदोपयोगोऽपि तस्य पक्षस्य दृश्यते ।
गुणात्प्रामाण्यनिष्पत्तौ स्वेन ज्ञानं किमुत्तरम् ॥

मीमांसका हि वेदप्रामाण्यनिर्णिनीषया स्वतःप्रामाण्यसाधनाय यतन्ते । न चास्मिन्पक्षे वेदोपयोगं पश्यामः । गुणाधीने प्रामाण्यजन्मनि तदभावात् वेदप्रामाण्यं न सिद्धयति । तत्र स्वेनैव स्वप्रामाण्यवेदनं किं कुर्यात् । कामं च स्वेनैव स्वप्रामाण्यमवगम्यताम् । निर्णयस्तु परत एव । भवतैवाप्रमाणसाधारणमित्युक्तत्वात् । नन्वपवादरूपमप्रामाण्यज्ञानं दृष्टप्रामाण्यविरोधात् न कल्पयितुं शक्यमिति चेन्न । संप्रतिपन्नेषु अप्रमाणज्ञानेष्वपि तुल्यत्वात् ।

तत्र बाधकं दृश्यत इति चेन्न । कारणदोषज्ञानेनापि कल्प्यत्वेनाभ्युपगमात्[1] । दोषोऽपि वेदे नास्तीति चेन्न । गुणाभावात्कल्पनोपपत्तेः[2] । तथाहि—

यदा कार्यत्वविज्ञानं प्रामाण्यस्य गुणं प्रति ।
तदा हि कारणाभावात् कार्याभावोऽनुमीयताम् ॥

गुणाभावात्प्रामाण्याभावेऽनुमिते च पारिशेष्यात् अप्रामाण्यमेव वेदस्य स्यादिति । स्या(न स्या ?)देतत् । दोषस्याप्रामाण्यकारणत्वात्तदभावे तदपि न स्यादिति । एवमपि सन्देहात्प्रामाण्यनिर्णयानुपपत्तिरेव । स्वत एव निश्चीयत इति चेन्न । प्रमि-

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1. कारणदोषबाधकप्रत्यययोः कल्पकयोर्मध्ये एकाभावेऽप्यन्येनाप्रामाण्यज्ञानस्य कल्प्यत्वाभ्युपगमादित्यर्थः ।

2. कल्पनोपपत्तेः = प्रामाण्याभावकल्पनोपपत्तेः ।

त्यनुपपत्तेः । तथापि प्रामाण्यस्य परित्यागो न युक्त इति चेन्नायं तर्कः[1] । [2]प्रामाणिकविषयस्य परित्यागस्यैव तत्त्वात्[3] । प्रामाणिकपरित्यागो ह्यनिष्टः अप्रामाणिकस्वीकारश्च । अप्रतिपन्नस्यापि प्रामाण्याभावस्यानुमाने चोक्तो हेतुः कारणाभावो[4]ऽनन्यथासिद्ध एव । गुणप्रामाण्ययोः कार्यकारणभाव एवासिद्ध इति चेदागतोऽसि पन्थानम् । तत्रोक्तो हेतुः । अपि च--

उभयोश्चेदुभौ हेतू ज्ञानं नानुभयात्मकम् ।
वक्तृभावे भवेद्दोषो वेदनित्यत्ववादिनाम् ॥

यदि च वेदं नित्यं मीमांसकाः साधयेयुः, तेषां तत्स्ववधाय कृत्योत्थापनम् । ज्ञानं हि प्रमाणमप्रमाणं वेत्येव नान्यत्संभवति । वेदाच्च ज्ञानमुत्पन्नम् । तद्यदि वेदा नित्याः वक्तृगुणाभावे सिद्धे सामग्रीन्यूनताया दोषत्वस्य विशेषादर्शनात्संशयोत्पत्तौ दृष्टत्वाच्छब्दप्रमाणसामग्रीपौष्कल्याभावलक्षण दोषकलमषं वैदिकं ज्ञानमप्रमाणमेव भवेत् । तस्मादेवं स्वतःप्रामाण्यनिर्णयप्रयासो विपरीतफल एव (एवेत्युक्तं भवति ?) । एतदुक्तं भवति ।

[5]कति लोकेषु दृश्यन्ते सुग्रहग्राहका नराः ।
एवं न फलवद्बुद्धेः स्वप्रामाण्योपलम्भनम् ॥

तस्माद्यथोक्तप्रकारेण संवादादिभिः प्रामाण्यावसायः । कारणगुणात्तदुत्पत्तिरि-

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1. अयं न समीचीनतर्क इत्यर्थः । प्रामाणिकार्थस्य परित्यागो न युक्त इत्यस्यैव समीचीनतर्कत्वमिति भावः ।

2. तदेवोपपादयति— प्रामाणिकेत्यादिना ।

3. तत्त्वात्=अयुक्तत्वात् ।

4. कारणाभावः=कारणाभावरूपः ।

5. ज्ञानगतप्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानेनैव ग्रहणमकिंचित्करमिति सदृष्टान्तं चाटूक्त्या प्रतिपादयति—कतीत्यादिना । कति=बहवः । यथा लोके नराणां स्वज्ञानस्य इतरान्प्रति सामीचीन्यादिग्राहकत्वं वस्तुसत्सामीचीन्याय न प्रभवति, एवं ज्ञानस्य मम प्रामाण्यमस्तीति ग्रहणं न स्तुसत्प्रामाण्याय प्रभवतीत्यर्थः । लोकवत्परेण परगतगुणकथनमे विकतवितज्ञवपिच मिथतारभाः ।

त्यास्थेयमिति। अत्रायं प्रयोगः—प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीना कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वात् अप्रमावदिति। यदि च ज्ञानहेतुमात्राधीना भवेत् अप्रमापि प्रमैव भवेत्। अत एव न्यायविदो वेदस्याप्तपुरुषपूर्वकत्वात्प्रामाण्यमातिष्ठन्त इति।

अत्रोच्यते—

धियां स्वाभाविकं तेषां (तद्यत् ?) प्रामाण्यं जायते स्वतः।
अप्रामाण्यं पुनस्तासामपवादोऽन्यहेतुकः॥

तथाहि—

यज्जातिव्यञ्जका धर्माः ये ते तज्जातिबन्धनाः (साधनाः ?)।
तज्जातीयस्तु तैर्युक्तो (तज्जातिसाधनायुक्तो ?) निस्स्वभावः प्रसज्यते॥

सर्वा एव जातयः तैस्तैः स्वप्रयुक्तैः संस्थानगुणादिभिर्व्यज्यमाना दृश्यन्ते। न च व्यञ्जका नाम जातिप्रयुक्त [1] ....

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1. "अत्र गलितग्रन्थेन सह अतोऽवगच्छामो वस्तुगोचरत्वमेवार्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिरिति लक्षणार्थ इति" इत्यन्तस्य ग्रन्थस्यायं प्रतिपाद्यांश इति प्रतिभाति।

अत्र कौमारिल एव सिद्धान्तीत्यारम्भे व्यक्तम्। स च ज्ञानस्य ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमानसाध्यत्ववादी। स तावत् तार्किकेणार्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिरिति लक्षणानुसारेण भ्रमप्रमासाधारणविषयप्रकाशकत्वस्यैव ज्ञानासाधारणधर्मत्वावगत्या ज्ञानस्य विषयप्रकाशकत्वमेव स्वाभाविकाकारः। यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वायथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपेप्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये गुणदोषायत्ते अस्वाभाविकाकारौ इत्येवावश्याभ्युपगमनीयम्। न हि यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिरिति लक्षितम्। तथासति हि स एव स्वाभाविकाकारः। स एव च ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम्, आकारान्तरानुपलम्भात्। इदं रजतमित्यत्रापि ईदृशं प्रामाण्यमेवोत्सर्गतः प्राप्नोति। अनन्तरं बाधकेन निवर्तत इति प्रामाण्यं स्वाभाविकम्। क्वचिदप्रामाण्यमपवादरूपमिति वक्तुं शक्येत। नैवं लक्षितम्। तथा लक्षणकरणे भ्रमात्मकज्ञाने अव्याप्तिरेव स्यादिति पूर्वपक्षे प्रापिते स्वाभिमतं प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वमेवं साधयति। अर्थवस्तुसच्छब्दाः यथावस्थितार्थबोधका एव प्रयोगेषु दृश्यन्ते। अतोऽत्र लक्षणवाक्ये अर्थशब्दो न विषयपर्यायः। अपि तु वस्तुपर्यायस्सन् यथावस्थितार्थवाची। तथा च यथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव लक्षणतया विवक्षितमिति तदेव

अतस्तेनैव स्वभावनिष्कर्षो युक्तः । तत्रार्थप्रकाशसा···[तत्रार्थेन प्रकाशसामान्यस्य नि] रूपणं पटपदादिर्विशेषस्येति (घटपटादिभिर्विशेषस्येति ?) स्थिते सामान्या-

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स्वाभाविकं ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम् , आकारान्तरानुपलम्भात् । किञ्चास्मन्मते ज्ञानस्यार्थप्रकाशकत्वं नाम अर्थनिष्ठप्रकाशापरपर्यायज्ञाततजनकत्वम् । एतादृशज्ञाततया घटादौ विषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानमनुमीयते । इत्थं च ज्ञानं अर्थनिष्ठप्रकाशसामान्यापरपर्यायज्ञाततजनकत्वेन सिद्ध्यतीति पर्यवसितम् ॥

अत्र ज्ञाततार्थनिष्टेत्यर्थो ज्ञाततानिरूपको भवति । अर्थस्य तन्निरूपकत्वं च स्वेन रूपेण । न विषयतावत्त्वात्मकविषयत्वरूपेण । विषयताया एव ज्ञातारूपतया आत्माश्रयत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवं च विषयतारहितस्य शुद्धरूपस्यैवार्थस्य विषयतानिरूपकत्वसम्भव इति ज्ञानस्यार्थप्रकाशकत्वं वस्तुसदर्थनिष्ठ(निरूपित ?)ज्ञाततजनकत्वरूपमिति सिद्धम् । अयमेवाकारः स्वाभाविकः प्रामाण्यमित्युच्यते । ज्ञाने आकारान्तरानुपलम्भात् । ईदृशं प्रामाण्यं इदं रजतमित्यत्र न सम्भवति । तत्र रजतत्वनिष्ठज्ञाततायां वस्तुतोऽत्राविद्यमानस्यात एवार्थशब्दावाच्यस्य केवलं दोषवशेनात्र भासमानस्य रजतत्वस्यैव निरूपकत्वात् । तथा च तत्र इदमंश इव रजतत्वांशेऽपि सामान्यतः प्राप्तं प्रामाण्यं बाधकेनापोद्यते । अयं घट इति प्रमायां विशेष्यांशे विशेषणांशे सम्बन्धांशे इदं रजतमिति भ्रमेऽपि इदमंशे रजतत्वांशे च निरुक्तप्रामाण्यस्य सत्त्वेन तस्यैव स्वाभाविकत्वमुचितम् । संसर्गांशे परमप्रामाण्यम् । न हि वस्तुतो रजतत्वमेव नास्ति । आपणस्थरजते तत्सत्त्वात् । किन्तु शुक्तावेव तन्नास्तीति संसर्ग एवाविद्यमानो भासते । अतोऽप्रामाण्यस्य काचित्कत्वात् युक्तं तस्य परतस्त्वम् । अपि च विषयप्रकाशकत्वस्य बुद्धिलक्षणत्वेऽसम्भवप्रसङ्गः । विषयत्वेन विषयप्रकाशाभावात् । न हीन्द्रियार्थसंयोगानन्तरं अयं विषय इति कश्चिदपि प्रत्येति । अपि तु अयं घटः अयं पट इति तेन तेन वस्तुरूपेण । तेन तत्तद्वस्तुप्रकाशकत्वमेव लक्षणतया विवक्षितम् । भूयस्त्वादिदमेव स्वाभाविकं भ्रमेऽपि प्राप्तमपोद्यते । एवं च तेन तेन रूपेण तत्तद्वस्तुप्रकाशकत्वरूप एक एवाकारो ज्ञाने बहुष्वंशेषूपलभ्यते, न कारान्तरमिति स एवाकारो लक्षणे विवक्षित इति तदेव प्रामाण्यमित्युच्यते । भ्रान्तौ संसर्गांशे परं तद्भज्यते । नैतावता प्रामाण्यस्य त्वदभिमतगुणाधीनत्वरूपपरतस्त्वसंभवः । न चाव्याप्तिपरिहारः कथमिति शङ्क्यम् । भ्रान्तिज्ञानेऽप्यंशद्वये प्रामाण्यस्य सत्त्वेन तस्याः परिहृतत्वात् । विषयप्रकाशकत्वरूपं ज्ञानत्वम् । तदेव सामान्याकारः । प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये तु तद्विशेषौ । यस्यां ज्ञानव्यक्तावप्रामाण्यं तस्यां व्यक्तौ पलाशत्वमिव शिंशुपायां प्रामाण्यं नास्त्येव इति पक्षः परं यत्नेन निरस्यते । व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन व्यञ्जकत्वेन चाभिमतयोः ज्ञानत्वनिरुक्तप्रामाण्ययोः वृक्षत्वशाखास्कन्धादिमत्त्वयोरिव अत्यन्तभेदाभावेन ज्ञानत्वादेरिव प्रामाण्यस्यापि स्वाभाविकाकारत्वस्यैव युक्तत्वात् । तस्मादर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिरिति लक्षणवाक्येन न त्वदभिमतसिद्ध्यवकाशः । प्रत्युतास्माकमेव तदनुकूलमिति ॥

कारनिरूपकोऽर्थश्शुद्धरूप इति न[1] तन्निरूपितप्रकाशसामान्यसाधनत्वेन सिद्ध्यतो ज्ञान-सामान्यस्य स्वभावतोऽर्थविषयत्व···[मेव संभ] वति ।

यद्यप्यर्थप्रकाशापरपर्यायं ज्ञातत्वं तथा तत्त्वयो(तत्त्वातत्त्वयो ?)रुभयोरपि समन्वेति । तथापि [2]सामान्यस्य तत्त्वसमन्वयस्वभाव इत्यवसीयते । [3]तत्सामान्य-जननस्वभावतया तत्त्वमेव सामान्यतः प्रकाशयेत् । विशेषतस्त्वपवादात् दोषसंसर्गादय-थार्थमिति । ततस्साक्षादर्थसंबन्धिनि ज्ञातत्वे ज्ञाने वा अर्थसंबन्धस्वभावः परीक्षणीय इति स एव क्रियत इति ।

न हि स्वविषयत्वेन ज्ञानेनार्थः प्रकाश्यते ।
तस्माद्विषयनिर्भासो ज्ञानासम्भवि लक्षणम् ॥

यद्धि ज्ञाने विद्यते तदेव तस्य लक्षणमुचितम् । वस्तुप्रकाशत्वमेव ज्ञाने विद्यते, न तु विषयप्रकाशत्वम् । यतो विज्ञाने समुत्पन्ने विषयोऽयमिति न भाति किन्तु घटो-ऽयमिति । न च घटस्य [4] द्वैरूप्यं विद्यते । अतोऽवगच्छामो वस्तुगोचरत्वमेवार्थ-प्रकाशो बुद्धिरिति लक्षणार्थ इति ।

कस्यचित्प्रकाशः प्रकाशकमिति वा ज्ञानं निरूप्यताम् । किं विषयवस्तुविकल्पे-नेति चेन्न । तत्रापि वस्तुन एव परामर्शात् । न[5] हि ज्ञानं तत्र परामृश्यते । तत्पू-

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1. अत्र नञ् नास्तीति भाति । तत्सत्वे अर्थविषयत्वमित्यत्रार्थपदं विषयपरं बोध्यम् ।

2. सामान्यस्य = ज्ञानसामान्यस्य ।

3. तत् ज्ञानसामान्यं कर्तृ अनेकस्थलानुयायि सामान्याकारजननस्वभावतया तादृशं तत्त्वमेव उत्सर्गतः प्रकाशयेदित्यर्थः ।

4. अस्तित्वनास्तित्वात्मकरूपद्वयवत्त्वम् । अविद्यमानस्यापि विषयत्वसंभवात् अर्थ-सद्भावस्थले अस्तित्वं अभावस्थले नास्तित्वमिति विषयस्य द्वैरूप्यं विद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

5. कुमारिलेन स्वयंप्रकाशत्वानभ्युपगमादिति भावः ।

र्वको वा विषयः। ततो वस्त्वेव परामृश्यत इत्यायातम्। न च विषयवस्तु-साधारणं [1]किञ्चिच्छब्दवाच्यं [2]रूपमस्ति। [3]विशिष्टाविशिष्टसाधारणस्य विशेष्यमात्रत्वात्। तस्य च पूर्वोक्तवस्तुमात्रत्वादिति। स्यादेतत्। [4]वस्तुगोचरत्वमव्यापकं अप्रमाणे तदभावात्। ततोऽसाधारणं सन्न सामान्यव्यञ्जकम्। [5]तद्व्यञ्जकं च न प्रमाणनियतमिति दुष्करं स्वतःप्रामाण्यघटनमिति।

नैतदेवम्, यतः—

वस्तुगोचरता सैव संसर्गांशेन विश्लथा।
अप्रमाणेऽपि विज्ञाने ज्ञानत्वव्यक्तिकारणम्॥

यथैव हि सास्नापुच्छकर्णशृङ्गादिसंस्थानविशेषाभिव्यङ्ग्यं गोत्वं तेषामन्यतमवैकल्येऽपि शेषैरभिव्यज्यते, एवमखिलविशेषणविशेष्य [6]संसर्गलक्षणवस्तुगोचरत्वाभिव्यङ्ग्यं ज्ञानत्वमेकदेशवैकल्येऽपि शेषैरभिव्यज्यते।

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1. कस्यचित्प्रकाशकमित्यत्र किञ्चिच्छब्दस्य वाच्यमित्यर्थः।

2. रूपमस्ति = रूपान्तरमस्ति।

3. यथा दण्डिदेवदत्तकेवलदेवदत्तोभयसाधारणं रूपं देवदत्तस्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तमुपलभ्यते। एवं विषयताविशिष्टवस्तुकेवलवस्तुसाधारणं रूपं वस्तुस्वरूपमेव नातिरिक्तमिति कस्यचिदित्यत्र किंशब्देन विषयवस्तु साधारणरूपपरामर्शेऽपि वस्तुप्रकाशकत्वमेव सिद्ध्यति नातिरिक्तप्रकाशकत्वमिति भावः।

4. यथावस्थितार्थस्यैव वस्तुशब्दवाच्यत्वात् तद्विषयकत्वस्याप्रमाणशब्दितभ्रमरूपज्ञानेऽभावात् प्रमाणरूपज्ञानमात्रवर्तीदृशं वस्तुगोचरत्वं न ज्ञानत्वरूपसामान्यव्यञ्जनसमर्थनं भवति। व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोः समानदेशत्वावश्यंभावात्। न हि सास्नादिकं गोमहिषादिसाधारणं पशुत्वमभिव्यङ्क्तुमीष्ट इत्यर्थः।

5. ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकं च विषयप्रकाशकत्वं न प्रमाणज्ञानमात्रनियतमित्यर्थः। अयथावस्थितस्यापि विषयपदवाच्यत्वादिति भावः।

6. संसर्गलक्षणं यद्वस्तु तद्गोचरत्वेत्यर्थः।

यथा [1]सच्छिद्रके हेतुकारकत्वं विहन्यते ।
उदकाहरणार्थेऽपि स्वतो लोकानुसारतः ॥

तथा लोकेन विज्ञाने व्यवहारार्थमादृते ।
प्रमाणत्वं निवर्तेत संसर्गादिरुपप्लवात् ॥

प्रमाण····[मपि का]रकविशेषः । [2]कारकत्वं च केनचित्सामान्ये[3]न प्रसक्तं तत्र तत्र[4] कैश्चिद्विशेषै[5]रपोद्यते । एवं उपादानार्थिभिर्वा (हानार्थिभिर्वा?) [6]कारकत्वेन सामान्यतो लौकिकैरुपादीयमान(ने?)····[ज्ञाने प्रामाण्यम]पि कारणोत्थितैर्दोषै[7]रपोद्यते । तथापि न स्वतःप्रामाण्यव्याघातः । [8]कारकान्तरवत् ज्ञानस्यापि सामान्यप्रयुक्तत्वात्प्रमाणत्वस्य । न चैवं सति···[कारका]न्तरेष्वपि [9]सामान्याकारातिरेकिभिः कैश्चिद्विशेषैरेव तत्तत्कारकत्वं निरूप्यत (निरुह्यत?) इति साम्प्रतम् । तथासति [10]दृश्यं रूपमकारकं [11]अदृश्यं किञ्चित् कारकत्वनिर्वाहकं रूपमिति स्यात् । तथा च

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1. स्वत उदकाहरणार्थेऽपि घटे सच्छिद्रके यथा हेतुकारकत्वं विहन्यते तथा व्यवहारार्थं लोकेनादृते विज्ञानेऽपि संसर्गाभावे सति प्रमाणत्वं निवर्तेत इत्यर्थः ।

2. उदकाहरणसाधनत्वरूपं कारकत्वं चेत्यर्थः ।

3. सामान्येन=घटत्वादिरूपेण ।

4. तत्र तत्र=सच्छिद्रघटादिषु ।

5. विशेषैः=छिद्रादिभिः ।

6. कारकत्वेन=व्यवहारसाधनत्वेन ।

7. दोषैः=संसर्गोपप्लवादिभिः ।

8. सच्छिद्रविषये तदसंभवेऽपि घटत्वप्रयुक्तस्य उदकाहरणसाधनत्वरूपकारकत्वस्य औत्सर्गिकत्वरूपं स्वतस्त्वं यथा सङ्गच्छते, एवं ज्ञानसंबन्धिनः प्रमाणत्वस्यापि ज्ञानत्वरूपसामान्यप्रयुक्तत्वेन स्वतस्त्वमुपपद्यत इत्यर्थः ।

9. घटत्वाद्यतिरिक्तैरच्छिद्रत्वादिभिः विशेषैः ।

10. परिदृश्यमानं बीजत्वादिकं रूपं अङ्कुरादिसाधनत्वरूपकारकत्वानिर्वाहकमित्यर्थः ।

11. अदृश्यं=बौद्धसमये कुर्वद्रूपशब्दितं किञ्चिद्रूपम् ।

बीजाङ्कुरादिष्वन्वयव्यतिरेकगोचरदृश्यसामान्यरूपस्यैव कारकत्वोपपादनं महता प्रयासेन क्षणभङ्गनिराकरणाय क्रियमाणमबुद्धिपूर्वकमापद्येत [1] । बीजत्वमात्रप्रयुक्तमङ्कुरकारकं (कारकत्वं ?) कालपाकाद्यपवादहेतुका तन्निवृत्तिरिति हि युक्तमभ्युपेतुम् (अभ्युपेतम् ?) । तस्माद्वस्तुपरिच्छेदकत्वमेव ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकं रूपम् । तदभावे निस्स्वभावत्वं ज्ञानानामिति तदेव प्रामाण्यं स्वत इत्याचक्ष्महे इति । एतत्सर्वमभिसन्धायोक्तमाचार्यपादैः—

"निस्स्वभावत्वमेवं हि ज्ञानरूपे प्रसज्यते" इति ।

यत्तूक्तं शिंशुपापलाशादिविशेषेषु वृक्षत्वमिव प्रमाणाप्रमाणयोः साधारणं ज्ञानत्वं तदवान्तरविशेषौ प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे इति । तदनेन प्रत्युक्तमिति वेदितव्यम् । नहि वृक्षसामान्यस्यापवादिकं वौत्सर्गिकं वा रूपं शिंशुपात्वादीति युक्तम् । [2]न हि शाखाभङ्गादिना शिंशुपात्वादि निष्पद्यते । [3]अपिच —

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1. तार्किकेण त्वया बीजत्वमेवाङ्कुरकारकत्वनिर्वाहकं, नान्यददृश्यं कालपाकादिरूप दोषेण क्वचित्तस्यापवाद इति साधयता कालपाकादिदोषरहिते बीजे कश्चनातिशय एव बीजत्वातिरिक्तः कारकत्वनिर्वाहक इति वदतो बौद्धस्य क्रियमाणो निरासोऽज्ञानकृतः स्यादित्यर्थः ।

2. प्रकृतज्ञानस्थलापेक्षया वृक्षस्थलस्य वैषम्यं दर्शयति—नहीत्यादिना । अयमाशयः । ज्ञानविषये विशेषणविशेष्यतदुभयसंसर्गरूपवस्त्वपरपर्याययथावस्थितार्थप्रकाशत्वरूपाकार एवोत्सर्गत उपलभ्यते । स एव ज्ञानत्वात्मक इत्यभ्युपगम्यते । तदपेक्षयातिरिक्तत्वस्य ज्ञानत्वे आपादयितुमशक्यत्वात् । भवतु वा अर्थप्रकाशकत्वज्ञानत्वयोर्व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन भेदः । तथापि ज्ञानानां ज्ञानत्ववदर्थप्रकाशत्वमप्युत्सर्गसिद्धमेव । तदेव प्रामाण्यमित्युच्यते । क्वचिद्दोषवशात् वस्तुसतस्संसर्गांशस्याभाने एतादृशप्रामाण्यापवादेनाप्रामाण्यं भवति । वृक्षविषये तु नैवं वक्तुं शक्यम् । वृक्षस्य शाखास्कन्धादिमत्त्वमौत्सर्गिकं रूपं तदन्यतमभङ्गे शिंशुपात्वादिकमापवादिकं रूपं जायत इत्यदर्शनात् । एवं शिंशुपात्वविशिष्टस्यैव किंचिदन्यथात्वे पलाशत्वमित्यपि न दृश्यते । किन्तु तत्तद्विशेषेषु वृक्षत्ववत् शिंशुपात्वादिकमपि स्वाभाविकमेव दृश्यते । ज्ञाने तु विशेषणविशेष्यसंसर्गरूपार्थत्रयविषयकत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यमुत्सर्गसिद्धम् । तेषां मध्ये संसर्गांशवैकल्ये अपवादरूपमप्रामाण्यमित्यनुभवसिद्धम् । तस्माद्वृक्षत्वमिव ज्ञानत्वं सामान्यं शिंशुपात्वपलाशत्वादिकमिव प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये इति न युक्तमत्यन्तवैषम्यादिति ।

3. वैषम्यान्तरं प्रदर्शयति—अपिचेत्यादिना । अयमर्थः । वृक्षत्वरूपसामान्याकारव्यञ्जनमात्रे अपर्यवस्यन् तद्विशेषभूतशिंशुपात्वाद्याकारव्यञ्जनसमर्थः पर्णस्पर्शादिविशेषशिंशुपा-

वृक्षत्वव्यञ्जनाक्षीणपर्णस्पर्शादिभेदवत् ।
ज्ञानत्वानुपयुक्तोंऽशः प्रामाण्ये (प्रमाणे?) नोपलभ्यते ॥

[1]यदि वृक्षसामान्याभिव्यञ्जकस्कन्धशाखादिमात्रमपहाय पर्णस्पर्शादिविशेषान्तरवत् ज्ञानत्वव्यञ्जकमर्थप्रकाशमपहाय अधिकं रूपमुपालप्स्यत ततस्समभविष्यतामपि प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये विशेषौ । न चैवं लभ्यते—

संवादादिसहस्रैरप्युत्तरैरुपकारिभिः ।
निर्णीयमाने प्रामाण्ये [2]ज्ञानं नैवातिरिच्यते ॥

यथा हि ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यनन्तरमनुव्यवसायेन[3] ज्ञानमवभासते । तथैव हि तस्य प्रामाण्यनिर्णायकाभिमतैस्संवादकारणगुणज्ञानादिभिः सहस्रशः प्रवृत्तैरपि तदवभास्यते

दिवृक्षविशेषे यथोपलभ्यते एवं ज्ञानविशेषतया त्वदभिमते प्रमाणज्ञाने ज्ञानत्वरूपसामान्याकारापेक्षया अधिकाकारव्यञ्जनसमर्थोंऽशः न कोऽप्युपलभ्यत इति ।

1. अयं भावः । पलाशादिवृक्षविशेषेषु सामान्यरूपं शाखास्कन्धादिमत्त्वं तत्तन्मात्रासाधारणं पर्णस्पर्शादिभेदवत्त्वं चेत्याकारद्वयमुपलभ्यते । तत्र सामान्याकारेण वृक्षत्वसामान्यं विशेषाकारेण पलाशत्वादिकञ्चाभिव्यज्यत इति तत्र युक्तो वृक्षत्वस्य सामान्यत्वं पलाशत्वादीनां च विशेषत्वमित्यभ्युपगमः । ज्ञाने तु नैवं युज्यते । विशेषत्वेन त्वदभिमते प्रमाणरूपे ज्ञाने ज्ञानत्वरूपसामान्याकारव्यञ्जनसमर्थस्यार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपस्यैकस्यैवाकारस्योपलम्भात् तद्विशेषाकारानुपलम्भात् । ततश्च व्यङ्ग्यविशेषत्वस्य व्यञ्जकविशेषत्वाधीनतया व्यञ्जकस्य चात्र कस्यचिद्विशेषस्यादर्शनेन न प्रामाण्यस्य तद्व्यङ्ग्यत्वसम्भव इति युक्तं निरुक्तप्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानत्वं प्रति विशेषत्वासम्भवेन तद्वदौत्सर्गिकत्वमभ्युपगन्तुमिति ॥

2. अनुव्यवसायवेद्याकारातिरिक्ताकारकं न भासत इत्यर्थः ।

3. सर्वस्यास्य प्रकरणस्य तार्किकं प्रति प्रवृत्ततया एवमुक्तिरिति द्रष्टव्यम् । तन्मते व्यवसायात्मकस्य ज्ञानस्यानुव्यवसायवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । अत्रेदमवधेयं—वादेऽस्मिन्द्वितीये ज्ञानत्वविशेषौ प्रामाण्याप्रामाण्ये । द्वे अपीमे परत एव । प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिर्गुणात्स्वरूपसतः । तन्निर्णयस्तु गुणज्ञानात् । एवमप्रामाण्यं दोषात् । तन्निर्णयोऽपि तज्ज्ञानादिति वदन्तं तार्किकं

नाधिकं किञ्चिद्रूपमुन्नीयते। अपवाद एव परं यत्नेनापि निरस्यते। अतोऽवगच्छामो ज्ञानानां सामान्यरूपमेव प्रामाण्यम्। न वैशेषिकं रूपमिति। तदभिप्रायेण चोक्तम्—[1]"तस्माद्बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता" इति।

अपि च—

यदि स्वाभाविकं बुद्धेः प्रामाण्यमिति नेष्यते।
अन्यप्रामाण्यवाञ्छायामनवस्था प्रसज्यते॥

[2]अपूर्वार्थावधारणत्वं हि ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम्। तत्र[3] शङ्कितव्यभिचारेंऽशे गुणेन समाधानं कर्तव्यम्।

सिद्धान्ती अर्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव ज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यमप्यनधिगताबाधितार्थप्रकाशकत्वमेव। ईदृशप्रामाण्यमेव ज्ञानस्योत्सर्गिकमित्यनुभवसिद्धम्। क्वचित्तु दोषवशात् संसर्गवैकल्ये एतदपवादतया अप्रामाण्यमित्येतदपि। गोत्वस्थानापन्नस्य ज्ञानत्वस्याभिव्यञ्जकं सास्नादिस्थानापन्नं निरुक्तप्रामाण्यमितीदृशप्रामाण्यस्य कस्यांचित् ज्ञानव्यक्तावनङ्गीकारे तस्या निस्स्वभावत्वं प्रसज्येत। तस्मात् व्यञ्जकतृव्यङ्ग्ययोस्समनियतत्वमेवोचितमिति साधयतः कौमारिलस्य मते स्थित्वा निरस्यतीति वेदितव्यम्। कौमारिलमतमवलम्ब्य तन्निरसनस्य प्रयोजनमन्यथाख्यात्यभ्युपगमेऽपि तत्सिद्धौ वेदान्तिनः स्वस्य कैमुत्येन तत्सिद्धिरिति सूचनमिति पूर्वमेवोक्तम्।

31. ज्ञानगतं प्रामाण्यं ज्ञानत्वप्रयुक्तमित्यर्थः। नहि प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञानत्वविशेषत्वे एवमुक्तिस्संगच्छते। न हि पलाशत्वं वृक्षत्वप्रयुक्तमिति युक्तम्। तथासति सर्वोऽपि वृक्षः पलाशः स्यादिति भावः।

32. अपूर्वपदेनानधिगतत्वमर्थपदेनाबाधितत्वम्, अवधारणपदेन प्रकाशकत्वं च विवक्षितमिति ध्येयम्।

33. प्रामाण्योत्पत्तौ सत्तयैव गुणस्य कारणत्वाङ्गीकारे कथमनवस्थावकाश इति शङ्कायां प्रामाण्यज्ञप्ताविव तदुत्पत्तावपि गुणज्ञानस्यैव कारणत्वमवश्याङ्गीकार्यमित्यनवस्था प्राप्नोत्येवेत्यभिप्रायेण तत्रापि गुणज्ञानस्य कारणत्वं तार्किकं प्रत्युपपादयति—तत्रेत्यादिना।

न च प्रकाशापूर्वत्वयोर्व्यभिचारस्संभवति । न च[1] तयोरंशयोरप्रमाणज्ञान-साधारणयोः गुणाः कारणमिति युक्तम् । तद्विनापि [2]भवतः तत्कार्यत्वानुपपत्तेः । न[3] च ज्ञानमात्रगोचरेणैव (गोचरत्वेनैव ?) स्वाभाविकत्वेनावगतस्यौपाधिकत्वसंभवः । तेन वि[4]षयांश एवापेक्षेत्यवशिष्यते । तस्य तु ज्ञायमानत्वेनैव प्रामाण्यान्तर्भावः । तत्र च गुणाः सत्तया नोपकारकाः । तदा हि प्रामाण्यज्ञाने सत्तयैव हेतवः स्युः न ज्ञाततया । न चोत्पत्तौ सत्तयोपयुक्तानां ज्ञप्तौ ज्ञायमानतया उपयोग इति वाच्यम् । प्रामाण्योत्पत्तावपि विषयांशस्य [5]ज्ञायमानत्वात् ।

[6]तज्ज्ञप्तौ च विषयस्य [7]तादवस्थ्यमेव । [8]न हि प्रमाणोत्पत्ता(प्रामाण्योत्पत्ता ?)-वनवगतं किञ्चिद्रूपं प्रामाण्यावगतिवेलायां विषयस्यावसीयते । न चैकस्यैकरूपेण ज्ञाने किञ्चिदेकदा ज्ञातमन्यदा चाज्ञातं कारणमिति युक्तम् । [9]न च प्रामाण्यावगतिवेलायां

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1. एवं व्यभिचारशङ्कानिरासरूपप्रयोजनासंभवेनांशान्तरयोः गुणानामनपेक्षामुपपाद्य तयोर्गुणकारणकत्वस्यानुपपत्त्या तदनपेक्षामुपपादयति—न च तयोरित्यादिना ।

3. भवतः = जायमानस्य ।

3. औपाधिकत्वासंभवेन तामुपपादयति—न च ज्ञानमात्रेत्यादिना ।

4. विषयांश इति = अपूर्वार्थावधारणत्वमित्यत्र उक्तार्थांशे इत्यर्थः ।

5. तथाच ज्ञप्तिस्थलावैषम्यमुत्पत्तिस्थलस्येति भावः ।

6. ननु कथमवैषम्यं ज्ञप्तिस्थले विषयस्य वैलक्षण्यसद्भावादित्यत्राह—तज्ज्ञप्तौ चेत्यादिना । तज्ज्ञप्तौ = प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तौ ।

7. तादवस्थ्यं = ऐकरूप्यम् ।

8. एतदेवोपपादयति—न हीत्यादिना । एतावता न चैकरूपस्यैकरूपेणेत्यादिवक्ष्यमाण-दूषणे एकस्येत्यनेनोक्तमेकत्वं सम्पादितमिति ज्ञेयम् ।

9. प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तौ गुणज्ञानापेक्षेत्यस्मदुक्तेः नार्थरूपप्रामाण्यांशविषयत्वम् अपि तु अपूर्वत्व-प्रकाशरूपांशान्तरविषयत्वम् । अतो नोक्तदोष इत्यत्राह—न च प्रामाण्येति ।

प्रकाशाद्यंशान्तरेषु गुणज्ञानापेक्षेति युक्तम् । अनुव्यवसायमात्रेणैव [1]तत्सिद्धेरुक्तत्वात् । न च गुणाः सत्तयैव प्रामाण्यं निश्चाययन्ति । तत्सन्देहाभावप्रसङ्गात् । न हि निश्चिते सन्देहावकाशोऽस्ति ।

भवतां हि प्रामाण्यमेव सन्दिह्यते । [2]अस्माकं तु वक्ष्यामः । तस्मात्प्रामाण्यांशे [3]विषये अज्ञातानां गुणानां असत्समत्वं प्रामाण्यावगतौ दृष्टमिति तदुत्पत्तावप्यर्थावधारणे[4] तदेवासत्समत्वम् । तस्माद्गुणज्ञानमेवार्थावधारणायापेक्षितमित्यायातम्[5] ।

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1. तत्सिद्धेः=अंशान्तरावभाससिद्धेः ।

2. ननु युष्मन्मतेपि सन्देहाभावप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारः । व्यवसायात्मकज्ञानग्राहकानुमानेनैव तद्गतप्रामाण्यस्यापि सिद्ध्या संशयासंभवादित्यत्राह—अस्माकंन्त्विति । वक्ष्याम इति "अप्रामाण्येऽपवादे तु संशयोऽप्यवकाशवानि" त्यादिनेति भावः । तत्रैवैतद्विवरिष्यते ।

3. प्रामाण्यांशे विषये=प्रामाण्यशरीरप्रविष्टार्थरूपांशे ।

4. अर्थावधारणे=प्रामाण्यज्ञानात्मकेऽर्थज्ञाने । साधिते सतीति शेषः ।

5. तस्य तु ज्ञायमानत्वेनैष प्रामाण्यान्तर्भावः इत्यादेः अपेक्षितमित्यायातमित्यन्तस्यायं निष्कृष्टार्थः । प्रामाण्यशरीरप्रविष्टस्यांशत्रयस्य मध्येऽर्थरूपांशस्यैव गुणापेक्षेति स्थितम् । अर्थोऽपि भासमान एव प्रामाण्यशरीरं प्रविशतीति अङ्गीकार्यम् । अन्यथार्थांशेन ज्ञानस्य सम्बन्धो नास्तीति फलितमिति अर्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्यैवासिद्धिप्रसङ्गः । निर्धामकांशान्तरप्रकाशकत्वासंभवश्च । तस्मादर्थस्य ज्ञायमानतयैव प्रामाण्यानुप्रवेशे प्रामाण्यज्ञप्तिवेलायामिव तदुत्पत्तिवेलायामप्यर्थस्य ज्ञानमस्तीत्यायातम् । प्रामाण्यज्ञाने सत्तया गुणानां हेतुत्वं प्रामाण्यसन्देहाभावप्रसङ्गेन न सम्भवतीति ज्ञायमानतयैव गुणानां तत्र हेतुत्वमास्थेयम् । इत्थं च प्रामाण्यघटकार्थज्ञानस्थले कुत्रचिद् गुणज्ञानस्यैव कारणत्वं दृष्टमिष्टञ्चेति प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिस्थलेऽपि प्रामाण्यघटकार्थज्ञानसद्भावस्योपपादनात् वैषम्यपरिहाराय ऐकरूप्येण गुणज्ञानस्यैव हेतुत्वमङ्गीकार्यम् । न हि निर्युक्तिकं वैषम्यमङ्गीकर्तुं युक्तम् । प्रामाण्यघटकार्थज्ञानं च प्रामाण्यज्ञानमेव । न च स्थलद्वयेऽपि अर्थज्ञानात्मके प्रामाण्यज्ञाने एकरूपे सति एकत्र सत्तया गुणाः कारणं अपरत्र ज्ञायमानतयेति युक्तम् ।अतः ज्ञप्तिस्थल इवोत्पत्तिस्थलेऽप्यज्ञातानां गुणानामसत्समत्वमेवेति तज्ज्ञानमावश्यकमिति गुणज्ञानेऽपि गुणज्ञानान्तरापेक्षायां अनवस्था दुस्त्यजेति । एतावता "ननु च गुणात्प्रामाण्याभ्युपगमे अनवस्थानं स्यात् । नैवं इन्द्रियादिवद्गुणस्यापि सत्तयाकारणत्वोपपत्तेः" इति तार्किकेण पूर्वमुक्तं प्रत्युक्तमिति वेदितव्यम् ।

गुणज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यं [1]गुणावधारणात्मकमिति तदर्थमपरगुणज्ञानं तस्यापि तथा इत्यनवस्था इत्युत्तरोत्तरज्ञानाभावात् [2](उत्तरोत्तरज्ञानात् ?) पूर्वपूर्वा····[का]रस्यावधारणासिद्धेरखिलमपि जगदन्धमापद्येत । तदेतदुक्तम् ।

"जातेऽपि यदि विज्ञाने तावन्नार्थो[3]वधार्यते" इत्यादिना ।

[4]अन्यत्रापि च यत्र वार्तिके प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिज्ञप्त्योरनियमेन साधनदूषणप्रवृत्तिः तत्र सर्वत्रापि विषयापेक्षया विशेषाभावादित्यनुसन्धेयम् । तेनैतत्प्रत्युक्तम् [5]यदिन्द्रियादिवद्गुणाः सत्तया प्रामाण्यं जनयन्तीति ।

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1. प्रामाण्यस्यार्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपतया गुणज्ञाने गुणानामेवार्थरूपत्वेनार्थावधारणात्मकतया पूर्वोक्तमेव प्रामाण्यमत्र गुणावधारणात्मकतयोक्तमित्यवगन्तव्यम् ।

2. अयं भावः । घटादिज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चये सत्येव हानादिव्यवहारः स्यात् । स च निश्चयो न संभवति । तस्य गुणज्ञानाधीनत्वात् । तादृशगुणज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयमन्तरा तेन घटज्ञाने प्रामाण्यनिश्चयायोगात् । गुणज्ञानगतप्रामाण्यनिश्चयश्च गुणज्ञानान्तरायत्तः । तेन च गुणज्ञानान्तरेण स्वोपरितनगुणज्ञानाधीनप्रामाण्यनिश्चयशालिना भवितव्यमित्यनवस्थायां सत्यां एकस्या अपि गुणज्ञानव्यक्तेः स्वोत्तरगुणज्ञानव्यक्त्यन्तरनैरपेक्ष्येण स्वपूर्वगुणज्ञानव्यक्तिगतप्रामाण्यनिश्चायकत्वासंभवेन सर्वा अपि गुणज्ञानव्यक्तयोऽनिश्चितस्वगतप्रामाण्यका एवेति प्रक्रान्तघटपटादिज्ञानगतप्रामाण्यनिश्चयायोगेन पटुतरेन्द्रिया अपि सर्वे प्रमातारः प्रामाण्यनिश्चयात्मकज्ञानरहिता अत एव हानोपादानादादिरूपव्यवहारशून्या अन्धपुरुषसदृशा भवेयुरिति ।

3. घटत्वविशिष्टघटाद्यर्थप्रकाशकत्वरूपं प्रामाण्यं यदि न निश्चीयत इत्यर्थः ।

4. यत्र यत्र वार्तिके प्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तिविषये ज्ञप्तिविषये वा साधनं वा दूषणं वा अवैषम्येणैकरूपतया प्रवृत्तं दृश्यते तत्र सर्वत्र पूर्वं न हि प्रामाण्योत्पत्तावनवगतमित्यादिना अस्मदुक्तविषयावैषम्याभिप्राय एव तादृशप्रवृत्तिमूलमित्यनुसन्धेयमित्याह—अन्यत्रापीत्यादिना ।

5. प्रामाण्यज्ञप्ताविन्द्रियाणामज्ञातानामसत्समत्वं दृष्टमिति तदेव तदुत्पत्तावपि अङ्गीकार्यम् । तत्रापि ज्ञप्तेस्सत्त्वादिति वदतः अस्मान्प्रति इन्द्रियादीनामिव गुणानां सत्तया प्रामाण्यं प्रति कारणत्वमित्युक्तिः न युज्यते । इन्द्रियादीनां सत्तयैव अर्थज्ञानकारणत्वम् न क्वचिदपि ज्ञायमानतयेत्यंशस्य संप्रतिपन्नतया क्वचित् ज्ञायमानतयार्थज्ञानकारणत्वं क्वचित् सत्तयेति वैषम्यस्य

न हीन्द्रियादीनां ज्ञायमानतया [1]प्रामाण्यप्रतिपत्तिहेतुभावः भवद्भिरपि इष्यते। तेन विधर्मा दृष्टान्तः। यच्चानवस्थानमुभयत्रापि सममिति, तन्न। उत्पत्त्यवस्मत्पक्षे ज्ञानान्तरानपे[2]क्षणात्। प्रमितौ यद्यपि ज्ञानद्वितयमपि [3]कांक्षितं तथाप्युत्पत्तिमात्रं न स्वतः प्रामाण्यं लाभतः (तथाप्युत्पत्तिमात्रात्स्वतःप्रामाण्यलाभः ?)। प्रमाणमिदमित्यस्य व्यवहारस्य परिनिष्पत्तये प्रमाणान्तरापेक्षा। न तु [4]प्रमाणकार्ये हानादौ। स्वयंप्रकाश-ज्ञानपक्षे तद्व्यवहारे जानामीत्यादौ हानादौ वा प्रामाण्यस्यानाहार्यत्वेन हेत्वनपेक्षत्वात्। तत्र ह्यपवादशङ्कैव निवर्तनीया। तदर्थं च दोषसदसद्भाव एव निरूपणीय इति न

तत्राभावेन दृष्टान्तस्य वैषम्यात् यस्य वस्तुनः एकस्मिन्कार्ये सत्तया क्वचित् ज्ञायमानतया च क्वचि-त्कारणत्वं दृष्टम् तदेव खल्वन्विष्य दृष्टान्ततयोपादातुं युक्तम्। तादृशं हि वस्तु न लभ्येतैवेति भावः।

1. प्रामाण्यं भासमानः अर्थः तत्प्रतिपत्तिः यथावस्थितार्थज्ञानम्।

2. ज्ञानजनकसामग्र्यैव तद्गतप्रामाण्योत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारादिति भावः। सा च सामग्री इन्द्रियार्थ-संयोगादिरूपा। तदेव मीमांसकानां प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वम् यत् स्वाश्रयज्ञानजनकसाम-ग्र्यैव जन्यत्वम्।

3. कुमारिलमते घटः घटत्ववद्विशेष्यकघटत्वप्रकारकज्ञानविषयः घटत्वप्रकारकज्ञातता-वत्त्वात् इत्यनुमानेन विषयतासंबन्धेन घटे तद्वति तत्प्रकारकत्वरूपप्रामाण्यविशिष्टज्ञानसिद्ध्य-भ्युपगमात्प्रामाण्यज्ञानं स्वसाधनतया निरुक्तानुमानं तत्साध्यकोटिप्रविष्टं स्वविषयप्रामाण्याश्रय-ज्ञानं चापेक्षत इत्यवगन्तव्यम्।

4. परतःप्रामाण्यवादिमत एव ज्ञानोत्पत्त्यनन्तरं नियमेन प्रामाण्यसन्देहात् व्यवहारा-संभवः। तन्निर्णयार्थं च गुणजन्यत्वहेतुकानुमानात्मकगुणज्ञानाद्यपेक्षा च। स्वतःप्रामाण्य-वादिमते तु प्रामाण्यविशिष्टस्यैव ज्ञानस्येन्द्रियार्थसंयोगादिना उत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमेन तदनन्तरमेव प्रामाण्यनिर्णयनिरपेक्षं व्यवहारः संभवति। इदं ज्ञानं प्रमा इति व्यवहारे तु व्यवहारं प्रति व्यव-हर्तव्यतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानस्य हेतुतया प्रामाण्यज्ञानमपेक्षितमिति तस्य ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानु-मानेन सिद्धिः। अस्य चानुमानस्य स्वतःप्रामाण्यशालितया कार्यकरत्वं निष्प्रत्यूहमिति न प्रामाण्यनिर्णयायान्यापेक्षेति नानवस्था। यस्यां ज्ञानव्यक्तौ यदा संशायकसामग्रीबलेनापवाद-शङ्कया प्रामाण्यसन्देहः तस्यामेव तदैव प्रामाण्यनिर्णयायान्यापेक्षेति भावः।

क्वचित्सजातीयापेक्षेति नानवस्था ।

यच्चानवस्थापरिहारार्थं स्वपरनिर्वाहकमनुमानमुपन्यस्तम् । तदयुक्तम् । कुतः ?

आकांक्षापरिहारार्थमनुमानं न कल्पते ।
तद्धि तामेकधा…[प्राप्तां बहु]धा जनयेद्यतः ॥

अनुमानं हि पक्षे(क्ष)हेतुदृष्टान्तादिबहुपरिकरसाध्यं तेषु तेषु प्रमाणमभिकांक्षमाणं तन्मुखेनानवस्थां बहुलीकरोति ।

[1]न चानुव्यवसायत्वे प्रामाण्यस्य व्यवस्थितिः ।
गुणज्ञानानपेक्षस्य तव तद्दुर्लभं यतः ॥

अनुव्यवसायादिषु पदार्थेषु प्रतिपन्नेषु हि भवत्यप्यव्यभिचारादिचिन्ता । तत्प्रतीतिरेव तु भवतां गुणज्ञानादिकमन्तरेण दुर्लभेत्युक्तम् । तद्यदि गुणज्ञानादिकमन्तरेणापि कस्यचित्परस्तादवधारणमुपपद्यत इति ब्रूषे वरं तत्प्रागेवाभ्युपगन्तुमिति कृतं क्वचित्परतःप्रामाण्यग्रहेणेति ।

यत्तु परस्तादनाश्वासे क्वचिदपि निश्चयानुपपत्तिरिति । तत्प्रथममस्माभिरुक्त-

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1. न वयं गुणज्ञानादिरूपमनुमानं स्वपरनिर्वाहकमभ्युपगम्य तेन प्रामाण्यनिर्णयं व्यवसायात्मके ज्ञाने संपादयामः, येन इत्थमुपालभ्येमहि । अपि तु अनुव्यवसायेनैवेत्यत्राह-न चेत्यादिना । पूर्वपक्षप्रकरणे स्वपरनिर्वाहकेणानुमानादिना अनुमानादिकं हि इति पाठे एवमनुमाने गतेऽपि अस्मत्परिगृहीतस्यैवानुव्यवसायस्य निर्दुष्टतया तेनैव प्रामाण्यं साधयाम इत्यत्राहेत्यवतरणं बोध्यम् । अनुव्यवसायस्य प्रामाण्यनिश्चये हि तेन व्यवसायगतप्रामाण्यं गृह्यते न वेति विचारस्संभवति । स एव न संभवति । तव मते तस्य गुणज्ञानाधीनत्वात् । अद्य च त्वया गुणज्ञानं परित्यज्य अनुव्यवसायावलम्बनात् । यद्यनुव्यवसायगतं प्रामाण्यं स्वेनैव गृह्यत इति मतं तदा मिश्रमतमेव आदृतमिति प्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वं परित्यक्तमेव । यद्येवं व्यवसायस्यैव तदङ्गीकृत्य गुरुमतमेवाद्रियताम्, किं व्यवसायप्रामाण्यमनुव्यवसायेन तद्गतं तु तेनैवेति वैषम्येण । एवमपि परतस्त्वपक्षः परित्यक्त एवेति न चेत्यादेः ग्रहेणेत्यन्तस्य निष्कृष्टार्थः ।

मेवानवधार्य पश्चात्स्वबलार्जितमिव भवन्तो मन्यन्त इति विशेषः ।

यत्त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां गुणात्प्रामाण्यं जन्यत इत्यास्थेयमिति तदन्यथासिद्धत्वात्प्रत्युक्तमिति वेदितव्यम् । यथा ह्यणुमहद्दीर्घह्रस्वादिशब्दानां भाववाचिनां विरोध्यभावप्रतीत्यन्वयव्यति······[रेकसद्भावेऽपि] तत्कारणत्वमन्यथासिद्धत्वान्नाद्रियते तद्वदत्रापि । तदुक्तम्—

तस्माद्गुणेभ्यो दोषाणामभावस्तदभावतः ।
अप्रामा······[ण्यस्य नास्ति]त्वं तेनोत्सर्गोऽनपोदितः ॥ इति ।

यच्चानुमानात्परतःप्रामाण्यसाधनमुपन्यस्तं प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तहेत्वधीनेत्यादि, तत्रोच्यते ।

असिद्धिर्वा विरोधो वा [1]तद्विशेषत्वसाधने ।
न ह्यवान्तरजातिर्नो न [2]चान्यापेक्ष[3]मन्यथा ॥

कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वादित्यत्र विशेषत्वं नाम किं ज्ञानावान्तरजातित्वं उपाधित्वं वा विवक्षितम् । तदसिद्धम् । अथोक्तप्रकारेणानपोदितसामान्यरूपमेव, ततो विरुद्धम् । न ह्यच्छिद्रघटस्य घटसामग्रीव्यतिरिक्तापेक्षा विद्यते । कार्यत्वे सतीति [4]चास्मान्प्रति व्यर्थम् । तव तु उपादेयमेवेति सङ्कटं सुमहत् । अथवा—

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1. कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वादित्यत्र तद्विशेषत्वरूपे साधनांशे ।

2. प्रमाणात्मकं ज्ञानं ज्ञानसामान्यकारणातिरिक्तकारणजन्यं न सिद्ध्यति । अपि तु तेन हेतुना तादृशकारणाजन्यत्वमेव सिद्ध्येत् । अच्छिद्रघटादौ तदा दर्शनात् । तथा चाभिमतविरुद्धसाधनाद्विरुद्धो हेतुरिति भावः ।

3. अनपोदितसामान्याकार एव तद्विशेषत्वमित्यङ्गीकारे ।

4. अस्मान्=ईश्वरस्य नित्यज्ञानमनभ्युपगच्छतः ।

[1]न च केचिद्गुणा नाम प्रामाण्ये सन्ति हेतवः ।
दोषा हि [2]प्रकृतिस्थानां हेतूनां [3]विक्रिया यतः ॥

स्वाभाविकं हि रूपं इन्द्रियाणां गुण इत्याख्यायते । न तु कश्चिदतिशयः । भेषजभेदैरपि दोषा एव निरस्यन्ते । तथैव शास्त्रप्रवृत्तेः ।

न चाजानसिद्धं रूपं विहायापरं गुणं प्रमाणान्तरेणापि पश्यामः ।

[4]अनुमाने तु विज्ञानं यावत् ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ।
तावतो नातिरेकेण गुणः कश्चिदपेक्ष्यते ॥

न चानारोपितत्वं तेषां गुणः स्वरूपमात्रत्वात् । आरोपितत्वे तु तदभाव एव । न च [5]भावाभावसाधारणं भावस्वरूपम्, विरोधादिति ।

न [6]च शब्दे गुणाः केचित् प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिहेतवः ।
आकांक्षादित्रयोपेतं वाक्यं ज्ञानस्य साधनम् ॥

न ह्यव्युत्पन्नमाकांक्षादित्रयरहितं वाक्यं ज्ञानं साधयति । तथा साधयत्तु प्रमाणमेवेति न गुणाः केचिदत्रापि । न च मूलप्रमाणापेक्षं योग्यत्वम् । सजातीयान्वयदर्शनादेव तत्सिद्धेरिति । तस्मात्सर्वाणि ज्ञानसाधनानि स्वरूपेण प्रमाणमेव

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1. कार्यगतप्रामाण्यं प्रति हेतवः=हेतुत्वेन विवादविषयाः कारणगता गुणा नाम केचिन्न सन्त्येवेत्यर्थः ।

2. प्रकृतिस्थानां=स्वाभाविकाकारशालिनाम् ।

3. विक्रिया=आकारवैकल्यम् । दोषस्य किञ्चिदाकारवैकल्यरूपतया तदभावात्मको गुणः स्वाभाविकाकारपौष्कल्यरूप एव नातिरिक्तः कश्चिदतिशय इति भावः ।

4. अनुमानकारणव्याप्त्यादिज्ञानातिरिक्तः कश्चिद्गुणोऽनुमाने नापेक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः ।

5. अनारोपितत्वस्य गुणरूपत्वे तस्य स्वरूपमात्रत्वेन आरोपात्मकाभावसाधारण्यापत्तिः । न च तद्युक्तम् । भावस्वरूपत्वस्याभावविरोधित्वादित्यर्थः ।

6. शब्दजन्यशाब्दबोधात्मकज्ञानगतप्रामाण्यहेतुत्वेन विवादविषयाः केचिदाकांक्षादित्रयसाहित्यरूपस्वाभाविकाकारातिरिक्ताः कारणे शब्दे गुणा न सन्त्येवेत्यर्थः ।

जनयन्ति। दुष्टानि तु भ्रान्तिमिति न गुणाः केचित् दोषाभावातिरेकिणो दृश्यन्त इति न युक्तम् (इति। तदुक्तम् ?)—भगवद्बोधायनादिपरमर्षिशतपरिचितसाङ्गवेद वेदान्तप्रस्थानयाथात्म्यदेशिकैः **शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्यकारैः** "यथावस्थितपदार्थप्रतीत्यनुगुणस्वाभाव्याच्च ज्ञानतत्साधनयोरनुग्राहकस्य च तच्च स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायसिद्धमिति"। यदि सर्वज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यं स्वाभाविकं जायते [1]अनुव्यवसायमात्रेण च ज्ञायते कथं तर्हि क्वचित्प्रामाण्यसन्देहो भव···[ताम्। न हि] निश्चितेऽप्यसौ सम्भवति नि···[यमेन] संशयप्रसङ्गादिति चेत्। तन्न।

[2]अप्रामाण्येऽपवादे तु संशयोऽप्यवकाशवान्।
निरस्ते पुनरेतस्मिन्प्रामाण्यं प्राच्यमेव नः॥

यथा हि कारकान्तरेषु तत्तत्कार्यसामर्थ्यं तद्गोचरप्रमाणमात्रेणाध्यवसितमपि क्वचिदपवादशङ्कया कुण्ठितव्यवहारं तन्निरसनेन [3]तस्मै कल्पते। [4]न चापवादनिरासमपेक्षत इत्यनिश्चितमस्वाभाविकं वा भवति। न हि ईषदग्निस्पृष्टमपि बीजतां विजहाति। न विलक्षणमीक्ष्यते। ततो भवत्येव [5]शङ्का सामान्यदर्शनेऽपि। न च

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1. व्यवसायविषयकज्ञानेनेत्यर्थः। ज्ञाततालिङ्गकानुमानेनेति यावत्। **गुरु-मिश्र-कुमारिलमतसाधारण्यायैवमुक्तिः।** मतत्रयेऽपि व्यवसायगतप्रामाण्यस्य क्रमात् व्यवसायानुव्यवसायानुमानग्राह्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् इति भावः। इदं ज्ञानं प्रमा न वा इति संशयस्य धर्मित्वेन ज्ञानसापेक्षतया संशयात्पूर्वमेव तेन तेन धर्मिसिद्धेरावश्यकतया तद्गतप्रामाण्यस्यापि तदैव सिद्ध्या प्रामाण्यज्ञानसत्त्वेन संशयासंभव इत्यर्थः। मात्रचा गुणज्ञानादिकं व्यवच्छिद्यते। मम तु गुणज्ञानाद्यभावदशायां संशयोपपत्तिरिति भावः।

2. अपवादशङ्काकलङ्करहितं प्रामाण्यज्ञानमेव संशयविरोधि। ईदृशमेव ज्ञानमुत्सर्गतः सर्वत्र जायते। क्वचिदेव सामग्रीवशात् सकलङ्कं भवतीति तत्र संशयस्सावकाश इत्यभिप्रायेण परिहरति—अप्रामाण्येत्यादिना। अप्रामाण्यस्यापवादत्वे सति तच्छङ्कया क्वचित्संशयसंभवः। अप्रामाण्ये अपवादे निरस्ते औत्सर्गिकं प्रामाण्यमेव स्थितमित्यर्थः।

3. तस्मै = व्यवहाराय।

4. न चानिश्चितमस्वाभाविकं वेत्यन्वयः।

5. शङ्का भवनकर्त्री।

तत्राप्यग्निसंयोगप्रागभावसहकृतस्य कार्यकरत्वमिति वाच्यम् । यतो बीजदोष एव तत्र प्रामाणिकः, न तु सहकारिविरहः । निश्शेषसहकारिसमवधानेऽपि बीजदोषादङ्कुरानुदयः तत्परीक्षकपरिषत्प्रसिद्ध इति किं तत्समर्थनेन । तस्मान्नालौकिकं किञ्चिदेतत् यत्सामान्यप्रसिद्धया निश्चितमपवादशङ्कया सन्दिग्धप्रायं तत्परिहारेण स्थिरीभवतीति । कारकान्तराणि जातानि पश्चादप्यपोह्यन्ते । ज्ञानं तु जायमानमेवेति विशेषः ।

अप्रामाण्यं विरोधित्वान्न ज्ञानानां स्वतो भवेत् ।
न च तद्बाधकाभावे विज्ञानेनावसीयते ॥

न चाप्रामाण्यं स्वाभाविकमिति शक्यमुत्प्रेक्षितुमपि, विरोधिरूपत्वात् । अर्थांशस्य बाधेन ह्यप्रामाण्यं गम्यते । [1]येनार्थज्ञानं निरूप्यते तदभावेनेति यावत् । ततः कथं स्वाभाविकं भवति । तस्मात् ज्ञानानामविकलाङ्गत्वं[2] प्रामाण्यम् । अङ्गैकदेशवैकल्य[3]मप्रामाण्यमिति पूर्वं स्वत एव परं परत एवेति सिद्धम् ।

[4]अप्रामाण्यनिवृत्तिश्च दोषाभावेन गम्यते ।
योग्यस्यानुपलब्ध्या च दोषस्याभावनिर्णयः ॥

यावच्छक्ति विचिन्त्यैव यदि दोषं न पश्यति ।
निर्णयेत्तस्य सोऽभा······[वमिति] स्वाभाविकस्थितिः ॥

सर्वप्रतीत्यनुकूलमार्गोऽप्ययमेवेति नालौकिकं किञ्चिदत्रापि । एवं व्यवस्थिते लोकप्रस्थाने सकलेतरप्रमाणागोचरार्थस्य निश्शेषसूरिपरिषदनुष्ठानमूलभूतस्य मन्वाद्यव-

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1. येन=अर्थेन ।
2. अविकलाङ्गत्वं=विशेषणविशेष्यसंसर्गरूपार्थत्रयनिरूपितत्वम् ।
3. वैकल्यं=संसर्गराहित्यम् ।
4. अप्रामाण्यरूपापवादनिरासकमाह—अप्रामाण्येत्यादिना ।

श्यापेक्षितानुभवस्मरणस्य कर्तुरस्मरणात् अखिललोकप्रसिद्धैस्तैस्तैः निरङ्कुशातिशयज्ञानशक्तिभिः बहुभिः **श्रीवेदव्यासपराशरादिभि**रपौरुषेयतयैव परिगृहीतस्य व्याख्यातस्य वेदराशेस्तु नित्यनिर्दोषतया दूरत एवाप्रामाण्यशङ्का सुनिरसेति स्वाभाविकप्रामाण्यसाम्राज्यं [1]विद्योततेतरामिति ॥

इति भगवद्रामानुजमुनिवरमतधुरंधरस्य अत्रिगोत्रप्रदीपश्रीपद्मनाभार्यनन्दनस्य वादिहंसनवाम्बुदस्य श्रीमद्रामानुजार्यस्य कृतौ न्यायकुलिशे कौमारिलमतानुरोधेन स्वतःप्रामाण्यवर्णनवादो द्वितीयः ॥

श्रीमते वादिहंसनवाम्बुदाय रामानुजार्याय नमः

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1. वाक्यान्तरेऽप्युक्तरीत्या निराबाधं स्वतःप्रामाण्यम् क्वचिदेवापवादशङ्कायामप्रामाण्यसंशयरूपायां जातायां योग्यानुपलब्ध्या दोषाभावनिर्णयेनापवादे निरस्ते औत्सर्गिकं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं दृढीभवतीति तत्तत्र विद्योतत एव। वेदे तु दोषासंभवेनाप्रामाण्यशङ्काया एवानुदयात्प्रामाण्यं विद्योततेतरामित्यर्थः ॥

SIDDHITRAYA

By

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उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात्पाराथ्र्यात्सन्निवेशविशेषतः ।
रूपादिमत्त्वाद्भूतत्वाद्देहो नात्मा घटादिवत् ॥
सच्छिद्रत्वाददेहित्वाद्देहत्वान्मृतदेहवत् ।
इत्यादिसाधनैर्न्याय्यैर्निषेध्या वर्ष्मणश्चितिः

एवं प्रत्यक्षविरोधादन्वयमुखेन साध्यमुपस्थापयद्भिरुदीरितसाधनैरपहृतविषयतया इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वादिव्यतिरेकहेतवो न साध्यमुपस्थापयितुमीशते ॥

१७. सन्तु तर्हीन्द्रियाण्येवात्मा । न च तानीदन्तया प्रथन्ते ; येन देहवदहङ्कारगोचराद्बहिष्क्रियेरन् । नापि तथोद्भूतरूपादिगुणानि स्थूलानि ; येन तत्प्रतिभास इव इन्द्रियगोचरत्वे अहंप्रत्ययस्य रूपावयवादिप्रतीतिः प्रसज्येत । तद्व्यापारफलं च ज्ञानं तद्गामि युक्तं स्नानाध्ययनादिफलवत् । अत एव सत्यतपाः द्रष्टुश्चक्षुष इति ।

body is not the soul, as it, like a pot, has a beginning, exists for the sake of others, possesses a particular configuration and has colour, etc., and is an element. Again, because the body has holes and is not the possessor of the body and is a body, consciousness cannot be its quality as in the case of the dead body. These and other logical proofs lead us to reject the view that consciousness is a quality of the body. Thus the subject having been disposed of in this manner with the aid of the aforesaid reasons, which point to the major term on the strength of positive concomitance, purely negative concomitance, such as, the quality of being the seat of the senses, will be powerless to establish the major term.

THE VIEW THAT THE SENSES ARE IDENTICAL WITH THE SOUL

17. Then let the senses themselves be (considered as) the soul. They are not referred to as ' this '. Otherwise, (if they were known as ' this '), they, like the body, may be excluded from that which is the object of self-consciousness. Unlike the body, the senses possess neither visible colour and other qualities nor big size. If they did, and if self-consciousness presented the senses as its objects, knowledge of their colour, parts, etc., may be expected to arise, as in the case of the knowledge of the body. Knowledge which is the result of their activity, like the results of bathing, study, etc., must, properly speaking, belong only to the senses. That is why Satyatapas speaks of ' the seeing eye '.[35]

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35. See *Varāha Purāṇa,* Ch. 98, verses 1-26. One day when Satyatapas was engaged in meditation, a boar which was chased by a huntsman took refuge in the vicinity of the sage's hermitage. Presently the huntsman rushed in and inquired

१८. तन्न, विकल्पासहत्वात् । तथाहि—किं प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियाणि चेतनानि, संभूय वा । यदि प्रत्येकं इन्द्रियान्तरदृष्टस्य इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसंधानं न स्यात् । अस्ति च तद् यमहमद्राक्षं तमहं स्पृशामीति । अत एव न संभूयापि चेतनत्वम् । न हि पञ्चभिरिन्द्रियैस्संभूय एकं वस्त्वनुभूयते अनुसंधीयते वा । एकेन्द्रियविगमे च प्रायणप्रसङ्गश्च । इन्द्रियचैतन्ये च तत्तदिन्द्रियापाये तदिन्द्रियार्थस्मरणमपि न भवेत् । न च तद्व्यापारफलतया तत्समवायित्वं ज्ञानस्य । शस्त्रादिव्यापारजन्मनोऽपि पापादेः परसमवायित्वात् । अन्यथा च प्रष्टुः मृत्युपपत्तिं शरणागतपरित्यागस्य नृशंसतां च आलोच्य सत्यतपसस्तथा वचनम् ।

THE REFUTATION OF THIS VIEW

18. It (the theory that the senses are the soul) is untenable, as none of its forms stands scrutiny. To explain it further—Do the senses possess knowledge individually or collectively ? If individually, what is perceived by one sense cannot be recognised by another. But such a recognition, viz., 'what I saw I touch', does exist. That is why the senses, even collectively, cannot be said to possess knowledge. No object is either perceived or recognised by all the five senses together. Again, (if this view were correct) even when one sense-organ perished, death must ensue. Besides, if knowledge belonged to the senses, with the decay of each of the different senses, the remembrance of their respective objects could not take place. Moreover, knowledge, though the outcome of the activity of the senses, need not inhere in them. For, sin and the like, though resulting from the activity of weapons, etc., inhere in something other (than weapons). Bearing in mind the fact that if he did not speak the truth, the person who interrogated would meet with death, and that (if he spoke the truth), it would be extreme cruelty to abandon one who had taken refuge, Satyatapas spoke like that.[36]

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of the sage if he saw a boar near by and said that if the animal could not be traced, he himself, his children and his dependents would have to die of starvation. The sage found himself in a dilemma—if he furnished the information regarding the animal's hiding place, he would be guilty of the heinous sin of betraying one who had taken refuge ; if he withheld the information, he would be responsible for the death of the hunter and his dependents. After a moment's reflection, Satyatapas replied, 'Animals are endowed with eyes to see and tongue to speak. The eye that sees has no tongue to report on what it perceives ; the tongue that speaks has no eye to see. Wherefore do you ask me ?' Struck by the ingenuity of his speech, the boar and its pursuer appeared to the sage in their true form as Viṣṇu and Indra respectively and blessed him.

36. See note on page 19.

१९. अस्तु तर्हि मन एव चेतनम् । तथा सति हि पूर्वोक्ता दोषाः परिहृता भवन्ति । तद्धि सर्वेन्द्रियाध्यक्षं प्रज्ञायते प्रतिज्ञायते च । [37] उपपद्यते च इन्द्रियान्तरेण प्रतिसंधानम्, दर्शनानुसंधानाधारस्य मनस एकत्वात् । तत्तदिन्द्रियापायेऽपि स्मरणमप्युपपद्यत एव, मनसो नित्यत्वात् ।

२०. तदपि न, करणत्वात् चक्षुरादिवत् । बाह्यान्तरसकलविषयसंवेदनकरणतया हि मनः प्रकल्प्यते । बाह्येन्द्रियेषु यथायथं निजविषयसन्निकर्षभागिष्वपि यतो न युगपदेव सर्वे विषयाः प्रतीयन्ते, अतोऽवगच्छामः अस्ति किंचिदपरमपि साधनं यत्साहाय्यकविरहान्न सर्वे, प्रकाशन्ते कश्चिदेव एकः प्रतीयत इति । तथा सुखादिसंवेदनान्यपि करणवन्ति क्रियात्वात् संवेदनत्वाद्वा रूपादिज्ञानवदिति । तदेवं ज्ञानकरणतयावगतस्य

THE DOCTRINE THAT MANAS IS THE SOUL

19. In that case, let manas (mind) be the soul. If that were so, the aforesaid difficulties would be got over. Indeed, manas has been known to be the controller of all the senses and has been so declared. Besides, recognition by a different sense becomes appropriate, since manas is the one entity that is the seat of both perception and recognition. Even when the respective senses perish, recognition is still possible, since manas is eternal.

THE EXAMINATION OF THIS DOCTRINE

20. This theory (that manas is the soul) too is erroneous, because manas is an instrument like the eye, etc. Manas has indeed been conceived as the instrument of all knowledge concerning the outer and the inner world. From the fact that even when the different external senses are in contact with their respective objects, they are not apprehended simultaneously, we learn that there exists some other instrument also (besides the senses) and that, on account of the absence of its help, all objects do not appear but some one (object) alone is cognised.[38] Likewise, knowledge of pleasure, etc., as in the case of knowledge of colour and the like, requires an instrument because it is either a form of activity or of knowledge. How can manas, which is thus known to be an instrument of knowledge, be the subject of knowledge ?

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37. Prajñāyate is found in the Telugu edition, but is wrongly omitted in the Benares edition. The presence of the word ca implies that there must be another verb besides pratijñāyate ; and it can only be prajñāyate. *vide infra* p. 17.

38. See *Nyāya Sūtra*, I. i. 16—Yugapat jñānānutpattir manaso lingam.

मनसः कथमिव ज्ञाने कर्तृत्वम् । स्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणं हि तत् । तच्च स्वच्छन्दानुरोधेन साध्यसिद्ध्यनुगुणोपकरणसंपादनसामर्थ्यं स्वसमवेतमेव वा गुणान्तरं तन्त्रीकृत्य प्रवृत्तिः । करणत्वं तु पराधिष्ठानाधीनव्यापारतारूपपारतन्त्र्यनियतं साधकतमत्वमिति कथमिवैकत्र मनसि परस्परविरुद्धतदुभयधर्मसंबन्धं प्रतिपद्येमहि ।

अथ तदपि मनः करणान्तरेण स्मरणादिषु कर्तृभावमनुभवति, तथा सति संज्ञामात्रे विवादः । य एव हि चक्षुरादिभी रूपादीन् आन्तरकरणेन च सुखादींश्चेतयते स एवात्मा । तस्मिन्नेव चेन्मनस्संज्ञा निवेश्यते कामं निवेश्यतां, न नः किंचिद्धीनम्, किंतु तथा सर्वलौकिकव्यवहारो बाध्येतेत्यलमनेन ।

आह—किमिदं मनो नाम । ननु उक्तमान्तरं ज्ञानकरणं द्रव्यमिति । किं पुनरस्य साधनम् । ननु उक्तं युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो लिङ्गमिति । उक्तं नाम तथापि कथं तत्त्वान्तर-

To be a subject is, really, to be independent. Independence consists either in the capacity to secure, in accordance with one's own desires, the means appropriate to the realisation of certain ends, or in the activity brought on by other qualities inherent in oneself. To be an instrument is to be the best means to an end, which is invariably associated with dependence on others, which, in its turn, consists in possessing activity that is subject to the control of others. How can we find in the selfsame manas the association of these two mutually conflicting qualities ?

Moreover, if it is maintained that the manas, which is an agent, acquires the character of an agent in remembering and other (activities) with the aid of another instrument, then the dispute concerns a name only. He alone is called the soul who perceives colour, etc., with (external senses such as) eyes, etc., and (who experiences) pleasure, etc., with the aid of the internal organ. If the name 'manas' be attributed to that, let it be done by all means. It does not affect us in the least. But it would go against all the usage of the world. No more of this.

What, it may be asked, is meant by manas ? It has already been described as an internal substance which is the instrument of knowledge. What is the proof of its existence ? The fact that knowledge of all objects does not arise simultaneously has already been shown to prove the existence of manas. True, it has been so pointed out ; but, how does it establish that it is a distinct entity ? Even after postulating it, you must perforce admit some other reason to account for the absence

सिद्धिः । कल्पयित्वापि हि तद्युगपत्स्मरणानुत्पत्त्युपपत्तये अवश्याश्रयणीयमेव निमित्तान्तरम् । सन्ति हि युगपदस्य स्मर्तुर्नानार्थानुभवभाविताः संस्काराः । अथ च न सर्वे स्मर्यन्ते, किंचिदेव कदाचित् स्मर्यते। संस्कारोन्मेषहेतूपनिपातक्रमात्तथात्वमिति चेत् , एवमपि प्रणिधानमात्रोद्बोधनीयसंस्कारस्य स्मृतियौगपद्यमापद्येत । यावदनुभूतसकलविषयसुस्मूर्षया सर्वतः प्रत्याहृतचेतसस्साधारण्येन प्रणिदधतोऽपि न सर्व एवार्थाः स्मृतिमधिरोहन्ति । यदि तु शुभाशुभरूपतया स्मरणानामदृष्टवशाद् व्यवस्थाक्रमः ज्ञानस्वाभाव्याद्वा आत्मनः, तथा सति बहिरिन्द्रियेषु च यथायथं स्वविषयसंप्रयुक्तेषु तथैव युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिरुपपद्यत इति कृतमिन्द्रियान्तरेण ।

स्यान्मतं कादाचित्कस्य सुखादेरात्मसमवायिनो बाह्यविषयादृष्टनिमित्तकारणस्यासमवायिकारणेन भाव्यम् , तच्च आत्ममनस्सन्निकर्ष इति मनोद्रव्यसिद्धिरिति । तदसत्, सुखदुःखादिपूर्वकालजन्मनः अभिमतानभिमतविषयसंपर्कज्ञानस्यात्मसमवायिन एव

of the simultaneous remembrance of all things. Impressions born of the experience of different objects exist simultaneously in the remembering person. Still all these objects are not remembered, but only some one (of them) is recalled at times. The order in which the causes, that are responsible for stimulating impressions appear cannot be said to account for this (the non-appearance of all remembrance at once). If that were so, to a person whose impressions can be aroused solely by concentration, all remembrance should appear simultaneously. But, even in the case of a person who, with the desire to remember all things he has experienced, withdraws his manas from all things and meditates in general, all things previously experienced do not become the object of remembrance. Should it be supposed that the order in which remembrances appear is due either to unseen forces (adṛṣṭa) inasmuch as all remembrance is either auspicious or inauspicious, or to the fact of the soul being of the nature of knowledge, then, the absence of the simultaneous appearance of all knowledge, even when the outer senses are in contact with their respective objects, would be rendered possible for the same reason ; hence no need to posit a different substance.

Again, pleasure and the like which are adventitious, which inhere in the soul and which have external objects and unseen forces for their efficient cause, must have a non-inherent cause and this is the conjunction of soul and manas. To believe that this argument establishes the existence of the substance known as manas is erroneous, for, the knowledge, which is produced by contact with agreeable and disagreeable objects and which originates prior to pleasure, pain and the like, and

असमवायिकारणत्वात्। तस्य च विषयसंप्रयुक्तेन्द्रियसंप्रयोग एव आत्मसमवेतोऽसमवायिकारणम्। तद्धेतुरपीन्द्रियव्यापारः प्रयत्नमदृष्टं चात्मसमवेतमपेक्षमाणादात्मेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षात् असमवायिकारणात्। प्रयत्नस्य तु स्वपूर्वक्षणवृत्तिकर्तव्यताज्ञानम्। प्रयत्न एव त्वदृष्टस्यापीति नात्मविशेषगुणानां बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छादीनामसमवायिकारणसापेक्षतयापि द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनं न्याय्यम्।

यत्तु नित्यद्रव्यविशेषगुणस्य द्रव्यान्तरसंयोग एव असमवायिकारणम्, पार्थिवपरमाणुषु अग्निसंयोगादसमवायिकारणाद्रूपोत्पत्तेरिति। तदपि स्थवीयः, पार्थिवपरमाणुषु रूपादयो दहनसंयोगादिति कुतोऽवगतम्। कार्यद्रव्ये तथा दर्शनादिति चेत्, इह वा तर्हि किं न दृश्यते इष्टानिष्टप्राप्त्यवगमादनन्तरं सुखादिर्जायत इति। दृष्टकारणव्यभिचारे हि कारणान्तरानुमानावसरः, न चेहास्ति व्यभिचारः। अतः प्रसिद्धकारणभावेष्वेव यत्र कार्यसमवायः तत्समवायिकारणम्

which inheres in the soul, may itself be the non-inherent cause. This (knowledge), in its turn, has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the organs, which are (themselves) in contact with objects, with the soul—a conjunction which inheres in the soul. The activity of the organ which is the cause of this (conjunction) has for its non-inherent cause the conjunction of the soul with the organs—a conjunction which is dependent on the effort and unseen forces inherent in the soul. This effort, again, (has for its non-inherent cause) the knowledge of the necessity for action existing at the preceding moment. The unseen force (has for its non-inherent cause) the effort itself. Thus, even the argument that knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire and other special qualities of the soul require a non-inherent cause does not justify the positing of a different substance.

From the fact that the colour of the atoms of earth (pṛthivī) originates from the non-inherent cause, viz., conjunction with fire, it may be said that the non-inherent cause of the special quality of an eternal substance is only the conjunction with another substance; but this argument too is superficial. Wherefrom is it learnt that the colour and other qualities of earth particles originate from the conjunction with fire? If the answer is it is so perceived in the resultant substance, then, inasmuch as pleasure and the like arise after the knowledge of the realisation of agreeable and disagreeable (objects), what is it that is not perceived here? Indeed, there will be occasion to infer other causes only when the perceived causes are found to be defective. And here, there is no defect. Therefore, it is well to accept the following formula—that among the factors well known to be causes, that is the inherent cause wherein lies the inherence of

यत्तु तत्प्रत्यासन्नं तदसमवायि, यदन्यत्तन्निमित्तमिति व्यवस्थाश्रयणमुचितम्, न त्वनपेक्षिताप्रसिद्धद्रव्यान्तरसंयोगाभ्युपगमेन तस्यासमवायिकारणत्वाश्रयणम् । कारणान्तरानुपलब्धेः दृष्टानुसाराच्च अणुगतरूपादौ तथाभ्युपगमः, इह तु तद्विपर्ययः प्रदर्शित एव । एवमपि व्याप्तिबलेन यो द्रव्यान्तरसंयोगोऽनुमातव्यः स तर्हि स्पर्शवद्द्रव्यसमवेतो भौतिक एव चोपलब्ध इति प्रसिद्धदेहादिसंयोग एवानुमानपर्यवसानान्न नवमद्रव्यसिद्धिः ।

अथोच्येत भौतिकत्वे हि मनसः पृथिव्याद्यन्यतमत्वेन भवितव्यम्, तच्चानुमानान्तरैर्व्यतिरेकमापादयद्भिः प्रत्यासिद्धम् । तथाहि न पार्थिवं मनः, रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् रसनावत्, न पाथसीयं गन्धग्रहणनिमित्तेन्द्रियत्वात् घ्राणवत्, एवम् अतैजसत्वाद्यपि तत्तदिन्द्रियागोचरग्रहणनिमित्ततया शक्याध्यवसानमिति अभौतिकत्वं मनस इति । तदनुपपन्नं धर्मिविशेषविपरीतसाधनात् । रसावगमनिमित्तेन्द्रियमपार्थिवत्वमिव पाथसीयत्व-

the effect; that is the non-inherent cause which is closely associated therewith; and the rest, the efficient cause. It is not proper to posit the conjunction of a different substance which is gratuitous and not well-known and to consider it the non-inherent cause. Such an admission with regard to colour and the like residing in atoms is due to non-apprehension of other causes and to (the logical need for) conformity with perceived things. But the contrary has already been proved here. Even if this were so, that conjunction with another substance, which may be inferred on the strength of invariable concomitance, being known to inhere in objects that can be touched and are elemental, the argument culminates in the conjunction with the well-known body, etc.; hence, a ninth substance (manas) need not be posited.

Again, if indeed, the manas were elemental, it must be one among (the bhūtas or the primal elements) earth and the like; but this is contradicted by other arguments proving it to be otherwise. They are:— Manas cannot be constituted out of the earth, because like the tongue, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing taste; it cannot be related to water, because like the nose, it is an organ instrumental in experiencing smell; similarly, being instrumental in experiencing what is not the object of the respective organs, it is possible to assert that it is not made of fire and the like; hence the non-elemental character of manas. This argument is inappropriate, for it would establish the opposite (conclusion), viz., that it is a distinctive substance (element). The character of being an organ instrumental in experiencing taste, proves that manas is composed of water (rasa), even as it establishes that manas is unrelated to earth. Similarly, the other reasons also prove the cha-

मपि समर्थयति । एवं साधनान्तराण्यपि भूतान्तरव्यतिरेकमिव आत्मीयभूतभावमापादयन्ति ।

अथ शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धेषु यद्गुणग्राहि यदिन्द्रियं तदेव तद्गुणकभूतारब्धम्, हन्त तर्हि तदेव तदितरभूतव्यतिरेकितयाप्यवगतमिति न तदवगमकतामात्रेणाभिमतव्यतिरेकसिद्धिः ।

अपि च शब्दादिगुणावगमसाधारणसाधनतया शरीरमिव पाञ्चभौतिकमेकं द्वित्रादिमयं वा इतरभूतसंसृष्टमस्तु मनः, यथाऽऽम्नायते अन्नमयं हि सौम्य मन इति । ननु तन्न तत्प्रकृतित्वप्रतिपादनपरम्, अपि तु तदधीनवृत्तितामात्रप्रदर्शनार्थम् आपोमयः प्राणः इत्यादिवत् । अत एव अपवर्गदशायामपि मनोऽनुवृत्तिः, दर्शितं हि तत्रैवाष्टमे मनसैतान्का-

racter of its being related to their respective elements, even as they reveal that it is not the other elements.

Further, that organ which grasps a particular quality among sound, touch, colour, taste and smell—that alone is constituted out of the element possessing that quality. Granting, indeed, that this is so, as it is also known that that organ alone (i.e., that organ which grasps only a particular quality) is not constituted of other elements than its own, by merely showing that (you) cannot establish the negative result which you intend to convey (viz., that manas is non-elemental).[39]

Moreover, being the common instrument apprehending sound and other qualities, manas, like the body, may as well be a single substance made up of the five elements, or it may be two-fold, three-fold and so on being made up of different elements.[40] For instance, it is said in scriptures, 'Gentle sir! manas is indeed food.'[41] It may be argued that it (this scriptural passage) does not seek to teach the fact of manas having its source in food, but, like statements such as 'Prāṇa is water'[42] it only seeks to assert the fact of its (manas) owning activities dependent on it (food). That is why manas continues to exist even in the state of realisation. Indeed, in the eighth chapter of the same (Upaniṣad) this fact has been stated thus: 'Perceiving with the aid of manas the object of his desires, (he) rejoices'; 'To this person, the manas is the

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39. The sense-organ which grasps only one quality may be said to be made of that particular element alone which possesses that quality. But this affords no basis for the inference that manas is non-elemental; for, manas apprehends all the qualities.

40. The variant reading is ekadvitrādimayam.

41. *Chānd. Up.* VI. 5.

42. *Chānd. Up.* VI. 5.

मान् पश्यन् रमते मनोऽस्य दैवं चक्षुः इति। तथा परस्याश्च देवतायाः सोऽन्यं कामं मनसाध्यायत इति महोपनिषदि, मनसैव जगत् सृष्टिं इति च पुराणे ।

उच्यते । सत्यमेवं द्रव्यान्तरपरिकल्पनातो वरमेवं वाश्रयणमित्युक्तम्, परमार्थतस्तु न भौतिकं नापि नवमं द्रव्यम् ।

क तर्हीदानीं मनश्शब्दः ? बुद्धावेव, अत एव हि बुद्धिमान् मनस्वी इति व्यपदिश्यते । मनसोऽवस्थाभेदाश्च द्रागेवापरोक्ष्यन्ते क्षुभितं मे मनः प्रसन्नं मे मनः इति । एवं च मनसः करणतया व्यपदेशो बुद्ध्यहङ्कारयोरिव वृत्तिभेदप्रदर्शनपरः पूर्वेषामिति । उच्यते, यदि बुद्धिरेव मनः यदि वा द्रव्यान्तरम् उभयथाऽपि तस्य न चेतनत्वमिति किमनेनाप्रतिज्ञातस्वरूपविमर्शनेन ।

celestial eye.'[43] Similarly, in the Mahopaniṣad it is said of the Supreme Deity that 'He meditates on another object of desire with the aid of manas'.[44] In the purāṇas too, it is said, 'He creates the world with the aid of manas only.'[45]

To the foregoing, it is replied—True, it is so. It was only said that rather than assume a different substance we may as well accept this position. But, in reality, it is neither elemental nor the ninth substance.

In that event, what does the word 'manas' refer to ? It refers only to the intellect (buddhi). That is why the person of (great) intellect is termed manasvī. The differences of states of mind are readily perceived in this way : 'My mind is perturbed'; 'My mind is tranquil.' To conclude, our ancestors' description of manas as an instrument is calculated to bring out the differences of states, just as intellect and egoity (though ultimately one, serve to indicate differences of states). The reply is whether manas is elemental or whether it is a different substance, in either of these two cases, intelligence cannot be attributed to it.[46] Hence, there is no use investigating into the nature of a substance, when no statement regarding that has been advanced.

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43. *Chānd. Up.* VIII.
44. *Mahopaniṣad,* I.
45. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa,* V, 11, 15.
46. Is manas an aspect of buddhi ? Or, is it a different substance altogether ? Yāmunācārya leaves this question open, and thinks that, in any event, manas cannot be an intelligent entity.

२१ अस्तु तर्हि प्राण एवात्मा, तथा सति तदन्वयिनि शरीरे सात्मकत्वप्रतीतेः तद्विरहिणि निरात्मकत्वप्रतीतिश्च उपपद्येयाताम् । देहादुत्क्रान्तिर्लोकान्तरगमनं देहान्तरसंचारश्च उपपद्यन्तेतरां, गत्वरस्वाभाव्यात् प्राणस्य । इतरथा परममहतो महतश्च स्पर्शविरहिणः परिस्पन्दानुपपत्तेः उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतिश्रुतयो भाक्ताः स्युः ।

२२ इदमप्यसत्, वायुत्वादेव बाह्यवायुवत् प्राणस्य चैतन्यानुपपत्तेः, वृत्तिहीनेऽपि आत्मनि सुषुप्तौ प्राणस्य वृत्तिमत्वाच्च । तद्वृत्त्या हि सुप्तस्यापि सप्तधातुभावेनाशितपीतद्रव्य परिणामः श्वासप्रश्वासौ च । तनुतरतेजोबन्नानुविद्धः कौष्ठ्यवातो हि प्राणः, स च कण्ठमुखनासाभ्यान्तरे बहिश्च रेचितः त्वचा स्पृश्यमानो घटादिरिव स्फुटमनात्मतया चकास्ति ।

THE THEORY THAT PRĀNA IS THE SOUL

21. Then, let the vital breath (prāṇa) be (called) the soul. If that were so, the apprehension of the body, which is associated with it (prāṇa), as one which is connected with the soul, and the apprehension of the body, where there is absence of prāṇa, as one which is not associated with the soul will both be appropriate. Departing from the body, going to other worlds, and wandering in other bodies would be even more appropriate inasmuch as it is prāṇa's nature to move. Otherwise (i.e., if prāṇa is not the soul), scriptural passages referring to departing, going and coming would have to be given a secondary significance, because movement cannot reasonably belong to that which is infinitely big and to that which is big, but which is devoid of contact.

CRITICISM OF THIS THEORY

22. This (theory) too is not correct. Intelligence cannot belong to prāṇa, because, like external air, it is only air, and because in the state of deep sleep, even when the soul is devoid of activity, the prāṇa possesses activity. Indeed, it is only on account of its activity that even in the case of the person who is asleep, transformation of substances that have been eaten and drunk into the sevenfold tissues of the body (dhātus)[47], inhalation and exhalation take place. The prāṇa is, indeed, the air which is mixed up with a little fire, water and food, and which resides in the viscera. This (air) too, being exhaled into and out of the throat, mouth and nostrils, and being sensed, like pots and others similar to it, by the organ of touch, clearly shines forth as the non-soul.

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47. Dhātu (from the root dhā, 'to hold') is that which supports or sustains the body. It is usual to mention seven dhātus or tissues of the body—chyle (rasa), blood (rakta), flesh (māmsa), fat (medas), bone (asti); marrow (majja); semen (śukra). Sometimes hair (keśa), skin (tvac), and muscle and tendons (snāyu) are added to the list. See *Tait. Ār.* X. 54.

किञ्च—निरस्तो देहचैतन्यप्रतिषेधप्रकारतः ।
प्राणात्मवादो न पृथक् प्रयोजयति दूषणम् ॥

अविभुत्वेनास्यात्मनः स्पर्शविरहिणोऽपि प्रयत्नादृष्टप्रेरणानुगुण्येन मनस इव उत्क्रान्तिगत्यादयो युज्यन्त इति न तन्निर्देशानां मुख्यार्थिता । परिमाणनिरूपणेऽप्येतद्भविष्यतीत्यलममुना ।

२३. भवतु तर्हि संविदेवात्मा अजडत्वात् । जडत्वप्रतिबद्धं ह्यनात्म्यं घटादिषु दृष्टम्, जडत्वं च संविदो निवर्तमानं तदपि निवर्तयति । अजडत्वं च संविदस्सत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वात् । न हि सती संवित् घटादिरिवाप्रकाशमानाऽवतिष्ठते, येन परायत्तसिद्धिरास्थीयेत ।

स्यान्मतं जातायामपि संविदि विषयमात्रं प्रथते । न खलु नीलमिदमिति प्रतियन्त-

Further, the doctrine that prāṇa is the soul, being refuted in the same manner in which intelligence has been negatived of the body, does not call for separate disproof. Because the soul is not all-pervasive, even though it is devoid of contact, departing, going and other (activities) conforming to the direction of effort and unseen forces, may appropriately belong to the soul, as (they belong) to the manas; hence, the passages declaring these activities as belonging to the soul are not to be taken as carrying a secondary significance. As this will be taken up again in inquiring into the size (of the soul), let this suffice (for the present).

THE THEORY THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SOUL

23. Then, let consciousness itself be (taken as) the soul, because it is not non-intelligent. The quality of non-soul is found in pots and the like, to be concomitant with the quality of being non-intelligent. The quality of being non-intelligent, which is foreign to consciousness, excludes its concomitant (the quality of being non-soul) from consciousness. The quality of being non-intelligent belongs to consciousness, because consciousness shines merely by its own being. Indeed, while it exists, consciousness, unlike jars and the like, does not remain without shining; if it fails to shine, it may be acknowledged that its shining is dependent upon something other than itself.

Perhaps you may hold the following view: Even when consciousness has arisen, it is the object only which shines forth.

स्तदैवानीलमनिदंरूपमपि संवेदनं प्रतीमः । अतः स्वरूपसत्यैव संविदा इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षेणेव विषयः प्रकाश्यते, ततश्च तद्गतागन्तुकप्रकाशातिशयदर्शनेन पश्चात् संविदनुमास्यत इति । तन्न, ज्ञानव्यतिरेकिणोऽर्थधर्मस्य प्रकाशस्य निपुणमपि निरीक्षमाणानां रूपादिवदनुपलब्धेः, उभयाभ्युपेतसंविदैव सकलव्यवहारोपपत्तौ च तत्कल्पनानुपपत्तेः ।

वित्तिवेदितृप्रतिभासशून्यायां च विषयवित्तावभ्युपगम्यमानायां घटस्तावदयम् अहं तु जानामि न वेति न ज्ञायत इति च कदाचित्प्रतिभासः स्यात्, न चैवमस्ति ।

अतीतानागतविषयग्रहणस्मरणेषु व्याहारव्यवहारयोरभावे, भावेऽपि ततः प्रागेव

When we have the knowledge 'This is blue'[48] we are not at the same time, conscious also of a consciousness, which is not blue and which is different from what may be pointed to by the word 'this'. Hence, by the very existence of consciousness the object is illumined as in the case of the sense-relation (where the object is brought to light, though the relation itself is not manifested). Immediately after, by noticing therein (in the object) a peculiar illumination,[49] which is adventitious, consciousness is inferred. This view is untenable, because, unlike colour and other qualities, that illumination, which is an attribute of things and which is something different from consciousness, is not apprehended even by keen observers. As all worldly experience and usage is explicable solely in terms of consciousness, which is admitted by both of us, it is not proper to posit that (illumination).

If the knowledge of objects be admitted to be devoid of the manifestation of knowledge and knower, sometimes the following experience must occur: 'This is a pot; it is not known whether I know it or not.' But it does not occur like this.

In respect of the apprehension of objects, past and future, if there is no speech and no action, the manifestation of such objects cannot be

48. In older philosophical works, more especially in Buddhistic writings, it was usual to take nīla as an illustration for an object. In later works, ghaṭa does duty for nīla.

49. According to the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāmsā, when cognition of an object arises, the latter is affected in a particular way; it becomes illumined, manifested or made known (prakāśa-viśiṣta). It is from this illumination or manifestedness (prākaṭya or jñātatā) that we infer that knowledge has previously arisen. Thus, it is held, that consciousness is not perceived, but is inferred from its result. For a refutation of this view see Vedānta Deśika's *Tattvamuktākalāpa,* page 394. See also *Sarvārthasiddhi.*

विदितत्वप्रतीतेः नानुमानिकी तत्र विषयसिद्धिः, नतरां तत्पूर्विका तत्र बुद्धिसिद्धिः। तथा हि—केनचित्प्रेरितः प्रणिधाय स्मृत्वानन्तरमेव प्रतिवदति स्मृतमद्य मयेति। न चायमेव व्यवहारस्तत्र लिङ्गम्, तत्पूर्वकत्वादन्योन्याश्रयणापत्तेश्च। स्वव्याहारेण स्वज्ञानानुमानं क इव निरपत्रपः प्रतिजानीत।

अन्यच्च यत्संबन्धादर्थान्तरे यो व्यवहारः धर्मभेदो वा स तस्मिन्नुपलभ्यमानस्त-स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः न तु तत्संबन्धनिबन्धनः, यथा सत्तासंबन्धात् पृथिव्यादिषु सद्व्यवहारः रूप-संबन्धाच्चाक्षुषत्वं सत्तायां रूपे च। एवं संवित्संबन्धात् प्रवर्तमानो घटादिषु प्रकाशत इति

proved by inference. And the manifestation of consciousness which is based thereon (the manifestation of objects) would be even more impossible. If there are no speech and action, the manifestation of objects is not established by inference, because it appears to have been known prior to them (speech and action).[50] To explain—Being prompt-by somebody, it is only after concentrating (the mind) and recollecting that a person replies, 'Now it is remembered by me.' It cannot be maintained that the aforesaid speech itself is the cause of this recollection, because it is a pre-condition of this (speech), and because of reciprocal dependence. Which shameless fellow will maintain that the knowledge of an object is inferred from statements concerning itself ?

Further, the statements and different properties found in that through whose connection these arise in another object are dependent upon the existence of the former itself and not upon its connection. For instance, the reference to existence arising in the case of earth and the like, on account of association with existence, does not arise in the case of existence itself through the connection with (another existence); the visibility found in earth and the like, by virtue of connection with colour, does not arise in the case of colour itself through the connection with (another) colour. Thus statements, such as it 'shines forth', and qualities, such as, knowability, found in pots and the like, arise

50. Against the view that cognition is inferred from its result, namely, jñātatā, it is urged that, in respect of objects past and future, as we cannot perceive the prākaṭya, we cannot infer the knowledge of such objects. To this it may be replied that though the jñātatā of past and future objects is not perceived, it may be inferred from the speech and action concerning them and that from the jñātatā thus inferred, knowledge of those objects can be easily inferred. This reply is unsatisfactory, because if speech and action do not exist, jñātatā cannot be inferred, and much less can consciousness of objects, which is based thereon, be inferred ; if they exist, they are not found to prove jñātatā, for the objects appear to have been known previously.

व्यवहारः प्रकाशमानत्वं वा धर्मः संविदि तु परिदृश्यमानो न संवित्संबन्धापेक्षः अपि तु तत्स्वरूपप्रयुक्त इति स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात्सैवात्मेति । किंच योऽपि संविदोऽन्यं संवेदितारमभ्युपगच्छति, अभ्युपगच्छत्येवासौ संविदम् । न ह्यसत्यामेव संविदि संवेत्तीत्युपपद्यते। एवं चेदुभयवादिसंप्रतिपन्नतया सैव परं वेदित्री भवतु किमन्येन कल्पितेन ।

ननु अहं जानामीति ज्ञानातिरिक्तस्तदाश्रयभूतोऽयमात्मा प्रतीयते । सत्यं, स तु विकल्परूपतया साक्षात्प्रत्यक्ष इति न शक्यः संश्रयितुम् । भेदज्ञानसिद्धवत्कारेण पृथग्वस्तुतया गृहीताव्यभिचारेण सहोपलम्भनियमेनाप्रकाशात्मनश्च स्वभावविरोधादेव प्रकाशायोगात्

from connection with consciousness; and these (statements and qualities) found in consciousness are not dependent on the connection with consciousness, but are dependent on its own being. Hence, consciousness itself (should be considered as) the soul, as it is self-luminous. Further, whoever admits a knower apart from knowledge admits also consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness were non-existent, the reference to the knower would not be appropriate. If this is so, as it is admitted by both parties, let that (consciousness) alone be the knower. What is the use of that other entity which has been assumed ?

It may be urged that from the statement 'I know' it is evident that the soul appears to be distinct from, and to be the seat of, consciousness. True, but as it is determinate (savikalpaka) perception, it cannot be admitted as a valid perception.[51] Proceeding on the assumption that the knowledge of distinctions is real, that being, which is of the nature of luminosity and which is referred to as 'I,' cannot be taken to be a separate entity, because of the invariable association of awareness (of knowledge and knower) to which no exception has been noticed, and because it (the entity which is admitted by you to

51. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svalakṣaṇa) and does not grasp its qualifications. This is passive reception of sense impressions. But the sense material thus received is invariably subjected to a process of mental elaboration. The forms of thought (vikalpa), which are of five kinds—generality (jāti), quality (guṇa), action (karma), name (nāma), and substance (dravya)—are superimposed on the svalakṣaṇa, so that every object perceived has to appear through their medium. We cannot help perceiving an object otherwise than as belonging to a class, bearing a name, as characterised by an attribute and as related to another substance. This is determinate (savikalpaka) perception. As it makes considerable additions to the material presented by sense, it may be said to distort the real. Hence, the Buddhists think that, strictly speaking, it is not perceptual in character. cf. kalpanāpoḍa mabhrāntam pratyakṣam nirvikalpakam vikalpo vastu nirbhāsādasamvādādupaplavaḥ.

प्रकाशस्वाभाव्ये च संवेदनत्वमित्यादिना वा प्रकाशात्मनोऽहमित्यंशस्य तत्त्वमेव दुरुपगमम्। ग्राह्यविकल्पप्रत्युद्धारेऽप्येष एव प्रकारः। अतो वासनाभिधानसमनन्तरप्रत्ययसामर्थ्यात् अनाद्यविद्यावशाच्च समारोपितावास्तवग्राह्यग्राहकविकल्पोल्लेखिनी स्वयंप्रकाशा संविदेव परमार्थसती, सैव आत्मेति सौगताः प्रकटाः प्रच्छन्नाश्च। यथाहुः प्रकटाः।

अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते॥

इति। यथा वा प्रच्छन्नाः

शुद्धं तत्त्वं प्रपञ्चस्य न हेतुरनिवृत्तितः।
ज्ञातृज्ञेयविभागस्य मायैव जननी ततः॥ इति।

अत्राह क्षणभङ्गिनी प्रतिविषयमन्यान्या च संविच्चकास्ति, सैव चेदात्मा पूर्वेद्युर्दृष्ट-

be distinct from consciousness) cannot be said either to possess the quality of luminosity or not to possess it. For, if the former, it cannot shine forth, as that will go against its nature; if the latter, it will amount to consciousness itself. Even in the matter of setting aside differences among perceived things, the very same mode (of reasoning) will apply. Therefore, the avowed Buddhists as well as the disguised Buddhists (declare) that the self-luminous consciousness alone truly exists and that it alone is the soul, and that this consciousness, on account of the capacity of the immediately preceding cognition known as vāsanā (impressions of previous experience), and on account of beginningless ignorance (avidyā), has for its object the erroneously imagined and unreal distinctions of knower and the known. For instance, the avowed (Buddhists) say—"Although consciousness, in its nature, is devoid of distinctions, yet, on account of erroneous knowledge, it appears as possessing the distinctions of object-consciousness and subject-consciousness.[52] The disguised Buddhists, for instance, say—The spotless reality cannot be the cause of the world, because (then) it (the world) would have no cessation. Hence, māyā alone is the originator of the distinctions of the knower and the known.

THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SOUL

24. The reply (to this view) is:—Consciousness manifests itself as perishing every moment and as being different in regard to every object. If that (consciousness) were the soul, how could a person recognise on the subsequent day what he perceived the previous day, as, 'I saw this'?

52. Quoted in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha,* in the chapter on Bauddha Darśana.

मपरेद्युरहमिदमदर्शमिति कथमिव प्रत्यभिजानीयात्। न च निरालम्बनप्रतिभाभेदमात्रतया इह समाधेयम् । निरालम्बनत्वप्रतिज्ञायाः प्रत्यक्षादिसकलप्रतीतिबाधितविषयत्वात् । साधनस्य च सालम्बनत्वे तदविशेषादशेषशेमुषीणां तथात्वापत्तेः, निरालंबनत्वे च साधनाभावादेव साध्यासिद्धेः । प्रपञ्चितश्च पूर्वोत्तरमीमांसाभागयोर्निरालम्बनप्रतिषेधः यथार्थख्यातिसमर्थनेन च शास्त्र इति न वर्ण्यते ।

अत एव न संतानाश्रयणेनापि प्रत्यभिज्ञोपपादनं साधीयः । विज्ञानलक्षणव्यतिरिक्तस्य स्थायिनः अनुसंधायिनः संतानस्य अभ्युपगमे स्वसिद्धान्तत्यागः परसिद्धान्ताभ्युगमश्च। अनभ्युपगमे प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिः । न ह्यन्येनानुभूते अन्यस्य प्रतिसंधानसंभवः । न च सुसदृशतया भेदाग्रहणेन प्रदीपादाविव प्रमातरि प्रत्यभिज्ञाभ्रान्तिः । युज्यते हि तत्रै-

This cannot be met with the aid of different objectless consciousnesses alone, for the statement that knowledge is characterised by objectlessness has for its meaning what is contradicted by every form of knowledge, such as perception and the like. If the middle term (which in this argument is no other than consciousness) possesses an object, there being no distinction between this consciousness and all other consciousnesses, they would also be similar (*i.e.*, possess objects); if it (the middle term) be objectless, then, as there is no middle-term, the conclusion cannot be established. As the doctrine that consciousness is objectless has been condemned at length both in the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāmsā sections,[53] and as the yathārtakhyāti has been established in Śaśtra,[54] it is not dealt with here.

That is why even on the (Buddhist's) admission that consciousness is a stream, the justification of recognition fares no better. If a stream of consciousness which is different from (momentary) consciousness, and which endures and which remembers is admitted, it will amount to giving up his own (Buddist's) position and accepting another's; if it is not admitted, recognition becomes inexplicable. Indeed, in regard to what is experienced by one person, recognition cannot arise in another. It cannot be maintained that the illusion of recognition arises in the knower on account of the non-apprehension of difference due to close similarity, as in the case of the flame and the like. Indeed, there (in the case of the flame), to one and the same individual who per-

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53. *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra,* I. i. 5; *Śābara Bhāṣya,* pp. 28-30, Ānandāśrama Series; *ślokavārtika,* Nirālambana section, pp. 24-90, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series; *Vedānta Sūtras,* II. ii. 27.

54. Nāthamuni's *Nyāyatattva* is, in all probability, the Śāstra here referred to. The opening stanza of that work refers to itself as a śāstra—

Yo vetti yugapat sarvam pratyakṣeṇa sadā svataḥ
tam praṇamya harim śāstram nyāyatattvam pracakṣmahe.

कस्यैव पूर्वापरव्यक्तिदर्शिनस्तुल्यसंस्थानतया व्यक्तीनां भेदमविदुषस्तथा भ्रमः, इह तु संविद्व्यक्तयः परस्परवार्तानभिज्ञा निरन्वयविनाशिन्यश्च सुगतमत इति न तास्वेकत्व-भ्रमस्याश्रयता विषयता वा संभविनी। न च सुसदृशत्वेऽपि अन्येन कृतमात्मकृततयाऽन्योऽनुसंधातुमलमित्यागमापायिसंवित्संन्तानाश्रयः प्रत्यभिज्ञानक्षणस्थायी चेतनोऽभ्युप-गन्तव्यः।

कश्चिदाह—न संविदनित्या, प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धेः। तदसिद्धिश्च तस्याः स्वतस्सिद्धत्वात्, न हि स्वतः सिद्धस्य प्रागभावादयः स्वतोऽन्यतो वा सिध्यन्ति। स्वयं हि स्वभावमवगम-यत् सद्वा असद्वा साधयेत्, असत्त्वे अभाव एव नास्तीति कथं साधयेत्। असत्त्वादेव साधकस्य पक्षान्तरे नतरां साधकत्वमिति न स्वतस्तावत्तत्सिद्धिः। नाप्यन्यतः, अनन्य-गोचरत्वादनुभूतेः। अनुभाव्यत्वे च घटादिवत् अननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गात्, अतः सा न जायते,

ceives the earlier and the later entities and who, on account of their possessing similar shapes, fails to notice their differences, the illusion is but natural. But here, in as much as the several consciousnesses are described in Buddhism as being ignorant of any information about one another, and as perishing without a remainder, neither the character of being the seat nor that of being the object of the illusion of identity can arise in these (consciousnesses); because, even if there be great similarity, one person cannot regard what has been performed by another as having been executed by himself. Hence, an intelligent entity, who is the seat of the stream of consciousnesses that appear and perish, and who exists at the time of recognition, must be admitted.

Here one may point out that consciousness is not non-eternal, for, its antecedent non-existence is not ascertainable. Its being unascertainable follows from the fact of consciousness being self-established. Indeed, in the case of what is self-established, antecedent non-existence and the like cannot be demonstrated either by itself or by another. That which manifests, by itself, its own non-existence must do so either by being existent or non-existent. If it (consciousness) exists, as there will be no non-existence, how can it establish (its antecedent non-existence)? On the other alternative (if consciousness is non-existent), by reason of its very non-existence, it is even less capable of establishing (its antecedent non-existence). Hence, it (antecedent non-existence of consciousness) is not established by consciousness itself. Nor is it proved by another, for, consciousness cannot be the object of anything else. If it were the object of consciousness, it would, like the pot, etc., cease to be consciousness. Therefore, (that is, as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not established either by itself or by another), it (consciousness) has

जन्माभावादेव इतरेऽपि भावविकारा निराकार्याः तत्प्रतिबद्धत्वात् तेषाम्। अत एव नानात्वमपि संविदि प्रत्युक्तम्। उत्पत्तिमत्त्वव्यापकनिवृत्त्या तद्व्याप्यभूतनानात्वस्यापि निवृत्तिसिद्धेः। न ह्यजं विभाग्यस्ति। चेत्यत्वाच्च भेदेतरेतराभावादयो न तद्धर्माः रूपादिवत्। अतो नास्यानुभाव्यः कश्चिदपि धर्मोऽस्ति। अतो निर्धूतनिखिलभेदविकल्पा निर्धर्मप्रकाशमात्रैकरसा कूटस्थनित्या संविदेवात्मा परमात्मा च। यथाह—यानुभूतिरजाऽमेयाऽनन्तात्मेति। सैव च वेदान्तवाक्यतात्पर्यभूमिः इति तेषां परिभाषा। यथाह तद्वार्तिककारः।

परागर्थप्रमेयेषु या फलत्वेन संमता।
संवित्सैवेह मेयोऽर्थो वेदान्तोक्तिप्रमाणतः॥

no origin. And, as it has no origination, other positive changes have also to be denied.[55] For, they are concomitant therewith (origination). That is why plurality of consciousnesses is also to be denied. The absence of the pervader (vyāpaka), namely, the character of having an origination, involves also the denial of what is pervaded by it (vyāpya), namely, plurality. For, what is unborn cannot possess differentiations. Moreover, because differentia, mutual non-existence and the like are objects of consciousness, like colour and other qualities, they cannot be attributes of consciousness. Therefore, nothing that is an object of consciousness can be its attribute.[56] Therefore, consciousness alone, which is devoid of all kinds of differences and which is attributeless and which has luminosity alone for its sole essence, and which is unchanging and eternal, is both the finite and the infinite self. It has, for instance, been said 'that consciousness which is unborn, unknowable and which is of the nature of the Infinite self . . . . . .' Their technical jargon (has it) that (consciousness) alone is the ultimate purport of the Vedānta texts. The Vārtikakāra[57] for instance, says that the scriptural testimony teaches that consciousness alone, which is supposed to be the result of those means of knowledge that have external things for their objects (*i.e.*, perception, inference, etc.), is the gist of the upaniṣadic texts. If something other than this (cons-

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55. Bhāvavikāra may also be taken to mean changes of positive entities. See *Śrutaprakāśikā*, pages 181-2.

56. The reading in the Benares and Telugu editions is anumeyaḥ.

57. Sureśvara (A.D. 800) is the Vārtikakāra here referred to. His chief works are the *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* and *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-Bhāṣya-Vārtika*. The latter work has been commented on by Ānandagiri in his *Śāstraprakāśika* and by Ānandapūrṇa in his *Nyāyakalpa-latikā*.

अप्रामाण्यप्रसक्तिश्च स्यादितोऽन्यार्थकल्पने ।
वेदान्तानामतस्तस्मान्नान्यमर्थं प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ इति ।

तदिदमलौकिकमवैदिकं च दर्शनमित्यात्मविदः । तथाहि—संविदिति स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित् प्रकाशनशीलो ज्ञानावगत्यनुभूत्यादिपदपर्यायनामा सकर्मकः संवेदितुरात्मनो धर्मः प्रसिद्धः । तथैव हि सर्वप्राणभृत्प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः अहमिदं संवेद्मीति । तस्योत्पत्तिस्थितिनिरोधाश्च सुखदुःखादेरिव प्रत्यक्षाः प्रकाशन्ते ।

स्वापमदमूर्च्छादशासु च योग्यानुपलम्भनिराकृतस्तत्सद्भावो नाभ्युपगममर्हति । यदि

ciousness) were postulated (to be the object of perception, and other pramāṇas), there would result the non-authoritativeness of the Vedānta texts; and hence something other than consciousness ought not to be postulated.[58]

Those who have understood (the true nature of) the self (assert) that this doctrine does not conform either to worldly experience or to the Vedas. To explain further—what is termed consciousness is well-known to possess the character of manifesting by its very existence, some object to its own substrate (i.e., the substrate of knowledge), to have the words jñāna, avagati, anubhūti, etc., as its synonyms, to have an object and to be the quality of the knowing self. It is, indeed, in this manner that the experience 'I know this' occurs to all beings individually. As in the case of pleasure, pain, and the like, the origination, existence and destruction of consciousness manifest themselves directly.

The existence of consciousness in the states of deep sleep, drunkenness and swoon cannot be accepted, as it is negatived by effectual non-

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58. This translation of these two verses (159th and 160th) from the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-Vārtika is based on Ānandagiri's commentary. According to him the first verse means that granting that pratyakṣa and other pramāṇas have external things for their objects, still their result, viz., consciousness, is the gist of the vedāntic texts. The second verse states that the pramāṇas cannot have external things as their objects, for, otherwise the vedāntic texts would lose their authoritativeness, inasmuch as they would be powerless to establish differenceless Brahman. Hence, the pramāṇas cannot have for their object anything other than vedāntic teaching, namely, consciousness. See *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya-vārtika*, Ānandaśrama Series, p. 51.

हि तास्वपि दशासु संवेदनमवर्तिष्यत ततः प्रबोधसमये अनुसमधास्यत । न च अनुसंधीयते । अत एव हि इयन्तं कालं न किंचिदहमज्ञासिषं इति प्रबुद्धः प्रत्यवमृशति । यावदनुभूतपदार्थस्मरणनियमाभावेऽपि संस्कारविच्छेदनिमित्तप्रायणादिप्रबलहेतुविरहेऽपि नित्यवदस्मरण मनुभवाभावमेव साधयति ।

न च सत्यपि संवित्प्रकाशे विषयावच्छेदविरहात् अहंकारगोचरापायाद्वा तत्स्मृत्यनुदयः । अर्थान्तराभावस्य तदग्रहणस्य च अर्थान्तरप्रकाशप्रयुक्तकार्यप्रतिबन्धकत्वायोगात् । त्रितयावभासेऽपि यथास्वमवभासानां स्वगोचरस्मरणहेतुत्वात् । न च प्रत्यभिज्ञाबललब्धस्थेमाऽहमर्थः स्वापादिदशासु निधनमुपगत इति शक्योऽभिधातुम् । अत एव हि इयन्तं कालमहमस्वाप्समिति प्रबोधे परामर्शः ।

perception. If in those states also consciousness were to exist, then, at the time of waking, it should be remembered ; but (as a matter of fact), it is not remembered. That is why the person who wakes up realises, on reflection, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.' Though there is no general rule to the effect that there should be remembrance of all the things experienced, and though there is absence of death and other powerful causes responsible for the obliteration of traces of previous experience, the uniform non-remembrance establishes only the non-existence of experience (during states of deep sleep, etc.).

Nor may it be said that even though there is manifestation of consciousness, non-origination of its remembrance may be due either to the absence of delimiting objects or to the extinction of the object of self-consciousness. For, the absence of one thing and the non-apprehension of that (thing) cannot possibly be the obstacles in the way of the result which is caused by the manifestation of some other object. Even if there be the manifestation of the three (consciousness, objects and self-consciousness) the manifestation of each of these is the cause of the remembrance of its respective object. Again, the object referred to by 'I,' which secures permanency on the strength of recollection, cannot be said to meet with death in deep sleep and other similar states. That is why on waking there is the judgment 'All the while I slept well'.

न च निर्विषया निराश्रया वा संविन्नाम काचित्संभवति, अत्यन्तानुपलब्धेः। संबन्धिशब्दाश्च संविदनुभूतिज्ञानप्रकाशादिशब्दा इति शब्दार्थविदः। न हि अकर्मकस्य जानात्यादेरकर्तृकस्य वा प्रयोगो लोके वेदे वा।

यत्तु स्वतः सिद्धस्य सत्वे तद्विरोधादेव प्रागभावादेः तदनीमवस्थानासंभवात् न ततः सिद्धिरिति। तदतिस्थवीयः, न हि संविदा स्वकालवर्तिन एव अर्थाः सिद्ध्यन्तीत्यस्ति नियमः, अतीतानागतयोरसंवेद्यत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेः सिद्ध्यतः तत्समकालतया भवितव्यमिति। किमेवं क्वचिद् दृष्टम्? हन्त एवं सति तत्सिद्धेर्न प्रागभवाद्यसिद्धिः। तत्प्रागभावः तत्समकाल इत्युन्मत्तवचः। ऐन्द्रियकप्रत्यक्षस्वभावो ह्ययं स्वसमकालपदार्थप्रकाशकत्वं नाम, न ज्ञानमात्रस्य प्रमाणमात्रस्य वा।

Moreover, something known as consciousness (samvid) which is devoid of objects and substrate cannot exist, as there is absolute non-apprehension (of the same). Those who have understood the true import of words maintain that the words samvid, anubhūti, jñāna, prkāśa and the like are relative terms.[59] Indeed, neither in common speech nor in scripture do we meet with the usage of roots, such as jānāti. without being associated with an agent or an object.

It was maintained that from consciousness its antecedent non-existence cannot be proved, because when what is self-established exists, at the same time its antecedent non-existence cannot exist, being opposed to it. But this contention is superficial. For, there is no rule to the effect that only such objects as exist at the time of consciousness are proved by it; (were it so) the past and the future would become unknowable.

If it is contended that when the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established, it must be contemporaneous with consciousness; (we ask) has it been perceived like this anywhere? If it is so (perceived), as the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is established thereby, the negation of antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) is not proved. The statement that the antecedent non-existence (of anything) is contemporaneous with that thing is a mad man's declaration. Indeed, this quality, namely, that of bringing to light objects that are contemporaneous with itself is the nature of perceptual knowledge arising from the senses. But this is not the nature of all forms of knowledge or of all means of knowledge.

59. A relative term depends for its meaning on its relation to some other name.

एतेन तदपि पराकृतम् ।

मानं स्वयं प्रकाशत्वात् स्वतः सच्चेत् सदास्त्यतः ।
तन्मेयं च सदास्त्येव मानं मेययुगेव हि ॥

इति। न हि मानस्य स्वसत्ताकाले अर्थाविनाभावो मेययोगः। किंतु यद्देशकालादिमत्तया मेयमवभासते तादृशतद्रूपमिथ्यात्वविरोधित्वम्। अत एव स्मृतिर्न बाह्यविषया नष्टेऽप्यर्थे स्मृतिदर्शनात् इत्यपि प्रलापः ।

अथ संवित्प्रागभावादेः अवर्तमानतया न प्रत्यक्षत्वं लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च न प्रमाणान्तरतः सिद्धिरिति, यद्येवमकारणं तर्हि स्वतः सिद्धत्वं प्रागभवाद्यसिद्धेः। प्रमाणाभाव एव हि इदानीं वाच्यः, न च तदभावः शक्योऽभिधातुमित्युक्तमेव । योग्यानुपलब्ध्यैव अभावस्य समर्थितत्वात् ।

For the same reason, the following (contention) also stands condemned. If the means of knowledge is real on its own right, inasmuch as it is self-luminous, it must exist at all times; therefore, its object too must exist at all times; for, the means of knowledge is always associated with the object of knowledge. For, the association of means of knowledge with objects of knowledge does not consist in the invariable relation of the objects of knowledge with the means of knowledge at the time of its existence; but it consists in the negation of the unreality of that particular form of things in which the latter have been apprehended as existing in a certain place, time, etc. That is why the statement that memory has no external object, because even when external objects have perished memory is noticed, becomes a prattle.

It may, however, be said that the antecedent non-existence and the like of consciousness are not ascertained by perception, because it is not something present at the time of perception; and that it cannot be established by other means of knowledge, since there are no signs (linga) and the like. If this were so, the character of being self-established would not prove the absence of antecedent non-existence; indeed, it has now to be maintained that there are no means of proving it. But it has already been said that it is impossible to hold that there are no means of proving it, for non-existence is established by effectual non-perception itself.

SIDDHITRAYA

BY

Yāmunācārya

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अपि च प्रत्यक्षसंवित् स्वसत्ताकाले स्वविषयस्य सद्भावं साधयन्ती यत्तस्य न सर्वदा सत्तां साधयति । तदवसीयते अहमिदानीमेवास्मि नान्यदेति कालविशेषावच्छिन्नैव सा चकास्ति इति । इतरथा घटादेरपि नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गात् । एवमनुमानादिसंविदोऽपि । न च प्रत्यक्षानुमानादिभेदशून्या निर्विषया निराश्रया धीः संभवतीत्युक्तमेव ।

न चान्याविषयत्वात् संविदोऽन्यतस्तत्प्रागभावाद्यसिद्धिः । अज्ञासिषमिति प्राक्तनसंविदोऽद्यतनधिया विषयीक्रियमाणत्वात् । प्रतिकूलानुकूलविषयनियतहानोपादानादिलिङ्गावगम्यत्वाच्च परसंविदः । तदनभ्युपगमे च शब्दार्थग्रहणासंभवेन वैदिकलौकिकसमस्तव्यवहाराभावप्रसङ्गः, गुरूपसर्पणाद्यनुपपत्तिश्च ; ज्ञानवत्त्वेन तस्याप्रतीतेः ।

Moreover, perceptual knowledge establishes the existence of its object at the time of its own existence, and not the existence (of the object) at all times. Hence, it has to be stated that consciousness manifests itself only as being limited by time, taking the form 'I exist only at this moment, not at other times.' Otherwise (if knowledge were not limited by time, its object too, namely) the pot and the like would be eternal. Similarly, inference and other kinds of knowledge (must be limited by time; otherwise, they would reveal their objects also to be eternal). And it has already been said that a pure consciousness, which is devoid of the distinctions of perception and inference, and which is objectless and supportless, cannot exist.

The contention that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved by anything other than consciousness on the ground that consciousness cannot be the object of anything else (p. 35) is indefensible; for (one's own) previous knowledge is made the object of present cognition, as in the judgment 'At one time I knew'. Besides, the consciousness of other persons is inferred from reasons (linga) such as, the invariable rejection and acceptance respectively of disagreeable and agreeable objects. And, if it is not admitted that the consciousness of others is inferred, there would result the impossibility of all scriptural and wordly usage, in as much as it would be impossible to grasp the meanings of words.[60] Further, approaching the guru and the like would be impossible, for there could be no apprehension that he is possessed of knowledge.

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60. The meanings of words may be understood from vyavahāra. Thus, for example, a youngster notices the pupil fetching a cow when his master utters the words 'Fetch the cow,' and immediately concludes that the action of fetching the cow was the result of the pupil grasping the desire of the master when he uttered the words 'fetch the cow.' At that time, he takes the words in one mass

न चान्यविषयत्वे अननुभूतित्वम् । स्वाश्रयस्य स्वसत्तयैव प्रकाशमानत्वं स्वविषयसाधनत्वं वाऽनुभूतित्वम् । ते च संविदन्तरविषयभावेऽपि स्वानुभवसिद्धे न भ्रश्येत इति कथमननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः । घटादेस्तु तथास्वाभाव्याभावादेव अननुभूतित्वम् , नानुभाव्यत्वात् ।

The belief that if consciousness is the object of anything else, it would cease to be consciousness is untenable. The character of being consciousness consists in the quality of manifesting itself solely by means of its own existence to its substrate; or in the quality of being the means of manifesting (by its own existence) its object (to its substrate).[61] These two characteristics (of consciousness, namely, that of manifesting itself and its object to its substrate), which are established by one's own experience, do not fall away even when consciousness becomes the object of another consciousness. How then can it be maintained that consciousness ceases to be consciousness (when it becomes the object of another consciousness) ? Pots and the like, on the other hand, do not possess the quality of being consciousness, simply because they do not possess the aforesaid characteristics and not because they are objects of experience.

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as conveying one complex whole of meaning. Which word in that whole stands for the animal, and which signifies the action is not apprehended there. Later, when the teacher says 'fetch the horse,' a different animal is brought. Again, when he says 'tie up the cow,' a different action follows. By observing varied actions resulting from the different utterances, the youngster understands that the word 'cow' denotes an animal of a certain description, that the word 'horse' an animal of another kind, the word 'bring' denotes the action of bringing, and so on.

61. In commenting upon these definitions, Sudarśanācārya observes that if consciousness is defined as that which manifests itself, this definition would also apply to pots and the like, for, they too manifest themselves. To exclude them, the qualification 'to its own substrate' is added; the pot manifests itself, not to its substrate, the ground on which it stands, but to the knowing person. Again, the further qualification 'solely by means of its own existence' is included in order to exclude certain attributes of the self, such as, atomic size, eternity and so on, which are manifested to their substrate, not by themselves, but by an act of knowledge. The Śrī Bhāṣya would add yet another qualification 'at the present time' with a view to excluding past states of consciousness. Even without this addition, past states of consciousness stand excluded, since every past experience is revealed not by its own existence, but by another act of knowing. But this qualification serves to emphasise the fact that any state of consciousness can manifest itself by its own existence only at the time it exists, and that a past state of consciousness can be apprehended by another state—a fact denied by the opponent. 'At the present time' denotes 'the time when the rela-

अपि च अननुभाव्यत्वेऽपि समानस्तत्प्रसङ्गः गगनकुसुमवत् ।

न चात्मनोऽनुभूतित्वम्, अनुभवितृत्वात् । नाप्यसावननुभाव्यः, अनुभवस्येव स्वतः सिद्ध्यतोऽप्यस्य स्वपरसंवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमात् । वेद्यत्वेऽनात्मत्वापादनं अवेद्यत्वेऽपि समानं पूर्ववत् ।

यदि तु गगनकुसुमस्यासत्त्वमेव अनात्मत्वाननुभूतित्वप्रयोजकमास्थीयेत, आस्थी-

Further, (even on your view) that consciousness does not possess the character of being the object of another consciousness, the same difficulty, namely, that it will cease to be consciousness, does exist as in the case of the sky-flower, (which is not an object of cognition, and which is not a cognition).

The quality of being consciousness cannot be attributed to the self, for it possesses the character of being the seat of consciousness. Nor can it be said that it (the self) is not the object of consciousness; for, though it is self-luminous like consciousness, it is admitted to be capable of being known by oneself and others. The objection that, if the self is knowable, it would cease to be self would, as stated before, equally apply even to the view that it is not knowable.

If it is contended that it is only the non-existence of the sky-flower (rather than the fact that it is not the object of experience) that is responsible for the sky-flower not being soul or consciousness, then let it be

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tion of consciousness to its object exists'. Since a state of consciousness cannot manifest itself, solely by its own sake, to any person other than its own substrate, the words 'to its own substrate' become necessary. This definition is acceptable only to those who maintain the svayamprakāśatva theory; hence, a second, which will be acceptable to all is offered. The qualifications 'to its own substrate,' 'by its own existence' and 'at the present time' have to be supplied in this definition also. 'Means of manifesting' would apply also to the potter's stick, wheels and other instruments; and hence the qualification 'to its own substrate.' The knowledge arising from one sense organ cannot be the means for the manifestation of an object revealed by another sense; visual perception, for example, does not manifest that which is the object of auditory perception. Hence the need for the words 'its own object.' The qualification 'by its own existence' serves to exclude the sense organs, which are instrumental in revealing objects, not by their own being, but in so far as they give rise to knowledge. As in the case of the first definition, here also the expressions 'at the present time' and 'to its own substrate' are intended to exclude respectively past states of consciousness and the experience of others.

यतां तर्हि घटादेरप्यसंविदाश्रयत्वाज्ञानाविरोधित्वयोरेव तत्प्रयोजकत्वम् । अथ ते अपि विषयत्वे स्यातामिति चेत्, अविषयत्वेऽपि तथैवेत्यलमप्रतिष्ठितकुतर्कोपहसनेन ।

यदपि जननविरहादनुभूतेर्विकारनिरसनम्, व्यभिचरति तदपि प्रागभावे । जन्माभावेऽपि तस्य विनाशदर्शनात् । भावविशेषणोपादानेऽपि भवदभिमताविद्ययानैकान्त्यम् । सा ह्यनादिरपि विविधविकारवती विनाशवती च तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात् । अपरमार्थास्तद्विकाराः सन्ति इति चेत्, परमार्थाश्च ते किं विकाराः सन्ति? जन्मवन्तो वा परमार्थाः? येन पारमार्थ्येन विशेषणं साध्यस्य साधनस्य वा अर्थवत्तामश्नुवीत । तथा च सति साधु समर्थितं तर्ककुशलेनेत्यलमनेन ।

held that even in the case of pots and the like, it is only their character of not being the seat of consciousness and of their not being opposed to ignorance[62] that is responsible for their being non-soul and non-consciousness. Should it be contended that if consciousness is the object of consciousness these two qualities (namely, the quality of not being the seat of consciousness and of not being opposed to ignorance) must belong to it, (we reply) that even on the view that consciousness is not the object of consciousness, it would likewise possess those two qualities, (as in the case of the sky-flower). No further need to ridicule these devious and flimsy arguments.

Again, the assertion that as consciousness has no origin, other modifications of it are negatived is fallacious; for, (the implied general proposition, namely, that whatever has no origin has none of the other changes, is falsified by the contradictory instance of antecedent non-existence, because,) although antecedent non-existence has no origin, it is found to have destruction. Even if the qualification 'positive entity' be added, the falsity (of the general proposition as modified viz., All positive entities having origin have none of the other changes) will be proved by the ignorance (avidyā) which is admitted by you. For, this ignorance, even though it has no origin, is subject to manifold changes and terminates through the rise of knowledge. If it is said that its modifications are unreal, (we ask) do you admit changes which are ultimately real, and believe in any entity having an origin and still being ultimately real? It is only if these are admitted, the qualification 'ultimately real' can be fruitfully applied either to the major or to the middle term. If these are admitted, then your case has, indeed, been ably defended by one skilled in logical acumen!

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62. It is not necessary that if external objects, such as pots, exist at all, they ought to be known. Hence, they are not considered to be opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi). Knowledge, however, is opposed to ignorance (ajñānavirodhi), because when it exists it must necessarily shine forth.

यदपि न ह्यजं विभागयस्तीति, तदपि न। अजस्यैवात्मनो देहेन्द्रियादिभ्यो विभागस्य समर्थितत्वात्। अनादित्वेनाभ्युपगतस्याज्ञानस्यात्मनो व्यतिरिक्ततया अवश्याश्रयणीयत्वात्। अपरमार्थस्स विभाग इति चेत्, परमार्थभेदः किं जन्मप्रतिबद्धः क्वचिद् दृष्टः ?। निर्बाधप्रतीतिसिद्धश्च दृग्दृश्यभेदः परमार्थ एवेत्यनन्तरमेवोपपादयिष्यामः।

यदपि नास्या मेयो धर्मोऽप्यस्ति, चेत्यानां न चिद्धर्मत्वमिति च, तदपि शास्त्रानुमानादिप्रमाणसिद्धैः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वनित्यत्वादिधर्मैः स्वयमभ्युपगतैरनैकान्तिकम्। न च ते

The statement that what is unborn cannot possess differentiations is not correct; for, the distinction of the self, which is assuredly unborn, from the body, senses and the like has already been established; and because ignorance, which is admitted to be beginningless, has necessarily to be taken as being distinct from the self.[63] If it is said that this differentiation is phenomenal, (we ask) have you observed anywhere real distinction to be invariably concomitant with origination?[64] It will be shown presently that the distinctions existing between various kinds of knowledge and objects of knowledge, which are established by uncontradicted experience, are ultimately real.[65]

The contention that consciousness does not possess the attributes which are objects of knowledge, and that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities is proved to be fallacious by the qualities of self-luminosity, eternity and the like, which are established, by scriptural testimony, inference and other means of knowledge to exist in consciousness, and which are acknowledged by yourself.[66] It cannot be pointed out that these attributes are in reality

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63. All systems of Indian thought, with the exception of the Cārvāka darśana, accept the distinction of the self from the body, senses and so on; and the opponent admits, in addition, the distinction of the self from avidyā. Hence, he cannot deny vijātīyabheda.

64. In order to prove that consciousness admits of no real distinctions, because it has no origin, the negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti)—whatever has real distinctions must have an origin—must be cited. But as the opponent does not admit real distinctions, he cannot point to any instance of this negative generalisation. Hence, his argument commits the fallacy of vyāpyatvāsiddhi. Moreover, if the distinction of avidyā from the self is not real, it follows that ignorance itself may become the self.

65. The distinction between objects of knowledge necessarily points to the distinction between kinds of knowledge. This shows that sajātīyabheda is real.

66. The admission that consciousness possesses the attributes of self-luminosity, eternity and the like implies that consciousness admits of internal differences (svagatabheda).

चितिमात्रमिति वाच्यम् । तत्सिद्धावपि तेषु विमतिदर्शनात् । अभ्युपगम्यैव हि संविदं तदनुमेयत्वक्षणिकत्वादि प्रतिजानते वादिनः । स्वरूपभेदाच्च । स्वाश्रयं प्रति सत्तयैव कस्यचित्प्रकाशनं हि संवेदनम् । स्वयंप्रकाशता तु सत्तयैवात्मने प्रकाशमानता । प्रकाशश्च चिदचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणो धर्म इति संवित्सिद्धावेव साधितम् । तदनभ्युपगमे तु व्यवहारानुगुण्यवचनः प्रकाशशब्दः । नित्यता तु सर्वकालवर्तमानता । एकसंख्यावच्छेदः एकत्वमिति ।

न च जडत्वकालदेशनानात्वाद्यवच्छेदशून्यतारूपत्वात्तेषां न यथोक्तदोष इति युक्तम् । तथारूपैरपि तैश्चितिधर्मभूतैरनैकान्त्यस्यापरिहार्यत्वात् । संविदि च निषेध्यत्वाभिमतजडत्वानित्यत्वनानात्वादिविरुद्धविविधधर्माभावे निषेधोक्तिरुक्तिमात्रमेव ।

only pure consciousness; for, even though it (consciousness) is admitted to exist, conflicting views with regard to these attributes are noticed. It is only after admitting the existence of consciousness that disputants maintain its inferability, momentariness, and the like. Besides, consciousness and these attributes are in their essential nature distinct. Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence, manifests some object to its own substrate. But self-luminousness consists in shining forth or being manifest solely by means of its own existence to the soul. While determining the nature of consciousness,[67] 'shining forth,' which is implied therein, has been taken to be a quality common to all sentient and insentient things alike. If you were to (confuse this 'shining forth' with prākaṭya and) say that it is not admitted by Vedāntins, (we point out that) the expression 'shining forth' refers to the quality of being fit to be an object of reference. Eternity, again, is the quality of existing at all times. Unity is limitation by the number 'one.'

It is not proper to suggest that as these attributes (self-luminosity, eternity and unity) constitute the negation of non-intelligence, of spatial and temporal limitations and of plurality respectively, the aforesaid difficulties are got over. For, even if they are of this nature, as they will still be the attributes of consciousness, you cannot meet the charge of anaikānta (straying reason). The denial of non-intelligence, non-eternity, plurality and the like would be empty statement signifying nothing, if the several qualities opposed to these were not present in consciousness. Ignorance (avidyā), which

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67. The expression 'samvitsiddhāveva sādhitam' has been interpreted to mean 'while determining the nature of consciousness' and not 'in the book called *Śamvitsiddhi*,' because it is a subsequent work of Yāmunācārya.

चेत्यं चाज्ञानमात्मनि दृष्टमिष्टं च भवताम् ।

अपि च अस्या इति षष्ठ्या अनुभूतेः संबन्धमभिधाय निर्धर्मत्वं प्रतिज्ञायमानं वन्ध्यात्वमिव जनन्या विरुद्धार्थमापद्येत ।

सिद्धिश्चेदभ्युपेयेत संविदः स्यात्सधर्मता ।
न चेत्तुच्छत्वमेवोक्तं भवेच्छशविषाणवत् ॥

ननु सिद्धिरेव सा । कस्य भोः ? । यदि न कस्यचित् , न तर्हि सिद्धिरेव । सा हि पुत्रत्वमिव कस्यचित् कंचित्प्रति । आत्मन इति चेत् , कः षष्ठ्यर्थः ? । तदेवं व्योमारविन्दसदृशवपुषि यथोदितदृशि वेदान्ततात्पर्यवर्णनं वेदान्तायैव स्यात् ।

अपि च नित्यत्वेऽप्यनुभूतेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानुपपत्तिस्तदवस्थैव । सा ह्यनुभवितारं

is knowable, is found in the self; and this is a position admitted by you. (Hence, it cannot be maintained that the attributes which are known do not belong to consciousness as its qualities).

Further, after suggesting the relation of consciousness to something with the aid of the genitive case ending found in the word asyāḥ (occurring in the statement nāsyā meyo dharmaḥ) to assert the attributelessness (of consciousness) will, like the attribution of the quality of being a barren woman to one's mother, convey the opposite meaning. If consciousness is admitted to be manifest, it will follow that it possesses attributes; otherwise, (if it is not admitted to be manifest) it amounts to positing an absolute non-entity like the horns of a hare. If it is said that manifestation itself is consciousness, (we ask) 'Oh, Ye! tell us whose manifestation it is. If the reply is that it is not the manifestation of anything, then, it cannot be manifestation at all, for, manifestation, like the quality of being the son, always refers to some entity and belongs to somebody. If it is said that it (manifestation) belongs to the self, (we ask) what is the meaning of the genitive case ending ?[68] Hence, to maintain that a consciousness, which has been described as above and which has a character similar to that of sky-lotus, is the ultimate end of the Vedānta will only lead to the destruction of the Vedas themselves.[69]

Further, even if consciousness were eternal, the impossibility of recognition would still persist; for, recognition which takes the form—

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68. Pāṇini's Sūtra,—Ṣaṣṭhī śeṣe—declares that the genitive case ending invariably refers to some relation or other. The expression 'soul's manifestation' (ātmanaḥ siddhiḥ) must, therefore, indicate that there is some relation between soul and the quality of manifestation. Hence, it cannot be maintained that the soul is attributeless.

69. There is a pun on the word vedānta.

पूर्वापरकालावस्थायिनमुपस्थापयति, अहमिदमन्वभूवमिति। अनुभूतिस्त्वनुभूतिरेव भवताम्। न तां प्रति सा कर्त्री कर्म वा।

यद्युच्येत परमार्थतस्तथाभूतापि भ्रान्त्या अनुभवितृतया परिस्फुरति रजततयेव शुक्तिः। न हि तथ्यमनवलम्ब्य मिथ्यावभासस्योत्थानमिति। तन्न। तथा सत्यनुभवसमानाधिकरणतया अनुभविता अहमर्थः प्रकाशेत अनुभूतिरहमिति, पुरःस्थितभास्वरद्रव्यशङ्खमुखचन्द्रादेराकरतयेव रजतपीतमुकुरस्थताद्वित्वादि। पृथगवभासमान एव त्वयमनुभवः दण्ड इव देवदत्तमर्थान्तरमहमर्थं विशिंषन्नालक्ष्यते अनुभवाम्य-

'I experienced this at one time'—indicates that there is a conscious subject existing at earlier and subsequent times. But, in your view, consciousness is only consciousness. With regard to itself, consciousness cannot be its own subject and its own object.

Should it be argued that, even though consciousness is ultimately only consciousness, it falsely appears as an experiencing subject, even as the shell appears as silver, and that (this consciousness itself cannot be said to be illusory, for) without a real basis no illusion can arise, this argument is unsound. On this view, the conscious 'I' would shine forth as equivalent to consciousness, taking the form 'consciousness is I,'[70] even as silver, the yellow colour, the quality of being existent in the mirror, duality and the like appear falsely as being the form of the lustrous object presented before us, the conch, the face, the moon and the like. This consciousness which always presents itself as something distinct (from the conscious subject) is marked as taking the form 'I am conscious' and as being the distinguishing attribute of the altogether separate entity known as 'I', just as the stick is found to be the attribute of Devadatta; when the judgment 'Devadatta holds a stick' does not have for its object the stick only, how

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70. When a piece of shell is mistaken for silver, the illusion takes the form 'This is silver,' and not 'shell is silver' for, so long as the specific qualities of an object are known, no illusion with regard to it can arise. Likewise, when conciousness erroneously appears as the 'I', the illusion must take the form 'This is I,' and not 'consciousness is I.' Hence, it may be asked: How can it be asserted that the illusion concerning consciousness would take the form 'consciousness is I'? Our reply is that in the case of shell-silver it is not the shell aspect of the presented object, but some other aspect that causes the illusion. But in the case of consciousness, as the opponent describes it to be attributeless, it cannot be said that some aspect other than that of being consciousness leads to the illusion. Hence, it has to be admitted that even when its specific aspect of being consciousness is known consciousness gives rise to the illusion of 'I' and takes the form 'consciousness is I.' See Śruta Prakāśikā.

हमिति । तदेवमनुभवविशिष्टमस्मदर्थमवभासयन्नयमहंप्रत्ययः कथमिव विशेषणभूतानुभूतिमात्रावलम्बनः प्रतिज्ञायेत, दण्डमात्र इव दण्डी देवदत्त इति प्रत्ययः ।

कुतश्चैष निश्चयोऽध्यस्तं ज्ञातृत्वमिति । स्थूलोऽहमितिवद्देहात्माभिमानवतः प्रतिभासनादिति चेत्, नन्वात्मतयाभिमतानुभूतिरपि तद्वत एवावभातीति सापि तथा स्यात् । तत्त्वज्ञानोदयात्परतोऽपि तदनुवृत्तेर्न तथा सेति चेत्, किं भोः तत्त्वज्ञानात् परमबोद्धैव अयमात्मा ? । हन्तैवं वरमितोऽतत्त्ववेदित्वम् । भ्रान्त्यापि हि तत्र बहु भद्रं पश्यतीति ।

ननु ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानक्रियाकर्तृत्वं विक्रियात्मकं जडमहंकारग्रन्थिस्थम् । तत्फल-

can it be asserted that (in the analogous case) this consciousness of 'I', which reveals the entity called 'I' as owning consciousness, has for its object this consciousness only, which is, in fact, a mere attribute.

How (we ask) did you arrive at the conclusion that the character of being a knower is an illegitimately transferred quality (adhyasta) ? If it is replied that this, like the statement 'I am stout', presents itself only to him who erroneously identifies the self with the body, (and as such, the character of being a knower, like stoutness, is superimposed on the self, we rejoin that) since the consciousness too, which you regard as the self, presents itself only to that person who has that (confusion of the self with the body), this consciousness also must likewise be a superimposition. If it be said that, since it (consciousness) continues even after the dawn of the true knowledge of reality, it cannot be illusory, (we ask) 'Sir, does the self really cease to be a knower after the acquisition of true knowledge ?'[71] Oh ! if that were so, it would be far better not to be the knower of the real than to be the knower of the real ; for, at least in illusion, he would perceive, in that state, many a happy thing.

You may maintain that to be a knower is to be an agent in the act of knowing, to be liable to change,[72] to be non-intelligent, and to reside in the knot of the ahamkāra;[73] and that the self is the enjoyer

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71. Scriptural passages describing the state of release definitely declare that the released soul continues to be a knower. Hence, it cannot be maintained that with the rise of true knowledge the quality of being a knower vanishes.

72. Knowledge is an activity and it has a beginning and an end ; hence, the quality of being an agent in the act of knowing must have a beginning and end, that is, must be subject to change.

73. Ahamkāra is spoken of as a knot (granthi) either because it is the root cause of the tangled mass of illusions or because it binds the jīva closely to the manifold illusions which are, in fact, its own handiwork.

भुक् अकर्ता अविक्रियः साक्षी प्रकाशमात्र आत्मा । कर्तृत्वादिर्हि दृश्यत्वात् रूपादिवन्नात्मधर्मः । कर्तृत्वे ह्यात्मनोऽहंप्रत्ययगोचरत्वेऽपि देहस्येव अनात्मत्वपरार्थत्वजडत्वादिप्रसङ्गो दुर्निवारः । दृष्टं च लौकिकवैदिककर्मसु कर्तृतया प्रसिद्धाद्देहात्तत्क्रियाफलभुजः प्रमातुरहंप्रत्ययिनः पृथक्त्वम् । तथेहापि प्रमातुरहमर्थाद्विलक्षणः साक्षी प्रत्यगात्मेति युक्तम् । नैवं युक्तम् । अहं जानामीति ज्ञातृतया सिद्ध्यतः प्रत्यगात्मनो व्यतिरेकेण साक्षिणो नाम प्रकाशमात्रस्य आत्मनोऽनुपलब्धेः । देहेन्द्रियमनःप्राणविज्ञानेभ्यो ज्ञानाश्रयतया विविच्यमाने प्रतीपमञ्चतीव निर्भासमानोऽहंभाव एव प्रत्यक्त्वं

of the fruits of the knowing process, a non-agent, a changeless entity, the witness (sākṣin)[74] and pure luminosity; and that the character of being an agent and the like cannot be the attributes of the self; for, like colour and other qualities, they are knowable; and that if the quality of being an agent belongs to the self, even though the latter is an object of the consciousness of 'I', it will be impossible to avoid the unwelcome conclusion that the quality of being non-soul, of existing for the sake of others, of being non-intelligent and the like would belong to the self even as they belong to the body; and that the distinction of the knower, who is the object of the consciousness of 'I,' and who enjoys the results of the activity of the body, from the body, which is well known to be the agent in all secular and sacred duties, is noticed; and that similarly here also it is reasonable to admit that the witnessing inward self is distinct from the knower denoted by the term 'I'. This argument (of yours) is illogical, for, apart from the inward self which shines forth as the knower in the judgment 'I know', no other self which is pure luminosity only and which is termed 'witness' is apprehended. The character of inwardness as attributed to the self (pratyaktva) consists precisely in the quality of being 'I' found in that entity which, by virtue of its being the seat of knowledge, is marked off from the body, senses, mind, vital breath and consciousness, and which, contrary to the procedure of outward objects, proceeds, as it were, and shines

74. According to the Advaitins the ultimate reality, Brahman, which is one, undifferenced, eternal and self-luminous consciousness (caitanya), is particularised by the antaḥkaraṇa in two ways. When Brahman is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a qualifying attribute (viśeṣana), it is called the jīva; when it is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a limiting adjunct only (upādhi), it is called the sākṣin. The antaḥkaraṇa is inseparably bound up with jīva, but is separable from the sākṣin. The sākṣin performs the office of manifesting the objects known as well as the knowing subject. Since all diversity takes its roots in ajñāna, the sākṣin which illumines objects of experience and the experiencer, is spoken of as the 'witness of ajñāna.'

नाम। साक्षित्वमपि तस्य साक्षाद् ज्ञातृत्वम्। न ह्यजानन् साक्षीति व्यपदिश्यते। सर्वं च प्रकाशमानं ज्ञात्रेऽहमिति चकासते प्रकाशत इति प्रत्यात्मसिद्धोऽयमनुभवः अहं जानामि मह्यं प्रकाशत इति। न चाव्याकृतपरिणामभेदस्य अहंकारनाम्नो बुद्धिनामधेयस्य वा ज्ञातृत्वम्। देहस्येव अचेतनत्वपरिणामित्वजडत्वपरार्थत्वादिहेतुभिस्तदनुपपत्तेः।

न च चितिच्छायापत्त्या तयोस्तत्संभवः। अचाक्षुषस्य छायादर्शनात्। न च ज्ञातृत्वं चितावपि ते वास्तवमस्ति, येन अग्निसंपर्कादयःपिण्ड इव औष्ण्यं तत्संपर्कादर्थान्तरे ज्ञातृत्वं जायेत ज्ञायेत वा।

for its own sake.[75] The character of being a witness as attributed to the same (self) consists in being a direct knower (an eye-witness). Indeed, one who is not knower is not spoken of as a witness. Since all objects that are manifested reveal themselves to the knower who shines forth as 'I', the experience—'I know', 'It presents itself to me'—is shared by every self. The quality of being a knower cannot belong to that modification of unmanifest prakṛti (avyakta) which goes by the name of egoity (ahamkāra), nor to that known as intellect (buddhi), for, as in the case of the body, the quality of not being an intelligent entity, the character of liability to change, insentience, the quality of existing for the sake of others and other similar reasons make it impossible (for the quality of being a knower to belong to either egoity or intellect).

Nor can it be said that the quality of being a knower may well belong to these (egoity and intellect) on account of the reflection of intelligence; for, what is not open to visual perception is not observed to have reflection. Besides, on your view, the quality of being a knower does not really belong to consciousness. If that is so (if the quality of being a knower really belongs to consciousness), on account of conjunction with that (consciousness) the quality of being the knower may appear in another substance (say in egoity or intellect) or be apprehended therein; even as heat appears in the iron-ball on account of contact with fire.

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75. Outward objects present themselves for the sake of the knowing subject, and not for their own sake. The self, on the contrary, shines for its own sake. Svasmai bhāsamānatvam pratyaktvam. Parasmai bhāsamānatvam parāktvam.

यद्युच्येत ज्ञप्तिमात्रमेव आत्मानमभिव्यञ्जन्नचेतनोऽप्यहङ्कारः स्वाश्रयतया तमभिव्यनक्ति। स्वभावो ह्ययं व्यञ्जकानां यदात्मस्थतयाऽभिव्यङ्ग्यमभिव्यञ्जन्ति, दर्पणजलखण्डमुण्डादय इव मुखमिहिरबिम्बगोत्वादीन्। तत्कृतश्चायं अहं जानामीति भ्रमः। अत एव खलु अहमुल्लेखविगमे सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योः स्वाभाविकविशदानुभवमात्ररूपेणात्मनः प्रकाशः। तत एव च अनात्मत्वमहमर्थस्य। तथा च **सौरेशं** वचः।

आत्मनश्चेदहं धर्मो यायान्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः।
यतो नान्वेति तेनायमन्यदीयो भवेदहम्॥ इति।

तदिदमसंबद्धम्। यतः—

शान्ताङ्गार इवादित्यमहङ्कारो जडात्मकः।
स्वयंज्योतिषमात्मानं व्यनक्तीति न युक्तिमत्॥

आत्मत्वाभिमताजडानुभवाधीना हि सर्वपदार्थाभिव्यक्तयोऽभिप्रेयन्ते। तादृशम-

You may perhaps maintain the following view : "In manifesting the self which is none other than pure consciousness, the egoity (ahamkāra), although of non-intelligent nature, manifests the self as residing within itself ; for it is the nature of manifesing entities to reveal the objects that are being manifested as residing in themselves, just as a mirror, a sheet of water, particular instances of a class (say, the short, the hornless cows) and the like reveal the face, the sun, cowness, etc. as dwelling in themselves respectively. The erroneous view that finds expression in the judgment 'I know' is the result of that (i.e., the ahamkāra being a manifesting entity reveals consciousness as residing within itself ; in other words, ahamkāra appears as the possessor of knowledge. That is why in states of deep sleep and release, there is manifestation of the self in its true nature of pure consciousness only without the revelation of the 'I'. That is also the reason why the quality of being non-soul has to be predicated of the 'I'. Sureśvara's statement runs to the effect—'If the quality of being 'I' belongs to the self, it must persist in states of deep sleep and release ; for the reason that it does not persist, it must be taken to belong to something else'.[76]" This (argument) is incoherent.

To say that the ahamkāra which is essentially insentient manifests the self-luminious soul is as illogical as to assert that a spent coal manifests the sun. In fact, the manifestation of all objects is known to depend on consciousness, which is not insentient, and which you consider to be the soul. The assertion—that the

76. *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi*. Bombay Sanskṛt and Prākrit Series. No. 38. Ch. II Stanza 32. p. 70.

शेषार्थसाधकमुदयास्तमयविपरिवृत्तिशून्यप्रकाशस्वभावं तन्तमनुभवं तदधीनसिद्धिरचिदहंकारोऽभिव्यनक्तीति उपहास्यमिदमात्मविदाम् । किंच ।

व्यङ्क्तृव्यङ्ग्यत्वमन्योन्यं न च स्यात्प्रातिकूल्यतः ।
व्यङ्ग्यत्वेऽननुभूतित्वमात्मनि स्याद्यथा घटे ॥

दिनकरकरव्यङ्ग्यकरतलं तदभिव्यञ्जकं दृष्टमिति मा वोचः । करतलस्य तद्बाहुल्यमात्रहेतुत्वात् । तथाभूताश्च दिनकरमरीचयः स्फुटमुपलभ्यन्त इति न करतलव्यङ्ग्यत्वम् ।

अपि च केयमभिव्यक्तिः, या अनुभूतिरूपस्य आत्मनः अहङ्काररूपेण क्रियते इत्युच्यते ? । न तावत्तत्सिद्धिः । तस्य स्वतः सिद्धत्वेनानन्याधीनसिद्धित्वाभ्युपगमात् ।

non-intelligent ahamkāra, which itself depends for its revelation on consciousness, reveals such a consciousness, which manifests all objects without an exception and which has as its essential nature a luminosity that knows neither birth nor extinction, nor any other modification—will be ridiculed by those who have understood the real nature of the soul.

Further, the relation of being the manifesting and the manifested entity cannot obtain between ahamkāra and consciousness, for they are opposite in nature.[77] If the self is admitted to be capable of being manifested, it would imply that, like the pot, it would cease to be consciousness. Do not say that the surface of the hand, which is itself manifested by the sun's rays, is seen to manifest those rays themselves ; for, the surface of the hand is responsible only for the accumulation of those rays.[78] The sun beams thus accumulated are distinctly perceived ; hence, they are in reality not manifested by the hand at all.

Again, what (we ask) is the nature of this 'manifestation', which is said to be effected by the ahamkāra in respect of the self which is essentially consciousness ? It cannot be said to be the origination of consciousness ; for, inasmuch as it is self-dependent, it must be admitted not to depend for its existence on anything other than itself. Nor can it

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77. Consciousness and ahamkāra have opposite natures. The former has the character of manifesting all objects without an exception ; while the latter, being distinct from consciousness, depends for its manifestation on consciousness. Hence, it is impossible for ahamkāra to manifest consciousness.

78. This analogy is unsound, because, unlike the sun's rays, consciousness is not spread out and cannot be said to be collected by ahamkāra.

नापि तद्विषयज्ञानम्, ज्ञानान्तराननुभाव्यत्वात् । अनुभाव्यत्वे हि घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसङ्गः ।

अत एव न ज्ञानकरणानुग्रहः । स हि वेद्यगतज्ञानोदयप्रतिबन्धकापनयनेन वा दीपेनेव संतमसनिरसनेन चक्षुषः, वेद्यसन्निकर्षोपाधित्वेन वा व्यक्तिदर्पणादिनेव जातिनिजमुखादिबोधकस्य नयनादेः, वेत्तृगतकलङ्कक्षालनेन वा शमदमादिनेव परावरात्मतत्त्वज्ञानोपायस्य आगमादेः । न तावदनुभवगतमहङ्कारापनेयमस्ति किंचित् ज्ञानोदयपरिपन्थि । अज्ञानं तु ज्ञानसमानाश्रयविषयतया न तदुभयभावविरहिणि भवदभिमतसाक्षिणि निक्षेपमर्हति । न खलु ज्ञानप्रसक्तिशून्यो घटादिरज्ञानीत्युच्यते ।

be said to be the illumination concerning consciousness, since it is not capable of being apprehended by another consciousness. Indeed, if it is capable of being experienced (by another consciousness), it would imply that it, like pots, etc., would cease to be consciousness.

For the same reason (i.e., that consciousness is not the object of another consciousness), it (manifestation) cannot be said to be the assistance rendered to the instruments of knowledge (concerning consciousness). This assistance may be (of three kinds)—(*i*) It is either such as results from the removal of those obstacles to the rise of knowledge which reside in the object to be known, like the service rendered to the eye by light through the dispelling of darkness. (*ii*) Or, it is the help arising from being the means of contact between objects known and the sense-organs, like the help rendered by the particular instance, mirror, etc., to the eye and the like, which reveal respectively general qualities, one's own face, etc. (*iii*) Or, it is the help which accrues from the removal of the impurities residing in the knower, like the service rendered by (virtues such as) tranquillity, restraint and so on to the śāstras, which are the means of the true knowledge concerning the infinite and the finite self.

(It cannot be the first kind, for) there is nothing resident in consciousness which impedes the origination of knowledge (of consciousness) and which could be removed by ahamkāra. (You cannot reply that ajñāna dwells in consciousness and is dispelled by ahamkāra, for) inasmuch as ignorance would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge, it is impossible to locate it in the witness which you have admitted, and which is devoid of the two qualities (of being the seat of knowledge and its object). Indeed, pots and the like, which are devoid of the possibility of knowledge, are never spoken of as possessing

तथैव न जातुचित् ज्ञातृत्वं ज्ञानमात्रस्येति न तस्याप्यज्ञानं भवेत्। भवदपि तदहङ्कारापनेयं नेष्यते। ज्ञानैकनिवर्त्यत्वादज्ञानस्य, तथाभ्युपगमाच्च। ज्ञानं च स्वविषय एव अज्ञानं निवर्तयति। न च तद्विषयत्वमात्मतयाभिमतस्यानुभवस्येष्यत इति तत्रत्यमज्ञानं न केनचित्कदाचिदुच्छिद्येत। ज्ञानप्रागभावरूपं चाज्ञानं न ज्ञानोत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धकमिति शक्यं व्यपदेष्टुम्। भावरूपमज्ञानमनिर्वचनीयं जगदुपादानमित्यादि प्रलापमात्रमिति संबन्धनिरूपणे प्रतिपादयिष्यते। अतो न वेद्यदोषापनयनरूपाहङ्कारेणानुभवाभिव्यक्तिः।

ignorance. Similarly, for the reason that the quality of being the knower never belongs to pure consciousness, it can never possess ignorance. Even if it is so (i.e., even if consciousness possesses ignorance), it is not admitted that ignorance is removable by ahamkāra, since ignorance can be put an end to only by knowledge, and since it has been so admitted. Besides, knowledge terminates the ignorance which concerns its own object only.[79] As the quality of being the object of knowledge has not been attributed to consciousness which is regarded as the self, the ignorance residing therein can never be destroyed by anyone at any time. (The ignorance which you speak of as existing in consciousness may be either defined as the antecedent non-existence of knowledge or considered as the indefinable). Ignorance, which is of the nature of the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the rise of knowledge.[80] That the following statements—Ignorance is positive in nature; (it is) indefinable; (it is) the material cause of the world; and so on—are merely incoherent prattle will be shown in the section dealing with the relation (of the finite soul to the infinite self). Hence, it cannot be said that the manifestation of consciousness is effected by the ahamkāra whose essential nature is the removal of defects in the objects known.

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79. When knowledge arises it dispels only that ignorance which centres round the object known. For example, when the shell is known as shell, this apprehension terminates the illusory cognition of that object which existed till then. If knowledge is said to put an end to all ignorance, it would have to be admitted that knowledge of the true nature of the shell dispels every form of illusion. See *Śruta Prakāsikā*.

80. The antecedent non-existence of an object cannot be regarded as an obstacle to the origination of that object.

करणानामभूमित्वान्न तत्संबन्धहेतुता ।
अहमर्थस्य बोद्धृत्वान्न स तेनैव शोध्यते ॥

न च स्वाश्रयतया अभिव्यङ्ग्यप्रकाशनमभिव्यञ्जयितुः स्वभावः, प्रदीपादावदर्शनात् । यथावस्थितवस्तुप्रकाशानुकूलस्वभावत्वाच्च ज्ञानतत्साधनतदनुग्राहकाणाम् । तच्च स्वतःप्रामाण्यन्यायात् । तदनभ्युपगमे च सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गात् ।

व्यक्तेस्तु जातिराकार एवेति तथाप्रत्यायनम् । न व्यञ्जकत्वप्रयुक्तम्,

(It cannot be the second, for) as consciousness is beyond the reach of the senses (the assistance rendered to the means of knowledge by ahamkāra) cannot consist in being responsible for the contact (of the objects known with the senses). (Nor can it be the third, for) as the entity known as 'I' is (in your view) the knower, it cannot be cleansed of its impurities by itself.

Nor can it be said that it is the nature of the manifesting entity to reveal the manifested objects as residing within itself; because such a nature is not observed in the lamp and the like (which manifest things without exhibiting them as residing in themselves); and because, knowledge, the means thereof and whatever is auxiliary to them have the nature of promoting the manifestation of things as they really are. That knowledge, the means thereof, and whatever is auxiliary to them have the aforesaid nature follows from the doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge (svataḥprāmāṇya)[81]; and if this is not admitted, there would ensue lack of certainty in anything.

(With regard to the analogy of the particular instance, vyakti, cited by you), such a manifestation (of the universal as residing in the particular instances) is due to the fact that the universal is only the character met with in the instances, and not the fact of those instances being the manifesting entities, as it has already been shown (that the case of

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81. On the question of the validity and invalidity of knowledge four views have been held. According to the Sāṅkhyas the validity and invalidity of knowledge are both inherent in it. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika takes the opposite position and contends that both the validity and invalidity of knowledge depend on external factors. On this view, knowledge, in itself, is neither true nor false; it is rendered valid or invalid by outside factors. The Buddhists take invalidity to be intrinsic to knowledge, and validity extrinsic. The Mīmāmsakas and Vedāntins, while admitting the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika view in regard to invalidity of knowledge, maintain that validity is inherent in knowledge.

उक्तादेव व्यभिचारात् । दर्पणादिस्तु नायनमहःप्रतिफलनलक्षणदोषहेतुर्नाभिव्यञ्जको वदनादेः । व्यञ्जकस्त्वालोकादिरेव । व्यञ्जकत्वेऽपि प्रतीपगमनदोषप्रयुक्तस्तत्रान्यथावभासः । न चेह तथाहमर्थस्य तादृशदोषापादकत्वं स्वभावः । तथासति सर्वस्यापि प्रत्यक्षादेरप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गात् न किंचित्तथ्यं स्यात् । तस्मात् ज्ञातृतया सिद्धयन्नहमर्थ एव प्रत्यगात्मा न ज्ञप्तिमात्रम् ।

यत्तु सुषुप्तिमुक्त्योर्ज्ञप्तिमात्रतया स्फुरणम्, अहमिति तु न प्रतिभातीति । तत्र सुषुप्तौ तथावस्थितिः पुरस्तादेव निरस्ता । अहमित्येकरूपेण आ प्रबोधात्तत्राप्यात्मनः

the lamp flame) falsifies the view (that all manifesting entities reveal objects as taking their abode in themselves). (As for the analogy of the mirror, etc.) mirror and similar objects are only responsible for the mistake, namely, the reflecting of the ocular rays, and are not manifesting agents of faces and other objects.[82] The real manifesting agents, however, are only light and the like. Although light is the real manifesting agent the false impression (of the face appearing within the mirror) is the outcome of the mistake of the deflection (of the ocular rays). But here, the capacity to produce a similar mistake (in the self-luminous consciousness) does not belong to the entity known as 'I'. If it is so, (i.e. if that capacity belonged to the 'I'), then perception and other forms of knowledge would lose their validity; and hence, nothing would be true. Therefore, what constitutes the inward self is not pure consciousness, but the entity 'I,' which reveals itself as a knower.

As regards your contention that in deep sleep and release the self manifests itself only as mere consciousness and does not appear as 'I', the belief that in deep sleep such a condition of consciousness (i.e., consciousness shining forth without an object or a substrate) prevails has already been refuted. Since even in deep sleep the self does present itself up to the time of waking only in the form of the 'I', (the manifestation of the 'I' cannot be said to be absent in that state).[83] If

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82. The general proposition 'all manifesting entities reveal their objects as residing within themselves' was sought to be established on the strength of instances such as mirror, etc. In refuting this view, it was first pointed out that there are instances against this generalisation. Now it is shown that even the instances cited by the opponent do not prove his case. The mirror for example, is responsible only for reflecting the ocular rays, and not for manifesting the face. The real manifesting agents are light and the like.

83. Ekarūpeṇa also suggests that the presentation of the self as 'I' is common to everybody.

स्फुरणात् । यदि परं परागर्थाननुभवात् तमोगुणाभिभवाच्च न विविच्य स्फुटं चकास्ति भवदभिमतानुभूतिरपि तदानीं तथैव हि प्रथत इति वाच्यम् । 'नाहमहम्, नाप्यर्थान्तरम्, अपि तुअनुभूतिमात्रमज्ञानसाक्षितयाऽवतिष्ठत' इत्येवंविधं स्वापसमयभवमनुभवं न हिसुप्तोत्थितः कश्चित् परामृशन्नुपलब्धचरः ।

एतावन्तं कालं न किंचिदहमवेदिषमितिपरामर्शनादेव तथात्वं लभ्यत इति चेत्, कथमिव ? । न किंचिदिति निर्देशादिति चेत्, नन्वेवमनुभूतिप्रतिभासोऽपि प्रत्याख्यातः स्यात् । अपि च सुषुप्तिसमयसिद्धमात्मानमहमिति परामृश्य न किंचदवेदिषमिति तस्य वेदने प्रतिषिध्यमाने तात्कालिकीं वित्तिसिद्धिं अहमर्थस्य चासिद्धिमभिदधानोऽनुभवविरोधमपि न जानाति देवानांप्रियः । निर्विषया निराश्रया च वित्तिर्नास्तीत्युक्तमेव ।

it is said that on account of the absence of consciousness of external objects, and prevalence of darkness (tamas) in deep sleep, the 'I' does not present itself clearly and distinctly, (we reply that) it must be admitted that even the consciousness assumed by you does not, likewise, present itself clearly and distinctly in that state. No one who has risen from deep sleep is found to recall the experience which occurred to him during sleep, namely, 'I am not I (ahamkāra); nor am I anything else (the knower or the known); but I am only pure consciousness and I stand as the witness of ignorance.'

If you were to say that from the reflection 'For so long a time I knew nothing at all' such a position (namely, that in deep sleep there is presentation of pure consciousness only) is made out, (we ask) how (is it made out)? (If your reply is that) this follows from the expression 'nothing at all' (occurring in the aforesaid reflection, we rejoin) in that case, the manifestation of consciousness also would have to be denied. While in the judgment, 'I knew nothing at all,' the word 'I' denotes clearly the self which is manifested in deep sleep and the words 'knew nothing at all' negative (all) knowledge on the part of that 'I', the fool who maintains (that the self-same judgment establishes) that in deep sleep there is manifestation of pure consciousness along with the absence of the presentation of 'I' does not know its contradiction to experience. It has already been said that there can be no knowledge without an object and without a substrate.

ननु मामप्यहं न ज्ञातवान् प्रसुप्त इत्यस्ति हि प्रबोधे प्रत्ययः । सत्यम् । स तु वर्णाश्रमादिविशिष्टतया प्रबोधसमयसंवेद्यमानं देहिनं मामित्यादाय स्वाप्ययावस्थाप्रसिद्धाविशदस्वानुभवैकतानाहमर्थस्य तेन रूपेणाज्ञातत्वं प्रज्ञापयति । न पुनर्ज्ञस्वभावस्य अहमर्थस्यापि । एवमिव खल्वयमनुभवः, “ अत्र सुप्तोऽहमीदृशश्चेति एवं मामपि न ज्ञातवानहम् ” इति ।

अपि च आत्मा सुषुप्तावज्ञानसाक्षित्वेनास्ते इति हि यौष्माकी स्थितिः । साक्षित्वं च साक्षात् ज्ञातृत्वमित्युक्तम् । स चायं जानामीति प्रतिभासमानोऽस्मदर्थ एवेति कथमिव तदानीमहमर्थो न प्रथेत । स्वस्मै स्वयंप्रकाशमानोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशत इति ।

यत्तु मुक्तावहमर्थो नानुवर्तत इति । तद् वार्तम् ; यतस्तथा सति वैनाशिकदर्शन इव आत्मनाश एवापवर्गः प्रकारान्तरेण प्रतिज्ञातः स्यात् । नो खल्वहमिति धर्ममात्रम् ,

You may ask: Do we not, on waking, get the knowledge 'I, who slept, was not even conscious of my self'? (Does it not indicate that in sleep there is absence of the manifestation of 'I'?). True, (we reply); that knowledge (namely, the reflection 'I was not even conscious of myself') after indicating by the word 'myself' the self, which, in the waking state, is understood as being characterised by caste, stage in life, etc., shows that the 'I', which shines forth in sleep, which is not clearly experienced, and which manifests itself for its own sake, is not known in such a manner (i.e. as characterised by caste, stage in life, etc.); but it does not show that the 'I' whose essential nature is to be the knower, is itself not apprehended. Indeed, our reflection is to the effect: 'I did not even know myself as having slept in a particular place and as possessing certain characteristics.'

Moreover, your position indeed is this, namely, that in deep sleep the self exists as the witness of ignorance. And it has already been said that to be a witness is to be a direct knower. This witness too is nothing but the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then, could this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which illumines itself for its own sake appears only as the 'I'; hence, it follows that the self, which shines forth even in sleep and other similar states, appears only as the 'I'.

To maintain that the 'I' does not persist in the state of liberation is unsound; for, it amounts to asserting, as is done in Buddhism, in a somewhat different way, that release consists only in the annihilation of the self. The 'I' is not a mere attribute of the self; if it were an

येन तदपगमेऽप्यविद्यानिवृत्त्यामिवात्मनः स्वरूपेणावतिष्ठत इत्युच्यते। अहमित्येव हि तस्य स्वरूपम्। ज्ञानमपि हि तद्धर्मत्वेन तस्यैव प्रकाशते, ज्ञानं मे जातमिति। का कथा पुनरर्थान्तरस्यात्मत्वे।

अन्यच्च यः सांसारिकदुःखैर्दुःखित्वेनात्मानं तत्त्वतो भ्रान्त्या वा प्रत्येति दुःख्यहमिति, स सर्वमिदमनिष्टजातं कथमहमपुनरुदयमपनुद्य अव्याकुलं स्वस्थो भूयासमिति संजातमुमुक्षः तत्साधने प्रवर्तते। स यदि साधनानुष्ठानादहमेव न भविष्यामीत्यवगच्छति, अपगच्छेदसौ मोक्षकथाप्रसङ्गादपि। ततश्चासंभवदधिकारितया सर्व एव वेदान्तविषयः सर्वाणि च मोक्षशास्त्राणि प्रामाण्यादेव प्रच्यवेरन्। अहमुपलक्षितः प्रकाशोऽपवर्गेऽवस्थास्यत इति चेत्, किमतः?। न हि मयि नष्टेऽपि कोऽपि प्रकाशः स्थास्यतीति

attribute, it may be said that even after its destruction the self exists in its true being, as it persists on the dissolution of ignorance. In fact, the true being of the self is nothing but the 'I'; and knowledge appears to the self as an attribute of the latter, as is evident from the judgment 'knowledge has arisen in me'. (It has been shown that even granting your position that the self exists as a witness of ignorance in deep sleep, it does not follow that the 'I' disappears in that state.) There is no need to argue the point, when something other than the witnessing consciousness (sākṣicaitanya) is the self.

Moreover, he who considers himself to be afflicted by the miseries of worldly existence, whether in truth or in error, and thinks 'I am suffering pain', and in whom the desire for release has arisen, making him reflect: 'How may I become tranquil and blissful, setting aside this entire collection of miseries?', he alone enters upon the means for realisation. If (on the other hand) he were to realise 'I should be no more if I practised the means (for the attainment of release)', he would run away at the very mention of the topic of release. As a consequence of this, since there can be none possessing the requisite qualifications (to enter upon the study of the scriptures), the entire upaniṣadic texts and all the śāstras relating to liberation would lose their validity.[84]

If you were to say that mere luminosity which is indicated by the word 'I' would persist in the state of release, (we ask) 'Of what use is it?' For, no sensible person would exert himself under the influence

84. The validity of scriptures consists in their generating true knowledge in the mind of the aspirant. If there were no qualified pupils to study them, they would lose their validity.

कश्चित्प्रेक्षावान् प्रयस्यति ।

एतेन तदपि परास्तम्—अस्मत्प्रत्यये योऽनिदमंशश्चिदेकरसः प्रकाशः स आत्मा । तस्मिंस्तद्बलनिर्भासिततया लक्षणतो युष्मदर्थ एव अहं जानामीति सिद्ध्यन्नर्थ इति । प्रत्यक्षविरोधात् । अहं जानामीति सिद्ध्यंश्चेतनो युष्मदर्थ इति माता वन्ध्येतिवद्व्याहतार्थं वचः । न चासावन्याधीनावभासः । चैतन्यस्वभावतया स्वयंज्योतिष्ट्वात् ।

of the idea 'Though I shall perish, there will remain some luminosity.'[85]

For the same reason, even the contention—that in self-consciousness (which expresses itself in the judgment 'I know') that element which is not referred to by the word 'this' (i.e. the non-objective element, pratyagartha), which has consciousness for its sole essence, and which is luminosity, is the self; and that in the same self-consciousness what has to be considered as objective element (yuṣmadartha, parāgartha), for the reason that it depends for its manifestation on consciousness, is the 'I' referred to in the judgment 'I know'—stands condemned.[86] It is also contradicted by direct perception, (for the judgment 'I know' implies that knowledge is an attribute and that the 'I' is its possessor, and that knowledge is an objective element (parāk), while the 'I' is a non-objective element, pratyak).

The statement that the intelligent entity referred to in the judgment 'I know' is an objective element (parāk) is as self-contradictory in its meaning as the assertion 'My mother is a barren woman'. Nor can it be said that this intelligent entity depends on something else for its manifestation (and is hence parāk, i.e., non-soul), for, being of the nature of consciousness, it is self-luminous.

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85. Cf. Srī Bhāṣya.

Nirastākhiladuḥkhoham anantānandabhāk svarāt |
Bhaveyamiti mokṣārthī śrvaṇādau pravartate ||
Ahamarthavināśaścet mokṣa ityadhyavaṣyati |
Apasarpedasau mokṣakathāprastāvagandhataḥ ||
Mayi naṣṭepi mattonyā kācit jñaptiravasthitā |
Iti tatprāptaye yatnaḥ kasyāpi na bhaviṣyati ||

86. Two arguments of the opponent are here referred to. The first seeks to prove that consciousness is the soul, for the reason that it is a non-objective element; that it is non-objective is inferable from its being self-luminous; its self-luminous nature follows from its being consciousness. The second tries to establish that the entity 'I' is not the self, because it is an objective element. That the 'I' is an objective element is shown by its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation. Its dependence on consciousness for its manifestation is inferred from its being distinct from consciousness.

प्रकाशश्च प्रकाशत्वादेव कस्यचित् भवेत् दीपादिप्रकाशवदिति नात्मा भवितुमर्हति। अतो ज्ञातृतया अहमिति सिद्ध्यन्नर्थ एव आत्मा।

स च मुक्तावप्यात्मनेऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते। स्वस्मै प्रकाशमानत्वात्। यो यः स्वस्मै प्रकाशते स सर्वोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशमानो दृष्टः। यथा तथाप्रकाशमानत्वेनोभयवादिसंमतः संसार्यात्मा। यः पुनरहमिति न चकास्ति नासौ स्वस्मै प्रकाशते, यथा घटादिः। प्रकाशते चायं मुक्तात्मा। तस्मात्सोऽहमित्येव प्रकाशते।

न चैवं प्रकाशमानत्वे मुक्तस्याज्ञानित्वसंसारित्वादिप्रसङ्गः आपादनीयः। मुक्तत्वविरोधात् अतदुपाधित्वाच्च तत्प्रत्ययस्य। न ह्यज्ञानोपाधिरहंप्रत्ययः।

Since luminosity, by the very fact of its being luminosity, must necessarily pertain to something or other, as in the case of the luminosity of the pot, etc., mere luminosity cannot be the soul. Therefore, that entity alone which shines forth as the knower and termed 'I' is the self.

This self, even in the state of release, shines to itself only as the 'I', for it shines for its own sake. (There is the general principle that) whatever shines for its own sake is found to shine only as the 'I'; for example, the self which is subject to the round of births and deaths is admitted by both the contending parties to shine in such a manner. Whatever does not appear as 'I' does not shine for its own sake; as pots and the like. The released soul does appear for its own sake. Therefore, it appears as the 'I' and in no other way.

It cannot be said that if the released self appears in such a manner (i.e., as the 'I') it would imply that it is involved in ignorance and samsāra; for, this would contradict the nature of being a released soul; and moreover, the consciousness of 'I' does not have for its cause the quality of being subject to ignorance and samsāra. Since even persons

ब्रह्मात्मापरोक्षज्ञानक्षपितनिरवशेषाविद्यानामपि वामदेवादीनां तत्प्रत्ययदर्शनात् । श्रूयते हि "तद्धैतत्पश्यन्नृषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदे अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्च अहमेव च वर्तामि भविष्यामि" इत्यादि ॥ तथा कथंचिदप्यविद्यादिक्लेशैर्लेशतोऽपि जातुचिदपरामृष्टस्य परमपुरुषस्याहमित्यात्मपरामर्शः प्रज्ञायते, 'हन्ताहमिमास्तिस्रो देवताः, बहु स्यां प्रजायेय, स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा' इति । तथा

यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥
तेषामहं समुद्धर्त्ता, अहं बीजप्रदः पिता ।
वेदाहं समतीतानि ॥

इत्यादिभिः ।

like Vāmadeva, who have had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety by means of the direct realisation of Brahman as the self of all, are found to have the consciousness of 'I', the latter cannot, in fact, have ignorance for its cause. The scriptures say—'Seeing this, the sage Vāmadeva understood : *I* was Manu and the Sun.'[87] '*I* alone exist and shall exist.'[88] From the following passages and others like them it is clear that a similar reference to Himself as 'I' is noticed even in the case of the Highest Person, who is not afflicted even in the least by ignorance and other evils in any manner and at any time. (The following scriptural passages are found) 'Let *me* enter these three divinities (i.e., fire, water and food)';[89] 'May *I* become manifested and be born';[90] 'He thought : "May *I* create the worlds"'[91] (It is said in the Gītā) 'Since *I* transcend the destructible (kṣara) and am also superior even to the Indestructible (akṣara), therefore, *I* am proclaimed in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person'; [92] '*I* am he who lifts them . . .'; [93] '*I* am the giver of the seed, the father'; [94] '*I* know the things past'; [95] and so on.

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87. *Bṛh. Up.* I. iv. 10.
88. *Atha. Up.* I. i.
89. *Chānd. Up.* VI. iii. 2.
90. *Chānd. Up.* VI. ii. 3.
91. *Ait. Up.* I. i.
92. *Bh. Gītā.* XV. 18.
93. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 7.
94. *Bh. Gītā.* XIV. 4.
95. *Bh. Gītā.* XII. 26.

एवं च साक्षादहमर्थादात्मनो विलक्षणेऽपि देहे येनाव्यक्तिकपरिणामभेदेनाहमिति भ्रमः तदभिप्रायोऽहंकारस्य क्षेत्रान्तर्भावोपदेशः भगवतः 'महाभूतान्यहङ्कारः' इति। बहुमन्तव्यजनावधीरणहेतुश्चासौ गर्वापरपर्यायस्तत्र तत्र शास्त्रेषु प्रायशो हेयतयोपदिश्यते। तस्मादहमिति मतिर्बाधकापेता साक्षादात्मगोचरैव। आनात्मनि तु शरीरे भवन्ती अविद्येति युक्तम्। उक्तं च—

'श्रूयतां चाप्यविद्यायाः स्वरूपं कुलनन्दन।
अनात्मन्यात्मबुद्धिर्या'—इति

महर्षिणा वसिष्ठनन्दनेन ॥ न च ज्ञप्तिमात्रप्रतिभासः कस्यचिच्छरीरेऽस्ति, येन तन्मात्रात्मवादिनोऽप्यनात्मबुद्धिरुपपद्येत।

(It may be asked) 'If the 'I' really constituted the self, how could the Highest Lord have included ahamkāra among the elements that go to make up the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra), and how could he have classed it among the evils to be rejected ? [96] (Our reply is) the teaching of the Highest Lord found in the verse (of the Gītā XV. 5) commencing with the words 'The great elements, the ahamkāra . . . ', to the effect that ahamkāra is to be included among the objects that constitute the material embodiment of the self (kṣetra) really refers only to that modification of the unmanifest prakṛti by whose instrumentality the body, which is distinct from the real self denoted by the word 'I', is erroneously taken to be 'I'. And this ahamkāra, which is responsible for our slighting persons who are worthy of respect, and which is termed conceit, is often referred to by śāstras as meriting rejection. Therefore, it is proper to conclude that the consciousness of 'I,' which has nothing to contradict it, has really the self for its object; and that, on the other hand, the consciousness of 'I' which arises in regard to the body that is not the soul, is ignorance. (In agreement with this) it has been said by (Parāśara) the grandson of Vasiṣṭha: 'O thou! the giver of delight to thy family! Hear from me the essential nature of ignorance; it is the consideration of the not-self as the self.' [97] (Our position squares well with Parāśara's definition of ignorance; but yours does not; for,) the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness occurs to no one. Even to you, who maintain that pure consciousness alone is the self, the consideration of the non-soul as the self will be possible, if there is the illusory apprehension of the body as pure consciousness. As is proved by perception

96. *Bh. Gītā.* XVI. 18.

97. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa.* VI. vii. 10.

अतः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धत्वादुक्तन्यायागमान्वयात् ।
अविद्यायोगतश्चात्मा ज्ञाताऽहमिति भासते ॥

यदुक्तम् अजडत्वाद्वित्तिरेवात्मेति ; तत्रेदं वाच्यम्–किमिदमजडत्वं नामेति । यद्युच्येत सदपि यत् न प्रकाशते तज्जडं तद्विपरीतमव्याभिचरितप्रकाशसत्ताकमजडम् इति ; तथासति सुखादिभिर्व्यभिचारी हेतुः । न खलु सुखदुःखेच्छादयो विद्यमाना अपि कदाचिदनवभासमाना भवन्ति । स्वसत्ताप्रयुक्तप्रकाशत्वमपि दीपादिभिरनैकान्तिकम् । ज्ञानव्यतिरिक्तप्रकाशानङ्गीकाराच्चासिद्धता विरुद्धता च । यदि मतम् अव्यभिचरितप्रकाशोऽपि सुखादिरन्यस्मै प्रकाशत इति घट इव जडतां नातिवर्तते तेना-

(the judgment 'I know' establishes knowledge to be an attribute and the 'I' to be its possessor), and as it results from the application of the aforesaid reasons (such as, if pure consciousness alone persisted and the 'I' disappeared in the state of release, no one would strive for realisation), and as scriptural texts (declare that even released souls refer to themselves as 'I'), and as there is the possibility of ignorance (only on our position), it follows that the self which is the knower presents itself as the 'I'.

With regard to (your) assertion that consciousness itself is the self, because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent, it has to be pointed out (that you must explain) what you understand by 'not non-intelligence'. If it is replied that a non-intelligent entity is that which may (at times) fail to manifest itself, even though it be existent, and that an intelligent entity is that which has an opposite nature, namely, an existence invariably associated with manifestation (we point out that) since pleasure and the like are not considered to be soul even though they are not non-intelligent, your reason is fallacious. Indeed, when pleasure, pain, desire and the like exist at all they never fail to present themselves. (If an intelligent entity is defined as) that which depends for its manifestation on its own existence, (we point out that) since the lamp and the like are not taken to be the soul even though they depend for their manifestation on their own existence, your reason is fallacious. Besides, as a manifestation different from consciousness is not admitted (by you) your hetu (reason, namely, intelligence occurring in the argument that consciousness itself is the soul, because it is intelligent) becomes unestablished (i.e. commits the fallacy of svarūpāsiddha); it also contradicts your theory (that consciousness is attributeless). If it is your view that pleasure and the like, although invariably associated with manifestation, are bound to be non-intelligent, for the reason that, like the pot, they manifest themselves for the sake of others, and are in consequence, to be considered as not-soul, (we ask